Clear and Present Danger Test

The words “clear and present danger,” first used as a casual phrase by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, became an important test for determining whether speech is protected by the First Amendment. Holmes introduced this phrase in Schenck v. United States, a 1919 opinion for a unanimous Court upholding against First Amendment challenges the convictions of socialists who had distributed antiwar circulars to men accepted for military service in World War I. In explaining why the defendants could constitutionally be punished for violating the prohibition in the 1917 Espionage Act against obstruction of recruitment, Holmes wrote, “The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent” (p. 52). Relying on the prevailing bad tendency test he himself had applied in previous cases involving speech, Holmes reasoned that in the circumstances of war these circulars had a tendency to obstruct recruitment. In Frohwerk v. United States and Debs v. United States, two companion unanimous decisions that also invoked the bad tendency of antiwar speech in affirming convictions under the Espionage Act, Holmes did not mention clear and present danger.

Even though Holmes used the phrase “clear and present danger” only in Schenck and relied on the bad tendency test in all three opinions, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., then a young professor at Harvard Law School, soon wrote a law review article claiming that Holmes intended the clear and present danger test to make “the punishment of words for their bad tendency impossible.” As Justices Holmes and Louis Brandeis rapidly became more sensitive to the value of free speech during the “Red Scare” following the war, they found it useful to rely on Chafee's misconstruction of clear and present danger in Schenck to express their developing views without repudiating their prior decisions. From the dissent by Holmes in Abrams v. United States (1919) through the concurrence by Brandeis in Whitney v. California (1927), Holmes and Brandeis elaborated the meaning of clear and present danger in ways that transformed it into a First Amendment test providing substantial protection for dissident speech. Most significantly, they infused an immediacy requirement into the clear and present danger test that precluded punishment of speech unless it imminently threatened an illegal act. Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney, moreover, belatedly responded to the majority's assertion in Gitlow v. New York (1925) that both the bad tendency test and the clear and present danger variant apply only “in those cases where the statute merely prohibits certain acts involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference to language itself” (p. 670). A statute that itself defines speech as criminal, Brandeis insisted in Whitney, is also subject to judicial review under the clear and present danger test.

The Supreme Court majority continued throughout the 1920s to apply the traditional bad tendency test and did not refer to clear and present danger when it first overturned convictions on First Amendment grounds in the early 1930s. From the late 1930s to the early 1950s, many majority decisions did rely on the clear and present danger test previously developed by Holmes and Brandeis to protect speech in a wide variety of contexts, and the Court never referred to clear and present danger in decisions that denied First Amendment claims. Yet at the height of Cold War fear about a communist conspiracy, the Court in Dennis v. United States (1951) removed the immediacy requirement and accepted Judge Learned Hand's reformulation of the clear and present danger test: “whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger” (p. 510). Applying this new standard, the Court upheld the convictions of eleven Communist party leaders for conspiring to advocate the violent overthrow of government (see Communism and Cold War).

Since the Dennis decision, the Supreme Court has largely ignored but has not entirely abandoned the clear and present danger test while developing different doctrines to analyze a proliferating range of First Amendment issues. The clear and present danger test may have resurfaced in the Court's 1969 per curiam opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio, which reversed the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under a state statute prohibiting the advocacy of criminal syndicalism. In an abrupt holding accompanied by scant and unconvincing analysis of prior decisions, the Court declared that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” (p. 447). Several scholars have interpreted this passage, although it does not contain the phrase “clear and present danger,” as combining the immediacy requirement derived from the Holmes‐Brandeis opinions with a further requirement that speech constitute an incitement to illegal action. The Court has not subsequently elaborated its analysis in Brandenberg and has applied it only infrequently, leaving its meaning uncertain, particularly in contexts other than subversive advocacy.

See also Speech and the Press.

Bibliography

• David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine. University of Chicago Law Review 50 (Fall 1983): 1205–1355

— David M. Rabban