An unusual act on the conduct of strategy by a commanding officer would be to allow for a vote among commanders reporting to the general in charge of a military operation. In the case of General George B. McClellan, he informed the secretary of war, Edwin Stanton that his officers unanimously voted to use Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the upcoming Peninsula campaign. McClellan informed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in the middle of March 1862, that based on the votes of his officers, Fort Monroe would be this base for McClellan's march on Richmond.
The reasons behind Lincoln's dismissal of McClellan were complex. With that said, President Lincoln had few choices. Ambrose Burnside replaced General George B. McClellan after the Battle of Antietam. Prior to his final dismissal in November of 1862, McClellan was stripped of his army in favor of the new army under General John Pope. Most people believed that McClellan's career was over. However, Pope's defeat at the second Battle of Bull Run saw Lincoln restore McClellan as the leader of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln's cabinet objected to give McClellan command of the Army of the Potomac, but Lincoln correctly reasoned that this army loved McClellan and would fight their best under his command.
General George B. McClellan was an excellent commander when it came to building and properly organizing troops. He displayed that when US President Lincoln summoned him to Washington DC in the Summer of 1861. McClellan was also a great military strategist. He made superb operational and battle strategies. His problems were over estimating the size of armies of the South he had to face and always asking for more troops. He mistakenly relied all too often on Allan Pinkerton to gage for him the troop strength of the Confederates. He was reluctant to march into battle unless he believed he had an overwhelming advantage. Additionally, he and US President Lincoln differed on the way to conduct the war. This eventually led to his battlefield career. He was dismissed from commanding the Army of the Potomac in November of 862 and was transferred to Trenton, NJ.
General George B. McClellan had his own plans for the conduct of the US Civil War. His plan centered around three points. These were the legal and military consequences of secession, the status of slavery, and the division of power between the presidency and a proposed "Commander in Chief of the Army.McClellan did not favor slavery, however, the fact that a substantial part of the US was in outright rebellion against the Federal government meant that there was a just cause that had to be addressed. If such was the case, then the issue of slavery was not part of a reconciliation between the North and the South.And, in order to prosecute the war in a logical and humane manner, the president only needed to be concerned with "Northern" issues.The newly appointed "Commander of the Army" would conduct the war in such a manner as to bring each side to the bargaining table.
That he should have allowed Rommel to conduct the North Africa campaign his own way, instead of bombarding him with orders.
Arab tribes were endemic to the Arabian Peninsula. They would migrate from one part of that peninsula to another part in search of grounds to pasture their flocks and in order to conduct trade relations with other tribes. When the expansion of the Islamic Empire brought Arabs out of Arabia, many of them became settled peoples and stopped migrating.
President Lincoln appointed Major General George B. McClellan to general in chief on November 1, 1861. He replaced the retiring General in Chief Winfield Scott. Lincoln relieved McClellan of his title on March 11, 1862. McClellan was not in Washington DC at this time. He was in the process of organizing the Peninsula campaign. It is written that Lincoln did not believe that McClellan could hold his position as general in chief and conduct the Peninsula campaign at the same time.
Union General George B. McClellan had estimated that 19,000 troops were needed to man Washington DC's defense as he proceeded to Fort Monroe. The fort was his safe launching pad for his Peninsula campaign. Somehow, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton concluded that 30,000 troops were needed. The term of "somehow" is used as there seems to have been no military officer involved in establishing this number. President Lincoln was given this information. Lincoln was also under pressure from the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Lincoln himself feared a problem if Washington DC was light on defenses. This resulted in removing General McDowell's corps from McClellan's army. McClellan was seething over this "political" decision. He later wrote that this move was the most infamous thing that history ever recorded.
US President Lincoln wanted to have General George B. McClellan to focus all of his attention on the Peninsula campaign. With this in mind he took away McClellan's title of general in chief on March 13, 1862. Lincoln delayed naming a replacement as he knew the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War was favoring either generals John Fremont or McDowell for that position. Lincoln believed that both were unqualified and both were too radical with their political views. Lincoln decided to wait for a better time to name a new general in chief.
The Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton M. Stanton had once been a strong supporter of General In Chief George B. McClellan. This relationship began to deteriorate as the Peninsula campaign began to unfold. With McClellan now at Fort Monroe, the garrison commander of the troops protecting Washington DC informed Stanton that he lacked enough troops to protect Washington DC. The claim was that this was an acute problem in that 4,000 troops had been ordered from Washington DC to Manassas. This was one of General Bank's areas of responsibility. Stanton determined that 30,000 troops were required to defend the city. At the time there were only 19,000. There are no records on how the number of 30,000 was determined. The end result was that US President Lincoln, under Stanton's advice, removed one division from McClellan's army. This was a direct intervention of McClellan's plans and he was not consulted on it.There is speculation that Lincoln was not only pressured by Stanton, but also from Congress's Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.
