343 U.S. 579 (1952), argued 12–13 May 1952, decided 2 June 1952 by vote of 6 to 3; black for the Court, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, and Clark concurring, Vinson, Reed, and Minton in dissent. This decision rejected the argument that President Harry S. Truman had inherent constitutional authority to issue an executive order seizing private steel mills in 1952.

Apprehensive that an impending strike by steelworkers would harm the country's participation in the United Nations' police action in Korea, President Truman issued an executive order instructing Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate the nation's steel mills. Secretary Sawyer directed the companies' presidents to operate the facilities in compliance with government regulations. The president immediately gave Congress formal notice of his action, but Congress took no action. Although the seizure lacked statutory authority, Truman took the view that his action was valid under the powers invested in him as president and commander in chief. He relied upon the many historical precedents of executive seizure without the consent of Congress.

The steel industry argued that the purpose of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft‐Hartley Act) was to allow the parties to arrive at a settlement and to permit Congress to become involved if collective bargaining was unsuccessful. The fact that Congress had specifically rejected a seizure provision during the debate of this act could only be interpreted as a prohibition against executive seizure.

The opinions of the justices reflected the two polar interpretations of the first clause of Article II of the Constitution: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.”

Justice Hugo Black, writing for the Court, held that inasmuch as Congress could have directed the seizure of the steel mills, the president had no power to do so without an express prior congressional authorization. Black insisted that each of the popular branches must be left to carry out its duties according to the original constitutional understanding. The power exercised by Truman was clearly a law‐making task that properly belonged only to Congress.

Concurring, Justice Felix Frankfurter suggested that long‐standing executive practices, with the silent acquiescence of Congress, might provide an additional gloss on the executive powers. Justice William O. Douglas concurred, observing that Congress has the power to pay compensation and is the only branch able to authorize a lawful seizure.

Justice Robert Jackson also concurred and distinguished constitutional situations in which presidential powers fluctuate: strongest with a congressional authorization, weakest against a congressional prohibition, and uncertain alongside a congressional silence. Jackson concluded that the president acted unconstitutionally because Congress had refused to authorize the seizure.

Justice Harold Burton concurred because Congress had prescribed specific procedures exclusive of seizure. Justice Tom Clark, who as attorney general had earlier advised Truman, concurred because the president's authority to act in times of national emergency was subject to the limitations expressly prescribed by Congress.

Chief Justice Fred Vinson dissented, joined by Justices Stanley Reed and Sherman Minton, and surveyed the elements of the emergency: the Korean military involvement, the importance of steel as a war material, and the impasse in the labor negotiation. Presidential emergency action had been allowed in the past, and the dissent concluded that the president acted constitutionally.

This decision, especially Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, has provided an important precedent for resisting subsequent claims of presidential inherent authority in areas such as impoundment, executive privilege, electronic surveillance, national security, and the “war on terror”. The holding has come to be generally understood as an interpretive effort to restrain the executive branch within a proper separation of power.

See also Inherent Powers; Labor; Presidential Emergency Powers; Separation of Powers; War Powers.

Bibliography

• Maeva Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case—the Limits of Presidential Power, rev. ed. (1994).
• William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court, rev. ed. (2001).
• Alan F. Westin, The Anatomy of A Constitutional Law Case, rev. ed. (1990)

— Thomas E. Baker

The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States. Copyright © 1992, 2005 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.