Explain various behavioral implications of control?
Automatic and Controlled Processes in BehaviouralControl: Implications for Personality PsychologyINTRODUCTIONMechanisms of behavioural control (e.g. automatic vs. controlled processing) arefundamental in psychological explanation; and individual differences in these mechanismsmay be assumed to play an equally important role in personality psychology. As Carver,European Journal of PersonalityEur. J. Pers. 24: 376–403 (2010)Published online in Wiley InterScience(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/per.779*Correspondence to: Philip J. Corr, University of East Anglia, UK. E-mail: p.corr@uea.ac.ukCopyright # 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCLEVELS OF BEHAVIOURAL CONTROLThis section presents some of the ‘scene-setting’ material in preparation for the articulationof the major theoretical problems. It should prove useful in avoiding any misunderstandings concerning the nature of the model proposed.CognitionIt is important to be clear as to what is meant by ‘cognition’, especially in the way it differsfrom ‘non-cognitive’ (e.g. ‘biological’) explanations. The concept of ‘cognition’, as used1This paper is not concerned with the nature of consciousness per se. It is concerned with how processing at thecontrolled level, which often has representation in conscious awareness, relates to processing at the automaticlevel. In a closed physical-causal system, themental aspect of conscious awareness (the experience of it) should beclearly differentiated from the mechanisms that control it, the latter of which interfaces with automatic levels ofcontrolin this paper, refers to the capacity to know and to have knowledge; and this definitionincludes the structures and information processes that support knowing/knowledge. Thisknowledge and the processes of ‘knowing’ are embedded in structures, beliefs andoperations (e.g. decision-making) that, in a fundamental conceptual sense, existindependently of nervous activity (although, of course, they are instantiated in thisactivity). For example, knowledge of Renaissance art, as contrasted with Cubism, is notdetermined by nerve assemblies—although, it should not be forgotten that our visualperception of art is determined by nervous system activity (e.g. the construction of thequalia2of colour from electromagnetic reflections from the paint surface). This knowledgeis often, but need not be, accessible to conscious awareness; however, to avoid the everpresent Cartesian trap, it is not assumed that conscious awareness comprises or controls theunderlying cognitive mechanisms; rather, it is seen as one of outputs of controlledprocessing.3Thus, one major problem that any theory of cognition and behaviour must address—to the extent that cognition is different from motor control processes—is howknowledge-level structures/processes interface with biological structures/processes ofthe neuroendocrine system to affect immediate behaviour. In cybernetic terms, cognitiveknowledge structures/processes must interface with behavioural systems in order to setthe weights at critical points in the regulatory feedback system that choreographs andcontrols behaviour—as elaborated below, behaviour is always initiated and executed ata pre-conscious, automatic level: Mind events follow brain events. This is a basic tenetof materialist brain science, which in one form or another is the standard modelendorsed (or, at least, not openly disavowed) by (the majority of) contemporaryresearchers.Dual-process modelsThe need to differentiate levels of behavioural control is demonstrated by the wide varietyof dual-process models in the literature (e.g. Carver, 2005; Eisenberg, 2002; Epstein, 1973,1994; Evans, 2003; Hirsh, 1974; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Metcalfe &Mischel, 1999; Rolls, 1999; Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Rothbart, Sheese, & Conradt, 2009;Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Toates, 1998, 2006; see Carver et al., 2008). Most of these modelscontain a combination of the following features:1. Automatic (reflexive): Fast, coarse-grained, ballistic (implicit/procedural learning), andpre/non-conscious.2. Controlled (reflective): Slow, fine-grained, deliberative (explicit/declarative learning),and often accessible to conscious awareness.SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEMThe problem to be addressed by the model of behavioural control may now be summarised.At the point of initiation and execution, all brain-behavioural processes are controlled bythe automatic-reflexive system, and the operations of this system cannot be affectedsimultaneously by high-level controlled processes, and nor can they be consciously knownas only their products are represented in conscious awareness. In order to eschew adualistic position, brains events must precede mind events, always.6Now, if controlled processing and conscious awareness comes only after correspondingbrain events and is the outcome, or product, of such causally sufficient processing, thenhow do controlled-reflective (often, but not necessarily, conscious) processes exert anyinfluence (if they do) on automatic-reflexive (pre/non-conscious) processes? This is acentral question in general psychology and personality psychology. It resides at the core ofthe issue of how multiple level processes interface; and how personality factors andprocesses operate at and between these levels.Inhibition of pre-potent behaviourAutomatic routines are well suited to reacting to predictable stimuli from