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Spanish Armada

 

Great fleet sent by Philip II of Spain in 1588 to invade England in conjunction with a Spanish army from Flanders. Philip was motivated by a desire to restore the Roman Catholic faith in England and by English piracies against Spanish trade and possessions. The Armada, commanded by the duke of Medina-Sidonia, consisted of about 130 ships. In the weeklong battle, the Spanish suffered defeat after the English launched fire ships into the Spanish fleet, breaking the ships' formation and making them susceptible to the English ships' heavy guns. Many Spanish ships were also lost during the long voyage home, and a total of perhaps 15,000 Spaniards died. The defeat of the Armada, in which Francis Drake played a principal role, saved England and the Netherlands from possible absorption into the Spanish empire.

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The voyage of the Gran Armada in the summer of 1588 is the subject of controversy on both the strategic and tactical levels. The Spanish plan, devised largely by Philip II himself between 1586 and 1588, involved an amphibious operation in which a fleet from Spain commanded by Medina Sidonia would occupy the anchorage in the Downs off the Kentish coast and protect a landing by an expeditionary force from the army of Flanders under Parma. The English, faced with a number of potential invasion sites, adopted a counter-strategy of intercepting the Armada in Iberian waters, but several attempts to do so between May and July 1588 were driven back by storms. Later in July the Armada (122 ships) sailed past the English fleet (66 ships) replenishing in Plymouth harbour. The running battle up the Channel was inconclusive (two Spanish ships lost through accident) and only the English fireship attack on the Armada's anchorage off Calais broke the stalemate. The Armada lost four important warships at this point, but the rest had to cut their cables and the prevailing wind drove them into the North Sea. They were then obliged to sail around the British Isles to return home, at the cost of 35 of the weaker ships.

The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory, but in strategic terms it was essentially indecisive.

Bibliography

  • Martin, Colin, and Parker, Geoffrey, The Spanish Armada (London, 1988).
  • Rodger, N. A. M., The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, vol. 1, 660-1649 (London, 1997).
  • Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J., and Adams, Simon (eds.), England, Spain and the Gran Armada 1585-1604 (Edinburgh, 1991)

— Simon Adams

The invasion fleet sent against England by Philip II of Spain in July 1588 comprised some 138 vessels, perhaps 7, 000 seamen, and 17, 000 soldiers. The number of soldiers would be doubled once the forces of the duke of Parma in Flanders were embarked. English naval forces comprised 34 royal warships and some 170 privately owned ships under the command of Lord Howard of Effingham. The quality of English guns and their handling were of an order with which the Spaniards could not compete, yet the English, in turn, could not compete with Spanish soldiery if it came to hand-to-hand fighting at sea, or on land. Philip II's purposes behind the Armada were to end English attacks on Spain's commerce with her American dominions, to assert his sovereignty in Flanders, and, above all, to bring heretic England back into the fold of Rome.

Under the command of the duke of Medina-Sidonia, the Armada took three weeks to make Corunna from Lisbon. From the Lizard Point in Cornwall on 29 July its disciplined crescent formation was only twice broken by English forces before it reached Calais on 6 August. Here Parma had failed to prepare his troops. The Armada's congestion made it vulnerable to Howard's fireship attack on the night of 7 August, and the following day there was heavy Spanish loss of life in a sustained battle off Gravelines. Deteriorating weather drove a dispersed Armada up the North Sea, pursued by Howard. Driven round Scotland and Ireland, in unseasonably severe weather, two-thirds of the Armada were brilliantly navigated back home, but upwards of 30 ships were lost in the Hebrides and western Ireland. Some 11, 000 Spaniards may have died. Although the elements had principally saved England, the campaign brought her high international repute, while Spain had proved she could place a huge naval force in northern latitudes.

Columbia Encyclopedia:

Spanish Armada

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Armada, Spanish (ärmä'), 1588, fleet launched by Philip II of Spain for the invasion of England, to overthrow the Protestant Elizabeth I and establish Philip on the English throne; also called the Invincible Armada. Preparations, under the command of the marqués de Santa Cruz, began in 1586 but were seriously delayed by a surprise attack on Cádiz by Sir Francis Drake in 1587. By the time the expedition was ready Santa Cruz had died, and command was given to the duque de Medina Sidonia. The Armada consisted of 130 ships, including transports and merchantmen, and carried about 30,000 men. It was to go to Flanders and from there convoy the army of Alessandro Farnese, duke of Parma, to invade England. It set out from Lisbon in May, 1588, but was forced into A Coruña by storms and did not set sail again until July. Medina Sidonia's orders were to proceed straight up the English Channel and refuse battle until he had made junction with Parma. This gave the initiative to the English, whose main fleet, commanded by Charles Howard (later earl of Nottingham), sailed out from Plymouth to achieve the windward side of the Spanish and attacked at long range. Three minor actions followed, in which the Armada was somewhat damaged but its formation unbroken. On Aug. 6, Medina Sidonia anchored off Calais, from which position he hoped to make contact with Parma. The following night the English sent fire ships into the anchorage, causing the Spanish fleet to scatter, and then attacked (Aug. 8) at close range off Gravelines. Unable to re-form, the Armada was severely battered, but a sudden change in the wind enabled most of the ships to escape northward. In attempting to sail home by Scotland and the west coast of Ireland, the Spanish ships were dispersed by storms; their provisions gave out; and many of those who landed in Ireland were killed by English troops. Only about half the fleet reached home.

Bibliography

See G. Mattingly, The Armada (1959); A. McKee, From Merciless Invaders (1964); W. Graham, The Spanish Armadas (1972).


Often called the "Invincible Armada," the Spanish Armada was the invasion fleet launched against England in 1588 by Philip II of Spain. Its defeat left England Protestant, aided the Dutch Revolt, and compounded the tax burden on Spain's strained economy.

