The US Supreme Court addressed three questions in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US 2 (1866):
"if a party is unlawfully imprisoned, the writ of habeas corpus is his appropriate legal remedy. It is his suit in court to recover his liberty."
The federal courts in Indiana were operational and, Milligan not being, nor having ever been, a member of the military, was not subject to the military tribunal's jurisdiction, but to the District and Circuit Courts' juridiction. As the tribunal lacked jurisdiction, the military trial was unconstitutional.
Further, the case was defective because the military failed to provide a list of prisoners, preventing Milligan from having his case remedied by the courts.
For these reasons, the Court concluded it was their duty to nullify the military proceedings against. Milligan.
For more information, see Related Questions, below.
In Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US 2 (1866) the US Supreme Court concluded that a military trial of a civilian is unconstitutional where civil courts are operating. In Milligan, the federal courts were open and operating, but were not informed that he was being held prisoner.
"A citizen not connected with the military service and a resident in a State where the courts are open and in the proper exercise or their jurisdiction cannot, even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, be tried, convicted, or sentenced otherwise than by the ordinary courts of law."
Justice David Davis, writing the opinion of the Court for a unanimous 9-0 judgment, concluded that the military had failed to follow the provisions of the Act of 1863 by failing to provide a list of confined prisons, failing to charge Milligan within 20 days, and failing to present his case before a civil grand jury.
Davis noted that Congress had intended to safeguard civilian liberty by instituting those practices, and that the military tribunal lacked authority to try a civilian when the appropriate federal courts were in operation.
Milligan's death sentence was vacated, and the Supreme Court ordered him released from custody.
For more information, see Related Questions, below.
The issue before the US Supreme Court in Ex Parte Milligan, 71 US 2 (1866) was whether the civilian courts had jurisdiction over decisions of a military court, and whether the military had jurisdiction over the trial of a civilian. The Court held that a military trial of a civilian is unconstitutional where civil courts are operating.
"A citizen not connected with the military service and a resident in a State where the courts are open and in the proper exercise or their jurisdiction cannot, even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, be tried, convicted, or sentenced otherwise than by the ordinary courts of law."
Explanation
In 1863, at the height of the Civil War, President Lincoln issued an executive order suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This Order, which did not issue under the direct authority of Congress as prescribed in Article I of the Constitution, was made as the result of general legislation Congress passed on March 3, 1863, "Relating to habeas corpus, and regulating judicial proceedings in certain cases." In Section 1, Congress authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus nationwide during an act of rebellion.
The Act contained safeguards designed to protect non-military personnel held as prisoners of war from violation of their civil rights. Section 2 of the Act provided that the Secretary of State and Secretary of War were required to issue lists of civilian prisoners to the federal District and Circuit Courts. The judges could then order the prisoners brought before them to determine if they were being charged or detained appropriately (this is the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus). Once a judge made a determination regarding the prisoner's status, military officers were required to abide by the judge's orders.
Section 3 of the Act provided that a prisoner may petition for discharge if not indicted within 20 days, or if his case wasn't brought before the conclusion of the next Grand Jury meeting. The US District Attorney for the jurisdiction was responsible for examining the petition and making a recommendation to a District or Circuit judge.
On September 15, 1863, President Lincoln issued 13 Statute at Large 734 which proclaimed the military was authorized to:
"hold persons in their custody either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders and abettors of the enemy, . . . or belonging to the land or naval force of the United States, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed for the military or naval services, by authority of the President, or for resisting a draft, or for any other offence against the military or naval service."
On October 5, 1864, Lambdin P. Milligan, a 20-year resident of Indiana, was arrested by order of Brevet Major-General Hovey on charges of 1) conspiracy against the United States; 2) giving aid and comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States; 3) inciting insurrection; 4) disloyal practices; and 5) violations of the laws of war, along with a host of lesser claims and charges. The arrest apparently stemmed from Milligan joining the Order of Knights or Sons of Liberty [some sources claim he was leader of the local Knights of the Golden Circle, a secret society of union members with Southern sympathies; others assert he was a member of the military section of the Peace Democrats], for the alleged purpose of overthrowning the US government.
Milligan and a group of associates were accused of planning to steal weapons in order to take over a military prisoner of war camp and free the Confederate soldiers being held there.
Milligan objected to the charges, but was found guilty by a military tribunal and sentenced to death by hanging, with the date set at May 19, 1865.
On May 10, 1865, Milligan's attorney filed a petition with the Circuit Court of Indiana (federal court), stating his client had been held more than 20 days without opportunity to challenge the charges, and that a Grand Jury had commenced in Indianapolis, Indiana, where Milligan was being held in military prison, but had adjourned without issuing an indictment against his client, nor evidence presented against him.
Milligan swore he had never been in the military, was not in an area where citizens were rebelling against the US; has been a resident of Indiana for more than 20 years; and had not violated the laws of war.
The two-judge panel on the Circuit Court were split over whether their court had jurisdiction to hear the case, and thus submitted a certified question to the US Supreme Court, which assumed control of the case.
The questions posed to the Court were:
Justice David Davis, writing the opinion of the Court for a unanimous 9-0 judgment, concluded that the military had failed to follow the provisions of the Act of 1863 by failing to provide a list of confined prisons, failing to charge Milligan within 20 days, and failing to present his case before a civil grand jury.
Davis noted that Congress had intended to safeguard civilian liberty by instituting those practices, and that the military tribunal lacked authority to try a civilian when the appropriate federal courts were in operation.
Davis also commented on the potential unconstitutionality of Congress assigning its constitutional powers to the President, and of making war rules that violated the Fifth Amendment due process right to a grand jury hearing, among other things. These points were obiter dictum, in that they did not address the questions before the Court, and were not appropriate to the official decision.
Milligan's death sentence was vacated, and the Supreme Court ordered him released from custody.
For more information, see Related Questions, below.
By opinions that state the facts, present the issues, announce the decision, and explain the reasoning of the Court.
What was the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia
The reasoning was that separate education was inherently unequal. It was incredibly important in desegregating schools.
majority opinion
US Supreme Court opinions (decisions) set binding precedents because all lower courts are required to follow the same reasoning when deciding similar cases under the doctrine of stare decisis (Latin: Let the decision stand).
US Supreme Court opinions (decisions) set binding precedents because all lower courts are required to follow the same reasoning when deciding similar cases under the doctrine of stare decisis (Latin: Let the decision stand).
US Supreme Court opinions (decisions) set binding precedents because all lower courts are required to follow the same reasoning when deciding similar cases under the doctrine of stare decisis (Latin: Let the decision stand).
US Supreme Court opinions (decisions) set binding precedents because all lower courts are required to follow the same reasoning when deciding similar cases under the doctrine of stare decisis (Latin: Let the decision stand).
US Supreme Court opinions (decisions) set binding precedents because all lower courts are required to follow the same reasoning when deciding similar cases under the doctrine of stare decisis (Latin: Let the decision stand).
By issuing a judicial review.
Judicial Review
Dissent