a pre-existingbehavioural repertoire; however, such automatic behaviours are not so good for tasksrequiring a departure from fixed routines (e.g. a novel task), or when automatic behaviour isnot going to plan. Much of cognitive processing involves inhibitory functions, and the ‘lateerror detection mechanism’, activated when things are not going to plan, serves thisfunction well.An experimental demonstration of the power of conscious awareness to inhibit prepotent (automatic) responses is seen in the ‘Jacoby exclusion task’ (Debner & Jacoby,1994). Briefly, words are presented either too fast for conscious recognition (i.e.50 milliseconds) or slow enough for recognition (i.e. 150 milliseconds); backward maskingis used to ensure these precise presentation times. In this experimental paradigm,participants are presented with the prime-word, for example:HOUSEThey are then given a stem-completion task, for example:HOU__A possible stem completion is to add S and E to form ‘HOUSE’.Now, the crucial manipulation in this task is the instruction to participants not tocomplete the word-stem with a prime-word. In the above example, it might be completedwith N and D to form ‘HOUND’.This task is trivially easy for mostDEFENSIVE SYSTEMS OF BEHAVIOURThe above discussion of the functions of consciousness has taken place in relation to theBIS, which is part of the reinforcement sensitivity theory (RST) of personality (Corr &McNaughton, 2008; Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Corr, 2004, 2008a)which comprises two other major systems, discussed below. RST provides a convenientmodel of the automatic processes involved in approach and avoidance behaviour withwhich to start to build a model of behaviour control.8In brief, RST comprises three systems as follows:(1) The fight–flight–freeze system (FFFS) is responsible for mediating reactions to allaversive stimuli, conditioned and unconditioned, and is responsible for avoidance andescape behaviours. It mediates the emotion of fear, and the associated personalityfactor consists of fear-proneness, timidity and avoidance.(2) The behavioral approach system (BAS) mediates reactions to all appetitive stimuli,conditioned and unconditioned, and is responsible for approach to appetitive stimuli. Itmediates the emotion of hope and anticipatory pleasure, and the associated personalityfactor consists of optimism, reward-orientation and impulsiveness.(3) The BIS is responsible for the detection and resolution of goal-conflict in very generalterms (e.g. between BAS-approach and FFFS-avoidance), and evolved to permit ananimal to withhold entrance (i.e. passive avoidance) or to enter a dangerous situation(i.e. leading to cautious ‘risk assessment’ behaviour), such as a foraging field wherepredators may be hiding. Its principal function is to resolve the evolutionarilyExecutive controlA high level of coordination is needed to ensure flexible behaviour, involving attention,decision-making and integrative functions. Whilst the hippocampus (and other distributedstructures) of the BIS may be necessary to mediate error signals, they work in conjunctionswith cortical stores of information reflecting the conflicts between goals. In addition,activation of the PFC is also expected to be important. With complex behaviour that entailseven a modicum of conflict, there is potential for behavioural interference. PFC has beenassigned an important role in resolving this behavioural problem. Miller and Cohen (2001)provide a review, and an outline of a model, of how the PFC functions to achieve thiscoordination. They note that, in order to avoid this behavioural confusion, mechanismsmust have evolved that coordinate low-level sensory and motor processes according to therepresentation of internal goals—this view fits snugly with the cybernetic view ofbehavioural control advanced in this paper, as well as with the view of the BIS as a goalconfliction detection/resolution device.Some general implications of the modelIndividual differences within these two major systems of behavioural control, as well astheir interplay, should account for important sources of variance between people. Somepotential implications are outlined below.First, a person could have all the ‘will’ (i.e. high-level controlled processing andconscious desire) in the world to behave in a certain way (e.g. dieting), but their ‘will’ canonly translate into actual behaviour if the controlled processing system is able to interfaceeffectively with the automatic processing system that, in a proximal sense, controlsimmediate behaviour (e.g. priming effects by hunger). Secondly, difficult-to-stopemotions/behaviours feature prominently in personality psychology (as well as in manypsychiatric disorders). In the case of emotional engagement and expression, especially asseen in the dysfunction of regulation in mood disorders, automatic defensive reactions areoften difficult to stop or inhibit (e.g. depressive rumination and violent rage)—drugs maydirectly inhibit these automatic processes, but ‘talk therapy’ (e.g. cognitive-behaviouraltherapy) would also have the power to modify the cybernetic weights of these automaticprocesses by engaging controlled (usually consciously-mediated) processes. Thirdly, theremay be insufficient representation by controlled processes in automatic processes, leadingto hard-to-stop counter-productive behaviours. For example, cigarette smoking may bedifficult to stop because there is more salient (in terms of priming) representation in theautomatic-reflexive processes than controlled-reflective ones.
