Who rejected the verdicts of jurists that idol worshippers are liable to be murdered?

Does France use sharia law?

No. France is official a secular state and, therefore, government endorsement of any religion or its views is categorically banned. France does not have anything similar to the multiculturalism that the UK currently has. However, private disputes can be arbitrated by Shari'a Courts, which are led by Islamic Jurists who are unaffiliated with the French government.

In India how does the police first information report FIR works-. is a copy of FIR available to accused person?

F.I.R. is the abbreviated form of First Information Report. It is the information recorded by the police officer on duty, given either by the aggrieved person or any other person about the commission of an alleged offence. On the basis of the F.I.R. the police commences its investigation.WHO CAN FILE AN F.I.R. Any person can file an F.I.R. He need not be the aggrieved person. It may be merely hearsay and need not be by the person who has had firsthand knowledge of the facts.WHERE TO FILE AN F.I.R. An F.I.R. can be filed in the police station of the concerned area in whose jurisdiction the offence has occurred. It must be made to the officer-in-charge of the police station and if he is not available the Assistant Sub Inspector is competent to enter upon the investigationHOW TO FILE AN F.I.R. When a wrong has been committed and the aggrieved person or any other person wants to file a F.I.R. it shall be filed in the following manner. # Go to the police station and meet the officer-in-charge. # Step by step in an orderly sequence narrate to the officer every information relating to the commission of the offence. # The officer shall reduce the information given in writing. # The information given shall be signed by the person giving it. # The information given shall be entered in a book to be kept by the officer.COPY OF THE INFORMATION AS RECORDED SHALL BE GIVEN FREE OF COST TO THE INFORMANT.WHERE AN OFFICER-IN-CHARGE REFUSES TO RECORD THE INFORMATION If the officer in charge refuses to record the information, the information may be sent in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him.INVESTIGATION Once the F.I.R. has been registered the investigation in the case shall begin. Accused should get copy of FIR: expertsOur High Court Correspondent Chandigarh, October 1Former Rajasthan High Court Judge Justice J.C. Verma today remarked that there was an anomaly in the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) in so far as the need to provide a copy of the first information report (FIR) or medico-legal report (MLR) to the accused. Speaking at a discussion on the right to have a copy of accusations, FIR and MLR, organised by the Punjab and UT Sections of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) here, Justice Verma said the accused should have a right to get a copy of the FIR/MLR whenever he wanted. "These are basic documents that disclose why a person has been arrested or is to be arrested. Yet, it is unfortunate that the law has not set up any procedure to make getting these vital documents a right of the accused," he said. Mr Jagmohan Chaudhary, Member, Law Commission, Punjab, also talked of the urgent need for an amendment in the Criminal Procedure Code. He said this simple step would go a long way in simplifying the procedure for the grant of bail etc. Advocate T.S. Sangha said though the FIR was a public document and could be inspected in the court, it was not given to the accused. However, the complainant was entitled to get the same, which was ironical. This violated Article 21 of the Constitution, he added. Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association president Anmol Rattan Sidhu, while supporting the other speakers, said if need be, a PIL should be filed in this matter. Advocate Navkiran Singh said the absence of a procedure of the supply of a copy of the FIR/MLR to the accused had given rise to corruption. "The only way to get a copy of these is to bribe the police or the staff of the magistrates," he observed.

What are the changes in occupational pattern in India since 10 years?

