How did the operation overlord compare to the landing at Anzio?

Answer 1

Both were amphibious attacks on an enemy coast. But a lot of planning went into Overlord, while the Anzio landings (Operation Shingle) were mounted very hurriedly, with little in depth planning, and with a strategic goal that amounted to wishful thinking. The Allied staff in the Mediterranean had considered mounting an operation along the lines of Anzio, to break the bloody deadlock on the Cassino front ninety miles south of Anzio, but had discarded the possibility, mainly because they could not anticipate having sufficient resources to carry through the operation. Overall planning called for making the landings in southern France, on the Riviera, the Mediterranean coast of France, at the same time as the landings in Normandy. This was going to require the transfer of an entire corps of three very veteran and experienced US infantry divisions from Italy, but more importantly, was also going to require that most of the LSTs in Italy be assigned to support the southern France landings, or moved to England to take part in the Normandy landings. LSTs were Landing Ship, Tanks.

These were the largest of the numerous specialized landing vessels the US Navy developed during the war, large enough to carry a fully armed and equipped infantry company, or a dozen tanks, and able to drive their flat-bottomed bows right up onto the beach to discharge their load. There were never enough LSTs to meet the world-wide demand, and many an operation was delayed or never took place because LSTs for it could not be had. (The Normandy landings were delayed for a month, from May to June 1944 due to weather, but the bright side of that was the invasion force would benefit from the extra month's production of LSTs). In the face of these facts the planners in Italy could not find enough men or LSTs to make an operation like Anzio, even though most Allied leaders agreed it would be a good thing to make an amphibious "end run" in Italy to break the deadlock at Cassino.

At this juncture fate took a hand, in the person of Winston Churchill, who went on a personal inspection tour to Egypt and the Middle East, where he caught the flu. While he was in bed recuperating, he revived the idea of a landing behind German lines in Italy. The whole "plan" was thrown together in about two weeks. There were several problems with the "plan", fairly clearly seen with hindsight. The first was, the landings were in the wrong place. If an amphibious attack was to be made, the place to do it was NORTH OF ROME. Anywhere north of Rome. Not south of Rome. Landing north of Rome, if the landings succeeded in causing the Germans to evacuate their forces to the south of the beachhead, would cause Rome to fall into the laps of the Allies as an extra fruit of the operation. But landing south of Rome, as the Allies did at Anzio, meant even if the Germans to the south at Cassino broke off and withdrew, Rome still had to be captured. Of course, eventually the Allies did cause the Germans to withdraw from the Cassino front - it just took four and one half months, and then the Allies did capture Rome, and it was the first time in 2000 years Rome had been captured from the south.

Another problem with Churchill's plan was that the initial landing force was too small, all part of his airy optimism characterizing the entire scheme - it would only take a relatively small force, it would be over quickly so the vital LSTs would be free in time for the simultaneous landings in southern France with Overlord (then scheduled for around the first week of May). Only two divisions were in the initial landing force, one British, and one American. The American division was probably the best the US had, Army or Marine, in the entire war, but Anzio was to be its costliest campaign of the war. This was the 3rd Infantry Division, veterans of North Africa, Sicily and southern Italy. It was the "3rd ID, Reinforced" for the Anzio operation, having with it three of the four battalions of Darby's Rangers (the second battalion had been removed to England to attack Pont du Hoc on the Normandy D-Day), the joint American-Canadian First Special Service Force ("The Devil's Brigade"), and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion. So, with the "Reinforcements" there were an additional seven battalions to the US component, or 7/9th of the rifle strength of a division, roughly. But still this was not enough, because of the goals of the operation at Anzio. The German forces at Cassino depended on two highways runing south out of Rome for their supplies, Highway 7, near the landing beaches running near the coast, and Highway 6, which was about 25 miles inland. So even a bit of cursory thought would reveal that this initial landing force of two divisions - even if one of them was "Reinforced" - was going to have to take and hold a perimeter of more than fifty miles, if it was to successfully interrupt the flow of supplies to the Germans in the south, and cause them to withdraw.

