Did the union or confederacy impose greater military and economic burdens on its citizens?

What were some of the main causes of the Holocaust?

Hitler brainwashed thousands of people to work for him in his attempt to create the perfect race. This meant eliminating Jews and people with physical defects. I'm pretty sure Hitler had this specfic thing against Jews, but I can't remember why.

Was the civil war worth its cost?

The US Civil War was definitely not worth its cost. Since this question can only be asked and answered after the war, to a degree the leaders on both sides never had the chance to see the full extent of the war's results. And with that said, leaders from President Lincoln to Jefferson Davis cannot be faulted as they found themselves in a bed of quicksand. Let it be said immediately that well into the 20th century, the South was a one political party section of the United States. Never could such a circumstance be seen from 1861. Also, even though the human costs of the war became so unsettling, it seemed almost impossible to end it without one side "winning". The war, even by the end of 1862, had cost thousands and thousands of lives. It is clear that radical Republicans, Democrats, War Democrats, moderate Republicans and even abolitionists, could have never believed that deaths of over 600,000 soldiers, the million casualties and the collateral damage to non combatants was worth such a war. There had to be an agreement in which all sides could reach, some kind of compromise that would have ended slavery, and not have the crippling effect of losing so many lives. There will be some who disagree with this conclusion, however, that stance overlooks too many affects of the war. Let's understand the individual results of the US Civil War. 1. The Southern economy was for all practical purposes destroyed. Not even by 1900 was it as strong as it was in 1860; 2. The loss of lives was especially hard on the relatively smaller population base than in the North; Taking points one and two into consideration, there would have never been a Confederacy. This economic loss and the loss of lives in the North most certainly would have caused a compromise. The "reunion" of the States encompassed an economic totality that prevented the growth and prosperity that could have been gained for the United States as a whole. The sticky issue of slavery must also be considered. The North was an enabler of the Southern slave economy. This was true for over 60 years. The fact that the US Treasury and certain parts of the US military awarded licenses to trade in cotton with the South while the war was still raging on is almost unbelievable but true. For a moment, lets pause and think about trading timber and steel to Imperial Japan during WW2, We need not think to long on the absurdity of such an arrangement. At the end of the US Civil War, the US was in debt for several billion dollars. This amount of money in 1865 was astronomical. The debt was a burden. The monies could have better been spent on ways to accelerate the vast explosion of the North's economy after the war. There is no doubt that this amount of money could have been used to "buy" the freedom of slaves. It was done in the British Empire, why not in the USA? Well, one could say it would change the customs and way of life in the South. Money changes everything, and combine that with the cost of the war which freed slaves anyway, it would have been the best way to handle the sticky slavery problem. Taken in its entirety, the vast economic growth of the USA on an overall basis, could have been multiplied almost beyond measure without the burdens of lost lives and the destruction of the Southern farmlands.

What did the US gain from World War 2?

Depends on what you call a gain. IMO, the USA did not gain much from the war. America had to assume vast military burdens for other countries. This, along with the huge amounts spent during WWII has left the American government deep in debt. The war altered the American perspective on the world, IMO in a negative way. Before the war the USA engaged actively in trade and economics but avoided foreign entanglements via treaty. After the war the USA entered into a multitude of agreements that have caused the USA to engage in fighting in remote and non strategic arenas around the globe. The USA was founded as a Republic that was meant to stand apart from entangling treaties. Instead the USA operates much more like a nation defending an Empire than a Republic. WWII was the catalyst for this change.

How long was a typical tour of duty in Vietnam?