Based on the 1991 census, the government estimated that the labor force had grown by more than 65 million since 1981 and that the total number of "main workers"--the "economically active population"--had reached 285.9 million people. This total did not include Jammu and Kashmir, which was not enumerated in the 1991 census. Labor force statistics for 1991 covered nine main-worker "industrial" categories: cultivators (39 percent of the main-worker force); agricultural laborers (26 percent); livestock, forestry, fishing, hunting, plantations, orchards, and allied activities (2 percent); mining and quarrying (1 percent); manufacturing (household 2 percent, other than household 7 percent); construction (2 percent); trade and commerce (8 percent); transportation, storage, and communications (3 percent); and "other services" (10 percent). Another 28.2 million "marginal workers" were also counted in the census but not tabulated among the nine categories even though unpaid farm and family enterprise workers were counted among the nine categories. Of the total work force--both main and marginal workers--29 percent were women, and nearly 78 percent worked in rural areas. Included in the labor force are some 55 million children, other than those working directly for their parents. The Ministry of Labour and nongovernmental organizations estimate that there are 25 million children employed in the agricultural sector, 20 million in service jobs (hotels, shops, and as servants in homes), and 5 million in the handloom, carpet-making, gem-cutting, and match-making industries. With mixed success, nongovernmental organizations monitor the child labor market for abuse and conformity to child labor laws. In government organizations throughout the nation and in nonagricultural enterprises with twenty-five persons or more in 1991, the public sector employed nearly 19 million people compared with about 8 million people employed in the private sector. Most of the growth in the organized work force between 1970 and 1990 was in the public sector. Observers expected that this trend might be reversed if the government's policy of economic liberalization continued. Labor law makes it very difficult for companies to lay off workers. Some observers feel that this restriction deters companies from hiring because they fear carrying a bloated workforce in case of an economic turndown. A new source of employment appeared after OPEC sharply increased crude oil prices in 1974. The Middle East oil-exporting countries quickly undertook massive development programs based on their large oil revenues. Most of these countries required the importation of labor, both skilled and unskilled, and India became one of many nations supplying the labor. Because some labor agents and employers took advantage of expatriate workers, especially those with little education or few skills, in 1983 India enacted a law governing workers going abroad. In general, the new legislation provided more protection and required fairer treatment of Indians employed outside the country. By 1983 some 900,000 Indian workers were registered as temporary residents in the Middle East. In the mid-1980s, there was a shift in the kinds of skills needed. Fewer laborers, metalworkers, and engineers, for example, were required for construction projects, but the need for maintenance workers and operating staff in power plants, hospitals, and offices increased. In 1990 it was estimated that more than 1 million Indians were resident in the Middle East. India benefited not only from the opening of job opportunities but also from the remittances the workers sent back, which amounted to around US$4.3 billion of foreign exchange in FY 1988. Both employment and remittances suffered as a result of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when about 180,000 Indian workers were displaced. In the mid-1990s, the outlook for Indian employment in the Middle East was only fair. India's labor force exhibits extremes ranging from large numbers of illiterate workers unaccustomed to machinery or routine, to a sizable pool of highly educated scientists, technicians, and engineers, capable of working anywhere in the world. A substantial number of skilled people have left India to work abroad; the country has suffered a brain drain since independence. Nonetheless, many remain in India working alongside a trained industrial and commercial work force. Administrative skills, particularly necessary in large projects or programs, are in short supply, however. In the mid-1990s, salaries for top administrators and technical staff rose sharply, partly in response to the arrival of foreign companies in India. The Trade Unions Act of 1926 provided recognition and protection for a nascent Indian labor union movement. The number of unions grew considerably after independence, but most unions are small and usually active in only one firm. Union membership is concentrated in the organized sector, and in the early 1990s total membership was about 9 million. Many unions are affiliated with regional or national federations, the most important of which are the Indian National Trade Union Congress, the All-India Trade Union Congress, the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, the Indian Workers' Association, and the United Trade Union Congress. Politicians have often been union leaders, and some analysts believe that strikes and other labor protests are called primarily to further the interests of political parties rather than to promote the interests of the work force. The government recorded 1,825 strikes and lockouts in 1990. As a result, 24.1 million workdays were lost, 10.6 million to strikes and 13.5 million to lockouts. More than 1.3 million workers were involved in these labor disputes. The number and seriousness of strikes and lockouts have varied from year to year. However, the figures for 1990 and preliminary data from 1991 indicate declines from levels reached in the 1980s, when in some years as many as 35 million workdays were lost because of labor disputes. The isolated, insecure, and exploited laborers in rural areas and in the urban unorganized sectors present a stark contrast to the position of unionized workers in many modern enterprises. In the early 1990s, there were estimates that between 10 percent and 20 percent of agricultural workers were bonded laborers. The International Commission of Jurists, studying India's bonded labor, defines such a person as one who works for a creditor or someone in the creditor's family against nominal wages in cash or kind until the creditor, who keeps the books and sets the prices, declares the loan repaid, often with usurious rates of interest. The system sometimes extends to a debtor's wife and children, who are employed in appalling working conditions and exposed to sexual abuse. The constitution, as interpreted by India's Supreme Court, and a 1976 law prohibit bonded labor. Implementation of the prohibition, however, has been inconsistent in many rural areas. Many in the urban unorganized sector are self-employed laborers, street vendors, petty traders, and other services providers who receive little income. Along with the unemployed, they have no unemployment insurance or other benefits.

