osama
William Bajusz has written: 'Deterrence, technology, and strategic arms control' -- subject(s): Deterrence (Strategy), Nuclear arms control, Nuclear warfare
Strategic nuclear deterrence
nuclear deterrence - the idea that if you attack me with nuclear weapons then I will attack you back with nuclear weaponsmutual assured destruction - the idea that if you attack me with nuclear weapons then I will totally destroy you with nuclear weapons and if I attack you with nuclear weapons then you will totally destroy me with nuclear weapons - thus any nuclear attack by either party will result in the certain destruction of both parties
Stephen Shenfield has written: 'The nuclear predicament' -- subject(s): Communism and nuclear warfare, Government policy, Military policy, Nuclear warfare, Nuclear weapons 'The mathematical-statistical methodology of the contemporary Soviet family budget survey' 'Minimum nuclear deterrence' -- subject(s): Deterrence (Strategy), Military policy, Nuclear warfare
The military used to advance the concept that the possession of nuclear weapons would assure the owner nation freedom from attack. The attack on the US Cole, and various attacks in Russia, Britain, and so on have shown that most of the time, a nuclear response would be overkill (no pun) and of negative effect. In summary, Nuclear deterrence assures (assumes) that a nuclear response would be expected if a nuclear attack were made. War continues to be profitable.
Nuclear deterrence
Preventing other countries with nuclear munitions from using them (nuclear deterrence, mutual assured destruction). Or, obviously, to end the world
Fred Korkisch This is a rather artificial question, because in the official literature the term "deterrence by denial" was never used, asked, nor answered, nor mentioned. The post-nuclear literature tried to invent and imagined a number of terms and phrases that were never used by the people who wrote about nuclear war planning and doctrine. Deterrence was either used in relation to * Gradual Deterrence (see: The gradual use of nuclear weapons, or a gradual use of force, like the escalation President Johnson used against North Vietnam etc.); * Minimum Deterrence (see: The threat to use force, including nuclear weapons on a limited scale, or the minimum number of strategic weapons which provides a credible deterrence; see SALT, START); * Finite Deterrence (see: The nuclear capabilties which will survive any enemy attack, available for a devastating counterstrike, like SLBM-weapons on submarines; * Deterrence by Punishment (this is a rather juridical term, used after WW II, to explain the legal rightfulness of the bombardments of German and Japanese cities, as a justified "punishment" for the aggressions of both states, used later on for the possible use of nuclear weapons as a retaliatorial strike. To explain "Deterrence by Denial" one can follow the logic of protection of nuclear delivery systems by various measures, like dispersal of bombers, missiles in silos, SLBM-submarines etc.
John T. Cappello has written: 'Tactical nuclear weapons' -- subject(s): Deterrence (Strategy), Military policy, Nuclear arms control, Nuclear weapons, Tactical nuclear weapons
David Weinberger has written: 'The Cluetrain Manifesto' 'Too Big to Know' 'Nuclear dialogues' -- subject(s): Arms control, Deterrence (Strategy), Imaginary conversations, Moral and ethical aspects, Moral and ethical aspects of Deterrence (Strategy), Moral and ethical aspects of Nuclear warfare, Nuclear warfare, Peace 'ILL - Everything is miscellaneous'
Naeem Salik is a Pakistani author and military analyst known for his book "The Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan's Perspective." This book explores the development of Pakistan's nuclear program and its strategic implications.