Short : 12 months:"Tour of duty" means how much time did a person typically spend in a war zone. In Vietnam, the "war zone" was complicated. For 99% of Army and Marine ground soldiers, the war zone was limited to South Vietnam. But for Air Force and Navy pilots, the "war zone" extended beyond South Vietnam to North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. (Carrier fighter pilot John McCain, for example, a bona fide hero for his prison time in North Vietnam, never set foot in the South Vietnam combat zone, never witnessed ground forces in battle. Also, many Air Force flight missions in Southeast Asia were flown out of Guam.)So, recognizing some variances, it's easiest to consider ground soldiers of the Army and Marine Corps. Since all of South Vietnam was a combat zone, the key factor was time "in-country" -- that period between boots first stepping down on the tarmac to "wheels-up" at the end of a tour. But that in-country period did not translate directly into "combat time", which was more accurately a factor of one's military service and specialty; only about half of those who served in Vietnam were routinely exposed to the dangers of combat.For most of its personnel as the steady build-up progressed, Army eventually established the in-country tour length at 12 months. This required tour length applied to both enlisted men and commissioned officers, and equally to Regular, Reserve and National Guard soldiers. The Marines were required to serve 6-month tours, but were given incentives to serve for 13-months; most did.But the Army and Marine Corps also had programs where, if you were willing to extend your tour an additional 6 months, they would give you a free leave of 30 days in between the two tours, flying you anywhere you wanted to spend it free of charge. The flight time didn't count towards those thirty days, nor was the leave time credited towards your extra 6 months. The same applied to each successive six-month extension. These extension programs were usually more popular among headquarters administrative personnel or people who spent their entire tours on really huge fortified and very well-defended bases, than they were among infantrymen. Overly frequent rotation of forces is counter-productive and frequent rotation of forces is expensive; the objective was to find some middle ground between the wishes of the men and the requirements of the military mission. (By comparison, World War II soldiers served for the duration of the war, or until becoming casualties precluding a return to duty.)(Some Army and Navy special operations personnel such as Special Forces and SEALs served six month TDY tours (temporary duty, with different pay schedules) in country in succession. That is, a "green beret" might be on his "sixth straight tour", which meant that he had been in country for three straight years.)It's important to note that in Vietnam the Army rotated personnel, not units. The unit (i.e., an Army brigade, Marine battalion) was permanently based in-country, and individual soldiers were rotated in and out of country to and from that unit. (Today both services try to follow the traditional British regimental example. That is, both Army and Marines now try to rotate whole units, usually whole brigades, keeping members together as a cohesive unit from beginning to end of a combat tour in-country. This more expensive practice largely negates the possibility of individual tour extensions, but does significantly improve overall unit effectiveness.) For a deadly war that dragged on year after year, the practice of rotating individuals was not the best for unit morale, cohesion and effectiveness, but it was more cost effective. Still, until the Draft ended in 1975, ground soldiers were widely considered, even in the military, as just more mechanical widgets in the grand scheme of things, to be plugged in like interchangeable nuts and bolts where and when needed. (There remains among certain naive or arrogant civilian quarters a continued tendency to view soldiers in such a demeaning manner, through talk of inanimate "troops", etc., even though, in a modern all-volunteer military, 80% of American citizens in their age group cannot qualify for service in today's rather well compensated Regular Army. It's a very different military force today.)Combat units in Vietnam tried to follow as best they could a practice of not committing personnel or small units to constant combat situations for longer than six months. So a man or his squad ideally might be deployed "out in the boonies" for six months before being pulled back to headquarters base camp for the remaining six months of his one-year tour. But, due to constant high casualties and inherent mission requirements, it rarely worked out so neatly. (Greatly improved body armor and improved medical capabilities today result in far fewer disabling injuries and deaths from wounds than was the case in Vietnam; this naturally results in significantly less personnel turn-over today.) In Vietnam you simply never wanted to send out a "green" squad for six months with no experienced personnel in it. And employing soldiers in static defense at base camp or around a civilian town certainly did not ensure that they would not come under deadly attack.For ground combat personnel like Army infantry and Marines, where casualties were highest (in Vietnam 92%, today 98%), the limited year-long tours were a mixed blessing. As was the practice in all American wars up to 1975, most combat ground soldiers during the Vietnam era were involuntarily drafted, very young, single men, and the limit on tour lengths in Vietnam helped ensure that they would not be dumped into endless war and forgotten. After all, regardless of what credentials they bought to the table, and very many of them had undergraduate and graduate degrees, their "grateful nation" felt that their lives were worth a basic pay of only $2.00 for each day they managed to survive in-country.On the other hand, the one-year tours also gave rise to a situation where almost half of American combat forces in theater were always rather new and inexperienced individual soldiers, while their enemy, who kept going at it as a small unit year after year, grew ever more expert and effective at his job for as long as he remained alive - on his own turf. This had an inherent propensity to raise US casualties.So, for US combat personnel such as infantry, placing limits on tour lengths in an unconventional war that never showed signs of ending, especially one that was quite unpopular among Americans, had both very real positive and very real negative consequences.And there was another aspect that remains important although nebulous: The tour limits gave rise to "short-timer" calendars that ticked off the remaining days a man had to remain in country; the 180-day mid-point was the tipping point for Army soldiers, and a man's calendar gradually affected his thinking about what he was doing. If the war never ended, at least the "short-timer" calendar