Adm jabalpur vs union of India case?

ADM Jabalpur case: A Supreme mistake-- By Rajindar Sachar[ Also see, K. G. Kannabiran's response: The court has always held against liberty ]Certain decisions taken by their highest courts continue to shame all countries, particularly the legal fraternity of their civil society. It was the United States Supreme Court's declaration in the Dred Scott case, that a slave was a private property that ultimately resulted in the civil war. The decision in the Liversidge versus Anderson (House of Lords, 1942) case, blasting all civil and political rights of citizens in wartime, makes English judges run for cover even now. In India, the Supreme Court judgment in ADM Jabalpur, holding that the right to life did not survive during Emergency, would continue to proclaim the pusillanimity of the Supreme Court in refusing to act as a sentinel to safeguard human rights.Many politicians, journalists, and social activists were arrested by Ms Indira Gandhi under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) on non-existent or frivolous grounds after Emergency was declared in 1975. The detentions were challenged, but they were met with the government's plea that Article 21 was the sole repository of liberty, and that as the right to move for enforcement of that right had been suspended by the Presidential order of June 27, 1975, petitions were liable to be dismissed at the threshold. This objection having been overruled by nine high courts, the appeal was heard by a five-judge bench in the Supreme Court. Only one of them, Justice Khanna, showed courage in negating this totalitarian claim. Two of them, Justices Chandrachud and Bhagwati (who it was generally assumed would side with the liberties of citizens), however, wilted and joined Chief Justice Ray, and Justice Beg (who in any case no one expected to go against the government) in dismissing the habeas corpus petitions. It was to take another 21 months and people's simmering anger to get rid of Emergency.There are still reasons as to why Chandrachud and Bhagwati decided as they did. For their conclusion, they relied on the single most important case of Liversidge vs Anderson (1942), wherein the House of Lords in England by majority (the sole dissenter being Lord Atkin) had held that the Home Secretary's opinion that a person should be detained was final and not renewable by the court.Khanna, in his powerful dissent, held that Article 21 could not be considered to be the sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty, and such right could not be taken away under any circumstance without the authority of law, in a society governed by rule of law.But Chandrachud and Bhagwati allowed themselves to be persuaded otherwise by following the majority decision in Liversidge to the effect that the opinion of the detaining authority was not challengeable, to the extent that even if a policeman were to shoot a citizen maliciously and capriciously there was no remedy to that action in a court of law.But surprisingly, both these judges ignored Lord Atkin who was caustic about those judges who "show themselves more Executive minded than the Executive" and commented that such arguments might be addressed acceptably to the Court of King's Bench in the time of Charles I.It is however unexplainable how Chandrachud and Bhagwati chose to ignore that soon after the Liversidge decision was given there had been vociferous support given by jurists to Lord Atkin's views as against the majority view. In fact, one Justice Stable was so upset that he said that the status of the judiciary had been reduced "to mice squeaking under a chair in the Home Office."Lord Radcliffe (1951) (HL) said that "it would be a very unfortunate thing if Liversidge's case were regarded as laying down any general rule."In 1963 Lord Reid (HL) referred dismissively to "the very peculiar case in Liversidge vs Anderson" and said, "it should be confined, apparently to a wartime context," and "that it is already clear that the decision was regarded as an aberration."The trenchant criticism of the Liversidge judgment had been available in various law quarterly reviews since the beginning. A review available in Law Quarterly Review (1970) clearly spelled out how embarrassing the decision in Liversidge was becoming for the English judiciary. And yet our Supreme Court surprisingly chose to follow the majority view. The embarrassment was becoming more and more intolerable as time went on. That is why Lord Diplock (HL) in 1979 was constrained to rule "For my part I think the time has come to acknowledge openly that the majority… in Liversidge vs Anderson were expedient and, at that time, wrong and the dissenting right." And Lord Scarman hit the final nail by saying that "the ghost of that decision need no longer haunt law."Some commentators have ironically described the majority in the Liversidge case as the court's contribution to the war effort of England. Similarly, in our country people are inclined to describe the majority in the Jabalpur case as the Supreme Court's contribution to the continuance of the 1975 Emergency. I am inclined to agree. Had the Supreme Court taken the same view as the nine high courts, the Emergency would have collapsed immediately because no court could have upheld the detention of stalwarts and patriots like Jayprakash Narayan, Morarji Desai, Bhimsen Sachar, Madhu Limaye, and thousands of others on the ground that they were a danger to the security of the country. The inevitable result would have been the immediate release of these leaders, leading to an overwhelming Opposition movement which would have swept away the Indira Gandhi government by the end of 1975, earlier than in 1977.But alas, all this is in the realm of speculation. The Supreme Court did not show courage and this case will continue to haunt the Court and the judicial fraternity. We will never be able to live it down. How future of nations can be influenced by the pusillanimity of a few individuals, but then such is life. However, we