State Constitutions (United States)

South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 US 177 (1938)

Barnwell Brothers, Inc. was an interstate trucking operation headquartered in Burlington, NC, a state adjoining South Carolina. In 1933, the South Carolina General Assembly passed Act 259 (38 Stat. 340), which placed restrictions on the size and weight of freight trucks allowed on its highways. The Act limited the width of semis to 90 inches, and the total unit weight (cab, trailer and load) to 20,000 pounds.

The law also prohibited trucks from using bridges the Highway Department concluded were "not constructed with sufficient strength to support the heavy trucks of modern traffic or too narrow to accommodate such traffic safely." The Highway Department placed signs on either side of the bridges, requiring trucks over the specified size and weight limit find alternate routes.

Barnwell Brothers sought an injunction against South Carolina, preventing them from enforcing the law on the grounds that the statute placed an undue burden on interstate commerce and violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. They also argued the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 superseded the South Carolina state law.

The trial court conducted an independent investigation and concluded that 85-90% of the freight carriers on the road were 96 inches wide (6 inches wider than permitted by South Carolina law) and, when loaded, weighed in excess of ten tons (heavier than allowed by South Carolina law). On this basis, the lower court agreed South Carolina placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.

South Carolina appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

The Barnwell Brothers attempted to invoke federal intervention under the Constitution's Interstate Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3) that conferred to Congress the right to regulate commerce with foreign nations, between the states, and with Native American tribes. Earlier Supreme Court cases tended to overturn state laws and policies that placed burdens on commerce; however, the justices hearing Barnwell were more supportive of states' rights, and believed many past rulings imposed too much control over the states.

In Barnwell, the sitting Court appeared to overcorrect. In finding for the state of South Carolina, the Supreme Court declared regulation of local traffic was reasonable under the Dormant Commerce Clause (an inverse interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause that allows states to pass legislation in the absence of controlling federal legislation). South Carolina passed Act 239 in 1933, two years before the Federal Motor Carrier Act, and was therefore within its rights under the Dormant Commerce Clause.

Although South Carolina's highways were constructed with partial funding from the federal government, the state built, owned and maintained the roads. In the Opinion of the Court, Justice Stone wrote:

"Here, the first inquiry has already been resolved by our decisions that a state may impose nondiscriminatory restrictions with respect to the character of motor vehicles moving in interstate commerce as a safety measure and as a means of securing the economical use of its highways....

"Since the adoption of one weight or width regulation, rather than another, is a legislative, not a judicial, choice, its constitutionality is not to be determined by weighing in the judicial scales the merits of the legislative choice and rejecting it if the weight of evidence presented in court appears to favor a different standard....

"In view of the varying conditions of traffic, and lack of uniformity in highway construction in the several States, no uniform gross weight limitations are here recommended for general adoption throughout the country.

"The present weight limitation was recommended by the commission after a full consideration of relevant data, including a report by the state engineer who had constructed the concrete highways of the state and who advised a somewhat lower limitation as necessary for their preservation. The fact that many states have adopted a different standard is not persuasive. The conditions under which highways must be built in the several states, their construction and the demands made upon them, are not uniform. The roadbuilding art, as the record shows, is far from having attained a scientific certainty and precision, and scientific precision is not the criterion for the exercise of the constitutional regulatory power of the states."

Further, the Court determined that neither the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause nor the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 applied. While the Court acknowledged South Carolina's law imposed a burden on interstate commerce, it concluded "regulating state highways is...peculiarly of local concern." Since Act 239 was inclusive of both interstate and intrastate trucking and didn't create an unfair trade advantage.

[This decision faced criticism in later years.]