did - IF the soldier could remain alive long enough to check off that last day. And the closer he got to that last day, the more important it became to him that he stay alive by avoiding dangerous situations as much as possible. Individual survivability eventually competes with, and might even supersede, military mission - a tendency better balanced by rotating whole units despite the extra cost. The psychological effect of "short-timer" calendars in such a constant unconventional warfare environment gradually got blurred with "combat fatigue" and "burn-out", so that it was nearly impossible to distinguish one from the other or to sort out what was actually going on in a man's mind. Nor was the psychological aspect of the soldier viewed at that time worth even considering; at the end of the year, most surviving and mobile Army draftees were simply flown back to the US and mustered out of service, a jungle-to-street journey that rarely took longer than 24 hours. These were the human male widgets who somehow engendered the women's "liberation" movement in America.With all of that having been said, it was still possible for Army and Marine career soldiers to serve two, three or four tours "in-country", each separated by a period of assignment outside Vietnam or back in CONUS (Continental US). And some of those tours could have been for periods longer than 12 months. Army personnel are authorized to wear on the right lower jacket sleeve one perpendicular golden hash mark for each six months served in a combat zone; it was not uncommon during the Vietnam era to see professional Special Forces men with as many as ten of these hash marks on their uniforms.It should be noted that most practices with male soldiers in Vietnam, with the exception of tour length limits, pretty much mirrored practices throughout 200 years of American history before 1975. Following on centuries of practices of European monarchies, there had always been a certain "expendable" aspect to American soldiering. Today we fight wars more intelligently, with the knowledge that ground soldiers are actually valuable assets and that all other military assets exist to support their enormously complex and incredibly dangerous mission among other humans on the ground. Unfortunately, the US military doesn't have half the number of ground soldiers to execute properly the various missions that today's politicians want it to execute, tour limits or not, but the politicians still prefer to pour taxpayer money into unnecessary military toys intended for conventional warfare that generate civilian jobs and votes back home, while hoping that American ground soldiers thrown into any situation will eventually figure out how to solve it. European politicians play the same game with American soldiers and taxpayers, placing far greater burdens on Americans than they are willing to deliver as equitable "allies".Naval shore personnel generally served one year tours such as at NSA Danang. Navy Seabees served from six months to ten months or more with a Mobile Construction Battalion. If Seabees were assigned to a shore activity, generally they stayed a year. Brown water sailors usually served a year tour, but could be more or less. Seabees could extend with relieving battalion and stay anywhere from eight to twenty months depending on the battalions work schedule. I have heard of Seabees doing four tours with battalions, or a tour or two with a battalion and another with a shore station such as NSA Danang. Navy Corpsmen serving with Marines generally did thirteen month tours, same as Marines. Some Seabees served aboard ships in the Yellow Sea patrolling the coastline. These Bees served as long as the ship stayed on station.Footnotes:1. Vietnam was an unconventional war, fought in a set geographical space over a very long period. It began under President Eisenhower with the introduction of the 1st Special Forces Group in 1957 (900 in 1961), increased under President Kennedy (16,000 in 1963), and escalated dramatically under President Johnson (543,482 in 1969); official US military involvement in Vietnam ended 16 years later under President Nixon with the withdrawal of the last US military forces in 1973. Over those 16 years, a total of 2,644,000 American military members served in-country in Vietnam, about half of whom (1.3 million) were routinely exposed to combat and 80% of whom had at least a high school diploma. Only about 29% of those serving on US military active duty during the period actually saw service in Vietnam; 71% did not. Of the 1.73 million men drafted during the period (only 2.5% into the Marine Corps), just 38% actually served in Vietnam. About 25% of those serving in-country were ground forces draftees, and they accounted for 30.4% of combat deaths, but it's not known how many men volunteered to avoid being drafted. The war, which had an overall US casualty rate of about 13.7%, resulted in 58,202 Americans killed, 1,700 missing and 303,635 wounded. (South Vietnamese military losses were 3.8 times larger in all categories.)2. The war was mostly static, rather than fluid (as was, say, the global WW II). Static unconventional wars that go on and on are very different from conventional wars that are continually driving to some clear conclusion as rapidly as possible. (The first three weeks of the Iraq War, for example, were entirely conventional fluid attack, and then immediately shifted to unconventional static occupation, but without adequate and appropriate US personnel and equipment for unconventional warfare / military occupation, including counter-insurgency, reconstruction, and stability operations.) The two types of war are almost exact opposites, requiring very different expertise, equipment and configuration; fluid conventional is all about offense, about destroying things and killing people, while static unconventional is all about defense, about building things and helping people. (Because of very significant ground forces personnel shortfalls, today's American super-soldiers are expected to shift from offense to defense and back to offense on a dime without missing a beat; most consider that expectation unrealistically naïve in an environment where a single mistake in a half second can result in death. Americans would never consider asking their professional football teams to do that in a completely safe and controlled environment.) Static unconventional wars place much more emphasis on defending stationary base camps and civilian populations, a "backward leaning" requirement that draws huge numbers of soldiers away from performing "forward leaning" aggressive attack against moving enemy targets. In Vietnam, American forces had to commit many more soldiers to static defense than it could commit to fluid offense. So it was highly likely that a combat soldier would be employed in both roles (offense and defense, within an unconventional environment) during his 12-month in-country tour, and very often one role was just as dangerous as the other.