As it worked out, the landing force never did get to Highway 6, though after the breakout from the beachhead in late May (after four months of punishment) they did get close enough to hear the German traffic moving north on it, before Mark Clark ordered them to turn left and make straight for Rome, for fear the British (despite their promises) would try to steal the glory of capturing Rome from him and the US 5th Army. Another problem with this whole "strategic" notion of the Anzio campaign was that there were ample side roads available, further east than Highway 6, used successfully by Germans fleeing from the south, which could have been used to supply the Cassino front if the Germans wanted to keep fighting there, so even successfully capturing both Highways 6 and 7 by the landing force would not necessarily have resulted in achieving the goal of forcing a German withdrawal from the south.

The Anzio landings were easy at first. The Germans had not expected that the Allies would be so foolish as to land there, of all places, so the Anzio-Nettuno area was undefended, with only part of an engineer battalion on the scene. For long weeks though, until Allied strength in the beachhead was built up, there were not sufficient troops to form an actual front line - all that could be managed was a string of strong points.

Other problems at Anzio included that the entire beachhead was within range of German artillery, and since the entire beachhead was also ringed by hills, all held by the Germans, they had excellent observation to direct and correct their artillery fire, which made it swiftly fatal to try to move around in the beachhead during daylight. Far from withdrawing, trembling with fear at this bold Allied move, the German commander in Italy, "Smiling Albert" Kesselring, activated a new Field Army HQ and brought in troops from as far away as Yugoslavia, and within a week had the beachhead tightly hemmed in. There was no question of the landing force reaching its goals, way out there at Highway 6; the question was whether they would be annihilated and driven back into the sea, and it was a very near thing, heavy German attacks in early February coming very near to accomplishing just exactly that. So many, many more Allied divisions had to be fed into the fight, at first just to hang on, and then to build up sufficient strength to make a breakout, and the LSTs had to be kept in Italy as the sole lifeline of supply for this ever growing force. (Churchill said, somewhat disingenuously since the slender landing force was his idea, that he had hoped to fling a wildcat ashore, and instead had beached a whale).

Eventually of course, the Germans in the south did withdraw, Rome was captured, but at a heavy cost. And the southern France landings had to be delayed two and one half months, until August 15. One silverlining to that delay was the German forces which had been on the Riviera coast in early June had by mid-August departed for Normandy, so the southern France landings were not heavily opposed. This all was the result of poor planning, poor selection of a landing place, over-optimistic assumptions as far as achievable goals and German reactions.

Answer 2

Both were amphibious attacks on an enemy coast. But a lot of planning went into Overlord, while the Anzio landings (Operation Shingle) were mounted very hurriedly, with little in depth planning, and with a strategic goal that amounted to wishful thinking. The Allied staff in the Mediterranean had considered mounting an operation along the lines of Anzio, to break the bloody deadlock on the Cassino front ninety miles south of Anzio, but had discarded the possibility, mainly because they could not anticipate having sufficient resources to carry through the operation. Overall planning called for making the landings in southern France, on the Riviera, the Mediterranean coast of France, at the same time as the landings in Normandy. This was going to require the transfer of an entire corps of three very veteran and experienced US infantry divisions from Italy, but more importantly, was also going to require that most of the LSTs in Italy be assigned to support the southern France landings, or moved to England to take part in the Normandy landings. LSTs were Landing Ship, Tanks.

These were the largest of the numerous specialized landing vessels the US Navy developed during the war, large enough to carry a fully armed and equipped infantry company, or a dozen tanks, and able to drive their flat-bottomed bows right up onto the beach to discharge their load. There were never enough LSTs to meet the world-wide demand, and many an operation was delayed or never took place because LSTs for it could not be had. (The Normandy landings were delayed for a month, from May to June 1944 due to weather, but the bright side of that was the invasion force would benefit from the extra month's production of LSTs). In the face of these facts the planners in Italy could not find enough men or LSTs to make an operation like Anzio, even though most Allied leaders agreed it would be a good thing to make an amphibious "end run" in Italy to break the deadlock at Cassino.

At this juncture fate took a hand, in the person of Winston Churchill, who went on a personal inspection tour to Egypt and the Middle East, where he caught the flu. While he was in bed recuperating, he revived the idea of a landing behind German lines in Italy. The whole "plan" was thrown together in about two weeks. There were several problems with the "plan", fairly clearly seen with hindsight. The first was, the landings were in the wrong place. If an amphibious attack was to be made, the place to do it was NORTH OF ROME. Anywhere north of Rome. Not south of Rome. Landing north of Rome, if the landings succeeded in causing the Germans to evacuate their forces to the south of the beachhead, would cause Rome to fall into the laps of the Allies as an extra fruit of the operation. But landing south of Rome, as the Allies did at Anzio, meant even if the Germans to the south at Cassino broke off and withdrew, Rome still had to be captured. Of course, eventually the Allies did cause the Germans to withdraw from the Cassino front - it just took four and one half months, and then the Allies did capture Rome, and it was the first time in 2000 years Rome had been captured from the south.

