What is the importance of a dissenting opinion?
A justice may also give a dissenting opinion which gives an opposing view of the case and presents the reasons for the opposition.
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Majority: when the majority (5 or more of the nine justices) write an opinion on an issue and that opinion is the one that prevails. Dissenting: The other justices who disagreed with the majority opinion sometimes write a dissenting opinion to express their disagreements (dissent). Concurrence…: Sometimes, you have justices who agree with the ultimate decision made by the majority, but disagree as to the reasons why they came to that ultimate decision. For example, let's say that the majority concluded that gay marriage is a fundamental right given to homosexuals through equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. However, one of the justices agreed that the ultimate decision to allow gay marriage is justified, but disagreed that it was because of equal protection; rather, it was because of the right to privacy instead. This would be a concurring opinion because the concurring justice agrees with the ultimate decision that the majority came up with, but disagreed with why they came up with that conclusion. ( Full Answer )
Well the opinions of the supreme court are really important. They can tell if your guilty or not.
Dissenters was the term used in English history for Protestants who were fundamentally in disagreement with the established Church, that is, the Church of England. Liar!! It meens to disagree with something. I had to answer a question that was: "A dissenter is someone who..." the answer was: disag…rees with an opinion you are both wrong you noobs it actually means that you have to disagree with someone i dnt care what you say nooby noobs ( Full Answer )
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954) The 1954 US Supreme Court verdict in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka was unanimous in declaring de jure segregation a violation of the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. There was no dissenting opinion. For more information, see R…elated Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961) Justice Tom C. Clark wrote the majority opinion, and Justice John M. Harlan II wrote the dissenting opinion. For more information, see Related Questions below.
Majority opinion - Also called the "Opinion of theCourt," this is the official verdict in the case that representsthe vote of the majority of justices . Dissenting opinion - An opinion written by a justice whodisagrees with the majority . Concurring opinion - An opinion that agrees withth…e decision but may disagree with the some of the reasoning behindthe Court opinion, or may elaborate on a point made or introducefurther relevant information . The most important type is the majority opinion. Themajority opinion is, as the name suggests, the opinion of themajority of judges hearing the case. In most cases, a majorityopinion requires five Justices, unless one or more Justices haverecused themselves from a given decision. The majority opinion isimportant because it defines the precedent that all future courtshearing a similar case should follow. Majority opinions are sometimes accompanied by concurringopinions. Concurring opinions are written by individualJustices in the majority. These opinions agree with the majorityopinion, but may stress a different point of law. Sometimes,concurring opinions will agree with the result reached by themajority, but for a different reason altogether. Opinions written by justices not in the majority are known as dissenting opinions. Dissenting opinions are importantbecause they provide insight into how the Court reached itsdecision. . the statement written to explain why the decision was made(GradPoint) For more information, see Related Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
There was no dissenting opinion. The decision in McCulloch was formed unanimously, by a vote of 7-0. Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the only opinion in the case. Chief Justice John Marshall Associate Justices Bushrod Washington William Johnson Henry Brockholst Livingston Thomas …Todd Gabriel Duvall Joseph Story Case Citation: McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US 316 (1819) For more information , see Related Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
Do supreme court justices write their own concurring and dissenting opinions or do their clerks do it for them?
It is my understanding that Justice John Paul Stevens writes the first draft of all of his opinions, but that the others rely on assistance from their law clerks to varying degrees. There is probably no definitive answer to this question.
