What are some of the controversies surrounding the US Civil War siege on Vicksburg?

Answer 1

Apparently there have been many controversies regarding the significance of Vicksburg. It's clear from looking at many answers on the significance of this city, that more research needs to be done. On the surface, it seems that within the Confederate High Command, there were different points of view on Vicksburg. And from the Union standpoint, there is a mixture and concern about the real gains made by its capture.As the US Civil War unfolded, there seemed to be a surprising response from key generals in the Confederacy regarding the importance of Vicksburg. It was not a unanimous one however.

Senior Southern generals were well aware of the propaganda value of Vicksburg to the Union when it was finally taken down after numerous assaults and finally a siege. This process took the Union several separate campaigns and much effort was invested in its capture.

Southern generals, however, were not overly impressed with its military or logistical significance.

This was especially true with the high command of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Now, Robert E. Lee valued the fortress city primarily because it impeded Union commerce and military operations on the Mississippi. Under Lee was General Longstreet who believed the South would lose little if it was captured.

He is quoted as saying " We would be no worse cut off from the West than we are now." He clearly was correct regarding the commerce value to the North, regarding the mighty Mississippi, he reasoned that their commerce would be impeded because the long miles of river banks could still offer problems for Union shipping on the river.

Now General Joseph E. Johnston, after his transfer to the West, regarded Middle Tennessee as strategically more important. PT Beauregard had apparently written off its capture as early as June of 1862, a year before Vicksburg's demise. Based on his retreat from Corinth, he wrote off the city, and had no urgent grief about it.

Well, as can be seen to this point, Vicksburg's loss was seen as secondary, compared to other areas in the West, and there was not much in reverse thinking from other quarters in the South. (This many historians despite ) What cannot be disputed was the attitude of key Southern generals.

As we know, this view of Vicksburg was 180 degrees to the opposite of the views held by generals Halleck, Grant and Sherman. Add US President Lincoln to that list.

Pausing here, it's important to note that"attitude" had allot to do with the ultimate capture of Vicksburg. What one side strongly desires, as opposed with what the other side thinks, is rather important to the final results. Now there is another factor to consider. While Halleck and Lincoln had great faith in Grant and Sherman, on the Confederate side, Jefferson Davis still exercised final strategies and general assignments. Jeff Davis could have easily, early on, replaced Vicksburg's commander, General John Clifford Pemberton, with any number of his generals who had more combat savvy. As an aside, Pemberton of Pennsylvania, was one of the few Northern natives that was appointed to a significant rank in the Confederate Army. These types of "turncoats" were especially irritating to other West Point graduates. On the flip side, Pemberton's Philadelphia birthplace was not deemed to be the same as being born in Charleston, South Carolina, from a Southern point of view.

The several Union campaigns that had been directed towards Vicksburg, beginning early on by Admiral Farragut, is an indicator of the Union's flip side attitude towards Vicksburg in comparison to the Southern view. The details of Grant's intensity concerning Vicksburg have been detailed in several places in the US Civil War sub-category. With that said, the following facts are of interest to true US Civil War buffs and historians.

In the view of many totally unbiased historians, the occupation of Vicksburg was a "white elephant". The loss of transit did not hurt the supply situation between the two parts of the Confederacy located on each side of the Mississippi. Logistically, the South had long been already separated. Additionally, contrary to commonly made assumptions, the Confederacy's main logistical need was in moving supplies from East to West.

And yes, in the very early stages of the war, the Richmond bureau of supply affairs was eager to receive wool, leather and beef on the hoof from the West. Limited success was achieved. However, as early as 1861, the Confederate Quartermaster, had informed Texas and other "western locations" that they had to fend for themselves on their own resources or with trade with Mexico.

The Union's control of Vicksburg in one sense, handicapped Union operations because the instructions were to rely now on the Mississippi to supply their armies, and as the South already knew, the Mississippi and its intermittently navigable tributaries were troublesome.

The main loss of the South was New Orleans, well before Vicksburg, and the South had already had been compensating for that problem.

The seemingly frantic efforts of Davis, Secretary of War Rudolph and Johnston was the mistaken belief that Arkansas's forces should be combined with those in Mississippi, because the former had valuable troops, which it did not have.

The bottomline here was that the loss of the Mississippi was one of prestige rather than one of substance. And in 1863, the South's bid for independence relied on the latter. To cynics both North and South, the Union had acquired an albatross that required troops to defend.

There are far more details and opinions on the "Vicksburg Situation". What has been attempted here was to see how the situation appeared to key Southern leaders.