may not have to pass through that darkness again, because the 44th Amendment to the Constitution (1978) has taken away the power of the President to suspend Article 21. But still we must continue to remember that "eternal vigilance is the price nations must pay for safeguarding the liberties of individuals."A.D.M. Jabalpur vs ShuklaWhen the Supreme Court struck down the Habeas Corpus-- By Jos. Peter D 'SouzaApril 28th, 1976 is a day never to be forgotten by any of us Indians who love the pledges of Justice and Liberty which we gave to ourselves in the Preamble of our Constitution. It was on this day when four of the five senior most Judges of the Supreme Court (including the Hon'ble Chief Justice) struck the first mortal blow to these cherished dreams enshrined in our Constitution. On this day during the Emergency the Supreme Court sank to its lowest when it decided the infamous Habeas Corpus Case with the following conclusion:"In view of the Presidential Order dated 27th June 1975 no person has any locus to move any writ petition under Art. 226 before a High Court for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to challenge the legality of an order of detention on the ground that the order is not under or in compliance with the Act or is illegal or is vitiated by mala fides factual or legal or is based on extraneous considerations."The Presidential Order referred to was the one issued during Emergency declaring that the right of any person to move any Court for any enforcement of the rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the above mentioned rights shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation of Emergency are in force.28th April, 2001, we complete twenty-five years of this horrific day when four of the five senior most Judges of the Supreme Court of the world's largest democracy could unabashedly declare that under those circumstances no one could seek the assistance of any court in India to try and save his liberty, life or limb threatened to be taken away by the State. A day, which produced a judgment so shameful that even Hitler would have blushed, had he the opportunity to peruse it!The question was simple: Despite the Presidential proclamation, can the High Court entertain a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person challenging his detention? All High Courts that had answered the question, had done so in the affirmative and had kept their doors open to those unfortunate who dared risk the wrath of some petty governmental official. Against the unanimous decision of the High Courts, four of the five senior most Hon'ble Justices of the Supreme Court thought it fit to rule otherwise. They were the then Chief Justice A.N. Ray, along with Justices M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud and P.N. Bhagwati. The Supreme Court had effectively ordered the High Courts to slam shut their doors and windows. The lone dissenting voice was that of Justice H.R. Khanna of whom the New York Times remarked: 'surely a statue would be erected to him in an Indian city'.Justice Khanna, conscious of his aloneness, ended his judgment with a quote:"As observed by Chief Justice Huges, Judges are not there simply to decide cases, but to decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they cannot always agree, it is better that their independence should be maintained and recognized than that unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice. A dissent in a Court of last resort, to use his words, is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possible correct the error into which the dissenting Judge believes the court to have been betrayed."Justice Khanna paid the price for his dissent. He was next in line to become Chief Justice of India. He resigned when his junior, Justice M.H. Beg, superseded him. That was justice Indira Gandhi style.It all started with the election of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, which had been held to be invalid by the Allahabad High Court. Wanting to cling to the chair at any cost, she chose to declare emergency as on 25th June 1975 - the pretext being 'internal threat' to India (read INDIRA). Censorship muzzled the Press, which could not publish the numerous arrests of vast sections of people. Any person who was considered to be a political threat, or who could politically voice his opposition was detained without trial under Preventive Detention laws one of which was the dreaded MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act). The opposition was silenced. The common man terrorized.Many who had been arrested challenged their detention by filing writs of habeas corpus under Article 226 in various High Courts. In most High Courts, the State Governments had raised the issue as to whether such writs were maintainable on the ground that in light of the Presidential Order the right to file such writ was taken away. The High Courts of Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Delhi, Karnataka, Madras, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, and Rajasthan had all rejected the Government's argument and held that despite the suspension of fundamental rights, a person detained could demonstrate that their detention was not in compliance with the law (under which he or she was detained), or that the State action was mala fide, or that there was a mistake of identity. Having received a drubbing nine to nil, the Government (read Indira Gandhi) decided to appeal against these decisions to the Supreme Court. It was thus that the Constitutional bench of five Judges came to be constituted to hear and decide the most crucial case in Indian legal history referred to in all law reports as A.D.M. Jabalpur vs. Shukla.Niren De, the then Attorney General began the arguments on 14th December 1975. He focused on the aspect of 'liberty' as found in Art.21 of the Constitution. His central contention was that since the right to move any Court had been suspended, the detenue had no locus standi and their writ petitions would necessarily