Many cases fit these criteria, because split decisions are common on a court where members have mixed political ideologies. Justices who strongly oppose a majority decision will often write a dissenting opinion(s) in order to record their legal reasoning for consideration in future cases. Justice…s who sign onto the majority opinion may also issue concurring opinions to clarify or expand on points in the majority opinion; or they may write an individual concurring opinion because they agree with the decision, but not with the legal reasoning used to arrive at that decision. Here are three recent cases that include majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003) The Court overturned a Texas state law making same-sex intimacy illegal on the grounds that the law violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Majority: Kennedy, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer Concurring: O'Connor Dissenting: Scalia, joined by CJ Rehnquist and Thomas; Thomas (separate dissenting opinion) Kelo v. City of New London, 545 US 469 (2005) Controversial case in which the Court affirmed the right of New London to exercise eminent domain to transfer land from a private owner to a business developer as a permissible "public use" under the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause. Majority: Stevens, joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer Concurring: Kennedy (added details) Dissenting: O'Connor, joined by CJ Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas; Thomas (separate dissenting opinion) Giles v. California, 554 US ___ (2008) Held that a convicted murdered who claimed evidentiary use of a conversation between the police and his deceased girlfriend was a violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, because the defendant could not cross-examine the witness (he had killed her). Majority: Scalia, joined by CJ Roberts, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Alito Concurring: Thomas; Souter, joined by Ginsburg Dissenting: Breyer, joined by Stevens and Kennedy ( Full Answer )
A dissenting opinion is written when a Justice of the Supreme Court doesn't agree with either the logic of a decision or the decision itself, and feels strongly enough to write said opinion.
If the justices who voted against the majority wish to issue a unified dissenting opinion, they decide amongst themselves who will author the opinion, then the others, if in agreement, will "join" the opinion. Individual justices may write their own (concurring or dissenting) opinions, regardless… of whether they agree with the majority. Justices may also "join" or sign any other written opinion they agree with. This generally strengthens the opinion. ( Full Answer )
Justice Potter Stewart wrote a brief dissent to the majority opinion in Engel v. Vitale, disagreeing that the New York law established a religion according to his understanding of the First Amendment Establishment Clause: "A local school board in New York has provided that those pupils who wis…h to do so may join in a brief prayer at the beginning of each school day, acknowledging their dependence upon God and asking His blessing upon them and upon their parents, their teachers, and their country. The Court today decides that in permitting this brief nondenominational prayer the school board has violated the Constitution of the United States. I think this decision is wrong. "The court does not hold, nor could it, that New York has interfered with the free exercise of anybody's religion. For the state courts have made clear that those who object to reciting the prayer must be entirely free of any compulsion to do so, including any "embarrassments and pressures." Cf. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette , 319 U. S. 624. But the Court says that in permitting school children to say this simple prayer, the New York authorities have established "an official religion." "With al. respect, I think the Court has misapplied a great constitutional principle. I cannot see how an "official religion" is established by letting those who want to say a prayer say it. On the contrary, I think that to deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our Nation. "The Court's historical review of the quarrels over the Book of Common Prayer in England throws no light for me on the issue before us in this case. England had then and has now an established church. Equally unenlightening, I think, is the history of the early establishment and later rejection of an official church in our own States. For we deal here not with the establishment of a state church, which would, of course, be constitutionally impermissible, but with whether school children who want to begin their day by joining in prayer must be prohibited from doing so. "Moreover, I think that the Court's task, in this as in all areas of constitutional adjudication, is not responsibly aided by the uncritical invocation of metaphors like the "wall of separation," a phrase nowhere to be found in the Constitution. What is relevant to the issue here is not the history of an established church in sixteenth century England or in eighteenth century America, but the history of the religious traditions of our people, reflected in countless practices of the institutions and officials of our government. "At the opening of each day's Session of this Court we stand, while one of our officials invokes