Aj ayer theory of knowledge

Answer 1

a traditional definition of knowledge is that you know that somthing is the case if 1) you are sure of it 2) what you are sire of is true, and 3) you have a right to be true.

AJ explains the reasoning behind these three conditions which he refers to as " necessary and sufficient conditions" for knowledge.

sufficient = A , is a necessary condition for another state of affairs, B, if B cannot occur without A occurring

necessary= A is a siffiecient condition for another stae of affaris, B, if the occuraence of A ensure the occurance of B ( for example 300 votes will win you the American election, in other words receiving 300 electoral votes is sufficient for voting.

however keep in mind that if A is necessary condition for B, A need not be a suffcient condition for B

similarily , even if A is a sifficient condition for B, A need not be necessary condition for B.

what we have to search for the necessary and sifficient conditions of knowledge- that is , the definition of knowledge.

the first requirement ( of knowing somthing is the case) is that what is known should be true, but this is not sufficient ; not even if we add to it the further condition that one must be completely sure of what one knows.

it is not hard to find examples of true and fully confident beliefs which in some ways meet the standards required for knowledge, it is not at all easy to determin exactly whast these standards are.

claims to know empirical statements may be upheld by a reference to pereception, or to memory, or to testimony, or to historical records, or to scientific laws. but backing up is not always strong enough for knowledge.

there may be cases in which one knows that somthing is so without its being possible to say how one knows it...

but if we allow this sort of knowledge to be even theoretically possible what becomes of the distinction between knowledge and true belief.

but if someone reaches a true conclusion without appearing to have any andequate bases for it, we are likely to say that he does not really know it.

he then concludes then that the necessary and sifficient conditions for knowing that something is the case are first that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have right to be sure.