Plessy v. Ferguson

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896)

Plessy v. Ferguson, (1896), was the landmark US Supreme Court case that legalized discrimination against African-Americans and gave credence to the "separate but equal" doctrine. Plessy, and the Jim Crow laws that flourished in the South due to the Supreme Court legitimizing segregation, were not formally discredited until 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, (1954). Even then, the federal government did little to dismantle segregation and other discriminatory laws until Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The battle for equal treatment under the law has been long, and is still ongoing.

In order to understand the case better, it is helpful to consider it in terms of the historical and social context of the times.

Reconstruction

Following the defeat of the Confederate Army and emancipation of the slaves at the end of the Civil War, the United States government left Union troops encamped in the South to assist with the transition from slavery to freedom. The states ratified the 13th (1865), 14th (1868) and 15th (1870) Amendments during this era, which, together with the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (which overturned southern "Black Codes), ended slavery, extended equal rights and protections to African-Americans, and granted African-American males the right to vote.

The Civil Rights Act of 1875 elaborated on the 1866 Act by providing that "all persons, regardless of race, color or previous condition, [was] entitled to full and equal employment of accommodation in inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement."

The Southern states were reluctant to obey these new mandates, so the federal government maintained a military presence in the region from 1865 until approximately 1879.

Political End to Reconstruction

The Presidential election of 1876 was a close race, but the Democratic candidate, Samuel Tilden, won the popular election by more than 200,000 votes. Unfortunately for Tilden, he received only 184 of the 185 electoral votes needed to assume the Presidency. While Republican Candidate Rutherford B. Hayes held only 165 electoral votes, 20 votes were still in dispute. With the exception of a single vote from Oregon, the majority of the undecided ballots were from the secessionist states of South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, which were governed by Reconstructionist Republicans (Hayes' party). These states returned two sets of electoral ballots - one favoring Tilden, and one favoring Hayes, so there was no clear winner.

Lacking Constitutional guidance for resolving a tied election, Congress decided to create an impartial Electoral Commission to make the decision. The Commission was intended to be ideologically balanced with five members of the House, five members of the Senate, and five members of the Supreme Court, comprising seven Democrats, seven Republicans, and one Independent.

The Independent, Supreme Court Justices David Davis decided he didn't want the pressure of being the swing vote, so, when his home state of Illinois offered him a Senate position, he accepted and resigned from the Committee. With no Independents remaining on the Supreme Court, Justice Davis was replaced by Justice Joseph Bradley, a Republican. This resulted in a Committee of eight Republicans and seven Democrats, all of whom voted down party lines, awarding the 20 disputed electoral ballots and the Presidency to Hayes. (This lead Democrats to refer to the new President as Rutherfraud B. Hayes, for what they considered his fraudulent ascension to the Presidency.)

Older historical documents refer to the outcome of the vote as the Compromise of 1877 and to the Wormley House Agreement (where Republicans and Democrats allegedly met in secret to hammer out a compromise), which supposedly resulted in Republicans agreeing to remove federal troops from the Southern States in exchange for certain political concessions. More contemporary research, however, raises some doubts about both events. Many historians now believe the decision to pull the military from the South had already been decided due to rising tensions between the military and Southerners that was threatening to erupt in violence.

President Hayes began withdrawing Union troops from the South shortly after his inauguration. Within a short period of time, Southern state and local political control reverted to the old-school southern Democrats, who began systematically establishing "Jim Crow Laws" aimed at segregating African-Americans from "white society," and restricting African-Americans' freedoms and options.

Jim Crow Laws

Jim Crow laws prohibited African-Americans from using the same accommodations as whites, and subjected them to discrimination, overt control, and restrictions on personal liberty. The Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect against blatant discrimination, but a series of legislative acts and US Supreme Court rulings undermined its application.

According to some historians, segregation was targeted directly at the developing African-American middle class, to prevent the perceived threat of equality that undermined certain whites' feelings of superiority. While poor African-Americans continued to relate to whites much the same as they had under slavery, middle-class African-Americans, only two generations removed from slavery at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, had made significant advances in terms of literacy, education, property ownership, and wealth, and had reasonable expectations of being treated as peers, not subordinates. Many whites, on the other hand, believed prosperous African-Americans had "stepped out of place," and continued to view them as inferior.

Many of the Jim Crow laws were applied to situations where African-Americans demonstrated educational and economic equality - in shopping districts, travel, and in the voting booth - and were enforced unevenly, with African-Americans who were performing in the service of a white person (as a nanny, companion, or assistant) allowed greater latitude than independent, well-dressed African-Americans. New Orleans' streetcar rules, which forced African-Americans to stand behind a screen, hidden from white passengers unless working servile capacity, illustrated segregation was more about establishing a social hierarchy than ensuring separation.