the protection of God. Since the days of John Marshall our Crier has said, "God save the United States and this Honorable Court." Both the Senate and the House of Representatives open their daily Sessions with prayer. Each of our Presidents, from George Washington to John F. Kennedy, has upon assuming his Office asked the protection and help of God. "The Court today says that the state and federal governments are without constitutional power to prescribe any particular form of words to be recited by any group of the American people on any subject touching religion. One of the stanzas of "The Star Spangled Banner," made our National Anthem by Act of Congress in 1931, contains these verses: "Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n rescued land Praise the Pow'r that hath made and preserved us a nation ! Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just, And this be our motto 'In God is our Trust."' "In 1954 Congress added a phrase to the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag so that it now contains the words "one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." In 1952 Congress enacted legislation calling upon the President each year to proclaim a National Day of Prayer. Since 1865 the words "IN GOD WE TRUST" have been impressed on our coins. "Countless similar examples could be listed, but there is no need to belabor the obvious. It was all summed up by this Court just ten years ago in a single sentence: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 313. "I do not believe that this Court, or the Congress, or the President has by the actions and practices I have mentioned established an "official religion" in violation of the Constitution. And I do not believe the State of New York has done so in this case. What each has done has been to recognize and to follow the deeply entrenched and highly cherished spiritual traditions of our Nation--traditions which come down to us from those who almost two hundred years ago avowed their "firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence" when they proclaimed the freedom and independence of this brave new world." "I dissent." Case Citation: Engel v. Vitale , 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ( Full Answer )
A dissenting opinion is written when a justice disagrees with the majority opinion (which carries the force of law). If a justice is writing a dissenting opinion, that means he or she voted with the minority group, and wants to explain the reason why he or she disagrees with the official Opinion of …the Court. Dissenting opinions may be cited, but are not enforceable. ( Full Answer )
The decision in Gideon v. Wainwright was unanimous (9-0); there was no dissenting opinion. Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion of the Court, and Justices Tom C. Clark, John Marshall Harlan II, and William O. Douglas wrote concurring opinions. The case citation is Gideon v. Wainwright, …372 US 335 (1963) For more information, see Related Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
Dissenting opinions may be cited as persuasive authority, so a relevant dissent should be included if it strengthens your case.
Koon v. United States, 518 US 81 (1996) There were three other opinions issued (other than the majority opinion), all concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Stevens wrote that he does not believe the District Court abused discretion. He accepts all parts of the majority opinion exc…ept that he does "not understand the opinion to foreclose the District Court from basing a downward departure on an aggregation of factors each of which might in itself be insufficient to justify a departure." Justice Souter wrote, with which Justice Ginsburg joined, that he affirmed the Circuit Court's "rejection of the downward departures based on susceptibility to abuse in prison and on successive prosecution, for to do otherwise would be to attribute an element of irrationality to the Commission and to its 'heartland' concept." Justice Breyer wrote, with which Justice Ginsburg joined, that the Guideline called into question encompasses the possibility of a "double prosecution." "For that reason, a simple double prosecution, without more, does not support a departure." Also, potential mistreatment in prison cannot be used for departure because then everybody would use that as an excuse. ( Full Answer )
No, a dissenting opinion is written when a justice disagrees with the majority opinion (which carries the force of law). If a justice is writing a dissenting opinion, that means he or she voted with the minority group, and wants to explain the reason why he or she disagrees with the official Opinion… of the Court. Dissenting opinions may be cited, but are not enforceable. ( Full Answer )
Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803) The Court only issued one opinion in Marbury v. Madison, (1803), which was authored by John Marshall. Marbury was decided by a unanimous vote of 4-0; therefore, there were no dissenting opinions. (Justices Cushing and Moore took no part in the decision du…e to illness during oral arguments.) For more information, see Related Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
The dissenting opinion was that the 4 th amendment is only used by the federal government therefore overruling the exclusionary rule (rule that illegally obtained evidence should be excluded from a trial).
