Famous then and later for over estimating the size of Confederate armies, Major General George B. McClellan was falsely alarmed about the size of Confederate troops that would be soon threatening Washington DC. In mid-August of 1861, he made it clear that his Army of the Potomac, still in a training mode, would soon have to face as many as 170,000 Southern troops. In reality, the Rebel force in Northern Virginia at that time had only 45,000 troops. At the same time his army had at least 80,000 men.
As the Union's Peninsula campaign was in its early stages, General McClellan was certain that President Lincoln was hampering McClellan's war operations. Lincoln had stepped in and retained the corps under General McDowell to defend Washington DC. Lincoln believed this was a necessity.
Halleck came to the conclusion that even if McClellan did, his planned turning movement would result in becoming an exterior line of operation to General Lee's advantage. Confederate General Robert E. Lee was situated between the armies of Pope and McClellan and could thus form a concentration against either army and result in a major Union defeat. The exterior line situation that the Union had created was a potential disaster. The best move was to evacuate the Peninsula and join Pope in Northern Virginia.
In his initial plan to end the Southern rebellion, General McClellan outlined a multipronged offensive. The key area of operations would be in Virginia.
Confederate General Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg believed that Kentucky's neutrality had given it no guarantees from the Union and the Confederate raid there would bring Kentucky into the Confederacy.
Confederate General PT Beauregard had strong opinions as to why the South lost the US Civil War. He wrote after the war that faulty military strategies and and the poor leadership of President Jefferson Davis caused the Confederate defeat. He did not believe that the numerical troop disadvantages of the South was the main cause at all.
General George B. McClellan has had bad feelings towards President Lincoln and his cabinet when he learns that troops he counted on would be saved to protect Washington DC. He is then refused reinforcements for two reasons. One is the threat to Washington DC posed by Major General Stonewall Jackson as he closes in on Harpers Ferry. On top of that, McClellan already outnumbers the Confederates defending Richmond by a two to one margin. McClellan refuses to believe the number of Confederate left to defend his target, Richmond.
General McClellan, in 1861, recommended that 20,000 troops were needed to defend Washington DC. With other troops stationed in the vicinity , additional reinforcements could be rapidly sent to the defense of the capitol.
President Lincoln appointed Major General George B. McClellan to general in chief on November 1, 1861. He replaced the retiring General in Chief Winfield Scott. Lincoln relieved McClellan of his title on March 11, 1862. McClellan was not in Washington DC at this time. He was in the process of organizing the Peninsula campaign. It is written that Lincoln did not believe that McClellan could hold his position as general in chief and conduct the Peninsula campaign at the same time.
Much of General George B. McClellan's correspondence to Washington DC and personal letters are now in the public domain. A good number of historians have to the belief that McClellan had a "Calvinistic" belief in predestination. The totality of these published papers appear to demonstrate that McClellan believed that God had called him to save the Union.
As the Union's Peninsula campaign was in its early stages, General McClellan was certain that President Lincoln was hampering McClellan's war operations. Lincoln had stepped in and retained the corps under General McDowell to defend Washington DC. Lincoln believed this was a necessity.
Although Major General George B. McClellan was not part of the Second Battle of Bull Run, he estimated that General Lee had 120,000 troops. This was double the actual number of troops that General Lee had at his disposal. McClellan's estimate was based on numerous rumors instead of actual facts. McClellan had consistently over estimated the number of Rebel troops that were operating in Northern Virginia.
Union General George B. McClellan, along with many other Union generals, believed the best way to defend Washington DC, would be to assault Richmond, the Confederate capital. Their thinking was that if Confederate General Robert E. Lee had been compelled to fight for the safety of Richmond, he would have been forced to concentrate the main part of his army around that city. Now Lee would still have the ability to launch a raid down the Shenandoah Valley, if the valley was improperly protected by Union forces, this would only require a small segment of his army. It would not constitute a decisive threat to Washington DC. With the Union attacking, rather then withdrawing, this would have forced Lee to fight which to many was the best path to a Union end to the rebellion.
Major General George B. McClellan was aware that Texas and the US Territories bordering Mexico were potential trouble spots for the US. With regards to that, McClellan recommended that the US maintain cordial relations with Mexico as a means of intelligence gathering on Confederate forces that may try to dominate US areas in the Southwest.
I believe it was Jeb Stuart, confederate cavalry officer who scouted a great deal for General Lee
Halleck came to the conclusion that even if McClellan did, his planned turning movement would result in becoming an exterior line of operation to General Lee's advantage. Confederate General Robert E. Lee was situated between the armies of Pope and McClellan and could thus form a concentration against either army and result in a major Union defeat. The exterior line situation that the Union had created was a potential disaster. The best move was to evacuate the Peninsula and join Pope in Northern Virginia.
In his initial plan to end the Southern rebellion, General McClellan outlined a multipronged offensive. The key area of operations would be in Virginia.
Confederate General Kirby Smith and Braxton Bragg believed that Kentucky's neutrality had given it no guarantees from the Union and the Confederate raid there would bring Kentucky into the Confederacy.