President Lincoln sent his newly appointed General in Chief Henry Wager Halleck to visit General McClellan at his headquarters on the Peninsula in July of 1862. McClellan refused to take the a second offensive against Richmond unless he was reinforced. Halleck immediately saw the Union's disadvantage in this situation. Unless Confederate General Lee perceived McClellan as a threat to Richmond, he would be free to use his interior lines to attack either McClellan or the new army in Virginia under the command of General Pope. Halleck's decision proved to be eventful. He ordered McClellan to leave the Peninsula and reinforce Pope in northern Virginia.
When President Lincoln promoted Major General Henry W. Halleck as the new general in chief, Halleck had more than one problem confronting him. Part of the reason for this was that after Lincoln removed McClellan from the general in chief position, too many months passed before Lincoln designated Halleck to fill this crucial position. Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton took on that role to the detriment of the Union's war efforts. Aside from the disaster of the Peninsula campaign and what to do with Major General George B. McClellan, Halleck faced problems in the West. His departure from the West caused a loss of unity in that critical area. Halleck had no real candidates to fill his old position and had resolved to reorganize the Western department. He also faced the new political pressures that Washington DC presented to him.
With the disaster of the Peninsula campaign still remaining a lingering problem, Lincoln summons General Henry Halleck to Washington DC. On July 23, 1862, Halleck assumes the position of general in chief. He is sent to meet McClellan ans asses the situation at Harrison's Landing.
General Hallecks chief problem with Union operations and strategies in June of 1862 are perhaps one reason later on that US President Lincoln had to change his own ideas on conducting the war. The fact is that in early June of 1862, Halleck had no strategy at all.
President Lincoln had summoned General Henry Wager Halleck from the Western Theater to become the Union's general in chief. Lincoln based his decision on the success Halleck had in the West. Here in the East, Halleck faced the decision of what to do with two armies in a critical position. He had General John Pope's Army of Virginia in northern Virginia and General McClellan's army on the Peninsula but within striking distance of Richmond.Halleck believed he had several possible lines of action available to him:1. Send most of ope's army by sea to reinforce McClellan on the Peninsula;2. This presented a problem in that with those forces in transit via sea they were helpless to do anything;3. The first two elements would leave Washington DC sparsely defended, inviting an attack from Stonewall Jackson. This Jackson had threatened but a few month's earlier;4. President Lincoln would not allow this fearing the safety of the Union capitol;5. Or, reinforce Pope with General Burnside's IX Corps, up from North Carolina;6. This would relieve pressure on Washington DC;7. Confederate forces would be forced to defend Richmond, if Halleck could get McClellan to again assault Richmond;8. Burnside's Corps combined with Pope would place Confederate forces in Virginia in a difficult position;9. If McClellan found any number of his usual reasons for not advancing, Confederate forces could converge on Pope and destroy his army;10. Or, withdraw McClellan from the Peninsula and reinforce Pope in northern Virginia; and11. The two armies combined, the Army of Virginia and the Army of the Potomac, could then march south and capture Richmond; ( this was always a Lincoln favorite type move ).A McClellan army in transit was a weak one, and Pope still did not have enough strength. This would enable a crafty General Robert E. Lee with two windows of opportunity. He could attack McClellan's disorganized and embarking Army of the Potomac, or allow Lee to attack the still weak Pope, while the army of McClellan in sea transit would be of no help to anyone.Here is a situation that never should have happened. Despite the available troops from the population rich North, they were not recruited in time to form a larger Union army either in northern Virginia or on the Peninsula. It became quite clear then and late,r that attacking Lee and or Jackson on their home turf, either in the Valley or near Richmond, required an overwhelming set of forces. These set of forces should have been recruited 12 months ago.Here we have the late Summer of 1862, well over a year since the beginning of hostilities, and not enough Union troops in the East. On paper they did, however, they were over matched in terms of leadership. And, hampered by Washington DC political engineering from a Radical and War Democrat US Congress, and Lincoln cabinet infighting. Not to mention that President Lincoln, when taking away McClellan's general in chief duties had only himself and Secretary of War Stanton to operate the entire Union war effort. Far too late was Halleck summoned to become the general in chief.Not long after this would the pigeon's come home to roost as the Second battle of Bull Run would be a worse loss than the first one a year ago.
During the Mexican War, George B. McClellan contracted malaria. Ever since his time in Mexico, McClellan suffered a recurring series of malarial fevers. This health problem lessened his ability to fully command the Army of the Potomac as it reached the outskirts of Richmond.
Based on the problems created by Union General George B. McClellan, Halleck was sent to McClellan's headquarters in Eastern Virginia. At his place of retreat, Halleck and Quartermaster General Meigs needed to determine whether the Army of the Potomac needed the 20,000 extra troops McClellan claimed were required to save the Peninsula Campaign. If not, or due some other problem, McClellan would be ordered to return to Northern Virginia.
On July 25, 1862, General in Chief Henry W. Halleck visits the headquarters of General McClellan at his Virginia headquarters in Virginia. He brings General Ambrose Burnside with him. Burnside and McClellan are friends. Halleck gives McClellan a choice, and both of them will be a serious problem for McClellan. McClellan must either restart his Peninsula campaign or make a total withdrawal from Harrison's Landing. These troops will be given to John Pope's new Army of Virginia. McClellan's anger with the Lincoln government intensifies. Reportedly he has been receiving letters from his supporters in the North to march on Washington DC and take control of the government. One thing is certain, Burnside reports that anti-government agitation among McClellan's officers seem treasonous to him. The Army of the Potomac is piece by piece brought back to Washington DC to help form General Pope's new army.