have to be dismissed. It was on the next day that Justice Khanna was to ask the first uncomfortable question. "Life is also mentioned in Article 21 and would Government argument extend to it also?". There was no escape. Without batting an eyelid Niren De answered, 'Even if life was taken away illegally, courts are helpless'. [Remember the Nazi holocaust]. The case was argued for over two months. Judgment was reserved. It was only when an application was moved for the pronouncement of the judgment that it was read in open Court on that dark and ignominious 28th April 1976.And so was delivered the biggest blow to the Supreme Court, by the Supreme Court.This one case is a glaring example of how the four wise Judges of the Supreme Court tried to outdo themselves in being more loyal to the throne than the king himself. The final order goes way beyond what was demanded of them by the plea of the Union of India. All the individual judgments of Ray (C.J.), Beg, Chandrachud & Bhagwati (JJ) record in extensio the submissions of the Attorney-General on behalf of the government wherein he made the claim that the detenue had no right to approach the Court to challenge his detention.They also record the concession of the Attorney-General to the effect that despite this general ban the Courts may grant relief if the detention order is on the face of it bad, as for example, if it is passed by a person not authorized to pass it, or if it is passed for a purpose outside those mentioned in Section 3(1) of the MISA or if it does not bear signature at all. The Attorney General had thus handed over to the Supreme Court the same key with which all High Courts had earlier used to keep ajar their doors for the detenues to squeeze through and enter. The Supreme Court, instead, preferred to throw away this key to their own self-respect. The majority judgment, literally taken, and as understood thereafter by all High Courts, clearly directed that detenues were to be stopped at the doors if not in the corridors of the halls of Justice.Another shocking aspect of A. D. M. Jabalpur is that it establishes beyond doubt our Judges do really live in ivory towers totally oblivious of the ground realities. In speaking of the Emergency and the condition of those detained Justice Beg has this to say: "We understand that the care and concern bestowed by the State authorities upon the welfare of detenues who are well housed, well fed and well treated, is almost maternal." Justice Chandrachud went further in his eulogy when he ended his Judgment stating: "Counsel after counsel expressed the fear that during the emergency, the executive may whip and strip and starve the detenue and if this be our judgment, even shoot him down. Such misdeeds have not tarnished the record of Free India and I have a diamond-bright, diamond-hard hope that such things will never come to pass."Chief Justice Ray had the audacity to chide counsel for the detenues who brought to mind the nazi gas chambers. He voiced his belief that people who have faith in themselves and in their country will not paint pictures of diabolic distortion and mendacious malignment of the governance of the country.We will never know if any of these men ate their words when a year later on 24th May, 1977 The Times Of India reported: "The Calicut Regional Engineering student Mr. P. Rajan, 'died while in unlawful police custody at Kakayam Police Camp on 2 March 1976, as a result of continuous police torture with iron and wooden rollers'. This was admitted in the returns filed in the form of affidavits by respondents, including the former Chief Minister, Mr. K. Karunakaran before the Div. Bench of the Kerala High Court."A special mention must be made of Justice Bhagwati the man who had a knack with words and who knew how to use them to play to the gallery. Though Justice Khanna had held high the torch of freedom, it was Justice Bhagwati who spoke grandiosely about liberty. It was Mark Anthony updated for the occasion telling us how much he loved liberty, but, how much more he loved the law. Let us read his own words: "I have always leaned in favour of upholding personal liberty, for, I believe, it is one of the most cherished values of mankind, without it life would not be worth living. It is one of the pillars of free democratic society. Men have readily laid down their lives at its altar, in order to secure it, protect it and preserve it. But I do not think it would be right for me to allow my love of personal liberty to cloud my vision or to persuade me to place on the relevant provision of the Constitution a construction which its language cannot reasonably bear."Yes, his intense love for the Constitution could not permit him to read into it things which were not there. Yet, all this he did, and much more a little later in the case of Indira Gandhi's daughter in law, Maneka Gandhi, when the Janata Government had impounded her passport. When it came to the then famous daughter-in-law's case, Justice Bhagwati read the Constitution like a visionary and prophet finding within its pages and between the lines the famous principle that laws have to be 'right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive'. He also brought in the theory that the soul of natural justice was fair play in action.Last year on 25th June we brought back to mind the proclamation of Emergency being the start of the darkest period in Indian democracy. If this were so then we should never forget that during this dark period, the 28th April, 1976, was its blackest day. It is all the more important to remember this day since we the people of India have grown accustomed to being ruled by preventive detention laws where thousands are being jailed without trial. Over and above this, Government after Government is attempting to bring in laws which put to shame both MISA and TADA combined. The Judiciary has failed us once. If we, the people of India, forget this, we will be condemning ourselves sooner or later to history repeating itself. So let us always remember A.D.M.

