Why was the battle of khalkhin-Gol a decisive battle?

Answer 1

The Battle of Khalkhin Gol was NOT a decisive battle in the manner it is usually thought of. It was a Soviet victory to be sure, but it was far from an easy walk-over of the Japanese 23rd and 7th divisions. According to M. Kolomiets in Frontovaya Illyustratsia, in achieving victory over the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol, the Soviet-Mongolian forces under Grigory Shtern and Georgy Zhukov (the latter a future hero of WWII) suffered losses of:

397 tanks and armored vehicles

692 other motor vehicles

94 mortars, artillery pieces, and anti-tank guns

9,868 killed and 16,343 wounded for a total of 26,211 casualties

In addition, the according to V. Kondratiev, the Soviet Air Force took losses amounting to:

208 aircraft destroyed in combat

42 aircraft lost through non-combat causes, and

436 aircraft damaged for a total of

686 aircraft destroyed or damaged

This is measured against Japanese losses, which according to the same sources (plus the research of Yotaro Oda), as well as V. Dyatlov in "Soviet Artillery in the conflict at Khalkhin gol" amounted to:

30 tanks

327 mortars and artillery pieces

29 armored vehicles and an unknown number of trucks and motor vehicles

8,632 killed and 9,087 wounded for a total of 17,719 total casualties.

According to Kondratiev, the Japanese Air Force lost:

162 aircraft, including 88 destroyed through aerial combat, and

220 aircraft damaged, for a total of

382 aircraft destroyed or damaged

Thus, the ratio of ground force casualties, shown as USSR/Mongolia:Japan is about 1.48:1 in favor of Japan. The ratio of total aircraft damaged and destroyed by all causes, shown in the same manner is about 1.8:1, again in favor of Japan.

Therefore, according to the table of losses, as well as the testimony of Soviet soldiers who participated in the battle against Japan, the victory of the Soviet Union at Khalkhin gol was by no means easy. Nor was it militarily decisive. The numerically superior Soviets had pushed back a relatively small (compared to the forces the USSR and Japan had facing one another at the time) Japanese incursion into Mongolian territory, at the cost of huge losses on both sides. The mauling of a Japanese division, and the decimation of a Soviet Army Group did little to alter the total strategic balance of forces on the Manchuria/USSR/Mongolia front, other than to restore a contested border.

The real effect of the Khalkhin gol battle was political. The Japanese Kwantung Army leadership was humiliated at the defeat of one of their divisions, even though it was held back by IGHQ (Imperial General Headquarters) in Tokyo. (The Japanese High Command did not want the incident, started by rogue Japanese officers, to escalate into a full-scale war, and forbade the Kwantung Army from bombing Soviet airfields). Angered by the Neutrality Pact its ally, Germany, recently signed with the Soviets after the battle (but not necessarily because of it), Japan decided to hold off on attacking the USSR for the time being. The outcome of the Khalkhin gol battle never significantly altered Japanese strategic plans, a myth that has persisted to this day. The Japanese Imperialists always intended to attack the Soviet Union at some point in the future, even after Khalkhin gol, and were only forced to indefinitely postpone this plan when the United States imposed an embargo which robbed Japan of its raw materials, as retaliation for the latter's invasion of French Indochina. It was because of this that Japan decided to strike South, against the Western Allies, rather than North, against the Soviet Union, and not the battle of Khalkhin gol.