Carl Von Clausewitz relentlessly wrote about his ideas that wars were an extension of politics. The military operations of the South in the Fall of 1862 were in great part due to political pressures within the South to undermine Northern support for the war.
In its most basic form, Carl Von Clausewitz defined the total defeat of an enemy as military operations that were not necessarily political, although the defeat of the enemy would have political effects. But before the political ramifications were realized, Clausewitz defined total victory as the destruction of the enemy's armies and the conquest of its territory.
Lenin turned to the works of military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz in 1915. Lenin was not that interested in military strategy or tactics. What many people overlook is that Clausewitz paid attention to war time politics and the role of warfare in relation to the masses. In some of Lenin's writings he copied verbatim some of Clausewitz's observations on how the politics of a nation interacted with wars.
To win a decisive war, military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz believed that this is best accomplished by destroying the enemy's army. He did make mention that the capture of the enemy's capital city was important, however, that city had to be a significant military target and lose many of its defenders in the combat.
Both military theorists, Clausewitz and Johmini wrote about the Napoleonic era wars, their publications contained significant differences. Clausewitz is almost in a metaphysical mode in his publication of ON War. He assumes the reader is already familiar with Henri Johmini. Johmini expressed his view on the geometrical rules for warfare. With that said, perhaps the most significant differences between them were their views on the relative power of offensive and defense. Clausewitz clearly emphasizes the power of tactical defense, while Johmini leans toward tactical offensives.
Military theorist had written extensively on the Napoleonic War and the military exploits of Frederick the Great. Clausewitz believed that if the enemy's army could not be destroyed, the its farms and cities should be assaulted. This would hamper the opposition's army ability to function. The Union resorted to this strategy in the second half of the war.
In its most basic form, Carl Von Clausewitz defined the total defeat of an enemy as military operations that were not necessarily political, although the defeat of the enemy would have political effects. But before the political ramifications were realized, Clausewitz defined total victory as the destruction of the enemy's armies and the conquest of its territory.
The relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz's "Principles of War" for contemporary military professionals is that it deals with the mind of man at war and not the weapons of war.
Confederate General had become the military advisor to Jefferson Davis on March 13, 1862. Davis respected the military know-how of Lee and together they operated the Confederate war operations in Virginia.
One major difference between Carl Von Clausewitz and Henri Johmini is the fact that Clausewitz writes more on how politics and military strategies are linked. Johmini tends to shy away from this angle of warfare and is more concerned with purely military tactics and strategy. As an aside, Vladimir Lenin studied Clausewitz because Clausewitz speaks to what Lenin wanted to learn. That being how military strategies and political goals are inter related.
Lenin turned to the works of military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz in 1915. Lenin was not that interested in military strategy or tactics. What many people overlook is that Clausewitz paid attention to war time politics and the role of warfare in relation to the masses. In some of Lenin's writings he copied verbatim some of Clausewitz's observations on how the politics of a nation interacted with wars.
After replacing General Joseph E. Johnston as the commander of the Army of Tennessee, General John Bell Hood began a series of counterattacks upon the overwhelmingly large army of General Sherman. These were assaults on Sherman's well entrenched forces. Carl Von Clausewitz always cautioned commanders from making frontal assaults on entrenched armies.
American revolution
Military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz believed that the driving elements in any war were chance, passion and rationality. These were respectively governed by the military, the people and the government.
Henri Jomini and Carl Von Clausewitz were prominent military thinkers in the 19th century. Much of their writings were based on the wars fought by Napoleon and Frederick the Great. Both Jomini and Clausewitz were first hand witnesses to the military exploits of the aforementioned generals.
In the Spring of 1862, Union armies under the command of George B. McClellan and Henry Wager Halleck made coordinated advances against the South. These are called time and space by military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz. It means that the Union concentrated its forces and made a two pronged attack on the South.
As with most nations' military, strategies and tactics in any ongoing conflict are not publicized, however, observers can make assessments as they see military operations unfold. And, Army doctrines can be ignored if the circumstances do not fit doctrine. It can be said however, that military students and their professors discounted Carl Von Clausewitz until 1984. Curriculum changes however, can be dull to most people. With that said, US Army officers discuss the works of Clausewitz and his ideas on culminating points and centers of gravity with serious thought, both for historical purposes and where they may be applied to future military conflicts. They. however, are not as of yet, Army doctrines.
To win a decisive war, military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz believed that this is best accomplished by destroying the enemy's army. He did make mention that the capture of the enemy's capital city was important, however, that city had to be a significant military target and lose many of its defenders in the combat.