Louisiana, where the Plessy case originated, had an even more complex social structure than most Southern states because many of its residents were of mixed ethnicity. Although the South adhered to the "one drop rule" (a person was classified as black even if he or she had only a single African ancestor, unless the person could "pass" for white, and chose to do so), those with lighter skin, or a higher percentage of white ancestry, had higher social status than those with little or no "white blood." Homer Plessy, the petitioner in this case, for example, was classified as an "Octoroon," a very light-skinned person who was one-eighth African-American.

Some of the legislation and rulings of the post-Reconstruction era almost completely undid the progress made immediately following the war.

The following were of particular importance to the Plessy case:

Civil Rights Cases, (1883)

Civil Rights Cases, 109 US 3 (1883), was a consolidation of five cases in which African-Americans legally challenged violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which specifically mandated equal access to private accommodations, such as lodging, travel and entertainment. Among the grievances were exclusion from a hotel dining room; refusal of admission to a New York City opera; segregation to lower-quality seats in a theater; and removal from a train car set aside for white women. All of these indignities were violations of rights enumerated in the 1875 legislation.

The Supreme Court analyzed these cases in view of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded the Amendment was not designed to apply to private citizens or private organizations, but only to the federal and state governments. This decision resulted in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 being invalidated, and opened the doors to blatant discrimination by businesses and individuals.

John Marshall Harlan, who was a supporter of civil rights, was the lone voice of dissent on the Court, which ruled 8-1 against the petitioners. Harlan argued that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to remove the badge of servitude, and that Congress had the right to legislate against the discrimination:

"I am of the opinion that such discrimination practiced by corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public or quasi-public functions is a badge of servitude the imposition of which Congress may prevent under its power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment; and consequently, without reference to its enlarged power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the act of March 1, 1875, is not, in my judgment, repugnant to the Constitution."

The Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890

In 1862, Congress established the "Land-Grant College Act" (more commonly known as the First Morrill Act) which provided 30,000 acres to every state that remained in the union to sell in order to fund public land-grant colleges. Under segregation, African-Americans were not permitted to attend the whites-only schools, but the act provided that States could use some of the money to establish "separate but equal" facilities for African-Americans. Only Mississippi and Kentucky agreed; the rest used the money exclusively for white students. After emancipation, a few more states established "Normal Schools," which were like junior colleges used exclusively for teacher training.

In 1890, Congress determined to force states to distribute the land-grant money equally, and thus legislated that African-American institutions were to receive an equal amount of funding. They also required any state that did not already have a college or university for African-American students to build one. This resulted in the foundation of 16 "Black Land-Grant Institutions." Congress had positive intentions, and the Second Morrill Act, expanded African-Americans' access to higher education; but the Act also reinforced the notion that "separate but equal" was an acceptable condition under the Constitution. This was not challenged in the Supreme Court.

(Also note that this predates the Plessy v. Ferguson, (1896) decision usually credited with establishing the "separate but equal" doctrine. In fact, the government and private businesses had already put "separate but equal" into practice; the Supreme Court ruling validated the legality of this form of discrimination and allowed Jim Crow laws to flourish.)

Louisiana Separate Car Act of 1890

In 1890, the Louisiana State Legislature passed the Separate Car Act (Act 111), which enforced "separate but equal" travel accommodations in railway transportation. The Act stated: "...all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this state shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and the colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations" (emphasis in original).

Violation of the law was a misdemeanor crime punishable by a $25.00 fine (a lot of money in 1890) or a 20-days jail sentence. The legislation encountered some opposition among Republicans (who, at the time, were more liberal than Southern Democrats), who expressed a belief that the law was being enacted to placate lower-class whites who had "no social or moral standing in the community." Despite resistance, the law based by a vote of 23-6.

On May 24, 1890, the Louisiana legislature received a signed complaint submitted by seventeen prominent African-American professionals, entitled "Protest of the American Citizens' Equal Rights Association of Louisiana Against Class Legislation." Two of the signatories were Louis Martinet and Rudolphe Desdunes, who became leading activists in the fight for civil rights after Reconstruction.

The men disparaged the law as "unconstitutional, un-American, unjust, dangerous, and against sound public policy [that would be] a free license to the evilly disposed that they might with impunity insult, humiliate and otherwise maltreat inoffensive persons, and especially women and children who happen to have dark skin."

In separate essays published in The Crusader newspaper, Martinet and Desdunes laid blame for passage of the bill on the backs of the 18 African-American legislators who had gained office by virtue of the 15th Amendment giving Black men the right vote and twelve of whom had voted in favor of the Act in exchange for white votes against other Jim Crow legislation. The white politicans broke their promises.

Challenging Jim Crow in New Orleans

In the South, especially in urban areas, educated African-American professionals formed committees to deliberately and systematically challenge segregationist policies. In New Orleans, attorney, newspaper publisher (The Crusader), and later physician, Louis André Martinet helped organize the "Citizens' Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate Car Law" (generally called the "Citizens' Committee") in 1891.