In 1585 worsening relations between Philip II of Spain and Elizabeth I of England erupted into war. Elizabeth signed the Treaty of Nonesuch with the Dutch and permitted Sir Francis Drake to maraud in response to a Spanish embargo. Drake surprised Vigo, Spain, in October, then proceeded to the Caribbean and sacked Santo Domingo and Cartagena.

Philip ordered the marquis of Santa Cruz in Lisbon to form an armada of thirty-four ships to pursue and "punish" Drake. He also asked Santa Cruz and the duke of Parma, his commander in the Netherlands, to submit plans for the "Enterprise of England," that is its invasion, for which he asked blessing and money from Pope Sixtus V. Parma thought that 35,000 men might cross in twelve hours with favorable weather and sufficient secrecy. He eventually collected over two hundred barges and eighty coasters.

Santa Cruz prepared a plan that called for some one hundred fifty fighting galleons and ships, six galleasses, forty galleys, and over three hundred other vessels large and small to transport fifty-five thousand infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, artillery, and supplies. The troops would land in either Wales or Ireland. Considering the plans, Philip decided on a smaller armada. When English land and sea forces responded to its landing force, Parma would invade Kent, overthrow Elizabeth, and establish a Catholic regime.

Santa Cruz assembled at Lisbon nine Portuguese galleons and another three dozen vessels. From Basque ports Juan Martínez de Recalde and Miguel de Oquendo would bring two dozen armed ships. At Cádiz, Pedro de Valdés assembled fifteen armed Indiamen, while another dozen great ships and four galleasses sailed from Italy with Alonso Martínez de Leyva.

Drake attacked Spain in April–May 1587, destroyed over twenty ships in Cádiz Bay, and disrupted coastal shipping. Too late, Santa Cruz sailed in pursuit. Storms pounded him on his return to Lisbon, where he found plans changed. He was to sail forthwith to the Strait of Dover, cover Parma's invasion of England, and deliver six thousand men. Communication between the armada and Parma, who had to be ready, posed an immediate problem. The Armada had no safe port where it might wait. Communication had so far been through Philip. Despite Philip's demands, Santa Cruz did not sail, prevented by damage, shortages, and weather. Ailing, he died 9 February 1588.

The Armada Campaign

Philip appointed as successor the duke of Medina Sidonia, experienced in naval administration if not at sea. A council of war would assist him. Though reluctant to take command, the duke had the Armada's 130 vessels, 8,000 seamen, and 19,000 infantry to sea by the end of May. Storm struck off Cape Finisterre, forcing the Armada into La Coruña. On 21 July the repaired Armada sailed, reaching the English Channel on 28 July.

Ordered to join Parma and fight only if compelled, the Spaniards expected to find the English fleet in the Narrows. For battle, they would close, grapple, and board. The Armada's sixty fighting ships were big but bulky, loaded with men and stores; their guns were of mixed sizes and quality, and trained shipboard gunners were scarce. The remaining ships were transports or small craft.

Elizabeth's navy, under Lord Admiral Charles Howard of Effingham, with Drake as vice admiral and Martin Frobisher and John Hawkins commanding squadrons, chose not to wait in the Narrows. Over sixty galleons and great ships, and forty smaller, concentrated at Plymouth, leaving some three dozen under Lord Henry Seymour to watch Parma. Aware of the Spaniards' advantage in ship-board infantry, the English hoped to gain the weather gauge and use their handier ships and superior gunnery to avoid boarding and defeat any invasion attempt. When the Armada reached the Channel, Howard put to sea.

Leyva and Recalde urged Medina Sidonia to assault Plymouth. Prompted by Philip's orders and Diego Flores de Valdés, his chief of staff, Medina Sidonia refused and held course. Using the cover of night, the English by daybreak of 31 July gained the weather gauge. The Armada assumed battle formation, with two wings of twenty strong vessels each, and a main force of another three dozen, behind which sailed the transports. Howard and Drake formed two lines and pounded the Armada, doing little damage. But that evening, collisions and an explosion cost the Armada two big ships. Flores de Valdés persuaded Medina Sidonia to abandon them and hold course, a decision that many argued hurt morale and lost a chance for a boarding action.

The Armada kept course the next three days and sparred with the English, who could not break its formation. Lacking news of Parma, Medina Sidonia sought haven in the lee of the Isle of Wight. In a daylong battle on 4 August, the English kept the Armada from its aim and forced it toward Flanders. Late on 6 August the Armada anchored off Calais, to discover that Parma, who only learned on 2 August that the Armada was in the Channel, required several days to embark his army. Parma needed the Armada's protection against both the English and a Dutch blockade. On the night of 7/8 August, Howard sent eight fire ships blazing on breeze and tide toward the Armada, whose captains cut anchor cables and put out in disarray. A galleass grounded. On 8 August the English fleet, nearly 150 in number but with three dozen doing the fighting, attacked, employing their guns at closer range. It was mid-afternoon before the thirty outgunned ships that did the Armada's fighting recovered formation. One ship sank, two galleons beached, and eight hundred men were killed. With shifting winds the Armada cleared the Flemish banks and reached the North Sea. Its commanders agreed to return to Spain around Scotland and Ireland. Many damaged ships wrecked on the Irish coast; others succumbed to storm at sea. Perhaps sixty-five reached Spanish ports, while a few hired Hanseatic hulks returned home. Over half the crews were lost to battle, shipwreck, and disease. While the English lost no ships, hundreds of seamen perished of sickness.

Elizabeth and the Dutch hailed God's favor, Philip accepted God's punishment, although Flores de Valdés was court-martialed to placate military critics. The Enterprise had too many flaws, while the English wisely counted on gunnery. In 1596 and in 1597 other armadas sailed against England, to be stopped by storm. Peace came only in 1604, after Philip and Elizabeth were dead.

Bibliography

Calvar Gross, Jorge, et al. La Batalla del Mar Océano: Corpus Documental de las hostilidas entre España e Inglaterra (1568–1604). 3 vols. Madrid, 1988–1993. Documentary background.