False Added: To expand on the above comment: All published opinions, except per curiam, may be cited as precedent; however, dissenting opinions don't carry the force of law, as majority opinions do. HOWEVER - the dissent, or portions thereof, can be used in the future by like-minded jurists in f…uture efforts to have the views and thoughts of the dissent adopted. ( Full Answer )
A dissenting opinion is written when a justice disagrees with themajority opinion (which carries the force of law). If a justice iswriting a dissenting opinion, that means he or she voted with theminority group, and wants to explain the reason why he or shedisagrees with the official Opinion of the …Court. Dissenting opinions may be cited, but are not enforceable. A good example is if you have 3 people. One of them wants a bluecar, the other 2 want a red one. The majority is the 2 people whowant a red car. Whoever doesn't want a red car, is the dissenting.(Dissenting is whatever isn't the majority) Search Dissenting Opinion for more details. ( Full Answer )
Texas v. Johnson carried two dissenting opinions, one authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist (and joined my Justices White and O'Connor), and one authored by Justice Stevens. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent was largely an appeal to sentiment, focusing on the history and meaning of the American f…lag, as well as the values it represented. In addressing Johnson's behavior, Rehnquist remarked that burning the flag was not essential to the exposition of ideas, and had a tendency to incite lawlessness. He suggested burning other symbols of government, including its leaders in effigy, would have been a more appropriate expression of disapproval. He also suggested flag burning was less a form of "expressive speech" than a "grunt and a roar." The Chief Justice believed the government could legitimately create laws prohibiting flag desecration without violating First Amendment constitutional rights. Justice Stevens' dissent was largely an appeal to logic, acknowledging the flag as a symbol of "nationhood and national unity," but declaring it also had an intangible value as a symbol that sent a message about the United States not only to those who cared about the country's national unity, but also to dissidents, both at home and abroad. He believed the government's interest in preserving the the flag's symbolic value for the future was both significant and legitimate. Justice Stevens compared flag desecration to allowing people to spray graffiti on the Washington Monument, an act he was certain the government would not be challenged for prohibiting. According to Stevens, the majority was wrong in asserting the statutory prohibition of flag desecration placed any more than a trivial burden on free expression and that the law. Quoting from West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette , 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), "[the Texas statute] does not prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." He also wrote: "The statute does not compel any conduct or any profession of respect for any idea or any symbol. Nor does the statute violate "the government's paramount obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected communication." Justice Stevens concluded: "The ideas of liberty and equality have been an irresistible force in motivating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan B. Anthony, and Abraham Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan Hale and Booker T. Washington, the Philippine Scouts who fought at Bataan, and the soldiers who scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach. If those ideas are worth fighting for -- and our history demonstrates that they are - it cannot be true that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power is not itself worthy of protection from unnecessary desecration." Case Citation: Texas v. Johnson , 491 US 397 (1989) For more information, see Related Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
Even though dissenting opinions are not the law, they can be important in many ways: . Dissenting opinions can help us understand the meaning and implications of the majority opinion. Because the dissenting opinion often tells us what the majority does NOT stand for, dissenting opinions can h…elp map out the boundaries of the majority opinion, which can be useful in later cases. Often, it is not always clear what the Court is holding and what the implications of the outcome are when the Court's opinion is first issued. Dissents often draw out the issues of the case and pick apart the majority's rationale so that we can better understand what was really at stake, and how we should broaden and narrow the majority's holding for future cases to avoid potentially adverse results. . Dissenting opinions help us predict how justices will come out in future cases . The different justices on the Court have different theories of jurisprudence, and these jurisprudential theories (textualism, etc.) can often affect how a judge decides a case. Because dissenting opinions are often written by only one or two judges, this is where a justice can really showcase his or her theories on the law, which can help us understand how that justice thinks, and how the Court is thinking in general. Again, this can be helpful for both lawyers and lower court judges alike when formulating arguments and opinions in future cases. . Dissenting opinions can show us the limits of the majority's holding. This is similar to number one, but I cannot emphasize enough that judicial decisions can be ambiguous and interpreted to have either broad or narrow implications. The arguments in the dissent can show us WHY the majority's opinion SHOULD have narrow implications, even though it is currently the law. . Dissenting opinions show us where the "fight" was. Again, this is similar to number one, but if we know where the "fight" was, we might also be