What were the concurring opinions in US v Leon?

Answer 1

United States v. Leon, 468 US 497 (1984)

Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) dissenting:

Justice Brennan expressed concern that the Court's majority opinion may reopen the door to allowing illegally seized evidence to be used in court, and may result in the complete abandonment of the exclusionary rule. Brennan observed that the Court had gradually eased prohibitions against Fourth Amendment violations (in the furtherance of police work and prosecution), and believed the "good faith" exception was an affront to the Fourth Amendment.

Brennan took exception to the Court's cost/benefit analysis, as well as the rationalization that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy," not a constitutional right:

"A more direct answer may be supplied by recognizing that the Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, restrains the power of the government as a whole; it does not specify only a particular agency and exempt all others. The judiciary is responsible, no less than the executive, for ensuring that constitutional rights are respected.

"When that fact is kept in mind, the role of the courts and their possible involvement in the concerns of the Fourth Amendment comes into sharper focus. Because seizures are executed principally to secure evidence, and because such evidence generally has utility in our legal system only in the context of a trial supervised by a judge, it is apparent that the admission of illegally obtained evidence implicates the same constitutional concerns as the initial seizure of that evidence. Indeed, by admitting unlawfully seized evidence, the judiciary becomes a part of what is in fact a single governmental action prohibited by the terms of the Amendment."

While Justice White and the majority held that once the violation occurred, there was no way to remedy the defendant's lost right, and therefore, no further harm could be done by introducing the evidence, Justice Brennan predicted harm would arise from allowing an exception because both police and judiciary had a vested interest in obtaining a conviction.

Justice Brennan quoted Justice Day, who rendered the opinion of the Court in Weeks v. US, 232 US 383 (1914), the case that originally established the exclusionary rule:

"If letters and private documents can . . . be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution."

Justice Stevens concurring in part (82-963) and dissenting in part (82-1771)*:

*US v. Leon was a consolidation of two cases. One (docket no. 82-963), in Justice Stevens' opinion, involved a legally issued warrant, while the other (specifically, Leon's, 82-1771) involved an illegal warrant. His dissenting opinion addresses the reasoning behind the "good faith" exception, and criticizes the Court for consolidating a case concerning a legal warrant with another concerning an illegal warrant in order to support a rationalization.

Justice Stevens pointed out the paradox in the majority's thinking that an illegal search and seizure could be both "reasonable" and "unreasonable" at the same time.

Stevens also quoted the Fourth Amendment, drawing specific attention to the second section, which addressed a prohibition on the action of the court, a point he believed the majority failed to appreciate:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Further, Stevens posited that the majority had offered an illogical construction that contradicted case law:

"The majority's contrary conclusion rests on the notion that it must be reasonable for a police officer to rely on a magistrate's finding. Until today that has plainly not been the law; it has been well settled that even when a magistrate issues a warrant there is no guarantee that the ensuing search and seizure is constitutionally reasonable. Law enforcement officers have long been on notice that despite the magistrate's decision a warrant will be invalidated if the officers did not provide sufficient facts to enable the magistrate to evaluate the existence of probable cause responsibly and independently. Reviewing courts have always inquired into whether the magistrate acted properly in issuing the warrant - not merely whether the officers acted properly in executing it."

Finally, Stevens reminded the bench that the Founding Fathers' purpose in writing the Fourth Amendment was not so much to regulate police action as to remedy the problem of judges issuing "general" warrants without probable cause:

"The precise problem that the Amendment was intended to address was the unreasonable issuance of warrants. As we have often observed, the Amendment was actually motivated by the practice of issuing general warrants - warrants which did not satisfy the particularity and probable-cause requirements. The resentments which led to the Amendment were directed at the issuance of warrants unjustified by particularized evidence of wrongdoing. Those who sought to amend the Constitution to include a Bill of Rights repeatedly voiced the view that the evil which had to be addressed was the issuance of warrants on insufficient evidence."

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