Martin, Colin, and Geoffrey Parker. The Spanish Armada. Rev. ed. Manchester, U.K., 1999. Best treatment; benefits from the many books and the 1988 symposia on the armada, when the first, lavishly illustrated, edition appeared; updated bibliography.

Mattingly, Garrett. The Armada. Boston, 1959. Marvelously written and atmospheric, fine on diplomacy, outdated on ships and battles.

Parker, Geoffrey. The Grand Strategy of Philip II. New Haven, 1998. Masterful.

Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J., ed. Armada, 1588–1988: An International Exhibition to Commemorate the Spanish Armada. London, 1988. Splendid catalogue of the exhibition at the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich, England.

Rodríguez-Salgado, M. J., and Simon Adams, eds. England, Spain and the Gran Armada: Essays from the Anglo-Spanish Conferences, London and Madrid, 1988. Savage, Md., and Edinburgh, 1991.

—PETER PIERSON

(ahr-mah-duh)

A fleet of more than a hundred ships sent by King Philip II of Spain to conquer England in 1588. Although called the “Invincible Armada,” it was destroyed by a combination of English seamanship, Dutch reinforcements, and bad weather. Several thousand Spaniards were killed, and about half the Spanish ships were lost.

  • The defeat of the Armada was a sharp blow to the influence and prestige of Spain in the world and was an important step in England's ascent to power.

  • Wikipedia on Answers.com:

    Spanish Armada

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    Battle of Gravelines
    Part of the Anglo-Spanish War
    Invincible Armada.jpg
    The Spanish Armada and English ships in August 1588, by unknown painter (English School, 16th century)
    Date 8 August 1588
    Location English Channel, near Gravelines, then part of the Netherlands
    Result Decisive English victory[1][2]
    Belligerents
    England Kingdom of England
    Dutch Republic United Provinces
     Spain
    Commanders and leaders
    Lord Howard of Effingham
    Francis Drake
    Duke of Medina Sidonia
    Strength
    34 warships[3]
    163 armed merchant vessels
    (30 over 200 tons)[3]
    30 flyboats
    22 Spanish and Portuguese galleons
    108 armed merchant vessels[4]
    Casualties and losses
    Battle of Gravelines:
    50–100 dead[5]
    400 wounded
    8 fireships burnt[6]
    Disease:
    6,000–8,000 dead
    Battle of Gravelines:
    Over 600 dead
    800 wounded[7]
    397 captured
    5 ships sunk or captured[8]
    Storms/Disease:
    51 ships wrecked
    10 ships scuttled[9]
    20,000 dead[10]
    This article refers to the Battle of Gravelines, for the modern navy of Spain, see Spanish Navy.

    The Spanish Armada (Spanish: Grande y Felicísima Armada, "Great and Most Fortunate Navy") was the Spanish fleet that sailed against England under the command of the Duke of Medina Sidonia in 1588, with the intention of overthrowing Elizabeth I of England to stop English involvement in the Spanish Netherlands and English privateering in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

    The fleet's mission was to sail to Gravelines in Flanders and transport an army under the Duke of Parma across the Channel to England. The Armada achieved its first goal and anchored outside Gravelines but while awaiting communications from Parma's army, it was driven from its anchorage by an English fire ship attack, and in the ensuing naval battle at Gravelines the Spanish were forced to abandon their rendezvous.

    The Armada managed to regroup and withdraw north, with the English fleet harrying it for some distance up the east coast of England. A return voyage to Spain was plotted, and the fleet sailed north of Scotland, into the Atlantic and past Ireland, but severe storms disrupted the fleet's course. More than 24 vessels were wrecked on the north and western coasts of Ireland. Of the fleet's initial complement of 130 ships, about fifty failed to make it back to Spain. The expedition was the largest engagement of the undeclared Anglo–Spanish War (1585–1604).

    Contents

    History

    Background

    Philip II of Spain had been co-monarch of England until the death of his wife Mary I in 1558. A devout Roman Catholic, he deemed Mary's Protestant half-sister Elizabeth a heretic and illegitimate ruler of England. He had previously supported plots to have her overthrown in favour of her Catholic cousin and heir presumptive, Mary, Queen of Scots, but was thwarted when Elizabeth had Mary imprisoned, and finally executed in 1587. In addition, Elizabeth, who sought to advance the cause of Protestantism where possible, had supported the Dutch Revolt against Spain. In retaliation, Philip planned an expedition to invade England so as to overthrow the Protestant regime of Elizabeth, thereby ending the English material support for the United Provinces— that part of the Low Countries that had successfully seceded from Spanish rule – and cutting off English attacks on Spanish trade and settlements[11] in the New World. The king was supported by Pope Sixtus V, who treated the invasion as a crusade, with the promise of a subsidy should the Armada make land.[12]

    The Armada's appointed commander was the highly experienced Marquis of Santa Cruz, but he died in February 1588 and Medina Sidonia, a high-born courtier with no experience at sea, took his place. The fleet set out with 22 warships of the Spanish Royal Navy and 108 converted merchant vessels, with the intention of sailing through the English Channel to anchor off the coast of Flanders, where the Duke of Parma's army of tercios would stand ready for an invasion of the south east of England.

    Planned invasion of England

    Route taken by the Spanish Armada

    Prior to the undertaking, Pope Sixtus V allowed Philip II of Spain to collect crusade taxes and granted his men indulgences. The blessing of the Armada's banner on 25 April 1588 was similar to the ceremony used prior to the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. On 28 May 1588, the Armada set sail from Lisbon (Portugal) and headed for the English Channel. The fleet was composed of 151 ships, 8,000 sailors and 18,000 soldiers, and bore 1,500 brass guns and 1,000 iron guns. The full body of the fleet took two days to leave port. It contained 28 purpose-built warships: twenty galleons, four galleys and four (Neapolitan) galleasses. The remainder of the heavy vessels consisted mostly of armed carracks and hulks; there were also 34 light ships.

