Prince Otto von Bismarck

Bismarck, Prince Otto von, Duke of Lauenburg (1815-98). The ‘Iron Chancellor’, Prussian statesman, architect of German unity, and eventual elder statesman of Europe, Bismarck is identified with the concept of realpolitik, which for him included a degree of enlightened liberalism (the first European ‘welfare’ programmes were devised by him) to keep the populace happy while he concentrated on more serious matters. Personally tough, aggressive, energetic, and with an overpowering personal presence, Bismarck wrote that ‘having to go through life with principles is like walking down a forest path with a stick in one's mouth’. Nonetheless, he had some, particularly the dominance of his class, the junkers, over Prussia, and of Prussia over the fragmented Germany.

Bismarck's career has suffered from efforts during and after WW II to suggest a continuity between the modern Nazis and the Prussians of yore, ignoring the fact that the remains of the Prussian aristocracy did produce opposition to Hitler. Some historians argue that the creation of the Nazi state was a development of the Kaiserreich, and that the ‘blood and iron’ ethos of nationalism, autocracy, and militarism fostered by Bismarck led directly to National Socialism. The atheist and racist Third Reich would have been anathema to Bismarck, himself a man of dour and unbending faith, and married into a family of extremely pious Lutherans. Not that it stopped him freely breaking most of the commandments, but his success gave him the comforting assurance that he was fulfilling God's will. He was, therefore, very much more a Hegelian than the Nietzschean monster it suits some to portray him as.

Bismarck came from a family of junkers with estates in Pomerania, the heartland of Prussia. After serving in minor diplomatic posts, he had settled down to run his ancestral estate until he deputized for the local parliamentary delegate in Berlin, where he discovered his true métier. He was a loud and uncompromising reactionary during the revolutions and unrest of 1848, a reputation he carried with him when elected to the second chamber. Although some of his qualities were instinctive, his real schooling in realpolitik came from service as the Prussian delegate to the German Confederation at Frankfurt between 1851-8, where he saw for himself how tenuous was the authority of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and how Prussia might move into the vacuum of power.

When Wilhelm I succeeded his brother on the Prussian throne, Bismarck was posted as ambassador to St Petersburg, then to Paris, and finally he was summoned to become the chief minister of Prussia in September 1862. Unable to get the military budget he required from parliament he governed by means of royal decrees, keeping his king reassured and depending on a bureaucracy that yearned for the smack of firm government. His contempt for the elected representatives of the people was confirmed when they rallied to him two years later, when he took Prussia to war against Denmark to resolve the ‘Schleswig-Holstein question’, permanently. The inevitable Austro-Prussian clash came in 1866, in which ‘Prussian soldiers fought for a modern Germany; the Austrian troops battled for an ageing empire’, while Bismarck's diplomacy ensured the neutrality of Russia and France. Next on the checklist, he provoked the French by sending what was seen as an insulting telegram, and later recalled Moltke ‘the Elder’ rubbing his hands in glee when the war they both wanted came about. He used the Franco-Prussian war to bring together the scattered principalities of Germany under one banner, the Second Reich being proclaimed at Versailles in January 1871. He thus became the first chancellor of a united Germany, which had become the foremost power in Europe.

Thereafter he spent nineteen years weaving a web of alliances and intrigue to create not so much a balance of power as one of tension, believing that German security was best guaranteed by encouraging rivalries among the other powers. More for this reason than for any illusions about an overseas empire, he joined the scramble for Africa, one of the few European African ventures that was made (ruthlessly) to pay for itself.

Bismarck's tenure was ultimately cut off in 1890 by the insecure and impetuous young Kaiser Wilhelm II, and it can be argued that the ‘balance of tension’ he had created unravelled in the unsteady hands of his successors, leading ultimately to WW I. Perhaps, but he would not have been so foolish as to provoke the British by building a rival battle fleet, destined to spend most of its short life bottled up at Kiel, as he knew it would be. Nor is it likely that he would have entered into an alliance to prop up the ramshackle Austro-Hungarian empire, thus getting sucked into a war on two fronts. Least of all would he, who in his prime kept the far more imposing Wilhelm I firmly in his place, have permitted Wilhelm II to influence policy to the degree that he did. The unification of Germany was his life's work, in which he was greatly assisted by his opponents' inability to analyse the balance of forces realistically. He claimed in his memoirs to have been following a plan from the start, but the evidence suggests that he was a talented opportunist given some golden opportunities by feckless opponents, from which he was able to extract the maximum advantage because he was blessed with a rare ability to think matters through to a logical conclusion.