Another problem with Churchill's plan was that the initial landing force was too small, all part of his airy optimism characterizing the entire scheme - it would only take a relatively small force, it would be over quickly so the vital LSTs would be free in time for the simultaneous landings in southern France with Overlord (then scheduled for around the first week of May). Only two divisions were in the initial landing force, one British, and one American. The American division was probably the best the US had, Army or Marine, in the entire war, but Anzio was to be its costliest campaign of the war. This was the 3rd Infantry Division, veterans of North Africa, Sicily and southern Italy. It was the "3rd ID, Reinforced" for the Anzio operation, having with it three of the four battalions of Darby's Rangers (the second battalion had been removed to England to attack Pont du Hoc on the Normandy D-Day), the joint American-Canadian First Special Service Force ("The Devil's Brigade"), and the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion. So, with the "Reinforcements" there were an additional seven battalions to the US component, or 7/9th of the rifle strength of a division, roughly. But still this was not enough, because of the goals of the operation at Anzio. The German forces at Cassino depended on two highways runing south out of Rome for their supplies, Highway 7, near the landing beaches running near the coast, and Highway 6, which was about 25 miles inland. So even a bit of cursory thought would reveal that this initial landing force of two divisions - even if one of them was "Reinforced" - was going to have to take and hold a perimeter of more than fifty miles, if it was to successfully interrupt the flow of supplies to the Germans in the south, and cause them to withdraw.

As it worked out, the landing force never did get to Highway 6, though after the breakout from the beachhead in late May (after four months of punishment) they did get close enough to hear the German traffic moving north on it, before Mark Clark ordered them to turn left and make straight for Rome, for fear the British (despite their promises) would try to steal the glory of capturing Rome from him and the US 5th Army. Another problem with this whole "strategic" notion of the Anzio campaign was that there were ample side roads available, further east than Highway 6, used successfully by Germans fleeing from the south, which could have been used to supply the Cassino front if the Germans wanted to keep fighting there, so even successfully capturing both Highways 6 and 7 by the landing force would not necessarily have resulted in achieving the goal of forcing a German withdrawal from the south.

The Anzio landings were easy at first. The Germans had not expected that the Allies would be so foolish as to land there, of all places, so the Anzio-Nettuno area was undefended, with only part of an engineer battalion on the scene. For long weeks though, until Allied strength in the beachhead was built up, there were not sufficient troops to form an actual front line - all that could be managed was a string of strong points.

Other problems at Anzio included that the entire beachhead was within range of German artillery, and since the entire beachhead was also ringed by hills, all held by the Germans, they had excellent observation to direct and correct their artillery fire, which made it swiftly fatal to try to move around in the beachhead during daylight. Far from withdrawing, trembling with fear at this bold Allied move, the German commander in Italy, "Smiling Albert" Kesselring, activated a new Field Army HQ and brought in troops from as far away as Yugoslavia, and within a week had the beachhead tightly hemmed in. There was no question of the landing force reaching its goals, way out there at Highway 6; the question was whether they would be annihilated and driven back into the sea, and it was a very near thing, heavy German attacks in early February coming very near to accomplishing just exactly that. So many, many more Allied divisions had to be fed into the fight, at first just to hang on, and then to build up sufficient strength to make a breakout, and the LSTs had to be kept in Italy as the sole lifeline of supply for this ever growing force. (Churchill said, somewhat disingenuously since the slender landing force was his idea, that he had hoped to fling a wildcat ashore, and instead had beached a whale).

Eventually of course, the Germans in the south did withdraw, Rome was captured, but at a heavy cost. And the southern France landings had to be delayed two and one half months, until August 15. One silverlining to that delay was the German forces which had been on the Riviera coast in early June had by mid-August departed for Normandy, so the southern France landings were not heavily opposed. This all was the result of poor planning, poor selection of a landing place, over-optimistic assumptions as far as achievable goals and German reactions.