Why did hooker lose at the Battle of Chancellorsville?

Answer 1

Hooker did exceptionally well right up until the time when he stopped his advance in the Wilderness. He should have pushed on a few more miles to emerge in more open country where his enormous advantage in artillery could have been brought to bear. The Wilderness was a tangled, second-growth forest where visibility was limited to a few yards, and the fighting in these woods degenerated into a struggle between small groups of soldiers, and Hooker's artillery advantage was of little use. He failed to appreciate the value of one of the few cleared areas in the Wilderness, called Fairview. The Confederates seized this clear hill and placed their own artillery on it and bombarded the Federal positions at Chancellorsville. "Chancellorsville" was a single large home with a few outbuildings in another clearing. The bombardment of Chancellorsville injured Hooker, who was leaning against a pillar on the front porch of the house when it was struck by a shell, causing part of the pillar to fall on Hooker's head, knocking him unconscious for a time.

Had Hooker pushed on aggressively in almost any direction he could have gotten out of the Wilderness. In particular he should have pushed men from his Chancellorsville position eastward, to link up with Union troops coming west from Fredericksburg. All that was between these two converging groups of Yankees was Lee with a small portion of his thrice-divided army. Instead Hooker's men driving east stopped, and a communications snarl led his men coming west from Fredericksburg to cross back to the north side of the river. So Lee escaped being crushed between the two converging Federal columns.

Hooker's inertia allowed the Confederates to seize the initiative and gave time for Stonewall Jackson's powerful flanking column to make a long march of many hours to get into position to attack. Hooker and his subordinates ignored and ridiculed repeated reports of this flanking column when it was sighted, and refused permission for the commander at the threatened end of his line to turn his line from facing south to facing west, which would have put those troops across the path of the flanking Confederate attack. The attack was delivered late in the day after the hours consumed marching around into position, and only darkness and the wounding of Jackson saved Hooker from an even worse disaster than that which befell him.

Hooker then followed the pattern of all previous commanders of the Army of the Potomac. They would cross the river and get on the south side with the Confederates, fight a battle and have it not go particularly well, then they would withdraw to the north side, with nothing to show for the effort but thousands of casualties. Almost exactly one year later, in precisely the same spot, the Yankees again crossed the River and fought in the Wilderness. But this time Grant was in command. After a terrible day's fighting and carnage, an aide found Grant in his tent, crying over the thousands lost that day. The difference was, the next day, Grant went after the Confederates, instead of pulling back to the north side of the river, and he kept after them for almost a year until the war was over.

ADDITIONAL FACTORS.

In my opinion following factors also led to Hooker's defeat at Chancellorsville:

1) the decision of having thrown Gen. Stoneman's Cavalry Corps to raid Lee's

communication line south-westward, left the Unionists without sufficient cavalry to preceed and flank the marching columns and prevent them from being

"perforated" by Stuart's Cavalry units.

This lack of veil led :

A - to the capture of many prisoners who gave Lee precious information about the mass of troops concentrating in the area of Chancellorsville, enabling him to take the pivotal decision of withdrawing Jackson's II Corp from Frederickstown to line up it against Hooker's position at Chancellorsville;

B) The long stop Hooker ordered to the outflanking Corps there because surrounded by the thick woodland and broken terrain he ignored what was beyond his field of sight;

C) Had Hooker had sufficient Cavalry at disposal he probably would have prevented his right wing from being attacked and overwhelmed near Wilderness Church by Jackson's II Corp in the evening of 2nd May.

2) The authorization to attack and break through the Confederates position at Fredericksburg was given to Gen. Sedgwicks VI Corp only at dawn of 3rd May, too late to affect the outcome of the battle. Had Hooker not on April 29th peremptorily ordered Sedgwick to cross the Rappahannock, form a bridgehead and defend it without engaging in all out combat, but left him some

freedom of judgement and movement, the outcome of the battle may not have been so dreadful.