What are the parameters of a search incident to arrest?

Answer 1

The United States Supreme Court in Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968) stated as follows:

"[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 3686 (1925); Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97, 85 S. Ct. 223, 229, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964). Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, supra; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S. Ct. 1431, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1688 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959). And simple ' "good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough." . . . If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only in the discretion of the police.' Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 97, 85 S. Ct. at 229."

Thus a police officer must have an objective "articulable" fact on which to rely before that officer makes an investigatory stop of an individual. This was reaffirmed by the New York State Court of Appeals in People v Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413 (1975), wherein the Court stated that:

"It should be emphasized that the factual basis required to support a stop for a 'routine traffic check' is minimal. An actual violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law need not be detectable. For example, an automobile in a general state of dilapidation might properly arouse suspicion of equipment violations. All that is required is that the stop be not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. It is enough if the stop is based upon 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion' (Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, supra)." (Emphasis added.)

In People v Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518, 524, 473 N.E.2d 1, 483 N.Y.S.2d 649 [1984], the Court of Appeals noted in that case "two patrol cars were stationed in the area to follow and observe for possible violations any vehicle that avoided the road block by making a U-turn." One must note that the guidelines established in that case permitted only the following and observation for possible violations of any vehicle that avoided the checkpoint. The U-turn, in and of itself, did not in the Scott case amount to a reason to stop any vehicle. In other words, if not normally prohibited at that site, a legal U-turn was not an articulable reason to stop a vehicle. (See also, Gerstanzang, Handling the DWI Case in New York § 5.5 [2002-2003 ed] ["Checkpoint Evasion"].)

In People v Rocket, 156 Misc 2d 641 (1992), the court held that the stop of a vehicle, which merely turned off one public highway onto another such highway, without any alleged violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, resulting in the avoidance of a sobriety checkpoint, was not a permitted stop. The court stated that "Even if a defendant is intentionally avoiding a checkpoint police officials would not be cognizant of that fact other than by mere conjecture." Rocket, supra at 643 (emphasis added). The court further indicated that "While there are a number of cases which suggest that the avoidance of a checkpoint is in fact an articulable reason for a stop . . . it appears that the prevailing view and that more consistent with the articulations made by the United States Supreme Court is that the mere making of a U-turn or turnoff to avoid a . . . checkpoint is not, in and of itself, sufficient basis for a stop." Rocket, supra at 644; see also, Michigan State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990); People v. Bigger, 2004 NY Slip Op 24005, 2 Misc 3d 937, January 10, 2004, Justice Court of Town of Webster, Monroe County.

A traffic stop of a vehicle does not, in itself, justify a warrantless search of the vehicle or its occupants. See People v. Adams, 32 NY2d 451, 454-55 (1973); People v. Marsh, 20 NY2d 98, 101-03 (1967); People v. Guzman, 153 AD2d 320, 322 (4th Dep't 1990).

In 2009, the United States Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710, that because Gant could not have accessed his car to retrieve weapons or evidence at the time of the search because he was handcuffed and locked in the back of a patrol car, the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, as defined in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), did not justify the search in that case.

Under Chimel, police may search incident to arrest only the space within an arrestee's "`immediate control,'" meaning "the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 395 U.S., at 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034. The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying Chimel's reaching-distance rule determine Belton's scope. Accordingly, it was held that Belton does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant's arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Consistent with the holding in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S.Ct. 2127, 158 L.Ed.2d 905 (2004), and following the suggestion in Justice SCALIA's opinion concurring in the judgment in that case, id., at 632, 124 S.Ct. 2127, it was also concluded that circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.

In Chimel, it was held that a search incident to arrest may only include "the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Ibid. That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. See ibid. (noting that searches incident to arrest are reasonable "in order to remove any weapons [the arrestee] might seek to use" and "in order to prevent [the] concealment or destruction" of evidence (emphasis added)).

If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. E.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-368, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964).

In Belton, the Court considered Chimel's application to the automobile context. A lone police officer in that case stopped a speeding car in which Belton was one of four occupants. While asking for the driver's license and registration, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and observed an envelope on the car floor marked "Supergold"-a name he associated with marijuana. Thus having probable cause to believe the occupants had committed a drug offense, the officer ordered them out of the vehicle, placed them under arrest, and patted them down. Without handcuffing the arrestees, the officer "`split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway ... so they would not be in physical touching area of each other'" and searched the vehicle, including the pocket of a jacket on the backseat, in which he found cocaine. 453 U.S., at 456, 101 S.Ct. 2860.

The New York Court of Appeals found the search unconstitutional, concluding that after the occupants were arrested, the vehicle and its contents were "safely within the exclusive custody and control of the police." People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 452, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423 (1980).

The State had asked the United States Supreme Court to consider whether the exception recognized in Chimel permits an officer to search "a jacket found inside an automobile while the automobile's four occupants, all under arrest, are standing unsecured around the vehicle." Brief in No. 80-328, p. i. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because "courts ha[d] found no workable definition of `the area within the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile." 453 U.S., at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860.