able to predict how the case can best be overturned or narrowed to the point of insignificance. We might also be able to learn why the case was significant if it is not apparent in the majority opinion. . Dissenting opinions can help us react. By showing the implications of the majority's opinion, dissenting opinions can help the public and the legislature react to the majority's ruling. . An excellent example of this is Kelo v. City of New London , 545 U.S. 469 (2005). Here, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that pure economic benefit qualified as a "public use" under the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This means that, as a Constitutional floor, the government can take land from a private property owner by eminent domain if it is part of a purely economic redevelopment plan. Justice O'Connor wrote a scathing dissent, arguing that the result of this decision would be that the rich would benefit at the expense of the poor -- any Motel 8 could be replaced by the Ritz in the name of "economic redevelopment." As a reaction, more than 40 states enacted legislation limiting the scope of eminent domain to avoid the adverse results of the Kelo decision. O'Connor's dissenting opinion may have aided the state governments in justifying this response. . ( Full Answer )
Justice Black wrote a dissent because he disagreed with the majority opinion. In Katz, the majority changed how the Fourth Amendment was interpreted. Prior to Katz a physical intrusion into some protected space was required before the Fourth Amendment was violated. In Katz , the police had b…ugged an enclosed phone booth in such a way that there was no physical intrusion, but they could overhear what Mr. Katz was saying inside the booth. The majority ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. They ruled that Mr. Katz had a "reasonable expectation of privacy" inside the enclosed phone booth; and that the Fourth Amendment had been violated since the police did not have a search warrant. Justice Black argued that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect physical things (viz. "persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures"), not a nebulous concept of privacy. He argued that no "search" or "seizure" had occurred when the police listened to and recorded the telephone conversation. The citation is Katz v. United States, 389 US 347 (1967). ( Full Answer )
The majority opinion of an appellate court is the governing rule in the case. A dissent indicates why one of the judges on the court did not agree with the ruling of the majority. Dissents do not have the force of law, but they may be instructive in future cases where a similar issue is contested. … When reading a case, make sure you're looking at the majority opinion and not the dissent, if you're trying to understand what the ruling of the case was and how the court arrived at it. ( Full Answer )
United States v. Leon, 468 US 497 (1984) Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) dissenting: Justice Brennan expressed concern that the Court's majority opinion may reopen the door to allowing illegally seized evidence to be used in court, and may result in the complete abandonment of… the exclusionary rule. Brennan observed that the Court had gradually eased prohibitions against Fourth Amendment violations (in the furtherance of police work and prosecution), and believed the "good faith" exception was an affront to the Fourth Amendment. Brennan took exception to the Court's cost/benefit analysis, as well as the rationalization that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy," not a constitutional right: "A more direct answer may be supplied by recognizing that the Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, restrains the power of the government as a whole; it does not specify only a particular agency and exempt all others. The judiciary is responsible, no less than the executive, for ensuring that constitutional rights are respected. "When that fact is kept in mind, the role of the courts and their possible involvement in the concerns of the Fourth Amendment comes into sharper focus. Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence generally has utility in our legal system only in the context of a trial supervised by a judge, it is apparent that the admission of illegally obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of that evidence. Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary becomes a part of what is in fact a single governmental action prohibited by the terms of the Amendment." While Justice White and the majority held that once the violation occurred, there was no way to remedy the defendant's lost right, and therefore, no further harm could be done by introducing the evidence, Justice Brennan predicted harm would arise from allowing an exception because both police and judiciary had a vested interest in obtaining a conviction. Justice Brennan quoted Justice Day, who rendered the opinion of the Court in Weeks v. US , 232 US 383 (1914), the case that originally established the exclusionary rule: "If letters and private documents can . . . be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Justice Stevens concurring in part (82-963) and dissenting in part ( 82-1771) *: *US v. Leon was a consolidation of two cases. One (docket no. 82-963), in Justice Stevens' opinion, involved a legally issued warrant, while the other (specifically, Leon's, 82-1771) involved an illegal warrant. His dissenting opinion addresses the reasoning behind the "good faith" exception, and criticizes the Court for consolidating a case concerning a legal warrant with another concerning an illegal warrant in order to support a rationalization. Justice Stevens pointed out the paradox in the majority's thinking that an illegal search and seizure could be both "reasonable" and "unreasonable" at the same time. Stevens also quoted the Fourth Amendment, drawing specific attention to the second