The campaigns of Vicksburg, Chattanooga and the Overland Campaign.
The reasons behind Lincoln's dismissal of McClellan were complex. With that said, President Lincoln had few choices. Ambrose Burnside replaced General George B. McClellan after the Battle of Antietam. Prior to his final dismissal in November of 1862, McClellan was stripped of his army in favor of the new army under General John Pope. Most people believed that McClellan's career was over. However, Pope's defeat at the second Battle of Bull Run saw Lincoln restore McClellan as the leader of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln's cabinet objected to give McClellan command of the Army of the Potomac, but Lincoln correctly reasoned that this army loved McClellan and would fight their best under his command.
campaign
When General George B. McClellan was made general in chief, he asked Secretary of War, Cameron for permission to create a Coastal Division. The idea for such a division was from General Ambrose Burnside. As head of the Department of North Carolina, Burnside was able to continue the implementation of conducting naval & army operations in the South to establish bases that could be used to conduct raids on Southern railroads. The August 1861 capture of Cape Hatteras laid the foundation for this.
Union General George B. McClellan wanted to conduct the US Civil War in his own fashion which he believed was the correct course to take to win the war. He faced many obstacles in order to accomplish such a difficult task. He was not trying to take over the government but to redirect what he believed was an obstacle to do this. His first sights were set on the easiest targets, namely ones that were in the military where he had the most influence. Blocking McClellan was General Winfield Scott. From August to the end of October, 1861, McClellan began a systematic campaign to undermine Scott. Due to Scott's age, the easiest way for McClellan to reduce Scott was to drive him into retirement. This was ashame in that Scott was responsible for having McClellan in Washington DC in the first place. Because he and Scott had constant contact over military affairs, McClellan began to spread rumors about Scott's physical ability to retain his position, and, spread rumors about his failing mental capacities. He helped undermine Scott by ignoring him and bypassing him in the military chain of command. And he weakened Scott by being rude and standoffish. Scott did finally resign and McClellan replaced him as general in chief, a powerful position if used properly. Although Lincoln never expressed concern that his general in chief was disloyal, he cautioned McClellan that his new primary duties might impair McClellan's ability to take on two significant jobs. One was the rebuilding of the Army of the Potomac, the other was carrying on the strategic command of all the Union armies. McClellan convinced Lincoln that he could handle both jobs. In his own mind he had already taken a strong dislike of his Commander in Chief.
Daniela Muelheim
As a junior officer,George B. McClellan arrived at the Rio Grande equiped with a double-barreled shotgun, two pistols, a saber, a dress sword, and a Bowie knife and complained that he was too late to take part in any of the fighting because of the American Victory at Monterrey. He served for a period under General Zachary Taylor but was struck with dysentery and malaria and was holed up in hospital for almost a month. The malaria would come back to effect him in later years and he refered to it as his Mexican disease. Despite these set backs McClellan served bravely as a engineer during the war and was brevetted to a first lueitenants ranks for brave conduct at the Battles of Conteras and Churubusco and then he was brevetted to the higer rank of Captain for brave conduct during the Battle of Chapultepec. Much like his post Mexican-War commander Joe Johnston, McClellan greatly admired the skill displayed by Winfield Scott in his Mexican campaign but unlike Johnston he did not let that admiration for the man's skill carry over to the man himself. McClellan came away from the war with a profound respect for flanking manouevers and seige warfare as well as a personal distain for politician's interfering in military matters and for volunteer soldiers and officers but particularly politican general who cared nothing for training and discipline.
When it became clear that Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was stationed in Frederick, Maryland, it was naturally a huge problem for the commander of the Army of the Potomac, General George B. McClellan. He could not remain idle near Washington DC as he learned of Lee's forces controlling the countryside near Frederick and was also conducting or could conduct raids into Pennsylvania.As usual, McClellan was hesitant in that he, at that time at least, could not afford a major offensive against a superior Confederate army in Union territory. Certainly, if he could somehow force a retreat of Lee back to Virginia, it would be considered a victory in his own mind. And, at the same time he was well aware of the military idea's of even the novice, but superior commander in chief, US President Lincoln. Yes, no one could argue that Lincoln was not an experienced military leader. With that said, however, McClellan knew from his experiences in the Peninsula Campaign, that Lincoln as well as General Halleck, were offensive minded. And, they had the belief that McClellan leaned to the cautious side when calculating the strength of the enemy. In fact, not even two weeks into September, 1862 he had wired to General Halleck that he would be facing an Army of Northern Virginia that numbered at least 120,000 troops. As a consequence of these beliefs, McClellan asked for more troops.However, McClellan was an experienced and intelligent commander. His choices as per the original question was to decide whether to prepare for an advance upon Lee, or, prepare for a desperate defense against the highly numbered enemy commanded by Robert E. Lee. He could not rely on any sort of "bailout" from Washington DC which would make the decision he should be able to make with his strong army already in the field.