    In the Spanish Netherlands 30,000 soldiers[13]awaited the arrival of the armada, the plan being to use the cover of the warships to convey the army on barges to a place near London. All told, 55,000 men were to have been mustered, a huge army for that time. On the day the Armada set sail, Elizabeth's ambassador in the Netherlands, Dr Valentine Dale, met Parma's representatives in peace negotiations, and the English made a vain effort to intercept the Armada in the Bay of Biscay.

    On 16 July negotiations were abandoned, and the English fleet stood prepared, if ill-supplied, at Plymouth, awaiting news of Spanish movements. The English fleet outnumbered the Spanish, with 200 to 130 ships,[14] while the Spanish fleet outgunned the English—its available firepower was 50% more than that of the English.[15] The English fleet consisted of the 34 ships of the royal fleet (21 of which were galleons of 200 to 400 tons), and 163 other ships, 30 of which were 200 to 400 tons and carried up to 42 guns each; 12 of these were privateers owned by Lord Howard of Effingham, Sir John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake.[3]

    Signal station built in 1588 above the Devon village of Culmstock, to warn when the Armada was sighted

    The Armada was delayed by bad weather, forcing the four galleys and one of the galleons to leave the fleet, and was not sighted in England until 19 July, when it appeared off The Lizard in Cornwall. The news was conveyed to London by a system of beacons that had been constructed all the way along the south coast. On that evening the English fleet was trapped in Plymouth Harbour by the incoming tide. The Spanish convened a council of war, where it was proposed to ride into the harbour on the tide and incapacitate the defending ships at anchor and from there to attack England; but Medina Sidonia declined to act, because this had been explicitly forbidden by Philip, and chose to sail on to the east and toward the Isle of Wight. As the tide turned, 55 English ships set out to confront them from Plymouth under the command of Lord Howard of Effingham, with Sir Francis Drake as Vice Admiral. Howard ceded some control to Drake, given his experience in battle, and the Rear Admiral was Sir John Hawkins.

    First actions

    Charles Howard, 1st Earl of Nottingham

    On 20 July the English fleet was off Eddystone Rocks, with the Armada upwind to the west. That night, in order to execute their attack, the English tacked upwind of the Armada, thus gaining the weather gage, a significant advantage.

    At daybreak on 21 July the English fleet engaged the Armada off Plymouth near the Eddystone rocks. The Armada was in a defensive formation in a crescent convexed towards the east. The galleons and great ships were concentrated in the centre and at the tips of the crescent's horns giving cover to the transports and supply ships in between. Opposing them the English were in two sections, Drake to the north in Revenge with 11 ships, and Howard to the south in Ark Royal with the bulk of the fleet. Given the Spanish advantage in close quarter fighting, the English ships used their superior speed and manoeuvrability to keep beyond grappling range and bombarded the Spanish ships from a distance with cannon fire. However the distance was too great for this to be effective, and at the end of the first day's fighting neither fleet had lost a ship, though two of the Spanish ships, the carrack Rosario and the galleon San Salvador, were abandoned after they collided. When night fell, Francis Drake turned his ship back to loot the ships, capturing supplies of much-needed gunpowder, and gold. However, Drake had been guiding the English fleet by means of a lantern. Because he snuffed out the lantern and slipped away for the abandoned Spanish ships, the rest of his fleet became scattered and was in complete disarray by dawn. It took an entire day for the English fleet to regroup and the Armada gained a day's grace.[16] The English ships then used their superior speed and manoeuvrability to catch up with the Spanish fleet after a day of sailing.

    On 23 July the English fleet and the Armada engaged once more, off Portland. This time a change of wind gave the Spanish the weather-gage, and they sought to close with the English, but were foiled by the smaller ships' greater manoeuvrability. At one point Howard formed his ships into a line of battle, to attack at close range bringing all his guns to bear, but this was not followed through and little was achieved.

    At the Isle of Wight the Armada had the opportunity to create a temporary base in protected waters of the Solent and wait for word from Parma's army. In a full-scale attack, the English fleet broke into four groups – Martin Frobisher of the Aid now also being given command over a squadron – with Drake coming in with a large force from the south. At the critical moment Medina Sidonia sent reinforcements south and ordered the Armada back to open sea to avoid the Owers sandbanks. There were no secure harbours nearby, so the Armada was compelled to make for Calais, without regard to the readiness of Parma's army.

    On 27 July, the Armada anchored off Calais in a tightly packed defensive crescent formation, not far from Dunkirk, where Parma's army, reduced by disease to 16,000, was expected to be waiting, ready to join the fleet in barges sent from ports along the Flemish coast. Communications had proven to be far more difficult than anticipated, and it only now became clear that this army had yet to be equipped with sufficient transport or assembled in port, a process which would take at least six days, while Medina Sidonia waited at anchor; and that Dunkirk was blockaded by a Dutch fleet of thirty flyboats under Lieutenant-Admiral Justin of Nassau. Parma desired that the Armada send its light petaches to drive away the Dutch, but Medina Sidonia could not do this because he feared that he might need these ships for his own protection. There was no deepwater port where the fleet might shelter – always acknowledged as a major difficulty for the expedition – and the Spanish found themselves vulnerable as night drew on. At midnight on 28 July, the English set alight eight fireships, sacrificing regular warships by filling them with pitch, brimstone, some gunpowder and tar, and cast them downwind among the closely anchored vessels of the Armada. The Spanish feared that these uncommonly large fireships were "hellburners",[17] specialised fireships filled with large gunpowder charges, which had been used to deadly effect at the Siege of Antwerp. Two were intercepted and towed away, but the remainder bore down on the fleet. Medina Sidonia's flagship and the principal warships held their positions, but the rest of the fleet cut their anchor cables and scattered in confusion. No Spanish ships were burnt, but the crescent formation had been broken, and the fleet now found itself too far to leeward of Calais in the rising southwesterly wind to recover its position. The English closed in for battle.