Are India's false claims on Kashmir valid?

On October 28th 1993, Washington D.C. stated that it did not recognise the fraudulent Instrument of Accession to India as meaning that Kashmir is not forever more an integral part of India. She expressed the view that the whole of Kashmir is a disputed territory, the future status of which must be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir.The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), based in Geneva, recently, passed a resolution proclaiming Kashmir's accession to India as bogus and null and void. The ICJ went further by condemning the human rights violations in Occupied Kashmir. These events serve to highlight the disputed status of Kashmir by focusing on the fraudulent nature of the Instrument of Accession which was 'signed' by the Mahrajah of Kashmir on 26th October 1947.The Indians claim that the Instrument of Accession was signed by Mahrajah Hari Singh on 26th October 1947, in which the Mahrajah agreed to accede to India in return for military assistance to put down the popular rebellion against him, seen at that time as an invasion by tribesmen from neighbouring Pakistan. The details of the accession were worked out between the Kashmiri Prime Minister, MC Mahajan and the Indian official, VP Menon, in Dehli. However, there are serious doubts about the signing of the document. Alastair Lamb (in his book, Kashmir - A disputed legacy 1846-1990) points out that the Instrument of Accession could not have been signed by the Mahrajah on 26th October as he was travelling by road to Jammu (a distance of over 350 Km). There is no evidence to suggest that a meeting or communication of any kind took place on 26th October 1947. In fact it was on 27th October 1947 that the Mahrajah was informed by his MC Mahajan and VP Menon (who had flown into Srinagar), the the Instrument of Accession had already been negotiated in Dehli. The Mahrajah did not in fact sign the Instrument of Accession, if at all, until 27th October 1947. This sheds doubts on the actions of the Indian regime. Some Indian troops had already arrived and secured Srinagar airfield during the middle of October 1947. On 26th October 1947, a further massive airlift brought thousands of Indian troops to Kashmir - BEFORE the signing of the Accession. Therefore, this situation begs the question: would the Mahrajah have signed the Instrument of Accession had the Indian troops not been on Kashmiri soil?No satisfactory original of the Instrument of Accession has ever been produced in an international forum; a published form has always been shown. Further, the document was not presented to Pakistan or to the UN. In the summer of 1995, the Indian authorities reported the original document as lost or stolen. This sheds further doubt on whether the Mahrajah actually signed the Instrument of Accession.The Governor-General of India at the time, Lord Mountbatten, stipulated that the permanent accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union will only be accepted once the people of Kashmir had been consulted. He noted in a letter to the Mahrajah, "the question of the states's accession should be settled by a reference to the people".Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General of India, on conditionally accepting the Instrument of Accession wrote:"consistently with their policy that in the case of any state where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state. "Furthermore, when the Kashmir crisis broke out in October 1947, the principle of reference to the people through plebiscite was already established as similar disputes in some other states had been resolved this way. The Indian Prime Minister J Nehru, accepted this principle and reiterated his position in a letter to the British Prime Minister on 25th October 1947, "our view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that the question of accession in any disputed territory must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people and we adhere to this view". Therefore, at the time of the so-called accession, the Indian regime accepted the principle of reference to the people. Based on this principle, the Instrument of Accession should have been provisional and conditional upon the outcome of a plebiscite.When India took the Kashmir issue to the UN in 1948, it did so under article 35 of Chapter VI which outlines the means for a peaceful settlement of disputes. It is interesting to note here that India did not present the Kashmir