What emerges is not a power-hungry man, nor a reactionary, nor even a far-sighted liberal—and biographers have advanced all three interpretations—but a true Machiavellian figure for whom the end indeed justified the means. But his objectives were carefully measured on a case by case basis, and his wars were mercifully swift precisely because he did calculate the balance of forces, and moved when he found them favourable. By contrast WW I and even more so WW II were wars fought with unlimited means because the instigators had unlimited ends in mind, the antithesis of realpolitik. Bismarck did not destroy the old Europe of empires; he reaffirmed it and claimed what he saw as Germany's rightful place at the head of the table. Gargantuan appetite though he had, it would never have crossed his mind to try to make mere waiters of the other diners.

— Peter Caddick-Adams/Hugh Bicheno

The German statesman Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck (1815-1898) was largely responsible for the creation of the German Empire in 1871. A leading diplomat of the late 19th century, he was known as the Iron Chancellor.

Otto von Bismarck, born at Schönhausen on April 1, 1815, to Ferdinand von Bismarck-Schönhausen and Wilhelmine Mencken, displayed a willful temperament from childhood. He studied at the University of Göttingen and by 1836 had qualified as a lawyer. But during the following decade he failed to make a career of this or anything else. Tall, slender, and bearded, the young squire was characterized by extravagance, laziness, excessive drinking, needlessly belligerent atheism, and rudeness. In 1847, however, Bismarck made a number of significant changes in his life. He became religious, entered politics as a substitute member of the upper house of the Prussian parliament, and married Johanna von Puttkamer.

In 1851 Frederick William IV appointed Bismarck as Prussian representative to the Frankfurt Diet of the German Confederation. An ingenious but cautious obstructionist of Austria's presidency, Bismarck described Frankfurt diplomacy as "mutually distasteful espionage." He performed well enough, however, to gain advancement to ambassadorial positions at Vienna in 1854, St. Petersburg in 1859, and Paris in 1862. He was astute in his judgment of international affairs and often acid in his comments on foreign leaders; he spoke of Napoleon III as "a sphinx without a riddle," of the Austrian Count Rechberg as "the little bottle of poison," and of the Russian Prince Gorchakov as "the fox in wooden shoes."

Minister-President of Prussia

In 1862 Frederick William's successor, William I, faced a crisis. He sought a larger standing army as a foundation for Prussian foreign policy; but he could not get parliamentary support for this plan, and he needed a strong minister-president who was willing to persist against opposition majorities. War Minister Roon persuaded the King to entrust the government to Bismarck. William attempted to condition the Sept. 22, 1862, appointment by a written agreement limiting the chief minister's part in foreign affairs, but Bismarck easily talked this restriction to shreds.

Bismarck's attempt to conciliate the budget committee foundered on his September 29 remark, "The great questions of the day will not be decided by speeches and resolutions of majorities - that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849 - but by iron and blood." Bismarck complained that the words were misunderstood, but "blood and iron" became an unshakable popular label for his policies.

Bismarck soon turned to foreign affairs. He was determined to achieve Prussian annexation of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein at the expense of Denmark. The history of Schleswig-Holstein during the preceding 2 decades had been stormy, and there were a number of conflicting claims of sovereignty over the territories. Bismarck let the Hohenzollerns, the Prussian ruling family, encourage the Duke of Augustenburg in his claim for Holstein, and the duke established a court at Kiel in Holstein in December 1863. Bismarck then, however, persuaded Austria's Count Rechberg to join in military intervention against the Hohenzollern protégé. This ability to take opposite sides at the same time in a political quarrel for motives ulterior to the issue itself was a Bismarckian quality not always appreciated by his contemporaries. Austro-Prussian forces occupied Holstein and invaded Schleswig in February 1864. The Danes resisted, largely because of a mistaken hope of English help, which Bismarck reportedly assessed with the comment, "If Lord Palmerston sends the British army to Germany, I shall have the police arrest them."

Denmark's 1864 defeat by Austro-Prussian forces led to the 1865 Austro-Prussian Gastein Convention, which exposed Rechberg's folly in committing Austrian troops to an adventure from which only Prussia could profit. Prussia occupied Schleswig, and Austria occupied Holstein, with Prussia to construct, own, and operate a naval base at Kiel and a Kiel-Brunsbüttel canal, both in Holstein. King William made Bismarck a count.

