What was the reason that Germany failed to beat the Russians in World War 2?

Answer 1

There is no short answer to this question. You must start with the Soviet situation. The Soviets had decimated their officer staffs for political reasons a couple of years before the German invasion. The Soviets had then moved their huge armies and vast storehouses of equipment up close to the border making them vulnerable to attack. Thus despite having the largest army in the world, with more tanks and planes than all the other armies of the world COMBINED, the Soviets were in a poor position to resist a major German attack. The Germans, by 1941, had perfected the blitzkrieg attack methods. They'd had experience in Poland, France and the Balkans. German army equipment was top notch with excellent communication and control systems. The German air force was clearly the world's finest overall in equipment, pilots, and experience. The Germans launched their 1941 attack a little late, due to heavy spring rains. The total delay was about six weeks but could probably have been cut to four weeks despite the weather. Despite the delay and the vast buildup of forces, the Germans still achieved surprise. The too far advanced, poorly led, centrally controlled Soviet forces were crushed quickly and the Germans poured into the country - racing dozens of miles per day. Barely a month into the fight, the Germans crushed a major Soviet force at Smolensk, and were then only two hundred miles of good highway from Moscow. Logistical reasons required a pause of at least two weeks but the German delay turned into over a month of arguing at high command. Ultimately the Germans turned south to capture the Soviet army at Kiev, a giant battle they won, but that probably cost them the war. Clearly, by August, Soviet forces were immobile, being held in place by arbitrary 'fight to the last man' orders from higher up. The Germans could with impunity have continued the fight into Moscow at that time, regardless of Soviet forces on the flanks. German control of Moscow by late August 1941, puts them in command of the battlefield. Moscow was the center of EVERYTHING in Russia in 1941....highways, rail lines, air transport, key industries, high command, centralized planning, troop assembly........ all were centered on Moscow. The capture of Moscow makes Leningrad untenable and it too would have fallen winter 1941. Further German attacks south in Sept and Oct 1941 would then have seized the Ukraine and Stalingrad. A 1942 campaign would have gained the N Caucasus oil fields and effectly ended the war.....to be continued by major air attacks on the Russian Ural industrial base using bases far forward in the key Moscow area. As it was the Germans did destroy the Ukrainian armies of Russia in August 1941. They then felt rather overconfident and proceeded to launch a Fall/Winter campaign without proper equipment, against the Russian capital. This campaign proceeded to string out the German forces, reduce concentrations, increase supply problems and generally put the world class German army at severe disadvantage. At this point the finest Russian general of the war, Zhukov, organized a counterattack using various formations totaling only about 90,000 men. With this small force he was able to nearly rout the massive German armies, due to their poor displacement. The loss of equipment by the German army was never fully made up - trucks and artillery in particular were lost in massive quantities. Following this disaster, the front stabilized due to superior German command and control. The Germans then proceeded in 1942 to repeat their error of 1941 by stringing out their forces, failing to concentrate power, failing to select key objectives, etc. The result was, again, the cream of the army being cut to pieces, this time at Stalingrad. Again, the Stalingrad debacle was created by Zhukov. Not only was Stalingrad and the trapped Sixth Army lost but massive amounts of equipment was abandoned by the Germans in the north Caucasus area as they retreated before those armies too, were cut off. Even after these two gigantic debacles, the front could still have been stabilized by the Germans along the Dnipre River line had they pulled back forces more quickly, created concentrations, built proper defenses and created a credible mobile reserve of armor. Instead the German failed to build defenses, wasted their armor on futile offensives and eventually were ground down to pieces by the Russians. Otherwise it is certainly worth mentioning that the Russians were outstanding in rebuilding their military-industrial complex during the invasion. Production numbers were outstanding in several key weapons areas. To a large extent the Russians were able to concentrate on tanks, planes and artillery since they mostly used American trucks, boots, and food for the army and did not have to manufacture so much of those items. The German side of the equation was that German industry was hampered by heavy British/American bombing by summer 1942, severe lack of fuel supplies and a transport system east of the Polish border that was under constant guerrilla type attack. In summary the Germans lost despite having surprise and a superior military due to lack of quality leadership at the very top. The Russians won because of tenacity and ability to sacrifice.

Answer 2

The size of what we call Russia, Belorusse, the Ukraine & so on, makes what was then the USSR a massive undertaking to conquer. Nazi Germany had formidable weapons & resources but given that the idea of lasting for years against the Russian winters, they were there in 1941 & 1942, by the winter of 1943 the Germans were in retreat. This shows the Blitzkreig for what it was, it would not endure against sustained resistance. The aid supplied by the US & Britain was crucial to Russia but the resources of the USSR were immense and in time their armour, for example, became the equal if not better than the Germans. The depth of endurance the Russians showed was unparalleled in terms of human endeavour and desire to rid their country of the invader. Stalin was in his element as a dictator in defiance of the Nazis and it is a fact the Russians, although their response was tempered and measured, were driving the Germans back well before the Allies land in France. I think the one word answer to the question, the biggest single factor is, are, Resources. Russia was simply geographically too big & had too many men & machines for the Germans to overcome.

Answer 3

The standard answer (that imperial Russia was unprepared for a long war) is inadequate to answer this question for the first year of the war although it has validity for the long run perspective. It is clear that the German army was better organized and tactically adept that the Russian army. Yet such disparities have not always led to victory over the disadvantaged side. Unfortunately, research materials in English are, to my knowledge, not readily available to answer this question. I do not think the answer simply lies in bad decisions and accidents; there are certain patterns in Russian tactics throughout the 1914-1915 period that suggests that deeper structural and attitudinal factors were involved. Solzhenitsyn's August 1914 is suggestive but tends to build its argument by descriptive power rather than analysis. Works by Norman Stone and Dennis Showalter are more helpful but even they fall short of directly addressing the question. I am interested in ongoing research concerning this question. My Russian is rather rudimentary. The standard answer (that imperial Russia was unprepared for a long war) is inadequate to answer this question for the first year of the war although it has validity for the long run perspective. It is clear that the German army was better organized and tactically adept that the Russian army. Yet such disparities have not always led to victory over the disadvantaged side. Unfortunately, research materials in English are, to my knowledge, not readily available to answer this question. I do not think the answer simply lies in bad decisions and accidents; there are certain patterns in Russian tactics throughout the 1914-1915 period that suggests that deeper structural and attitudinal factors were involved. Solzhenitsyn's August 1914 is suggestive but tends to build its argument by descriptive power rather than analysis. Works by Norman Stone and Dennis Showalter are more helpful but even they fall short of directly addressing the question. I am interested in ongoing research concerning this question. My Russian is rather rudimentary.