case under the UN Chapter VII which relates to acts of aggression as India was alleging Pakistan. Therefore, it is evident that by raising the issue under Chapter VI, India recognised the Kashmir issue as a dispute, thus conceding that the Instrument of Accession had not confirmed the state to be an integral part of India. India is still party to all the UN resolutions on Kashmir. Moreover, India and Pakistan accepted the UN resolutions of January 1948 calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir to exercise the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. India's acceptance of the UN resolutions establishes beyond a doubt, that the future of status of Kashmir would be determined by its people. Therefore, the Instrument of Accession, even if genuine, is rendered null and void.In the past, attempts to hold a plebiscite have been met with fierce opposition from India. India has known, right from the start, that the result of a plebiscite is a foregone conclusion - the population of Kashmir would have voted to rid themselves of Indian rule. This has been the case from 26th October 1947 to the present day. On the practicality of holding a plebiscite, a paper by the US state department, presented to the UN on 2nd December 1947, noted , "the dominion of India may attempt to establish the extant electoral rolls on the basis for the referendum. As these rolls are said to contain less than 7% of the population and were compiled on a basis which served the weight to the members of the wealthiest educated Hindu majority who would obviously vote for accession to India, it is important that the electoral body should in fact be composed on a basis of complete adult suffrage in order that the result of the referendum may be representative of the actual wishes of the people of Kashmir".In view of the above arguments, it is clear that the Indian case on Kashmir is politically, legally and morally unjustified. The commitment made by India and the UN to allow the people of the state to choose their own future are neither time bound nor do they provide an escape clause for the Indian regime. It is only through fraud and repression that India continues to forcefully occupy a large portion of Kashmir.These events serve to highlight the disputed status of Kashmir by focusing on the fraudulent nature of the Instrument of Accession which was 'signed' by the Mahrajah of Kashmir on 26th October 1947.The Indians claim that the Instrument of Accession was signed by Mahrajah Hari Singh on 26th October 1947, in which the Mahrajah agreed to accede to India in return for military assistance to put down the popular rebellion against him, seen at that time as an invasion by tribesmen from neighbouring Pakistan. The details of the accession were worked out between the Kashmiri Prime Minister, MC Mahajan and the Indian official, VP Menon, in Dehli. However, there are serious doubts about the signing of the document. Alastair Lamb (in his book, Kashmir - A disputed legacy 1846-1990) points out that the Instrument of Accession could not have been signed by the Mahrajah on 26th October as he was travelling by road to Jammu (a distance of over 350 Km). There is no evidence to suggest that a meeting or communication of any kind took place on 26th October 1947. In fact it was on 27th October 1947 that the Mahrajah was informed by his MC Mahajan and VP Menon (who had flown into Srinagar), the the Instrument of Accession had already been negotiated in Dehli. The Mahrajah did not in fact sign the Instrument of Accession, if at all, until 27th October 1947. This sheds doubts on the actions of the Indian regime. Some Indian troops had already arrived and secured Srinagar airfield during the middle of October 1947. On 26th October 1947, a further massive airlift brought thousands of Indian troops to Kashmir - BEFORE the signing of the Accession. Therefore, this situation begs the question: would the Mahrajah have signed the Instrument of Accession had the Indian troops not been on Kashmiri soil?No satisfactory original of the Instrument of Accession has ever been produced in an international forum; a published form has always been shown. Further, the document was not presented to Pakistan or to the UN. In the summer of 1995, the Indian authorities reported the original document as lost or stolen. This sheds further doubt on whether the Mahrajah actually signed the Instrument of Accession.The Governor-General of India at the time, Lord Mountbatten, stipulated that the