What were Napoleons 3 fatal mistakes?

Answer 1

Napoleon's first mistake was trying to blockade trade between continental Europe and England. His second mistake was the Peninsular War 1808-1814 CE. He controlled Spain but not Portugal, during the battles he lost approximately 300,000 men. His third mistake was his invasion of Russia in 1812. Napoleon lost nearly half a million soldiers because they starved to death during Russia's winter.

Answer 2

He failed to consult the calendar and with a weatherman before invading Russia.

He failed to take a course in counter insurgency tactics before invading Spain.

He lacked a Navy that was equal to the the UK.

Answer 3

The biggest one, and the one that ultimately undid his whole campaign, was ironically the same mistake that Hitler made: namely, going to war in Russia in the middle of winter. Napoleon never recuperated from the dramatic losses of that winter.

Conrad Jalowski's response:

Napoleon Bonaparte made multitudinous mistakes during the Triumvirate: 1799-1804 CE and Despotate: 1804-1815 CE. Despite cognoscible and brilliant military campaigns such as of the Italian katabasis in the promontory from 1796-1797 CE of Montenotte, Millesimo, Saint Michele, Ceva, Lodi, Bassano, Rovento and Mondavi, and the socio-political changes with the castrametation of Cisalpine Caul, and the Transpadane and Cispadane Synhedrions as 'titular' autarchies, and the hoplomachies of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena-Austerdt, Friedland and Wagram, he suffered setbacks at Eylau, Borodino, Leipzig and Waterloo. The first major error was not creating a symmachia or military alliance with Austria in a Paris-Vienna axis that would have balanced the power in Europe and kept Russia at bay whilst allowing Napoleon I: 1769-1831 CE time to consolidate and solidify his peripherals and palatinates within Italy, the Helvetian Republic, the Autarchy of Naples, the Piedmont Kingdom and the Dutch-Belgian demarcation. He would have had less to govern thus diminishing military expenditure, over-extension of manpower, and resultant economic exhaustion. Another error was the two-front war, both in the Iberian promontory and Russia in 1807-1814 CE. Instead of appointing a hegemon of Iberia, Napoleon I promoted four marshals with four separate peripherals thus rendering them autonomous warlords inimical and contumacious to the Commander-inChief of Iberia thus abjurating any unitary command and letting dilapidation set in as the Imperial command was divided. Another failure was not tocreate a secure line of defense and garrison the mercantile and maritime supporting cities with the adscititious and creating a final reserve at a secure "central location" from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic such as a Catalonia-Galicia axis. (By being divided, Spanish irregulars were able to utilize scorched earth policy and Fabian attrition.) In terms of economical warfare, the Berlin Blockade (later to be expanded into the ContinentalBlockade)which could hardly have restricted the flow of British commodities as it had a gargantuan system of peripherals and hegemonies around the world, thus causing greater harm to France itself and exciting dissidence and unrest for the current regime. In the east, the failure in the famed Russian anabasis was ditrichotomous: the failure for a tripartite incursion with the Swedish throne being ascended by Napoleon I's mortal enemy Bernadotte, and the Ottoman Empire's symmachia with Russia, thus allowing Russia to concentrate all its military contingents at the center where Napoleon Bonaparte was expected to traverse. (Concentrating forces at the decisive point was promulgated by the Prussian military theorist Karl von Klausewitz). A second failure in the Russian campaign was the overwhelming size of the phalanxes which were a negative factor- the logistics for supporting 675,000 soldiers was gargantuan and posed a considerable problem to the overall campaign, which resulted in Napoleon Bonaparte's inability to subjugate Russia. In the end, the greatest inimical was his hubris which eventually consumed him...

why do ppl right this much? u asked a simple question.

Answer 4

1. His invasion of Spain and Portugal called the Peninsular War involved a vast Army to be stationed there against guerrilla activities.
2. His invasion of Russia began too late in the year and without adequate consideration of the long supply route and winter weather.
3. His attack against the Duke of Wellington at Waterloo required a defeat of the British before the arrival of the Prussian Army onto the battlefield and should have been begun earlier in the day.

Answer 5

The continental system, a European trade embargo on British goods made him unpopular with all of Europe and was a factor in the worsening relationship with Russia which led to war. It may have meant that other countries were more likely to join coalitions against him.

He should've pulled his army out of the Iberian peninsular to a defensive position along the the Pyrenees when it became aparent that the local population would continue fighting. Keeping an army there made the French unpopular and cost French lives. The only benefit was to continue to the trade embargo which was only ever partially successful.

Finally you could say 'Russia'. He made several decisions in the Russian campaign any of which could've turned things around. He didn't have enough horses and could never move fast enough so if he could catch the Russian army and fight them and win. The Russians could withdraw without being pursued and destroyed. He shouldn't have picked somewhere to stay during the Russian winter instead of withdrawing by way of an area that had already been burned and pillaged, i.e. if he did withdraw he should've picked a more southerly route. Put simply he shouldn't have fought Russia and if he did fight the Russian war then he should've won.

Answer 6

Attacking Spain, not paying attention to the approaching Russian winter and waiting for the ground to dry before attacking at Waterloo.