How many people were in the Mormon militia?

And now, here is the real history. MORMON BATTALION Mormon Battalion monument, State Capitol Grounds In July 1846, under the authority of U.S. Army Captain James Allen and with the encouragement of Mormon leader Brigham Young, the Mormon Battalion was mustered in at Council Bluffs, Iowa Territory. The battalion was the direct result of Brigham Young's correspondence on 26 January 1846 to Jesse C. Little, presiding elder over the New England and Middle States Mission. Young instructed Little to meet with national leaders in Washington, D.C., and to seek aid for the migrating Latter-day Saints, the majority of whom were then in the Iowa Territory. In response to Young's letter, Little journeyed to Washington, arriving on 21 May 1846, just eight days after Congress had declared war on Mexico. Little met with President James K. Polk on 5 June 1846 and urged him to aid migrating Mormon pioneers by employing them to fortify and defend the West. The president offered to aid the pioneers by permitting them to raise a battalion of five hundred men, who were to join Colonel Stephen W. Kearny, Commander of the Army of the West, and fight for the United States in the Mexican War. Little accepted this offer. Colonel Kearny designated Captain James Allen, later promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, to raise five companies of volunteer soldiers from the able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five in the Mormon encampments in Iowa. On 26 June 1846 Allen arrived at the encampment of Mt. Pisgah. He was treated with suspicion as many believed that the raising of a battalion was a plot to bring trouble to the migrating Saints. Allen journeyed from Mt. Pisgah to Council Bluffs, where on 1 July 1846 he allayed Mormon fears by giving permission for the Saints to encamp on United States lands if the Mormons would raise the desired battalion. Brigham Young accepted this, recognizing that the enlistment of the battalion was the first time the government had stretched forth its arm to aid the Mormons. On 16 July 1846 some 543 men enlisted in the Mormon Battalion. From among these men Brigham Young selected the commissioned officers; they included Jefferson Hunt, Captain of Company A; Jesse D. Hunter, Captain of Company B; James Brown, Captain of Company C; Nelson Higgins, Captain of Company D; and Daniel C. Davis, Captain of Company E. Among the most prominent non-Mormon military officers immediately associated with the battalion march were Lt. Col. James Allen, First Lt. Andrew Jackson Smith, Lt. Col. Philip St. George Cooke, and Dr. George Sanderson. Also accompanying the battalion were approximately thirty-three women, twenty of whom served as laundresses, and fifty-one children. The battalion marched from Council Bluffs on 20 July 1846, arriving on 1 August 1846 at Fort Leavenworth (Kansas), where they were outfitted for their trek to Santa Fe. Battalion members drew their arms and accoutrements, as well as a clothing allowance of forty-two dollars, at the fort. Since a military uniform was not mandatory, many of the soldiers sent their clothing allowances to their families in the encampments in Iowa.. The march from Fort Leavenworth was delayed by the sudden illness of Colonel Allen. Capt. Jefferson Hunt was instructed to begin the march to Santa Fe; he soon received word that Colonel Allen was dead. Allen's death caused confusion regarding who should lead the battalion to Santa Fe. Lt. A.J. Smith arrived from Fort Leavenworth claiming the lead, and he was chosen the commanding officer by the vote of battalion officers. The leadership transition proved difficult for many of the enlisted men, as they were not consulted about the decision. Smith and his accompanying surgeon, a Dr. Sanderson, have been described in journals as the "heaviest burdens" of the battalion. Under Smith's dictatorial leadership and with Sanderson's antiquated prescriptions, the battalion marched to Santa Fe. On this trek the soldiers suffered from excessive heat, lack of sufficient food, improper medical treatment, and forced long-distance marches. The first division of the Mormon Battalion approached Santa Fe on 9 October 1846. Their approach was heralded by Col. Alexander Doniphan, who ordered a one-hundred-gun salute in their honor. At Santa Fe, Smith was relieved of his command by Lt. Col. Philip St. George Cooke. Cooke, aware of the rugged trail between Santa Fe and California and also aware that one sick detachment had already been sent from the Arkansas River to Fort Pueblo in Colorado, ordered the remaining women and children to accompany the sick of the battalion to Pueblo for the winter. Three detachments