Most historians believe that Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, was more interested in the political results of military action than the "nuts and bolts" of military strategy. It appeared that US President Lincoln was far superior to Stanton on that issue. Nevertheless, Stanton and Lincoln agreed in January of 1862, that McClellan needed a victory soon for a "moral effect", if for any other reason. Here's where there seemed to be a miscommunication between McClellan and his civilian leaders. McClellan believed that Lincoln and Stanton wanted a military victory in a battle as soon as possible to effect the moral of the Rebels. This was not the case. Lincoln and Stanton wanted that victory to boost the moral of Northern citizens.
An unusual act on the conduct of strategy by a commanding officer would be to allow for a vote among commanders reporting to the general in charge of a military operation. In the case of General George B. McClellan, he informed the secretary of war, Edwin Stanton that his officers unanimously voted to use Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the upcoming Peninsula campaign. McClellan informed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in the middle of March 1862, that based on the votes of his officers, Fort Monroe would be this base for McClellan's march on Richmond.
General George B. McClellan believed that General in Chief Winfield Scott and President Lincoln were among a group in Washington DC that failed to properly recognize the gravity of the military situation the Union was in the Fall of 1861. McClellan, however had an ally in Edward M. Stanton. He was a fellow Democrat and a former member of President Buchanan's cabinet. The draft of McClellan's major strategy paper of October 1861 to Secretary of War, Simon Cameron reveals that it was written in part by Edwin Stanton. Apparently McClellan visited Stanton's home in Washington DC in an effort to avoid having to answer questions from President Lincoln's close friends and associates.
The General in Chief Winfield Scott officially retired from active service on November 1, 1862. As expected both President Lincoln and Secretary of War Simon Cameron agreed that McClellan should take on the new title of general in chief. This placed McClellan in charge of all Union military operations for the war. He was qualified for this position, of that there was and is no doubt on his qualifications.
General George B. McClellan's telegraph to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on June 28, 1862 bordered on treason. When McClellan's telegraph was received by General Dix in Washington DC, Dix omitted McClellan's claim that the Lincoln administration purposely acted to create the Peninsula campaign as a failure.
That depends on the president and his situation. He may depend on the Secretary Defense or he may have a favorite general that he trusts. As a rule, the Secretary of Defense gives advice on forming and equipping the military whereas the chiefs of staff are planners of strategy and military operations.
Although it seemed General George B. McClellan and the US Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton had a good relationship, they were at odds in early 1862.Based on plans discussed between Stanton and US President Lincoln, McClellan was ordered to begin in February an offensive against Confederate General Joe Johnston's entrenched troops southwest of Washington DC. These instructions interdicted McClellan's proposed turning movement. Never one to be shy, McClellan sent Stanton a 22 page letter on why and how the turning movement was necessary. The letter included the military principles explaining his strategy. The letter detailed why assaulting the entrenched Confederate army posed far too many difficulties.
General McClellan soon realized that the new secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, had no background in military affairs. Soon after Stanton's appointment to the war department, McClellan sought to explain to him why President Lincoln's orders to launch a frontal assault on the entrenched Confederate forces of General Joseph Johnston was not a sound idea. He put together a twenty-two page report on this to Stanton and offered to him his own plan to capture Richmond.
That depends on the president and his situation. He may depend on the Secretary Defense or he may have a favorite general that he trusts. As a rule, the Secretary of Defense gives advice on forming and equipping the military whereas the chiefs of staff are planners of strategy and military operations.
General Burgoyne. :)
The private organization that Union General George McClellan hired to help gather military intelligence was the Union Espionage Organization.
General Meade remained loyal to his former commander, George B. McClellan, even after Meade was appointed the leader of the Army of the Potomac. He, like McClellan outwardly criticized the political interference the military had to deal with concerning military issues.
No one doubts the brilliance of George B. McClellan as being a military genius. Those who do are entitled to their opinions. One Union major general had suggested the best solution of all. Because of McClellan's brilliance and we can assume his "commanding" slowness, the best thing that Lincoln could have done was to retain McClellan as general in chief and appoint a good general to head the Army of the Potomac. This would have relieved him of the stress of the battlefield, and use his fine military mind to create strategies and allow his major generals to carry them out. The Secretary of War, Stanton and US President Lincoln were good politicians and military strategies they themselves would have to admit were not their forte'.