section, which addressed a prohibition on the action of the court, a point he believed the majority failed to appreciate: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized ." Further, Stevens posited that the majority had offered an illogical construction that contradicted case law: "The majority's contrary conclusion rests on the notion that it must be reasonable for a police officer to rely on a magistrate's finding. Until today that has plainly not been the law; it has been well settled that even when a magistrate issues a warrant there is no guarantee that the ensuing search and seizure is constitutionally reasonable. Law enforcement officers have long been on notice that despite the magistrate's decision a warrant will be invalidated if the officers did not provide sufficient facts to enable the magistrate to evaluate the existence of probable cause responsibly and independently. Reviewing courts have always inquired into whether the magistrate acted properly in issuing the warrant - not merely whether the officers acted properly in executing it." Finally, Stevens reminded the bench that the Founding Fathers' purpose in writing the Fourth Amendment was not so much to regulate police action as to remedy the problem of judges issuing "general" warrants without probable cause: "The precise problem that the Amendment was intended to address was the unreasonable issuance of warrants. As we have often observed, the Amendment was actually motivated by the practice of issuing general warrants - warrants which did not satisfy the particularity and probable-cause requirements. The resentments which led to the Amendment were directed at the issuance of warrants unjustified by particularized evidence of wrongdoing. Those who sought to amend the Constitution to include a Bill of Rights repeatedly voiced the view that the evil which had to be addressed was the issuance of warrants on insufficient evidence." For more information, see Related Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
Virginia v. Black et al., 538 US 343 (2003) Three men were convicted of violating a Virginia state statute that makes cross burning a felony, when they lit a cross at a Carroll County, Virginia, Ku Klux Klan rally. The statute under which they were convicted reads (in part) that it is illegal:… "for any person ... , with the intent of intimidating any person or group ... , to burn ... a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place..." The law included a provision that "[a]ny such burning ... shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group," meaning any act of cross burning is automatically considered an attempted to intimidate, regardless of circumstances. The men argued that cross burning was expressive speech protected under the First Amendment, and objected to the clause that held the action was always evidence of an attempt to intimidate. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the cross burning statute was unconstitutional, and that the language of the statute was overbroad (too general and inclusive). The US Supreme Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the trial court for further disposition. Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion of the Court, explained that cross burning is inextricably bound with hate messages and intimidation against a particular group or individual; therefore, the act is often an exception to First Amendment protection. The Court found the Virginia state law constitutional to the extend that the state can tie a particular act of cross burning to an attempt to threaten or intimidate. The state has a right to ban "true threats," even if they are symbolic. On the other hand, the Court found Parts V and VI of the law, interpreting all acts of cross burning as "prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate" unconstitutional. The Court contended cross burning was a permissible act of expressive speech if done in a context where the burning was not a directed threat of violence against an individual or group. (The Court agreed that aspect of the statute was overbroad, and unconstitutional). Justice Thomas' Dissent Justice Thomas dissented from the majority, based on the violent history of the Klan and the frequency with which cross burning was followed by violence. "Although I agree with the majority's conclusion that it is constitutionally permissible to "ban ... cross burning carried out with intent to intimidate," see maj. op., at 17, I believe that the majority errs in imputing an expressive component to the activity in question, see maj. op., at 17 (relying on one of the exceptions to the First Amendment's prohibition on content-based discrimination outlined in R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377 (1992)). In my view, whatever expressive value cross burning has, the legislature simply wrote it out by banning only intimidating conduct undertaken by a particular means. A conclusion that the statute prohibiting cross burning with intent to intimidate sweeps beyond a prohibition on certain conduct into the zone of expression overlooks not only the words of the statute but also reality." Thomas agreed with the Virginia state legislature that prohibiting cross burning under all circumstances was appropriate, and not overbroad, as the majority believed. To read Justice Thomas' dissent and the full text of the Court's opinion, see Related Links, below. ( Full Answer )
Schenck v. United States , 249 U.S. 47 (1919) There was no dissenting opinion in Schenck ; the 9-0 vote was unanimous in support of the US government. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote the opinion of the Court. For more information, see Related Questions, below.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) There were actually three dissenting opinions, written by Justices Clark, Harlan, and White. Justice Stewart joined both Justices Harlan and White, and Justices Harlan and White joined each other's opinions.
