Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz used his experience and knowledge from the Napoleonic Era and from the battles of Frederick the Great of Prussia to form his ideas on strategy and tactics. He was aware that a mobile army although defeated could retreat and fight another day. With this in mind, he believed that the pursuit of a retreating enemy was necessary to inflict as much damage as possible. To accomplish this required a good cavalry. Even if the enemy presented an able rear guard, this could be compensated for by having the cavalry dismount and fight from the ground.
Lenin turned to the works of military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz in 1915. Lenin was not that interested in military strategy or tactics. What many people overlook is that Clausewitz paid attention to war time politics and the role of warfare in relation to the masses. In some of Lenin's writings he copied verbatim some of Clausewitz's observations on how the politics of a nation interacted with wars.
Military theorist had written extensively on the Napoleonic War and the military exploits of Frederick the Great. Clausewitz believed that if the enemy's army could not be destroyed, the its farms and cities should be assaulted. This would hamper the opposition's army ability to function. The Union resorted to this strategy in the second half of the war.
To win a decisive war, military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz believed that this is best accomplished by destroying the enemy's army. He did make mention that the capture of the enemy's capital city was important, however, that city had to be a significant military target and lose many of its defenders in the combat.
Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz graded the quality of a battlefield victory on several factors. For him the value or the degree of a battlefield victory depended on whether the skill of the winning general was able to outflank the enemy. He also placed emphasis on whether the rough terrain impacted the results of the battle and what army had the superior cavalry.
Carl Von Clausewitz relentlessly wrote about his ideas that wars were an extension of politics. The military operations of the South in the Fall of 1862 were in great part due to political pressures within the South to undermine Northern support for the war.
Lenin turned to the works of military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz in 1915. Lenin was not that interested in military strategy or tactics. What many people overlook is that Clausewitz paid attention to war time politics and the role of warfare in relation to the masses. In some of Lenin's writings he copied verbatim some of Clausewitz's observations on how the politics of a nation interacted with wars.
Credit for this idea has been given to 19th century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz. His book called On War provides examples of this.
Carl von Clausewitz determined the importance or significance of a battle on the so-called "degree" of victory. In his view a victory was significant if the losing enemy's army had been outflanked, the terrain of the battle, the number of troops the winner had and the effectiveness of the winner's cavalry.
Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz believed that the driving elements in any war were chance, passion and rationality. These were respectively governed by the military, the people and the government.
Military theorist had written extensively on the Napoleonic War and the military exploits of Frederick the Great. Clausewitz believed that if the enemy's army could not be destroyed, the its farms and cities should be assaulted. This would hamper the opposition's army ability to function. The Union resorted to this strategy in the second half of the war.
Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz assigned different values to battlefield victories based on certain criteria. For example, a victory where the enemy was outflanked, was one factor in his value system. Also, other elements included the terrain, numerical strength of the opposing armies and how cavalry factored into the victory.
To win a decisive war, military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz believed that this is best accomplished by destroying the enemy's army. He did make mention that the capture of the enemy's capital city was important, however, that city had to be a significant military target and lose many of its defenders in the combat.
Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz graded the quality of a battlefield victory on several factors. For him the value or the degree of a battlefield victory depended on whether the skill of the winning general was able to outflank the enemy. He also placed emphasis on whether the rough terrain impacted the results of the battle and what army had the superior cavalry.
Because Carl von Clausewitz died before completing all of his works on warfare, many of the beliefs he had that were part of the foundation of his works are subject to multiple meanings. For example, Clausewitz's reference to the Trinity. Many people assume that he borrowed the trinity concept from Christianity and used the term simply to emphasize certain points in his methodology concerning warfare. To some readers, the Trinity for Clausewitz meant the people, the army and the government. For others, they believe he was speaking of violence, chance and reason.
Carl Von Clausewitz relentlessly wrote about his ideas that wars were an extension of politics. The military operations of the South in the Fall of 1862 were in great part due to political pressures within the South to undermine Northern support for the war.
In its most basic form, Carl Von Clausewitz defined the total defeat of an enemy as military operations that were not necessarily political, although the defeat of the enemy would have political effects. But before the political ramifications were realized, Clausewitz defined total victory as the destruction of the enemy's armies and the conquest of its territory.
Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz wrote extensively about warfare, its tactics and strategies. He was aware of how difficult it was to obtain a decisive victory against an enemy based on his experience with the Prussian wars in Europe. For Clausewitz, the keys to destroying an enemy army were often built around advancing and assaulting an enemy with maximum speed to damage the enemy's main army and then to aggressively pursue the enemy's retreating forces.