Austro-Prussian War

Bismarck gave Austria a number of opportunities to retreat from its Holstein predicament; when Austria turned to the German Confederation and France for anti-Prussian support, however, Bismarck allied Prussia to Italy. In 1866 Austria mobilized Confederation forces against Prussia, whose Frankfurt representative declared this to be an act of war dissolving the Confederation. The resulting Seven Weeks War led to the defeat of Austria at Königgrätz (July 3) by the Prussian general Moltke. Bismarck persuaded king William to accept the lenient Truce of Nikolsburg (July 26) and Treaty of Prague (August 23).

Prussia's victory enabled Bismarck to achieve Prussian annexation of Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Frankfurt. The newly formed North German Confederation, headed by Prussia and excluding Austria, provided a popularly elected assembly; the Prussian king, however, held veto power on all political issues. The victory over Austria increased Bismarck's power, and he was able to obtain parliamentary approval of an indemnity budget for 4 years of unconstitutional government. Bismarck was also voted a large grant, with which he bought an estate in Farther Pomerania.

Franco-Prussian War

As payment for its neutrality during the Austro-Prussian War, France claimed Belgium. Bismarck held that the 1839 European treaty prevented this annexation, and instead he agreed to neutralize Luxembourg as a concession to the government of Napoleon III. The French were, however, antagonized by Bismarck's actions. In 1870 he heightened French hostility by supporting the claim of Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen to the Spanish throne. The French government demanded Leopold's withdrawal, and Vincent Benedetti, the French ambassador to Prussia, requested formal assurance that no Hohenzollern would ever occupy the Spanish throne. William, who was staying at Bad Ems, declined the request and telegraphed Bismarck an account of the interview. Bismarck edited this "Ems Dispatch" and published an abrupt version that suggested that discussions were over and the guns loaded. His action precipitated the French declaration of war against Prussia on July 19, 1870.

Bismarck's treaties with the South German states brought them into the war against France, and his work at field headquarters transformed these wartime partnerships into a lasting federation. Within 6 weeks the German army had moved through Alsace-Lorraine and forced the surrender of Napoleon III and his army at Sedan (Sept. 2, 1870). But Paris defiantly proclaimed a republic and refused to capitulate. The annexation of occupied Alsace - Lorraine became Bismarck's territorial justification for continuing the war, and the siege of Paris ended in French surrender (Jan. 28, 1871). Alsace-Lorraine became a German imperial territory by the Treaty of Frankfurt (May 10, 1871). The Prussian victory led to the formation of the Reich, a unified German empire under Prussian leadership. William was proclaimed kaiser, or emperor, and Bismarck became chancellor of the empire. Bismarck was also elevated to the rank of prince and given a Friedrichsruh estate.

Chancellor of the Reich (1871-1890)

Bismarck modernized German administration, law, and education in harmony with the economic and technological revolution which was transforming Germany into an industrial society. However, he developed no political system, party, or set of issues to support and succeed him. His Kulturkampf, or vehement opposition to the Catholic Church, was unsuccessful, and his anti-Socialist policies contributed to the wreckage of the Bismarckian parties in the 1890 election.

Among Bismarck's major diplomatic achievements of this period were the establishment of the Dreikaiserbund, or Three Emperors' League (Germany, Russia, Austria), of 1872-1878 and 1881-1887 and the negotiation of the 1879 Austro-German Duplice, the 1882 Austro-German-Italian Triplice, and the secret 1887 Russo-German Reinsurance Treaty. He served as chairman of the 1878 Congress of Berlin, and he also guided the German acquisition of overseas colonies.

The alliances that Bismarck established were not so much instruments of diplomacy as the visible evidence of his comprehensive effort to postpone a hostile coalition of the powers surrounding Germany. Restraining Russia, the strongest of these powers, required the greatest diplomatic effort. Bismarck's diplomacy is sometimes described as aimed at isolating France, but this is a misleadingly simplistic description of the complicated and deceptive methods he employed to lend substance to his statement, "We Germans fear God, but nothing else in the world."

