The failed Peninsula Campaign in July 1862 was frustrating for Lincoln. One result of this was Lincoln's appointment of General Halleck as general in chief. Halleck was thus appointed at this time to handle General George B. McClellan's problems.
Because his Peninsula campaign had failed, and some of Lincoln's cabinet thought he might even be a Confederate spy.
By late June of 1862, Major General George B. McClellan believed his Peninsula campaign had already failed. He blamed this problem on the Lincoln administration, and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in particular. He stated that his force was not as large as he had asked for, and accused the administration of deliberately sacrificing the Army of the Potomac due to politics.
Union General George Meade still believed that a "peninsula campaign" was the best way to assault Richmond. Meade did not press his ideas because of the 1862 failed Peninsula campaign of General George B. McClellan.
History places the blame for the failed Union Peninsula campaign on the shoulders of General George B. McClellan, and is correct in doing so. However, there was plenty of blame to spread around. President Lincoln was overly cautious in keeping so many soldiers to protect Washington DC. It already had a superior set of fortification. And, with the withdrawal of Confederate forces towards protecting Richmond there was no danger for an assault on Washington DC. In fact, by not reinforcing McClellan, he allowed the Confederate army of Joseph Johnston to have an interior lines position. His army lay between Washington DC and McClellan's troops.
President Lincoln made several battleground visits to speak to his generals after major campaigns. The widespread publicity given to the failed Peninsula campaign gave Lincoln the opportunity to speak directly with General McClellan in Virginia. Lincoln arrived at Harrison's Landing on July 8, 1862. Lincoln, for a president, had traveled a long way to meet with McClellan and urge him to go back on the offensive. McClellan is not responsive to that and gives Lincoln his own ideas on how the war should be conducted from now on. He has plans and they call for having McClellan to regain control of the Union's military operations.
US President Lincoln made it clear that he did not favor the Peninsula campaign proposed bt General George B. McClellan. Lincoln's plan was vastly different and involved a more or less direct attack by the Army of the Potomac based in Washington DC. Here are a number of concerns that Lincoln expressed early in 1862:* Lincoln believed that his plan would cost less time and money. It is estimated that it cost the Union $600,000 per day to keep an army of 200,000 soldiers in the field at that time. Clearly Lincoln was concerned not only with the costs but also the more time a campaign took to accomplish its mission, the more time for things to go wrong;* Lincoln believed that his direct assault on Richmond had a better chance of destroying the Rebel capital. Thus, destroying one of the South's centers of gravity;* Lincoln believed that his direct assault on Richmond, which would disable the rail head at Manasass, along with other lines of communication that could be cut on the way to Richmond. And, even more once Richmond was captured. Richmond of course being the Confederate capital and home to industry, would devastate Southern morale if it fell; and* Lincoln raised the concern of a "what if " situation. By this he meant that if both plans failed, would not a better defensed retreat be pursued with a direct retreat back to Washington. As it would take time to land the Army of the Potomac at Fort Monroe in the peninsula, a retreat from the peninsula would be fraught with danger.A former military veteran and writer, George Bruce supported Lincoln's plan. One of his reasons was that the number of troops needed for the Peninsula campaign would cause more chance of Washington DC to be exposed to Confederate attack. This was a valid point in that the bulk of the Union troops in the east would give the Confederates opportunities in consideration of the Rebel generals who had shown their ability to take risks.Also, Lincoln realized that McClellan's surprise attack plan was based on his certainty that his army would get upon Richmond faster than Confederate General Longstreet could get his troops there to defend a peninsula assault. If McClellan failed to move faster than the enemy, then the military term of "the enemy gets the vote" or Clausewitz's term, interaction" would come into play. The element of surprise being lost could destroy McClellan's plans and leave Washington DC at risk.
When the South had to destroy its CSS Virginia, the James River was now opened for a chance to play a significant role in the Union's Peninsula campaign. Union Admiral sought to aid the campaign by ordering the USS Monitor, the USS Galena and three wooden warships to steam up the James River towards Richmond on May 11, 1862. The move failed as Confederate artillery stopped their advance.
Whitewater
Severe loss of momentum in the Confederate campaign in the East, and increasing shortage of food and supplies, following Lee's failed invasion of Pennsylvania, where he had hoped for rich plunder.
The Confederation of the Rhine collapsed in 1813, with the aftermath of Napoleon's failed campaign against the Russian Empire. Many of its members changed sides after the Battle of the Nations.
The Confederation of the Rhine collapsed in 1813, with the aftermath of Napoleon's failed campaign against the Russian Empire. Many of its members changed sides after the Battle of the Nations.
The Confederation of the Rhine collapsed in 1813, with the aftermath of Napoleon's failed campaign against the Russian Empire. Many of its members changed sides after the Battle of the Nations.