Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961)
That depends on your perspective. The states undoubtedly considered the decision judicial activism because the "exclusionary rule," preventing "evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Federal Constitution from being admitted in a criminal trial in a state court," interferes with the states' police powers. Under Chief Justice Vinson, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment didn't apply this aspect of the Fourth Amendment to the states in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25 (1949).
It's probably more reasonable to say the exclusionary rule, itself, which the Supreme Court developed in response to Weeks v. US, 232 US 383 (1914), was an example of judicial activism because the rule was created by the Court, rather than the legislature. The White Court held the exclusionary rule was supported by a combination of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure and the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, providing further indication of judicial activism (in the Weeks case). In Mapp, the Warren Court held the Rule was supported entirely by the Fourth Amendment, resulting in a less creative and more straightforward constitutional interpretation.
Mapp upheld established federal laws and precedents found constitutional by earlier Supreme Courts, but carried the rule one step farther by applying it to states via the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. By the time the Mapp decision was released, the federal justice system had been using the exclusionary rule for 47 years.
The determination of whether the decision in Mapprepresented an instance of activism or restraint may rest on one's opinion about using the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to selectively incorporate the Bill of Rights to the States. Many constitutional scholars argue the Fourteenth Amendment intended total incorporation of the Bill of Rights, and that late 19th-century courts were guilty of resisting the Amendment's purpose for sociopolitical reasons.
For more information, see Related Questions, below.
It did not seem to be judicial activism as there wasn't a larger issue at hand. Rather, the final decision appears historically to be judicial partisanship.
Judicial activism weakens the separation of powers by involving the Court in what are traditionally executive and legislative functions. Judicial restraint reinforces separation of powers.
Doctrinalism relies on the principle of stare decisis.Judicial restraint relies on a narrow interpretation of the text of the Constitution and the Framers' inferred intent in decision-making. If the precedent being relied upon under stare decisis was made using judicial restraint, then adhering to the precedent also involves judicial restraint; if the controlling precedent being used represents an instance of judicial activism, then upholding the precedent also requires a (lesser) degree of judicial activism.The concepts of judicial restraint and judicial activism relate to decisions based on a particular theoretical view of the Constitution and its purpose. Stare decisis relates to consistency in upholding case law, regardless of whether the precedent was originally determined via activism or restraint.
Neither. The court simply ruled that people need to be advised of rights they had always been entitled to. --- Activism, because the Court invented a new rule. They used their power broadly to further justice instead of just allowing the decisions of the other branches of government to stand. It's true that their rights were already there, but that's not the determining factor of Judicial activism/restraint.
Judicial restraint is the philosophy that judges and justices should defer to written legislation whenever possible, if it is not in conflict with the Constitution. A justice who uses judicial restraint tends to take a narrower view of the Constitution and does not attempt to broaden the definition of Amendments to fit a particular social or political agenda. The opposite of judicial restraint is judicial activism. For more information on the debate between judicial activism and judicial restrain, see Related Links, below.
Judicial restraint. The opposite of judicial restraint is judicial activism.For more information about the controversy over judicial activism and judicial restraint, see Related Questions, below.
Judicial restraint is the theory that judges should limit their exercise of power and strike down laws only when they are obviously unconstitutional, and always follow precedents set by older courts. Judicial activism is the opposite view, and is sometimes meant to imply politically motivated judicial decisions.
A person who favors judicial activism is one who prefers a decision to be made via a personal opinion, rather than focusing on the law. A person who does this is considered unlawful or a federalist.
Judicial restraint is sometimes regarded as the opposite of judicial activism. In deciding questions of constitutional law, judicially restrained jurists go to great lengths to defer to the legislature.
The Supreme Court's primary focus is to determine if a law is constitutional. To do this, it follows certain philosophies to help it come to a decision. These philosophies are loose or strict constructionism, judicial restraint and judicial activism.
The Dred Scott decision and a philosophy of judicial restraint
The Warren Court, which was active from 1953 until Chief Justice Earl Warren retired in 1969, is often accused of judicial activism for its many decisions supporting African-Americans' civil rights. Whether they believed they were judicial activists or not is unknown.