Fall from Power

William I died March 9, 1888, but Bismarck remained as chancellor for Frederick III (who died June 15, 1888) and for 21 months of the reign of William II, last of the Hohenzollern monarchs. Court, press, and political parties discovered in the 29-year-old William an obvious successor to the power of the 73-year-old chancellor. William was intelligent and glib, with a singular capacity as a phrase maker, and his instability was as yet not widely recognized.

On March 15, 1890, William asked either for the right to consult ministers or for Bismarck's resignation; Bismarck's March 18 letter gave the Kaiser a choice between following Bismarck's Russian policy or accepting his resignation. Suppressing this letter, the Kaiser published an acceptance of Bismarck's retirement because of ill health and created him Duke of Lauenburg. Bismarck referred to this title as one he might use for traveling incognito.

Bismarck did not retire gracefully. Domestically he was happy at Friedrichsruh with Johanna, whom he outlived; and their children, Herbert, Bill, and Marie, frequently visited them there. Bismarck, however, used the press to harass his political successors, and he briefly stumped the country calling for more power to the parliament, of which he was an absent member from 1891 to 1893. Despite charades of reconciliation, he remained, to his death on July 30, 1898, thoroughly opposed to William II.

Historical estimates of Otto von Bismarck remain contradictory. The later political failure of the state he created has led some to argue that by his own standards Bismarck was himself a failure. He is, however, widely regarded as an extraordinarily astute statesman who understood that to wield power successfully a leader must assess not only its strength but also the circumstances of its application. In his analysis and management of these circumstances, Bismarck showed himself the master of realpolitik.

Further Reading

Bismarck's Gedanken und Erinnerungen was translated into English by A. J. Butler as Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman (2 vols., 1898). Bismarck's The Kaiser vs. Bismarck was translated by Bernard Miall (1920). Werner Richter, Bismarck (trans. 1965), is a readable modern biography of the chancellor. Erich Eyck, Bismarck and German Empire (3 vols., 1941-1944; abr. trans. 1950; 2d ed. 1963), presents critical views. Emil Ludwig, Bismarck: The Story of a Fighter (trans. 1927), is melodramatically partisan, while A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (1955), is part of the author's view of Germany as "alien".

The Correspondence of William I and Bismarck (trans., 2 vols., 1903) and The Kaiser's Memoirs: Wilhelm II, Emperor of Germany, 1888-1918 (trans. 1922) supply predictably different views of the chancellor. Norman Rich and M. H. Fisher, eds., The Holstein Papers (4 vols., 1955-1963), presents much useful material on Bismarck's later career. Heinrich von Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire by William I (7 vols., 1890-1898), is ultra-Prussian and tedious but supplies Bismarck's accounts of numerous diplomatic conversations. A brief delineation of Bismarck from contemporary documents is supplied in Louis L. Snyder, The Blood and Iron Chancellor (1967). Other contemporary accounts include Charles Lowe, Bismarck's Table Talk (1895); Moritz Busch, Bismarck (2 vols., 1898); C. von Hohenlohe, Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst (trans. 1906); Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs (trans., 2 vols., 1919); and Alfred von Waldersee, A Field-Marshal's Memoirs (abr. trans. 1924).

Significant monographs on specific aspects of Bismarck's career include Joseph V. Fuller, Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its Zenith (1922); Karl Friedrich Nowak, Kaiser and Chancellor (1930); Lawrence D. Steefel, The Schleswig-Holstein Question (1932) and Bismarck, the Hohenzollern Candidacy, and the Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870 (1962); and William A. Fletcher, The Mission of Vincent Benedetti to Berlin, 1864-70 (1965).

For more information on Otto Eduard Leopold prince von Bismarck, visit Britannica.com.

