What are the relationships between Turkey Syria and Iraq?

Answer 1

Turkey is in conflict with Syria and Iraq, because the Euphrates river starts in Turkey and runs through Syria and Iraq. Turkey is placing dams on the river to generate hydroelectric power, but this is actively preventing Syria and Iraq from getting sufficient water arriving downstream.

Answer 2

Entire classes are taught on the relationships between Middle Eastern countries. These countries in particular have very complex and constantly evolving relationships because of the ongoing wars and conflicts. As of September 2015 there are actually six countries and groups operating in these three countries: Republic of Turkey (Turkey), Kurds, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Republic of Iraq (Iraq), the Assad Regime (Syria), and the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Outward Relations of Each:

ISIL is probably the easiest to discuss. It is at war with all five of the remaining groups, seeing them as lacking the proper right to govern. The primary issue that ISIL has with the Syrian and Iraqi governments are that these countries are ruled by Non-Sunnis and in accordance with secular norms (as opposed to Islamist/Jihadist views). As Fundamentalist Sunnis, they hold that Shiite Islam (dominant in Iraq) and Alawite Islam (politically powerful in Syria) are heresies and publicly proclaim "takfir" (blasphemer) against them. ISIL's opposition to the Kurds is similarly based in Kurdish secularism and religious pluralism. Additionally, the Kurds have the most successful adversaries of ISIL in its various conflagrations. ISIL hates the FSA as it sees them as stooges for American Power and Sunni-majority secularism, but does not rate them as a serious threat. ISIL has only really declared an open war on Turkey since Turkey has joined the US-Arab Anti-ISIL coalition. It is not likely that ISIL wants a direct confrontation with Turkey at this early stage because the Turkish military is strong enough to uproot ISIL. Conversely, for reasons that will be discussed in the Turkish section, Turkey is also avoiding direct conflict with ISIL and allocating its resources elsewhere. As a result, while ISIL is fearful of Turkey, it does not hate Turkey to the same degree as it hates the others.

The FSA does not really have a relationship with Iraq. It strongly opposes both Syria and ISIL because these groups are trying to rule the Syria it is seeking to liberate. Turkey and the FSA have been exchanging strategic details and military technologies because of Turkey's hatred of the Assad Regime. The FSA has decent relations with the Kurdish groups and operations have overlapped in western Syrian Kurdistan, but, by and large the two organizations work in parallel as opposed to together.

Turkey has a complex relationship with most of the countries in this group. Turkey has taken a strong dislike to the Assad Regime and has consistently supported any group that seeks to dethrone it. This has resulted in a functional and strategic relationship with the FSA and an under-the-table weapons exchange with al-Nusra and ISIL until such things became politically untenable. The Turkish disagreement with Assad primarily stems from the human rights abuses that Assad is committing in Syria as well as Assad's former harboring of Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the PKK, a Kurdish paramilitary/terrorist group that operates in Turkey. Turkish relations with ISIL were originally lukewarm with allegations that Turkey provided them weapons. After several border incidents happened, resulting in deaths of Turkish citizens from ISIL, such a stance became less acceptable. Eventually, the US pressured Turkey into joining the US-Arab Coalition against ISIL. However, Turkey does not see ISIL as a direct threat since ISIL spends most of its energies attacking Kurds and the Assad Regime. Both of these targets are problems for the Turks as well, so they see no problem with ISIL handling this issue. In fact, since Turkey's joining in the Syrian Civil War, it has allocated more resources and troops to fighting the Kurds within Turkey, e.g. the PKK and other, more democratic, Kurdish Rights Groups, than to ISIL. Turkey's relationship withe Kurds is generally negative, since Turkey strongly opposes the possibility that part of Turkey could break off and join the nascent Kurdistan. As a result, Turkey has attacked the PKK in Turkey, refused to cooperate with ostensible ally the YPG in Syria, and come to have an awkward relationship with the PUK and PDK in Iraq because of the positive commercial boom that has arisen from the relationship. Turkey and Iraq also coordinate on strategy, but Turkey is wary of Iraq because of Iraq's strong alliance with the PUK and PDK and Iraq's increasing reliance on Iran as its primary backer and supporter. Turkey, like Iran, seeks to be a regional power, and so sees the Iranians as a diplomatic threat to Neo-Ottomanism and Turkish ascendance in the Middle East.

Syria has a weakly positive relationship with Iraq as they are both led by Non-Sunni Muslims and both governments oppose ISIL. Syria is currently at war the YPG Kurds near Qamishli, the Syrian Kurdish regional capital, but is expending far more of its force internally and against ISIL. Syria maintains a strongly antagonistic relationship with Turkey and ISIL since both countries wish to eliminate Syria. A significant portion of Syria's conflict is also with the FSA, but the two sides have been willing to negotiate on troop movements and attacks against ISIL.

The Kurds are not completely internally united and are actually made up of three main groups: the PKK paramilitary/terrorists in Turkey; the YPG, an offshoot of the PKK, in Syria; and the union between the PUK and PDK in Iraq, creating the KRG or Kurdish Regional Government. This division results in difficulty between coordinated attacks from Kurds in Iraq in Syria or in defense of the PKK in Turkey, which is under attack from Turkey. Given that the KRG uses Turkish military intelligence in targeting ISIL, the PKK has become suspicious that the PUK and the PDK know about impending Turkish attacks against their organization and are failing to provide advanced warning. YPG acknowledges that the KRG is stronger militarily than it is, but it does not want help from the KRG to translate into political or administrative power at a later point in time since the YPG is far more left-leaning economically than is the KRG. As a result, the YPG remains wary of accept military help from the KRG. The Kurds collectively maintain good relations with both Iraq and the FSA, since those groups have made provisions for Kurdish autonomy or independence. They jointly coordinate attacks on ISIL or Syria with these groups. The YPG is direct conflict with both Assad in Qamishli and ISIL further south, near Deir el-Zour, and further west, near Kobane. The Kurds collectively revile ISIL for its barbarity as well as its genocide against Yezidis (who are all ethnically Kurds) and Assyrians and other religious minorities (who the Kurds consider "their guests" in Kurdistan). The Kurds are the most successful Anti-ISIL group currently fighting.

Iraq is seeking an alliance with anyone who is willing to assist it against ISIL. This has resulted in constructive negotiations with Turkey and the Kurds and a weakly positive relationship with Assad, as they are both led by Non-Sunni Muslims and both governments oppose ISIL. Iraq has no perspective on the FSA and is one of the few Arab states to not have recognized it, likely in order to appease Iran, which has been helping the Iraqi Armed Forces make gains in the southeastern areas of ISIL control.