There were two clear dissents and one partial dissent. The two clear dissents were based on the dissenting Justice's opinions that the decision was not supported by the Constitution in that no such "right" was ever called for or mentioned, either explicitly, or implicitly, in the Constitution. The p…artial dissent was based on procedural grounds in that the "right to counsel" already existed in the 6th Amendment. For more information see Related Links and Related Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
popular opinion is a shifting target and is only one facet of democratic debate. for instance, the notorious Dred Scot decision by the U.S. Supreme Court which held at that time upheld racial discrimination, was a POPULAR decision, regardless of it's obvious improper interpretation of the U.S. Cons…titution. ( Full Answer )
There was no dissenting opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, which received a unanimous vote of 6-0*; however, Justice William Johnson wrote a concurring opinion in order to present points not specifically covered in Marshall's writing. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 (1824) For more information, see …Related Questions, below. ( Full Answer )
Yes. A dissenting opinion outlines one or more justices' reasoning about why the Supreme Court should have made a different decision. While dissenting opinions do not carry the force of law, they may be cited, and sometimes become a more important part of case law than the majority opinion.
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940) Thornhill was a First Amendment case challenging an Alabama law making it illegal for anyone to loiter or picket on or near company premises. "Section 3448. Loitering or picketing forbidden. -- Any person or persons, who, without a just cause or legal… excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any other person, firm, corporation, or association of people, engaged in a lawful business, for the purpose, or with the intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, have business dealings with, or be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association, or who picket the works or place of business of such other persons, firms, corporations, or associations of persons, for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; but nothing herein shall prevent any person from soliciting trade or business for a competitive business." The Alabama state courts construed the law to include publicizing facts about labor disputes in the vicinity of the business being picketed, regardless of the number of people involved or the peaceful nature of the assembly, on the grounds that such behavior constituted "restraint of trade." The Supreme Court held that the state law was overbroad and unconstitutional on its face, in that it infringed on the workers' First Amendment rights. In Thornhill , the exact nature of the dispute was not part of the case; the only issue was whether unions had a right to picket in front the business, in violation of Alabama law, as a means of bringing attention to their strike. The Court held that it was of vital importance for the workers to be able to communicate their concerns, and that the state could not abrogate the right to peaceable assembly or freedom of speech. Justice James C. McReynolds was the sole dissenter in the case, but his opinion consisted of a single statement: "Mr Justice McReynolds is of the opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed." ( Full Answer )
You could just try this resource: Plessy v. Ferguson Primary source document outlining the Supreme Court's decision and a dissenting opinion. See the related link.
Justice Hugo Black dissented from the 8-1 majority in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966), but did not file a dissenting opinion.
You could have a legal decision without an explanation, but the explanations are important because they become part of legal precedent and can be cited in future legal arguments.
The decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, (1963) was unanimous (9-0); there was no dissenting opinion.