permanent accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union will only be accepted once the people of Kashmir had been consulted. He noted in a letter to the Mahrajah, "the question of the states's accession should be settled by a reference to the people". Furthermore, when the Kashmir crisis broke out in October 1947, the principle of reference to the people through plebiscite was already established as similar disputes in some other states had been resolved this way. The Indian Prime Minister J Nehru, accepted this principle and reiterated his position in a letter to the British Prime Minister on 25th October 1947, "our view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that the question of accession in any disputed territory must be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people and we adhere to this view".Therefore, at the time of the so-called accession, the Indian regime accepted the principle of reference to the people. Based on this principle, the Instrument of Accession should have been provisional and conditional upon the outcome of a plebiscite.When India took the Kashmir issue to the UN in 1948, it did so under article 35 of Chapter VI which outlines the means for a peaceful settlement of disputes. It is interesting to note here that India did not present the Kashmir case under the UN Chapter VII which relates to acts of aggression as India was alleging Pakistan. Therefore, it is evident that by raising the issue under Chapter VI, India recognised the Kashmir issue as a dispute, thus conceding that the Instrument of Accession had not confirmed the state to be an integral part of India. India is still party to all the UN resolutions on Kashmir. Moreover, India and Pakistan accepted the UN resolutions of January 1948 calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir to exercise the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir. India's acceptance of the UN resolutions establishes beyond a doubt, that the future of status of Kashmir would be determined by its people. Therefore, the Instrument of Accession, even if genuine, is rendered null and void.In the past, attempts to hold a plebiscite have been met with fierce opposition from India. India has known, right from the start, that the result of a plebiscite is a foregone conclusion - the population of Kashmir would have voted to rid themselves of Indian rule. This has been the case from 26th October 1947 to the present day. On the practicality of holding a plebiscite, a paper by the US state department, presented to the UN on 2nd December 1947, noted , "the dominion of India may attempt to establish the extant electoral rolls on the basis for the referendum. As these rolls are said to contain less than 7% of the population and were compiled on a basis which served the weight to the members of the wealthiest educated Hindu majority who would obviously vote for accession to India, it is important that the electoral body should in fact be composed on a basis of complete adult suffrage in order that the result of the referendum may be representative of the actual wishes of the people of Kashmir".In view of the above arguments, it is clear that the Indian case on Kashmir is politically, legally and morally unjustified. The commitment made by India and the UN to allow the people of the state to choose their own future are neither time bound nor do they provide an escape clause for the Indian regime. It is only through fraud and repression that India continues to forcefully occupy a large portion of Kashmir.

Who rejected the verdicts of jurists that idol worshippers are liable to be murdered?

Add your answer:

Does France use sharia law?

In India how does the police first information report FIR works-. is a copy of FIR available to accused person?

What are the changes in occupational pattern in India since 10 years?

Adm jabalpur vs union of India case?

Are India's false claims on Kashmir valid?

When was International Commission of Jurists created?

How do you become a jurist?

What has the author Howard Tolley written?

What is the law in Iran?

Why were roman jurists able to provide a systematic framework for roman law because?

Formal collective word for all the judges in the legal system?

Who were Roman jurors?

Who is the patron saint of jurors?

What are the jurists' beliefs?

What has the author Karen Stiebitz written?

What do jurists do?

Which group of people spread the teachings of Islam?

Resources

Top Categories

Product

Company