    Battle of Gravelines

    Sir Francis Drake in 1591

    The small port of Gravelines was then part of Flanders in the Spanish Netherlands, close to the border with France and the closest Spanish territory to England. Medina Sidonia tried to re-form his fleet there and was reluctant to sail further east knowing the danger from the shoals off Flanders, from which his Dutch enemies had removed the sea marks.

    The English had learned more of the Armada's strengths and weaknesses during the skirmishes in the English Channel and had concluded it was necessary to close within 100 yards to penetrate the oak hulls of the Spanish ships. They had spent most of their gunpowder in the first engagements and had after the Isle of Wight been forced to conserve their heavy shot and powder for a final attack near Gravelines. During all the engagements, the Spanish heavy guns could not easily be run in for reloading because of their close spacing and the quantities of supplies stowed between decks, as Francis Drake had discovered on capturing the damaged Rosario in the Channel.[18] Instead the cannoneers fired once and then jumped to the rigging to attend to their main task as marines ready to board enemy ships. In fact, evidence from Armada wrecks in Ireland shows that much of the fleet's ammunition was never spent.[19] Their determination to thrash out a victory in hand-to-hand fighting proved a weakness for the Spanish; it had been effective on occasions such as the Battle of Lepanto and the Battle of Ponta Delgada (1582), but the English were aware of this strength and sought to avoid it by keeping their distance.

    With its superior manoeuvrability, the English fleet provoked Spanish fire while staying out of range. The English then closed, firing repeated and damaging broadsides into the enemy ships. This also enabled them to maintain a position to windward so that the heeling Armada hulls were exposed to damage below the water line. Many of the gunners were killed or wounded, and the Spanish ships had more priests on board than trained gunners, so the task of manning the cannons often fell to the regular foot soldiers on board, who did not know how to operate the complex cannons. Sailors positioned on the upper decks of the English and Spanish ships were able to exchange musket fire, as their ships were in proximity. After eight hours, the English ships began to run out of ammunition, and some gunners began loading objects such as chains into cannons. Around 4:00 pm, the English fired their last shots and were forced to pull back.[20]

    Five Spanish ships were lost. The galleass San Lorenzo ran aground at Calais and was taken by Howard after murderous fighting between the crew, the galley slaves, the English and the French who ultimately took possession of the wreck. The galleons San Mateo and San Felipe drifted away in a sinking condition, ran aground on the island of Walcheren the next day, and were taken by the Dutch. One carrack ran aground near Blankenberge; another foundered. Many other Spanish ships were severely damaged, especially the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic-class galleons which had to bear the brunt of the fighting during the early hours of the battle in desperate individual actions against groups of English ships. The Spanish plan to join with Parma's army had been defeated and the English had afforded themselves some breathing space. But the Armada's presence in northern waters still posed a great threat to England.

    Tilbury speech

    Elizabeth I of England, the Armada portrait

    On the day after the battle of Gravelines, the wind had backed southerly, enabling Medina Sidonia to move his fleet northward away from the French coast. Although their shot lockers were almost empty, the English pursued in an attempt to prevent the enemy from returning to escort Parma. On 2 August Old Style (12 August New Style) Howard called a halt to the pursuit in the latitude of the Firth of Forth off Scotland. By that point, the Spanish were suffering from thirst and exhaustion, and the only option left to Medina Sidonia was to chart a course home to Spain, by a very hazardous route.

    The threat of invasion from the Netherlands had not yet been discounted by the English, and Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester maintained a force of 4,000 soldiers at West Tilbury, Essex, to defend the Thames Estuary against any incursion up river towards London.

    On 8 August (Old Style) (18 August New Style) Queen Elizabeth went to Tilbury to encourage her forces, and the next day gave to them what is probably her most famous speech:

    "My loving people, we have been persuaded by some that are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes for fear of treachery; but, I do assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear, I have always so behaved myself, that under God I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and goodwill of my subjects; and, therefore, I am come amongst you as you see at this time, not for my recreation and disport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of battle, to live or die amongst you all – to lay down for my God, and for my kingdoms, and for my people, my honour and my blood even in the dust. I know I have the body of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king – and of a King of England too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which, rather than any dishonour should grow by me, I myself will take up arms – I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field. I know already, for your forwardness, you have deserved rewards and crowns, and, we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you. In the mean time, my lieutenant general shall be in my stead, than whom never prince commanded a more noble or worthy subject; not doubting but by your obedience to my general, by your concord in the camp, and your valour in the field, we shall shortly have a famous victory over those enemies of my God, of my kingdom, and of my people."[21]

    Return to Spain

    In September 1588 the Armada sailed around Scotland and Ireland into the North Atlantic. The ships were beginning to show wear from the long voyage, and some were kept together by having their hulls bundled up with cables. Supplies of food and water ran short, and the cavalry horses were cast overboard into the sea. The intention would have been to keep well to the west of the coast of Scotland and Ireland, in the relative safety of the open sea. However, there being at that time no way of accurately measuring longitude, the Spanish were not aware that the Gulf Stream was carrying them north and east as they tried to move west, and they eventually turned south much further to the east than planned, a devastating navigational error. Off the coasts of Scotland and Ireland the fleet ran into a series of powerful westerly gales, which drove many of the damaged ships further towards the lee shore. Because so many anchors had been abandoned during the escape from the English fireships off Calais, many of the ships were incapable of securing shelter as they reached the coast of Ireland and were driven onto the rocks. The late 16th century, and especially 1588, was marked by unusually strong North Atlantic storms, perhaps associated with a high accumulation of polar ice off the coast of Greenland, a characteristic phenomenon of the "Little Ice Age."[22] As a result many more ships and sailors were lost to cold and stormy weather than in combat.

