Why is this important section IRC 6011a in the USA v Springer case that the the United States DOJ in 09 cr 043 SPF told the usdc its not the prosecution burden to prove springer was liable?

Answer 1

August 12, 2009, the United States Department of Justice in 09-cr-043-SPF, USA v. Springer, told the United States District Court the following:

"IT IS NOT THE PROSECUTION'S BURDEN TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT SPRINGER WAS LIABLE BY EXPRESS WORDS IN TITLE 26, US CODE SECTIONS 1,61,63,6011(a), 6012(a)(1)(A), 6072(a), 6091, 6151 or 7203..."

This issue arose in the wake of the Court ordering the United States to explain to the Court, Springer and Stilley, what the Grand Jury meant when it said "required by law" in the Grand Jury indictment.

The code sections cited in the quote above are the exact code sections the United States gave the Court, Springer and Stilley, as purportedly meant by the Grand Jury in uttering such phrase "required by law."

The reason why this is so important is because section 6011(a), cited by the United States in the quote above and in the Court Ordered particulars, says "When required by regulation prescribed by the Secretary any person made liable for any tax imposed by this title...."

They are now admitting no express words in Title 26 make Springer liable for any tax imposed by "this title" yet they allege a tax was "due and owing."

The United States admits each and every code section listed above does not "by express words in Title 26" make Springer "liable" for any tax.

This became very important after the 10th Circuit reversed our District Court Judge on August 18, 2008, almost a year earlier, in United States v. Farr, 536 F35 1174, 1181 (10th Cir. 2008) wherein the 10th said

"By charging Ms. Farr with willfully attempting to defeat the "payment of the quarterly employment tax . . . due and owing by her," the indictment effectively limited the first element of Section 7201 --- a substantial tax due and owing --- to liability for quarterly employment taxes which she purportedly owed. From that point on, absent a proper amendment to the indictment by the grand jury, the government was not free to prove any other tax liability at trial."

If you are the source of generic income then Congress can impose a direct tax on the source and hold the source liable without regard to census or enumeration or rule of apportionment. If Congress seeks to make a certain activity taxable and it does not resort to the source, then it must resort to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 and the indirect tax or excise tax method.

The problem with this is that all excise taxes are regulated by the rule of "uniformity" and any rate that is "graduated" is not uniform. Uniformity means all articles taxed exactly the same way. If Congress seeks to tax income under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, the article being taxes being that of income can only be taxed at one rate and it matters not how much you received. If Congress resorts to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, to impose an income tax, they likewise run into several other violations of the uniformity rule like marriage penalty and so on.

Only by imposing a direct tax on the source of income can Congress graduate or exempt and penalize standing behind the 16th Amendment.

In the case cited above, Ms. Farr was indicted for attempting to evade the employer withholding tax she was alleged to be "liable" for under Title 26, Section 3403. At trial the Government only proved she had not paid the 100% penalty assessed against her at Title 26, Section 6672.

The United States argued on appeal in Farr that "a constructive amendment did not occur because the employment tax and the trust fund recovery penalty are proverbial alter egos." The Government asked the District Court and obtained a "contested instruction" during trial that dictated "to the jury that the trust fund recovery penalty and the quarterly employment taxes are the same thing. See Farr at page 1181.

The difficulty for the government in Farr was "that the difference between the quarterly employment taxes and the trust fund recovery penalty is not merely a semantic one under our precedent [10th Cir]." "While the ultimate object of the IRS's interest --- recovering the underlying delinquent tax --- is undoubtedly the same, the quarterly employment tax provision of Section 3403 and the trust fund recovery penalty of Section 6672 provide materially different means for achieving that end."

Notice the 3403 liability and the 6672 liability are taxes on the source and not the recipient. This is why these sections standing alone reference who is liable. In contrast, none of the sections provided by the United States in its Court Ordered Bill of Particulars in USA v. Springer used the term Liability or liable except section 6011. Examining that section shows "when required by regulation prescribed by the Secretary any person made liable for any tax imposed by this title..."

Section 6011 places the liability for any tax imposed on the "person made liable." Section 3403 makes the employer liable. Section 6672 makes the corporate officer liable. Section 1, 61,63, 6011, 6012, 6071, 6091, 6151 and 7203 do not ever say who is liable for the tax imposed by section 1 and for good reason.

The source is the only liable person under the 16th Amendment. Not the recipient. Think about it. Why would the employer be held liable if the employer does not withhold the correct amount of withholding? Why is the employee not held liable? After all, the employee kept the lions share and certainly possesses what was not properly withheld. The reason is in the 16th Amendment. The employer is the source and is the only person under the 16th Amendment Congress can make or hold liable.

All I am doing here is explaining why the United States said "it is not the prosecution's burden to prove that Defendant Springer was liable by express words in Title 26, US Code..." and why they are wrong about their burden but more importantly why they said it. Query - How can anyone be said to "owe" a tax if they are not the person made liable for that tax? Logically they cannot.

I realize some of you are immediately going to seek how to use this information to your advantage. The best way to use it is to write a letter to your Congressman, Freedom of Information, any Lawyer you know, and the IRS Commissioner, and ask them this prefaced question:

Title 26, section 60ll says "any person made liable for any tax imposed by this title." If I receive money from one or several State located sources, where has Congress spoken in clear language the whole world can understand that I am made liable for a tax imposed on the income I received from one or several of these sources? Please identify the tax imposed by code section and the code section which makes me liable if they are different?

Instead of simply identifying the code section which made me liable the United States chose to spend several pages in multiple pleadings saying how easy their liability theory was. They did cite to section 61 in another pleading but never said that section made me liable for any tax imposed by Title 26. In fact, I suggest you each see this for your self. Go read section 1 (tax imposed on the income), 61(gross income defined), 63 (taxable income defined), 6011(no liability), 6012(no exempt amount), 6071 (date of filing), 6091 (place to file) (no district directors or IR districts), 6151(pay what returns says you owe) and 7203(no definition or meaning of return). Section 61 never makes anyone liable for anything.

For this revelation I think it important to say that 6011 places the "made liable for any tax imposed by this title" as to be determined first by you or before any person is to make a return according to the forms and regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

Would like to see what is truly going on inside the battle between a private citizen and the United States Department of Justice and Internal Revenue Service.