What role does horizontal form of power sharing play in strengthen the Indian government?

Answer 1

Power-sharing and the Vertical Layering of Authority:

A Review of Current Practices

Stefan Wolff

I. The Context of Self-determination Conflicts and

Power-sharing

Self-determination conflicts are, at one level, also conflicts between competing views of

how decision-making powers should be allocated to different layers of authority within a

state, and thus how the state as a whole should be constructed. Traditionally, powers have

been, and still are, distributed between different vertical layers of authority, for example,

between central and local governments in unitary states, or between federal and federated

governments in federations and federacies. In addition to such vertical layering of authority,

the resolution of self-determination conflicts often requires additional mechanisms of powersharing that are horizontal, i.e., where power is (mandatorily) shared between different parties

at one-and-the-same level. While the level of such horizontal power-sharing can be the region

and/or the central government, the precise mechanisms and rules of such horizontal powersharing differ from case to case, and can be rigidly consociational, as in Northern Ireland, or

voluntary, as in Macedonia, where they are facilitated by the ethnic demography, the structure

of the country's party system and the rules of the electoral system.

Depending on the complexity of a given power-sharing system, it comprises one or more of

the following mechanisms: co-decision making (e.g., executive power-sharing), split

decision-making (e.g., territorial arrangements, such as federacy or federalism; or corporate

arrangements, such as cultural autonomy), and a range of pre-determined decisions (e.g.,

proportionality rules for representation for different communities in legislatures and the civil

service) or pre-determined procedures (e.g., qualified majority voting or parallel consent

regulations in legislatures).

Within systems of power-sharing the vertical layering of authority acquires extra

importance, often necessitating specific new institutional structures, thus adding to the overall

complexity of the process and outcome of state construction. However, the vertical layering

of authority also provides opportunities for instituting formal and informal mechanisms of

power-sharing at different levels of the political process - from the central government level

down to that of local communities. Yet, it can only accomplish this if two conditions are

fulfilled: the institutions and institutional structures created must be internally viable and

externally recognisable. That is, they must be capable in a technical sense of delivering the

outcomes they are set up to achieve (e.g., effectiveness and representativeness of the political

process) and the institutions and outcomes must be recognised by the agents participating in

Copyright (c) Stefan Wolff. All rights reserved. No reprint without permission.2

them as, if not desirable, at least preferable over continued violent conflict. Under these

conditions, vertically layered power-sharing institutions and the individual agents operating in

and through them will be capable of establishing a political process that is predictable and

stable. This in turn will facilitate, and over time be facilitated by, an increasing belief in the

authority of the institutions and institutional structures thus created.

***

With these preliminary considerations in mind, this chapter analyses state construction in

complex power-sharing systems from the perspective of how authority is distributed at and

between vertical layers of authority. The empirical basis for this analysis is provided by eight

recent cases of self-determination conflicts where attempts have been made to resolve them

by establishing complex power-sharing institutions. Examining the vertical layering of

authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bougainville, Gagauzia, Kosovo, Macedonia,

Mindanao, Northern Ireland and South Ossetia, I initially evaluate the particular vertical

structures of state construction in each case and contextualise them briefly in the nature and

dynamics of each individual self-determination conflict. The sequence of case studies is

determined by the complexity of the institutional structures. I begin with Bosnia and

Herzegovina, where power-sharing exists at regional and central levels, and is complemented

by elements of devolution of powers to cantonal and municipal levels. At the next level of

complexity, regional consociations exist in Bougainville, Mindanao and Northern Ireland.

Here two traditional conflict resolution techniques combine - territorial autonomy and

consociational power-sharing. Although similar in this particular aspect, the three cases can

be further distinguished according to their institutional structures. The arrangements for

Bougainville include limited power-sharing (co-decision making) between the regional and

central authorities; in Northern Ireland, extensive arrangements for cross-border cooperation

between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, as well as between these two entities

and a range of others within the British Isles form part of the 1998 Agreement; and in

Mindanao, the co-optation of regional officials to corresponding central institutions again

provides for limited co-decision making. The remaining four cases are examples of territorial

autonomy (Gagauzia), enhanced local self-administration (Macedonia and, pending the

resolution of its final status, Kosovo), and a quasi-sovereign parallel entity (South Ossetia).