    Following the gales it is reckoned that 5,000 men died, whether by drowning and starvation or by slaughter at the hands of English forces after they were driven ashore in Ireland; only half of the Spanish Armada fleet returned home to Spain.[23] Reports of the passage around Ireland abound with strange accounts of brutality and survival and attest to the qualities of the Spanish seamanship.[24] Some survivors were concealed by Irish people, but few shipwrecked Spanish survived to be taken into Irish service, fewer still to return home.

    In the end, 67 ships and around 10,000 men survived. Many of the men were near death from disease, as the conditions were very cramped and most of the ships ran out of food and water. Many more died in Spain, or on hospital ships in Spanish harbours, from diseases contracted during the voyage. It was reported that, when Philip II learned of the result of the expedition, he declared, "I sent the Armada against men, not God's winds and waves".[25]

    Aftermath

    The Spanish Barn in Torquay held 397 Spanish prisoners of war.
    A plaque in the Spanish Barn

    English losses stood at 50–100 dead and 400 wounded, and none of their ships had been sunk. But after the victory, typhus, dysentery and hunger killed many sailors and troops (estimated at 6,000–8,000) as they were discharged without pay: a demoralising dispute occasioned by the government's fiscal shortfalls left many of the English defenders unpaid for months, which was in contrast to the assistance given by the Spanish government to its surviving men.

    The English fleet was unable to prevent the regrouping of the Armada at the Battle of Gravelines, requiring it to remain on duty even as thousands of its sailors died.

    Technological revolution

    The outcome vindicated the English strategy resulting in a revolution in naval warfare with the promotion of gunnery, which until then had played a supporting role to the tasks of ramming and boarding. The battle of Gravelines is regarded by some specialists in military history as reflecting a lasting shift in the naval balance in favour of the English, in part because of the gap in naval technology and armament it confirmed between the two nations,[26] which continued into the next century. In the words of Geoffrey Parker, by 1588 'the capital ships of the Elizabethan navy constituted the most powerful battlefleet afloat anywhere in the world.'[27] The English navy yards were leaders in technical innovation, and the captains devised new tactics. Geoffrey Parker argues that the full-rigged ship was one of the greatest technological advances of the century and permanently transformed naval warfare. In 1573 English shipwrights introduced designs, first demonstrated in the "Dreadnaught," that allowed the ships to sail faster and maneuver better and permitted heavier guns.[28] Whereas before warships had tried to grapple with each other so that soldiers could board the enemy ship, now they more often stood off and fired broadsides that could sink the enemy vessel. When Spain finally decided to invade and conquer England, it was a fiasco. Superior English ships and seamanship thus foiled the invasion. Technically, the Armada failed because Spain's over-complex strategy required coordination between the invasion fleet and the Spanish army on shore. But the poor design of the Spanish cannons meant they were much slower in reloading in a close-range battle, allowing the English to take control. Spain still had numerically larger fleets, but England was catching up.[29]

    Legacy

    In England, the boost to national pride lasted for years, and Elizabeth's legend persisted and grew long after her death. The repulse of Spanish naval might gave heart to the Protestant cause across Europe, and the belief that God was behind the Protestant cause was shown by the striking of commemorative medals that bore the inscription, He blew with His winds, and they were scattered. There were also more lighthearted medals struck, such as the one with the play on Julius Caesar's words: Venit, Vidit, Fugit (he came, he saw, he fled). The victory was acclaimed by the English as their greatest since Agincourt.[citation needed]

    However, an attempt to press home the English advantage failed the following year, when the Drake–Norris Expedition of 1589, with a comparable fleet of English privateers, sailed to establish a base in the Azores, attack Spain, and raise a revolt in Portugal.[11] The Norris–Drake Expedition or Counter Armada raided Corunna, but withdrew from Lisbon after failing to co-ordinate its strategy effectively with the Portuguese.

    In 1596 and 1597, two more armadas were sent but were scattered by storms.

    The Spanish Navy underwent a major organisational reform that helped it to maintain control over its trans-Atlantic routes. High seas buccaneering and the supply of troops to Philip II's enemies in the Netherlands and France continued but brought few tangible rewards for England.[30]

    The memory of the victory over the Armada was evoked during both the Napoleonic Wars and the Second World War, when Britain again faced a concrete danger of invasion.

    Historiography

    Knerr (1989) has reviewed the main trends in historiography over five centuries.[31] For 150 years writers relied heavily on Petruccio Ubaldini's A Discourse Concernye the Spanish Fleete Invadinye Englande (1590), which argued that God decisively favoured the Protestant cause. William Camden (1551-1623) pointed in addition to elements of English nationalism and the private enterprise of the sea dogs. He also emphasized that the Duke of Medina Sidonia was an incompetent seaman. David Hume (1711-76) praised the leadership of Queen Elizabeth. However the Whig historians, led by James A. Froude (1818-94), rejected Hume's interpretation and argued that Elizabeth was vacillating and almost lost the conflict by her unwillingness to spend enough to maintain the fleet. Scientific modern historiography came of age with the publication of two volumes of primary documents by John K. Laughton in 1894. This enabled the leading naval scholar of the day Julian Corbett (1854-1922), to reject the Whig views and turn attention to the professionalization of the Royal Navy as a critical factor. Twentieth century historians have focused on technical issues, such as the relative power of English and Spanish guns and the degree of credit due Francis Drake and Charles Howard.

    Panorama

    “Elizabeth I and the Spanish Armada”; the Apothecaries painting,[32] sometimes attributed to Nicholas Hilliard[33] A stylised depiction of key elements of the Armada story; the alarm beacons, Queen Elizabeth at Tilbury, and the sea battle at Gravelines.[34]

    In popular culture

    The preparations of the Armada and the Battle of Gravelines form the backdrop of two graphic novels in Bob de Moors "Cori le Moussaillon" (Les Espions de la Reine and Le Dragon des Mers'). In them, Cori the cabin boy works as a spy in the Armada for the English.

    The Armada and intrigues surrounding its threat to England form the backdrop of the films Fire Over England (1937), with Laurence Olivier and Flora Robson, and The Sea Hawk with Errol Flynn.