Their first orchestrated challenge was carried out by Daniel Desdunes, who purchased a first-class ticket from the Louisiana & Nashville Railroad to travel from New Orleans, LA, to Montgomery, AL, across state lines. The initial protest was against practices that violated established federal statutes, in this case invoking the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which granted Congress the right to regulate travel and business between the states. Congress earlier declared segregation could not be applied to interstate travelers because it disrupted the flow of commerce, a rule not based on individual rights, but on federal supremacy.

On February 24, 1892, Desdunes boarded a segregated "whites-only" coach and refused to leave. He was duly arrested. Desdunes case never went to trial, however, because the Louisiana Supreme Court voted in another case on May 25, 1892, Abbott v. Hicks, 44 La.Ann. 770, to uphold federal Commerce Clause regulations, rendering the Desdunes case moot.

The Citizens' Committee raised $3,000 to finance a second dispute. Martinet had established ongoing correspondence with New York attorney Albion Tourgee, a well-known, "white" former judge (Tourgee's comments about himself actually suggest he considered himself an a person of mixed heritage who was "passing" as white) and author of French descent. Tourgee helped create the North Carolina Constitution, and had served as a superior court judge for several years. He was known for his intensity and intelligence, and was also a militant supporter of equality. The Citizen's Committee unanimously voted Tourgee their counsel of record, which he undertook without pay, for the battle to repeal the Separate Car Act.

Tourgee believed there would be an advantage to having an African-American with a very light complexion challenge the law. The Citizens' Committee resisted the idea at first, because it seemed to suggest the more privileged lighter-skinned people were entitled to better treatment than those with darker skin. Some believed the Committee intended only to help lighter people "pass" for white. Eventually, Tourgee persuaded the members to accept his plan.

In contrast to the Desdunes case, Tourgee believed they should solicit the railroad company's assistance, to ensure conductors would enforce the law. The first railroad they approached expressed interest, but confessed they only followed the legal provisions requiring them to provide a separate "colored" car and signage. Their employees were instructed not to interfere with travelers who ignored the rules. Two other railroads criticized the law, but feared public reaction to the plan.

The Citizens' Committee finally enlisted the cooperation of the East Louisiana Railroad, which adhered to the law, but wanted the Separate Car Act terminated for economic reasons.

On June 7, 1892, Homer Plessy, a 30-year-old "octoroon" (he had one African-American grandparent), purchase a first-class ticket for his trip, boarded a designated white coach, and took a seat. The railroad officials conspiring with the Citizens' Committee insisted Plessy remove himself to the Jim Crow car; Plessy refused; and the railroad had him arrested on charges of violating the Separate Car Act. Plessy was brought before Judge Ferguson in the Criminal District Court for the Parish of New Orleans.

Albion Tourgee and his local co-counsel, James Walker, argued that the law was unconstitutional and should be nullified under the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution because segregation imposed a badge of servitude and singled out African-Americans as inferior. They also argued the law was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because "separate but equal" was not really equal. Judge Ferguson found Plessy guilty.

UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896)

Answer

The Plessy decision was largely based on a combination of rationalization and precedent established by earlier Supreme Court cases addressing the interpretation and application of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, such as The Slaughter-House Cases, (1873), and the Civil Rights Cases, (1883). In The Slaughter-House Cases, the Court held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the states; in the Civil Rights Cases, they held that Congress could not prevent private citizens from discriminating against African-Americans. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, case law is an important factor in determining the outcome of most cases, so prior decisions that undermined the intended effect of the "Restoration Amendments" (Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth) supported later decisions that continued to impede African-Americans' civil rights.

In addition, Congress' recent establishment of separate schools for African-American and white children in the District of Columbia appeared to (and did) sanction the practice of segregation was a detriment to any argument that Congress and the States intended to outlaw segregation.

The Court argued the Louisiana Separate Car Act of 1890 (Act 111) was not in violation of either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. While conceding laws touching on the Fourteenth Amendment could not be arbitrary, the Court claimed the Act met the "reasonableness" test because it was in keeping with established customs and traditions, promoted comfort, peace and order, and was therefore constitutional.

Details of the Supreme Court Opinion

Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the Court, acknowledged, "The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law," then proceeded to reject the rule of law by insisting it wasn't intended to "abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power."

The Court rejected outright the argument that the Louisiana Separate Car Act of 1890 (Act 111) imposed a form of stigma on African-Americans. "That it does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is too clear for argument."

Justice Brown then followed the comment with an expression of racism contradictory to his previous assertion, "It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is property in the same sense that a right of action or of inheritance is property. Conceding this to be so for the purposes of this case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any way affects his right to, such property. If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may have his action for damages against the company for being deprived of his so-called property. Upon the other hand, if he be a colored man and be so assigned, he has been deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man."

The Court dispatched with the Fourteenth Amendment by declaring the Louisiana segregation law reasonable: "So far, then, as a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and, with respect to this, there must necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of reasonableness, it is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort and the preservation of the public peace and good order. Gauged by this standard, we cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures."

The final piece of the Court's argument arose directly from bias and judicial activism, "Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane."

For more information, see Related Questions, below.