Bismarck, Otto, Fürst von (Bismarck-Schönhausen) (Schönhausen, 1815-98, Friedrichsruh), of ancient landowning nobility with possessions in Pomerania (Kniephof) and Brandenburg (Schönhausen), was educated at the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Gymnasium in Berlin, at Göttingen University, where he studied law, and at Berlin. After a year's military service, he obtained posts in the administrative and judicial section of the civil service in Berlin and Aachen. On the death of his mother in 1839, he resigned in order to look after the family's Pomeranian estates. In their management he combined ability with application, and undertook additional responsibility as Deichhauptmann. In 1847 Bismarck began what was to be a long and happy marriage with Johanna von Puttkamer. At the approach of the 1848 Revolution (see Revolutionen 1848-9) Bismarck became a deputy of the Provincial Diet and, as a staunch royalist and Conservative, strongly supported the King in opposing constitutional demands made when the United Diet met in Berlin. In the following year he sharply criticized Friedrich Wilhelm IV for allowing himself to be intimidated by the populace. When in 1850 Prussia sought to lead a union of kingdoms (Prussia, Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, and Württemberg), only to yield to Austrian pressure (see Olmützer Punktation), Bismarck showed mature political judgement in his appreciation of the situation. Capable of patient diplomacy in the struggle for Prussian hegemony, he was determined to realize this aim. Between 1850 and 1862 Bismarck was a member of the Prussian United Diet at Frankfurt and ambassador at St Petersburg (1859) and at Paris (spring 1862). During this period his political career kept him at a distance from the centre of events, and he accepted the embassy at St Petersburg with a sense of bitter frustration. This was the price he had to pay for his outspoken opposition to all who did not share his extreme Conservatism, for which he found a vehicle in the newly formed Conservative Kreuzzeitung. He had shown himself to be a forceful personality and was feared by numerous opponents. In 1862 King Wilhelm I needed precisely these qualities to save his crown. The critical difference of opinion between the King and his government arose out of the budget to provide for greater expenditure on the army, regarded as necessary by the King and his minister of war, von Roon. Rather than accept defeat the King contemplated abdication; however, he decided, upon Roon's advice, to appoint Bismarck, whose deep-rooted loyalty to the Crown was known, to the office of chancellor and foreign secretary (September and October 1862 respectively). Bismarck overcame the crisis by blatantly infringing the constitution. His ‘Lückentheorie’ argued that the constitution made no provision for a situation in which there was no budget; the government was therefore obliged to levy the necessary taxes without a budget. Bismarck was well aware of the inadequacy of this ‘theory’, and therefore sought and won in 1867 the approval of the National Liberals for his initial unconstitutional conduct. Meanwhile he tried to silence public opinion, especially the bitter attacks of the newly formed Progressive Party (Fortschrittspartei, founded in 1861), by curbing the basic rights of the freedom of the press and of party political meetings.

In the following year Bismarck faced another crisis with Austria, and this continuing ‘dualism’ determined his policy during the first years of office. He abandoned the view that the problem of German unity could be resolved through diplomacy in a way acceptable to Prussia. He boycotted Austria's renewed attempt to settle the German constitution at a General Assembly of the German rulers in Frankfurt (1863) by not sending a Prussian representative. And he provoked Austria in the settlement of the issues involving the principalities of Schleswig and Holstein (see Schleswig-Holsteinische Frage), which resulted in a temporary settlement (Convention of Gastein, 1864). He secured French neutrality in the event of a war between Prussia and Austria. He cultivated good relations with Russia and made an alliance with Italy. But his attempt to counter Austria's move by summoning a German Parliament at the Federal Diet at Frankfurt failed because of the attitude of the South German states. As Austria, encouraged by this, requested that the Frankfurt Parliament should decide the issue concerning Schleswig and Holstein, Bismarck made this breach of the Convention of Gastein an issue of war. The armed conflict was decided by the Prussian victory at Königgrätz (see Deutscher Krieg). The ending of the campaign at this early stage against the wishes of the King and the generals, and the subsequent Peace of Prague were not only a personal success, but a proof of great foresight. Bismarck already saw in Austria a future ally and wished to spare it undue humiliation. He had resolved the conflict, as he had predicted, with ‘Eisen und Blut’, but the solution was not an end in itself; it was the beginning of the second phase of the ‘making of an empire’. Bismarck's next step was to form the North German Confederation (1867, see Norddeutscher Bund). The whole of Germany with the exception of Austria was now virtually under Prussian sovereignty, and Bismarck was its chancellor (Bundeskanzler). Bismarck's handling of the crisis leading to the Franco-German War (see Deutsch-Französischer Krieg) and Prussian military success led directly to the foundation of the Second German Empire. On 18 January 1871 the Prussian king was proclaimed Deutscher Kaiser in the Galerie des Glaces at Versailles.