    The Battle of Gravelines and the subsequent chase around the northern coast of Scotland form the climax of Charles Kingsley's 1855 novel Westward Ho!, which in 1925 became the first novel to be adapted into a radio drama by BBC.[35]

    In golf, Seve Ballesteros and José María Olazábal, who had a Ryder Cup record of 11–2–2 as a team—the best record for a pairing in the history of the competition—came to be called the "Spanish Armada".[36]

    The Battle of Gravelines is the climax of the 2007 film, Elizabeth: The Golden Age starring Cate Blanchett and Clive Owen.

    In the twentieth season of The Simpsons, an episode depicts the reason for the Armada's attack as Queen Elizabeth's rebuff of the King of Spain. Homer Simpson accidentally sets the only English ship on fire; then collides with the Armada, setting all their ships on fire, creating victory for England.

    The Final Jeopardy! response on 20 May 2009 on Jeopardy! was "The Spanish Armada". The clue was "It was the 'they' in the medal issued by Elizabeth I reading, 'God breathed and they were scattered.'"

    Winston Graham wrote a history of "The Spanish Armadas" and a historical novel, The Grove of Eagles, based on it - the plural "Armadas" referring to a lesser-known second attempt by Philip II of Spain to conquer England during 1598, which Graham argued was better planned and organized than the famous one of 1588 but was foiled by a fierce storm scattering the Spanish ships and sinking many of them.

    Several Science Fiction writers published variant descriptions of how history might have proceeded had the Spanish Armada won, including John Brunner ("Times Without Number", 1962), Keith Roberts ("Pavane", 1969) and Harry Turtledove ("Ruled Britannia" 2002).

    See also

    References

    Notes

    1. ^ Whiting pg. 237-8
    2. ^ Parker pg. 245
    3. ^ a b c Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1 901341 14 3, p. 40.
    4. ^ Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1 901341 14 3, pp.10, 13, 19, 26.
    5. ^ Lewis, Michael.The Spanish Armada, New York: T.Y. Crowell Co., 1968, p. 184.
    6. ^ John Knox Laughton,State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Anno 1588, printed for the Navy Records Society, MDCCCXCV, Vol. II, pp. 8–9, Wynter to Walsyngham: indicates that the ships used as fire-ships were drawn from those at hand in the fleet and not hulks from Dover.
    7. ^ Lewis, p. 182.
    8. ^ Aubrey N. Newman, David T. Johnson, P.M. Jones (1985) The Eighteenth Century Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature 69 (1), 108 doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.
    9. ^ Lewis p. 208
    10. ^ Lewis p. 208-9
    11. ^ a b Hart, Francis Rußel, Admirals of the Caribbean, Hougton Mifflin Co., 1922, pp. 28–32, describes a large privateer fleet of 25 ships commanded by Drake in 1585 that raided about the Spanish Caribbean colonies.
    12. ^ "The Spanish Armada". Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company. 1913. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/The_Spanish_Armada.  "…the widespread suffering and irritation caused by the religious wars Elizabeth fomented, and the indignation caused by her religious persecution, and the execution of Mary Stuart, caused Catholics everywhere to sympathise with Spain and to regard the Armada as a crusade against the most dangerous enemy of the Faith." and "Pope Sixtus V agreed to renew the excommunication of the queen, and to grant a large subsidy to the Armada, but given the time needed for preparation and actual sailing of the fleet, would give nothing till the expedition should actually land in England. In this way he eventually was saved the million crowns, and did not take any proceedings against the heretic queen."
    13. ^ Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1 901341 14 3, p. 94, gives 30,500 and raised to 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry on p.96. Also, the hoax paper The English Mercurie published by Authoritie, Whitehall 23 July 1588, Imprinted at London by Chriss Barker, Her Highnesse's Printer, 1588, otherwise states fairly accurately, p. 3, "…all the Spanish troops in the Netherlands, and consists of thirty thousand Foot and eighteen hundred Horse."
    14. ^ http://britishbattles.com/spanish-war/spanish-armada.htm
    15. ^ Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1 901341 14 3, p. 185.
    16. ^ Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1 901341 14 3, p.153.
    17. ^ HellburnersPDF (143 KiB).
    18. ^ Coote, Stephen (2003). Drake. London: Simon & Schuster UK. p. 259. ISBN 0-7432-2007-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=pY5QPcDfjdkC&dq=Drake+Stephen+Coote&q=Drake+Rosario#search_anchor. Retrieved 5 December 2009. 
    19. ^ Colin Martin, Geoffrey Parker,The Spanish Armada, Penguin Books, 1999, ISBN 1 901341 14 3, pp.189–190
    20. ^ Battlefield Britain: Episode 4, the Spanish Armada
    21. ^ Damrosh, David, et al. The Longman Anthology of British Literature, Volume 1B: The Early Modern Period. Third ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2006
    22. ^ Brian Fagan, The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History 1300–1850,. New York: Basic Books, 2000
    23. ^ Garrett Mattingly, The Armada, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1959, p.369, the English Lord Deputy's orders were for the English soldiers in Ireland to kill Spanish prisoners which was done on several occasions.
    24. ^ Winston S. Churchill, The New World, vol. 3 of A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, (1956) Dodd, Mead & Co., New York, p. 130.
    25. ^ SparkNotes: Queen Elisabeth – Against the Spanish Armada
    26. ^ Aubrey N. Newman, David T. Johnson, P.M. Jones (1985) The Eighteenth Century Annual Bulletin of Historical Literature 69 (1), 93–109 doi:10.1111/j.1467-8314.1985.tb00698.
    27. ^ Geoffrey Parker, 'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England', Mariner's Mirror, 82 (1996): 273.
    28. ^ Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Dreadnought' Revolution of Tudor England," Mariner's Mirror, Aug 1996, Vol. 82 Issue 3, pp 269-300
    29. ^ Geoffrey Parker, "Why the Armada Failed," History Today, May 1988, Vol. 38 Issue 5, pp 26-33
    30. ^ Richard Holmes 2001, p. 858: "The 1588 campaign was a major English propaganda victory, but in strategic terms it was essentially indecisive"
    31. ^ Douglas Knerr, "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." American Neptune 1989 49(1): 5–13.
    32. ^ Aled Jones (5 May 2005). RHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society: Sixth Series. Cambridge University Press. pp. 129–. ISBN 978-0-521-84995-1. http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pZXcviUTeM8C&pg=PA123&dq=karen+hearn+elizabeth+I+and+the+Spanish+Armada&hl=en&ei=LYmQTvKMJcfC8QO_n4lB&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=karen%20hearn%20elizabeth%20I%20and%20the%20Spanish%20Armada&f=false=p123 RHS. Retrieved 8 October 2011. 
    33. ^ The Battle of Gravelines by Nicholas Hilliard at bbc.co.uk
    34. ^ Aled Jones (5 May 2005). Transactions of the Royal Historical Society: Sixth Series. Cambridge University Press. pp. 129–. ISBN 978-0-521-84995-1. http://books.google.es/books?id=pZXcviUTeM8C&pg=PA129&dq=red+and+yellow+spanish+ensign&hl=ca&ei=UFqQTpPLE8774QTl9sytAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=2&ved=0CDIQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=red%20and%20yellow%20spanish%20ensign&f=false. Retrieved 8 October 2011. 
    35. ^ Briggs, Asa. The BBC: The First Fifty Years. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985. 63.
    36. ^ Harig, Bob (11 May 2011). "Seve, Ryder Cup almost never happened". ESPN. http://sports.espn.go.com/golf/columns/story?columnist=harig_bob&id=6520098. Retrieved 11 May 2011. 