Following this description of the empirical basis of this chapter, I then assess the relevance

of the vertical layering of authority within complex power-sharing systems by comparing and

contrasting all eight cases from the perspective of the types of institutional structures; the

combination of vertical and horizontal power-sharing mechanisms; the distribution of powers

at and between different vertical layers of authority; the types of coordination between

different vertical layers of authority; the constitutional and legal entrenchment of the

Copyright (c) Stefan Wolff. All rights reserved. No reprint without permission.3

institutions created; and territory and population as boundaries of authority. Following this

thematic comparison, I examine three common and potentially problematic issues relating to

the vertical layering of public authority in complex power-sharing systems: the relationship

between vertical and horizontal layers of power-sharing, the coordination of government

activities at and between these different layers, and the overall political institutional

settlement within which vertically and horizontally structured institutions have to operate.

Synthesising this discussion, I conclude by outlining the role that the vertical layering of

authority can play as part of a power-sharing 'toolkit' by examining the main types of

institutional structures and mechanisms of policy coordination and by assessing their contextdependence.

II. Multiple Layers of Authority in Practice: A Brief

Review of Eight Case Studies of Complex Powersharing

In order to assess similarities and differences and their significance in the vertical

construction of state institutions, empirical data are required. Given the focus of this chapter,

the following case studies do not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of each conflict

and its settlement, but rather concentrate on how executive, legislative and judicial institutions

are constructed in the state overall and at multiple levels of authority.1

A. Bosnia and Herzegovina

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was part of a wider regional conflict - the

disintegration of Yugoslavia. Over three-and-a-half years, between 1992 and 1995, three main

conflict parties - Serbs in Bosnia (and their supporters in Serbia), Croats in Bosnia (and their

supporters in Croatia) and Bosnian Muslims - fought each other in shifting alliances with

different aims. Serbs sought secession and unification with Serbia, as they felt threatened in a

state potentially dominated by a Muslim or Muslim/Croat majority hostile to them. To some

extent, Croats shared this goal of secession and unification (with Croatia), while Muslims

fought to prevent the disintegration of what they perceived as their ancestral homeland. The

intensity of the conflict prompted the UN to declare six safe areas for Muslims and to

despatch a peacekeeping force for their protection. Following the breakdown of a four-month

ceasefire between Muslims and Serbs, the latter launched an intensive campaign against

Muslim safe areas between May and August 1994 in which large numbers of civilians were

deliberately targeted and killed. In response, NATO intensified its air strikes against the

(regular and irregular) armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs and eventually forced all three

conflict parties to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio in September 1994.

1

For detailed background on the eight case studies of self-determination conflicts, refer to Vol. 1 ** CROSS-REF

Copyright (c) Stefan Wolff. All rights reserved. No reprint without permission.4

The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 provides the legal foundation upon which the postwar Bosnian state has been constructed. It establishes several layers of authority: principally,

the state level, the entity level and the local level. Within the Bosnian-Croat Federation,

cantons provide a further layer of authority. All four layers of authority have their

competences clearly laid out in the Dayton Peace Agreement, its various annexes and followon documents, as well as various subsequent amendments. A significant change to this

structure was made in 1997 when the so-called Peace Implementation Council, uniting almost

sixty states and governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in the

implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, decided to endow the Office of the High

Representative with the authority to dismiss elected and unelected officials in Bosnia and

Herzegovina if they were deemed to obstruct the implementation of the Dayton Peace

Agreement, and to make legally binding decisions (i.e., to pass laws) in any area in which the

state or entity parliaments were unable or unwilling to legislate. This establishes the High

Representative not only as the ultimate arbiter in any cases of difficulties in implementing the

Dayton Peace Agreement and in coordinating policy between the institutions it established,

but endows the office, similar to that of the Special Representative of the UN SecretaryGeneral in Kosovo, with significant legislative and executive powers. This is comparable only

to the powers of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who, through subsequent

amendment to the original Agreement, is able to suspend Northern Ireland's power-sharing

institutions and assume their executive and most of their legislative powers.

What is striking about the construction of the Bosnian state is the almost excess