consisting of 273 people eventually were sent to Pueblo for the winter of 1846-47. The remaining soldiers, with four wives of officers, left Santa Fe for California on 19 October 1846. They journeyed down the Rio Grande del Norte and eventually crossed the Continental Divide on 28 November 1846. While moving up the San Pedro River in present-day Arizona, their column was attacked by a herd of wild cattle. In the ensuing fight, a number of bulls were killed and two men were wounded. Following the "Battle of the Bulls," the battalion continued their march toward Tucson, where they anticipated a possible battle with the Mexican soldiers garrisoned there. At Tucson, the Mexican defenders temporarily abandoned their positions and no conflict ensued. On 21 December 1846 the battalion encamped on the Gila River. They crossed the Colorado River into California on 9 and 10 January 1847. By 29 January 1847 they were camped at the Mission of San Diego, about five miles from General Kearny's quarters. That evening Colonel Cooke rode to Kearny's encampment and reported the battalion's condition. On 30 January 1847 Cooke issued orders enumerating the accomplishments of the Mormon Battalion. "History may be searched in vain for an equal march of infantry. Half of it has been through a wilderness where nothing but savages and wild beasts are found, or deserts where, for lack of water, there is no living creature." During the remainder of their enlistment, some members of the battalion were assigned to garrison duty at either San Diego, San Luis Rey, or Ciudad de los Angeles. Other soldiers were assigned to accompany General Kearny back to Fort Leavenworth. All soldiers, whether en route to the Salt Lake Valley via Pueblo or still in Los Angeles, were mustered out of the United States Army on 16 July 1847. Eighty-one men chose to reenlist and serve an additional eight months of military duty under Captain Daniel C. Davis in Company A of the Mormon Volunteers. The majority of the soldiers migrated to the Salt Lake Valley and were reunited with their pioneering families. The men of the Mormon Battalion are honored for their willingness to fight for the United States as loyal American citizens. Their march of some 2,000 miles from Council Bluffs to California is one of the longest military marches in history. Their participation in the early development of California by building Fort Moore in Los Angeles, building a courthouse in San Diego, and making bricks and building houses in southern California contributed to the growth of the West. Following their discharge, many men helped build flour mills and sawmills in northern California. Some of them were among the first to discover gold at Sutter's Mill. Men from Captain Davis's Company A were responsible for opening the first wagon road over the southern route from California to Utah in 1848. Historic sites associated with the battalion include the Mormon Battalion Memorial Visitor's Center in San Diego, California; Fort Moore Pioneer Memorial in Los Angeles, California; and the Mormon Battalion Monument in Memory Grove, Salt Lake City, Utah. Monuments relating to the battalion are also located in New Mexico, Arizona, and Colorado, and trail markers have been placed on segments of the battalion route. See: Sergeant Daniel Tyler, A Concise History of the Mormon Battalion in the Mexican War 1846-1848 (1969); Philip St. George Cooke, et. al., Exploring Southwestern Trails, 1846-1854 (1938); Frank Alfred Golder, Thomas A. Bailey, and Lyman J. Smith, eds., The March of the Mormon Battalion From Council Bluffs to California Taken from the Journal of Henry Standage (1928). Susan Easton Black

Did the union or confederacy impose greater military and economic burdens on its citizens?

Add your answer:

What were some of the main causes of the Holocaust?

Was the civil war worth its cost?

What did the US gain from World War 2?

How long was a typical tour of duty in Vietnam?

How many people were in the Mormon militia?

What has the author Robert Mark Rosh written?

When was Burdens created?

Advantages of small family?

What is a sentence for burdens?

Why did the rise of fascist regimes in countries like Italy and Germany come in the early 20th century?

What does relished mean?

Why did the rise of fascist regimes in countries like Italy and Germany in the early 20th century came about in part?

List three major problems British government faced in trying to win the french and Indian war?

When was Laying My Burdens Down created?

What type of burdens are common in an adult life?

When was The Burdens of Being Upright created?

Why does life have to be full of burdens?

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