When President Lincoln promoted Major General Henry W. Halleck as the new general in chief, Halleck had more than one problem confronting him. Part of the reason for this was that after Lincoln removed McClellan from the general in chief position, too many months passed before Lincoln designated Halleck to fill this crucial position. Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton took on that role to the detriment of the Union's war efforts. Aside from the disaster of the Peninsula campaign and what to do with Major General George B. McClellan, Halleck faced problems in the West. His departure from the West caused a loss of unity in that critical area. Halleck had no real candidates to fill his old position and had resolved to reorganize the Western department. He also faced the new political pressures that Washington DC presented to him.
With the disaster of the Peninsula campaign still remaining a lingering problem, Lincoln summons General Henry Halleck to Washington DC. On July 23, 1862, Halleck assumes the position of general in chief. He is sent to meet McClellan ans asses the situation at Harrison's Landing.
Strategy in the Western theater was a constant problem for the Union as well as for the Confederacy. In the situation between General Halleck and General McClellan regarding Tennessee, a clash of opinions began when Halleck informed McClellan that he had no plans for taking action past the capture of Fort Donelson and Clarksville. Here is a summary and a commentary of the events surrounding this particular situation:1. Since Halleck had no firm plans as mentioned above, McClellan as general in chief decided for him;2. McClellan ordered Union General Buell to support Halleck's forces, move past Bowling Green and on to Nashville;3. Halleck called this bad strategy and but forth another plan ( too long to place here );4. For various reasons, Halleck believed that Nashville was of no importance as the Union controlled Bowling Green; and5. McClellan insisted and demanded that Halleck prepare at all costs to advance upon Nashville.Commentary, part of McClellan's plan was based on the importance of the Tennessee capital city of Nashville. This city was the South's second largest industrial center and primary crossroads of rail and river networks between the Appalachians and the Mississippi.Clearly there was a struggle for power between the two generals. He petitioned McClellan for the creation of a Western Division with himself in charge. Halleck at the same time made the same request to the assistant Secretary of War, Thomas Scott.
Lincoln's Cabinet wanted him to get rid of General George B. McClellan. Or, perhaps better said, not let him be in charge of major armies, and certainly never again as general- in -chief. General Henry Halleck was in charge of the West and US Grant reported to him. Halleck believed that Grant almost failed at Shiloh. This was due to Grant being the victim of a surprise Confederate army assault and perhaps not properly fortifying his position at Pittsburg Landing. Rumors about Grant's drinking problem was also well known Lincoln urged Halleck to stay with Grant because he believed Grant was a fighting general.
President Lincoln's cabinet was astounded that he reappointed General George B. McClellan once again command the Army of the Potomac. The Northern public, newspapers, the military, and the entire Lincoln administration were shocked. This was perhaps one of the most unthinkable acts that Lincoln would perform in the course of the war. The reasons for not reappointing McClellan are:1. President Lincoln held McClellan responsible for the defeat of Pope and the Army of the Potomac at the Second Battle of Bull Run. And understands that McClellan has a problem with engaging the enemy;2. Lincoln's cabinet also blames McClellan, this includes Secretary of War Stanton and generals Pope and McDowell. Stanton's aids claim McClellan with "treason" on Bull Run and soon this is public knowledge;3. General Pope accused McClellan of "deliberate sabotage";4.. The Northern Republican newspapers also blame McClellan for Pope's defeat. They also charge McClellan with treason;5. The former position of McClellan as general in chief, removed in the Spring of 1862, is given to General W. Halleck, who also finds serious faults with McClellan not only for Bull Run, but McClellan's poor showing in the Peninsula campaign; and6. When on the Peninsula, McClellan blames his failure there on the deliberate actions of Lincoln and Stanton.Lincoln's only response is that only McClellan can reorganize the Army of the Potomac after it's terrible defeat at the Second Bull Run.The reappointment of McClellan at this point of the war seems "unbelievable".
It was wise of US President Lincoln take the advice of his new general in chief, Henry W. Halleck. The general was an expert in warfare, while Lincoln was not. When Halleck recommended to Lincoln that the best strategy in Virginia was to defeat the Army of Northern Virginia, rather then assault Richmond, Lincoln agreed. It was, however, with the understanding that this would be a difficult task. Lee had already proven he was a general to be respected as a military opponent. Therefore nothing was guaranteed on this strategy.The South, being large, however, had soft spots in the East. General McClellan understood that which is why his planned Peninsula campaign was one of great promise. Without going into detail McClellan now gone, still had a slim chance of success. Slim is amplified. The main problem under McClellan was the same one for Halleck. And, let it be said now, this problem could have been viable if Lincoln realized that his armies needed more men. Historians remind readers that the 500,000 troops Lincoln called to raised in 1864, was the path he should have taken in the Summer of 1861, With that said, based on the troops Halleck would have now would create the problem of exterior lines. In other words, a split Army of the Potomac, with Lee, as the attacker, laying between the two Union armies. Based on the last experiment of attacking Virginia and Richmond from the easter coast, this strategy never again surfaced. A shame as tens of thousands of lives might have been saved.
To maintain his army on the peninsula leading to Richmond, McClellan faced a huge logistical problem. His army and artillery batteries required 600 tons of supplies daily. He used the York River Railroad to bring his supplies to the battle fronts.
By late June of 1862, Major General George B. McClellan believed his Peninsula campaign had already failed. He blamed this problem on the Lincoln administration, and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in particular. He stated that his force was not as large as he had asked for, and accused the administration of deliberately sacrificing the Army of the Potomac due to politics.
There seemed to be a communications gap between General Henry Halleck and General Meade. The problem seemed to be over the logistical support for his army and the views of Halleck on this crucial point.
General Hallecks chief problem with Union operations and strategies in June of 1862 are perhaps one reason later on that US President Lincoln had to change his own ideas on conducting the war. The fact is that in early June of 1862, Halleck had no strategy at all.