There are several dissenting opinions contained in this decision, depending on the issue involved. On the issue of Death being cruel and unusual punishment: . MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN stated, quote: "This Court inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of our Constitution, to… say whether, when individuals condemned to death stand before our Bar, "moral concepts" require us to hold that the law has progressed to the point where we should declare that the punishment of death, like punishments on the rack, the screw, and the wheel, is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society . My opinion in Furman v. Georgia concluded that our civilization and the law had progressed to this point and that therefore the punishment of death, for whatever crime and under all circumstances, is "cruel and unusual" in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. I shall not again canvass the reasons that led to that conclusion. I emphasize only that foremost among the "moral concepts" recognized in our cases and inherent in the Clause is the primary moral principle that the State, even as it punishes, must treat its citizens in a manner consistent with their intrinsic worth as human beings - a punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to human dignity." . MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (concurring opinion), I set forth at some length my views on the basic issue presented to the Court in these cases. The death penalty, I concluded, is a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. That continues to be my view. The decisions then devolve into why different state systems are constitutional, or unconstitutional depending on the state (at least 4 are involved, and details are lengthy). ( Full Answer )
There were no dissenting opinions because the case ruled against Nixon 8-0. The concurring opinion was a collective agreement between all justices in that the tapes held criminal conduct between the President and his men as well as that Nixon's claim to absolute executive privilege was wrong. Execut…ive privilege is a right to the president; however, it is not absolute and can be checked by the Congress or Supreme Court. ( Full Answer )
Two justices, Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan II , wrote independent dissenting opinions in Tinker . Justice Black disagreed with the Court's decision to allow students and teachers to use the schools as a platform for the expression of free speech, and believed policy matters should be …left to school administration. Black cited the recent decision in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US 536 (1965), in which the Court held the First Amendment right to exercise free speech was not absolute and "[does] not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time." According to Justice Black, the First Amendment had two components: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act. He asserted the freedom to believe was absolute, but reminded the Court that it had historically made exceptions to the freedom to act for good cause. In this case, "good cause" involved the right of the schools to maintain discipline and control, and not cede this power to the students. Justice Harlan believed the schools should have "the widest authority" to promulgate their own rules, provided the rules were motivated by legitimate reasons, and held the burden should be on the Petitioner (Tinker) to demonstrate the Respondent (Des Moines ISD) had a "desire to prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while permitting expression of the dominant opinion," rather than maintain order. In his view, the school had acted in good faith and should prevail. Case Citation: Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 US 503 (1969) ( Full Answer )
Nothing really "happens". It's published along with the majority opinion but doesn't change the majority decision in any way. Unless the Court votes unanimously, there will generally be a dissenting opinion. A justice may even opt to write an opinion "concurring" with the judgment itself, but ind…icating that he has reached the same conclusion via different reasoning, or "concurring in part and dissenting in part" which means he thinks part of the majority opinion is good and part of it is not. It's not uncommon for there to even be three or more opinons published, with various justices agreeing with each other about some parts but disagreeing on others. For example, the majority opinion might be: the decision of the lower court is overturned for Reason 1, Reason 2, and Reason 3. A dissenting opinion may state that the decision should not be overturned at all, and an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part may say that Reason 3 is total hogwash (they generally polite it up a bit, but that's often the general gist... reading Supreme Court opinions is sometimes more entertaining than you might think), but that Reason 1 and Reason 2 are still good, and a fourth opinion might say that Reasons 1, 2, and 3 are all wrong, but the decision should still be overturned because of Reason 4. None of this changes the basic decision itself (to overturn the lower court's ruling) in any way. ( Full Answer )
It is important because fact is what is proven by an official and opinion is what you determine on your own. :)
There was no dissenting opinion written for Reynolds v. US because the decision was unanimous (9-0). Chief Justice Morrison Waite wrote the opinion of the Court. Case Citation: Reynolds v. United States, 98 US 145 (1878) For more information, see Related Questions, below.
Free public opinion is the soul of Democracy, since they are inside of the ethical and moral values.
Concurring is that of agreeing; dissenting is that of disagreeing. And I learnt this in 30 seconds off Google, using 'define:...' -- google it first. -.-
It is just a differing opinion that is included in the finaldocument so that all opinions are expressed for the record.
to support an argument by showing that because other courts havemade similar decisions, the decision in the current case must belogical
Majority just means most, dissenting is those that disagree, butcan be majority or minority depending on if group larger or smallerthan one you are speaking about
In America and a few other democracies, being a dissenter is not asimportant as the principle of Free (Political) Speech & Freeelections. Taking the opposite view or position to others is notnecessarily a virtue, however it is important & a worthy causeto defend the constitutional rights of all citi…zens regardless ofthe political correctness, cultural or peer pressure, or unpopularviewpoints they express. ( Full Answer )