    Bibliography

    • Corbett, Julian S. Drake and the Tudor Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power (1898) online edition vol 1; also online edition vol 2
    • Cruikshank, Dan: Invasion: Defending Britain from Attack, Boxtree Ltd, 2002 ISBN 0752220291
    • Fernández-Armesto, Felipe. The Spanish Armada: The Experience of War in 1588. (1988). 336 pp.
    • Froude, James Anthony. The Spanish Story of the Armada, and Other Essays (1899), by a leading historian of the 1890s full text online
    • Kilfeather T.P: Ireland: Graveyard of the Spanish Armada, Anvil Books Ltd, 1967
    • Knerr, Douglas. "Through the "Golden Mist": a Brief Overview of Armada Historiography." American Neptune 1989 49(1): 5–13. Issn: 0003-0155
    • Konstam, Angus. The Spanish Armada: The Great Enterprise against England 1588 (2009)
    • Lewis, Michael. The Spanish Armada, New York: T.Y. Crowell Co., 1968.
    • McDermott, James. England and the Spanish Armada: The Necessary Quarrel (2005) excerpt and text search
    • Martin, Colin, and Geoffrey Parker. The Spanish Armada (2nd ed. 2002), 320pp by leading scholars; uses archaeological studies of some of its wrecked ships excerpt and text search
    • Martin, Colin (with appendices by Wignall, Sydney: Full Fathom Five: Wrecks of the Spanish Armada (with appendices by Sydney Wignall), Viking, 1975
    • Mattingly, Garrett. The Armada (1959). the classic narrative excerpt and text search
    • Parker, Geoffrey. "Why the Armada Failed." History Today 1988 38(may): 26–33. Issn: 0018-2753. Summary by leadfing historian.
    • Pierson, Peter. Commander of the Armada: The Seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia. (1989). 304 pp.
    • Rasor, Eugene L. The Spanish Armada of 1588: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography. (1992). 277 pp.
    • Rodger, N. A. M. The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain 660–1649 vol 1 (1999) 691pp; excerpt and text search
    • Rodriguez-Salgado, M. J. and Adams, Simon, eds. England, Spain, and the Gran Armada, 1585–1604 (1991) 308 pp.
    • Thompson, I. A. A. "The Appointment of the Duke of Medina Sidonia to the Command of the Spanish Armada", The Historical Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2. (1969), pp. 197–216. in JSTOR
    • Alcalá-Zamora, José N. (2004). La empresa de Inglaterra: (la "Armada invencible" : fabulación y realidad). Taravilla: Real Academia de la Historia ISBN 9788495983374

    Popular studies

    • The Confident Hope of a Miracle. The True History of the Spanish Armada, by Neil Hanson, Knopf (2003), ISBN 1-4000-4294-1.
    • Holmes, Richard. The Oxford Campanion to Military History. Oxford University Press. 2001. ISBN 978-0198606963
    • From Merciless Invaders: The Defeat of the Spanish Armada, Alexander McKee, Souvenir Press, London, 1963. Second edition, Grafton Books, London, 1988.
    • The Spanish Armadas, Winston Graham, Dorset Press, New York, 1972.
    • Mariner's Mirror, Geoffrey Parker, 'The Dreadnought Revolution of Tudor England', 82 (1996): pp. 269–300.
    • The Spanish Armada, Michael Lewis (1960). First published Batsford, 1960 – republished Pan, 1966
    • Armada: A Celebration of the Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588–1988 (1988) ISBN 0-575-03729-6
    • England and the Spanish Armada (1990) ISBN 0-7317-0127-5
    • The Enterprise of England (1988) ISBN 0-86299-476-4
    • The Return of the Armadas: the Later Years of the Elizabethan War against Spain, 1595–1603, RB Wernham ISBN 0-19-820443-4
    • The Voyage of the Armada: The Spanish Story, David Howarth (1981) ISBN 0-00-211575-1
    • T.P.Kilfeather Ireland: Graveyard of the Spanish Armada (Anvil Books, 1967)
    • Winston Graham The Spanish Armadas (1972; reprint 2001) ISBN 0-14-139020-4
    • Historic Bourne etc., J.J. Davies (1909)

    External links


     
     

     

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