From now on Bismarck aimed at the maintenance of peace, and, in view of the annexation of Alsace and part of Lorraine, at the prevention of Germany's isolation in Europe. His policy of alliances (Bündnispolitik) served this end (see Dreikaiserbund, Zweibund, and Rückversicherungsvertrag). At the Congress of Berlin in 1878 Bismarck acted as mediator between the powers in the settlement of the international crisis which had arisen out of the Russo-Turkish war (1877-8). In the intervening years he had, however, encountered serious difficulties in home affairs. He had to compromise and accept virtual defeat in the Kulturkampf and to face pressing social problems while resisting collaboration with the Social Democratic Party (see SPD). He also broke with the Liberals over the issue of fiscal policy. Bismarck used two attempts on the Emperor's life as a pretext for the dissolution and re-election of the Reichstag (October 1878). This enabled him to pass the anti-socialist law (‘Gesetz gegen die gemeingefährlichen Bestrebungen der Sozialdemokratie’). Inflexibly adhering to an outworn reactionary feudal attitude, he refused to acknowledge the political implications of the industrial age, and sought to prevent democracy by social legislation. In 1881 he caused the Emperor to promise state assistance for the working class, a promise that was implemented in the Krankenversicherungsgesetz (1883), the Unfallsversicherung (1885), and the Invaliditäts- und Altersversicherung (1889). The death of Wilhelm I in 1888 removed the security of Bismarck's position and he was dismissed by Wilhelm II in 1890. He spent the remainder of his life in retirement on his estate at Friedrichsruh, where he worked on his memoirs.

Bismarck's autocratic statesmanship during his twenty-eight years of office, nineteen of which he served as the ‘iron chancellor’ of the Empire (‘der eiserne Kanzler’), ended in bitter and angry retirement. He became a legendary and monumental figure, but his ruthless treatment of his opponents, his victimization of liberal, socialist, and progressive politicians, and his contemptuous attitude towards truly parliamentary legislative government had made him many enemies. He was so confident of the old Emperor's dependence on him that he did not hesitate to use the threat of resignation to force Wilhelm I into concurrence with his policy. He was the last German statesman to believe in the divine right of kings.

Bismarck's memoirs appeared as Gedanken und Erinnerungen (2 vols.) in 1898, to which was added in 1921 a third volume bearing the title originally intended by Bismarck for the whole work, Erinnerung und Gedanke. His collected works (Friedrichsruher Ausgabe), which include his speeches and letters, comprise 19 volumes (1924-35). Bismarck figures in numerous works of literature, poems, songs, fiction, and plays, among them Bismarck, an epic by G. Frenssen (1914), the play Bismarck by F. Wedekind (1916), and the biographical study Bismarck by Emil Ludwig (1926). The social and political climate of the Bismarck era permeates the work of the writers of the day, including the representatives of Naturalism (see Naturalismus). Contemporary views of Bismarck are reflected in several novels of Th. Fontane and especially in Irrungen Wirrungen.

Early Life and Career

Born of an old Brandenburg Junker family, he studied at Göttingen and Berlin, and after holding minor judicial and administrative offices he was elected (1847) to the Prussian Landtag [parliament]. There he opposed the liberal movement, advocated unification of Germany under the aegis of Prussia, and defended the privileges of his elite social class, the Junkers. As Prussian minister to the German diet at Frankfurt (1851–59) and as ambassador to St. Petersburg (1859–62) and to Paris (1862), he gained the insight and the experience was to partially determine his subsequent policy.

Wars with Austria and France

Bismarck was appointed premier in 1862 by William I in order to secure adoption of the Prussian king's army program, which was then being strenuously opposed in parliament. Bismarck, in direct violation of the constitution, dissolved parliament and collected taxes for the army without parliamentary approval.

To expel Austria from the German Confederation now became Bismarck's chief aim. The disposition of Schleswig-Holstein, former Danish territory annexed by Austria and Prussia after their defeat of the Danes in 1864, provided the necessary pretext. By the Gastein Convention of 1865 the two countries agreed to rule jointly—Austria was to administer Holstein and Prussia was to administer Schleswig; but friction soon developed. Bismarck accused Austria of violating the Gastein treaty and thus precipitated the Austro-Prussian War (1866), which ended after seven weeks with the defeat of Austria. By the treaty signed at the end of the war, Germany was reorganized under Prussian leadership in the North German Confederation, from which Austria was excluded.

Fear of France, skillfully propagated by Bismarck, was to bring the remaining German states into the Prussian orbit when the candidature of a Hohenzollern prince to the throne of Spain caused friction with the French Emperor Napoleon III. To make sure that this friction would provoke war, Bismarck published the famous Ems dispatch. In the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) that ensued the states of S Germany rallied to the Prussian cause as Bismarck had anticipated, and in Jan., 1871, William I of Prussia was proclaimed German emperor.

