Why did the U S lose the Vietnam war?

Answer 1

We didn't lose we just came back because people of the U.S. were getting tired of the war Technically, we were fighting to maintain South Vietnam as a free country independent of North Vietnam. This was achieved with the signing of the Paris Peace Accord in which North Vietnam agreed to cease military action against the South. When the North resumed their aggression in violation of the accord, the US public would have hanged any politician who dared suggest sending our troops back.

Answer 2

In my opinion, the US Military did not "lose" the Vietnam War: despite many problems and errors, no major American unit/ formation collapsed in the face of the enemy; at no time were any major formations forced to surrender or driven from the field; there were numerous highly successful operations inflicting massive losses on the enemy, which, for complex reasons, were not generally acknowledged at the time as the significant tactical (and, in some cases, strategic) wins they actually were! The classic example of such was the Tet Offensive, 1968.

The truth is that significant sections of American public and political opinion lost the will to maintain the commitment in SE Asia; misguided, but well intentioned, attempts at negotiated settlement hampered military operations, and there was an almost total failure by the political leadership, and upper echelons of the military/ the Pentagon, fully to appreciate the true nature of the war.

Many fine people in the military knew exactly what needed to be done, and often did it to great good effect in the localities in which they served. Their voices, however, were not heard higher up: McNamara's misguided insistence on micromanaging the war and running it like a corporate enterprise had devastating impact on overall effectiveness; inhibiting initiatives, emasculating leadership, and undermining morale.

Despite all this, and despite undoubted problems with drug use, small unit discipline, absenteeism etc (much of it, I might add, often grossly overstated by those who have a vested interest in so doing!), the average soldier/ marine continued to do his job, often very well, right to the bitter end. Even when committed to tactically irrelevant objectives, and asked to fight futile battles, most American soldiers "did the business", and usually "carried the day" - eg the battle for "Hamburger Hill", 1969.

In hindsight (20:20 Hindsight Vision being a wonderful thing!) it is obvious that had "Rolling Thunder", "Linebacker" etc been sustained relentlessly (no let-ups for negotiations, the outcomes of which the Northern Govt had no intention of honouring!) the social and economic infrastructure of the North would have collapsed totally by the early 1970s, and it certainly would never have been capable of sustaining major combat operations in the South. Even in the early 1970s (by which time US ground forces were drawing down and no longer taking the lead in operations) when the NVA attempted its first major invasion of the South, it was defeated decisively by US air power.

Those who argue the South could not have been saved are, IMO, talking rubbish. However, to do so would have required actions by the United States that would not have been "politically acceptable" to large sections of both US and World opinion.

Many problems with the conduct of the war accrued from the piecemeal, "half-cocked", approach taken from the start. Pres Johnson, lumbered with a war not of his making, eager to pursue his "Great Society" program at home, but anxious to avoid the label of "the President who lost us SE Asia", wanted to get it all over as quickly as possible. Consequently, there was no coherent strategy; no consistent rethinking of doctrine; no clear strategic (nor even, for much of the time, tactical!) objectives! They simply thought they could re-run WW2 (but without really taking the fight to the main body of the main enemy!?), "win" (whatever that might mean?! Never clearly defined!), and "bring our boys home" a.s.a.p.! Absurd - comical had it not been so tragic.

Johnson and his advisers simply did not accept that to "win" required a long term commitment demanding both sustained and ruthless military action against the North to cripple it; decisive interventions in Cambodia and Laos; direct American "oversight", whether they liked it or not, of the Saigon regime; a concerted program of land reform, "civic action", counter-insurgency etc throughout the South, plus - probably - an invasion of the North aiming to inflict decisive defeat/ damage on its ground forces, and drive them back to where they should have been, well away from the 17th Parallel!

Had all of this been done from 1965, the final outcome would probably have been very different. As things stand, I still assert that America's efforts in Vietnam were not wasted. Had Saigon fallen in the mid/ late '60s (and certainly this would have happened without US intervention), then what would the effect have been throughout the whole region? I'll hazard the suggestion that had America not "held the line" in Vietnam during the crucial period of the late '60s/ early '70s the subsequent emergence of a relatively stable, highly prosperous, Asian/ Pacific Rim would have been much less likely.

So, IMO, America's intervention in SE Asia (covertly from the 1950s; major direct military action, 1965-73), although hugely flawed in execution, was ethically sound and well intentioned; more than justified in the context in which it happened, and a geopolitical success in that it did "hold the line" for many years, enabling relatively benevolent regimes to develop/ embed in many neighbouring areas.

Answer 3

People at home no longer thought the war was worth the cost (58,000 dead men).