Alignments and Alliances

Bismarck, the creator of the German empire, became its first chancellor. When added to his Prussian positions (premier, foreign minister, and minister of commerce) the imperial chancellorship gave him almost complete control of foreign and domestic affairs. To maintain the peace necessary for the consolidation of the empire, he proposed to advance a strong military program, to gain the friendship of Austria, to preserve British friendship by avoiding naval or colonial rivalry, and to isolate France in diplomacy so that revanche would be impossible. Therefore, in 1872, he formed the Three Emperors' League (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia) and also maintained friendly relations with Italy.

The Balkan rivalries of Austria and Russia and the subsequent triumph of Austria at the Congress of Berlin (see Berlin, Congress of), over which Bismarck presided, caused a rift in Russo-German relations. A defensive alliance with Austria was now concluded (1879), and this Dual Alliance became a Triple Alliance when Italy adhered in 1882 (see Triple Alliance and Triple Entente). Friendship with Russia was revived in the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887. Bismarck, with his system of alignments and alliances, became the virtual arbiter of Europe and was acknowledged as its leading statesman.

Domestic Policies

Bismarck's influence upon German domestic affairs was no less apparent than his international stature. The empire, soon after its establishment, was disturbed by the Kulturkampf, a fierce struggle between the state on the one hand and the Roman Catholic Church and Catholic Center party on the other. The conflict initiated a period of cooperation between Bismarck and the liberals, who were violently anticlerical. However, the struggle lost intensity after Bismarck failed to break the power of the Center party, which made large gains in the Reichstag in 1878. The detente with the liberals foundered in the late 1870s after Bismarck's refusal to appoint three liberals to his ministry and his adoption of protective tariffs in place of the liberals' free trade position.

Relations between Bismarck and the Center party continued to improve, and the chancellor turned his attention toward the socialists, who had increased their strength in the Reichstag, particularly after the fusion of the Lassalle and Marxian socialists (1875). Bismarck at first met the socialist opposition with extremely repressive measures. The antisocialist law passed in 1878 prohibited the circulation of socialist literature, empowered the police to break up socialist meetings, and put the trial and punishment of socialists under the jurisdiction of police courts.

Although the socialists were initially weakened, they again began to increase their number in parliament. Now, partly to weaken the socialists and partly as a result of his policy of economic nationalism, Bismarck instituted a program of sweeping social reform. Between 1883 and 1887, despite violent opposition, laws were passed providing for sickness, accident, and old age insurance; limiting woman and child labor; and establishing maximum working hours. Bismarck's new economic policy also resulted in the rapid expansion of German commerce and industry and the acquisition of overseas colonies and spheres of influence (see Germany).

End of the Era

The Bismarckian era closed with the death of Emperor Frederick III. A struggle for supremacy between Bismarck and William II developed immediately upon that emperor's accession in 1888 and ended with Bismarck's dismissal in 1890. Bismarck, created prince (Fürst) after the Franco-Prussian War, was now made duke (Herzog) of Lauenburg. He retired and spent the remainder of his life in oral and written criticism of the emperor and his ministers and in defense of his own policies.

Bibliography

See Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman (his reminiscences, tr. by A. J. Butler, 1898, repr. 1966); E. Eyck, Bismarck and the German Empire (3d ed. 1968); A. J. P. Taylor, Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (1955, repr. 1987); O. Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany (2d ed. 1971); J. E. Rose, Bismarck (1987).

A political leader of Germany in the nineteenth century, known as the “Iron Chancellor.” After the Franco-Prussian War had brought many small German states together as allies against France, Bismarck persuaded them to unite in a single German Empire under a Kaiser, with Bismarck as first chancellor, or chief of government. Enormous economic progress took place under Bismarck's leadership. He resigned over differences with Kaiser Wilhelm II, the emperor who was to rule during World War I.

Quotes:

"An appeal to fear never finds an echo in German hearts."

"The great questions of the day will not be settled by means of speeches and majority decisions but by iron and blood."

"A government must not waiver once it has chosen it's course. It must not look to the left or right but go forward."

"The main thing is to make history, not to write it."

"A journalist is a person who has mistaken their calling."

"Laws are like sausages. It is better not to see them being made."

See more famous quotes by Otto Von Bismarck