On March 19, 1862, Union General George B. McClellan informed Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton of his plans for the Peninsula campaign. With all approvals in order, meaning from President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton, McClellan orders his forces to begin the sea transport of the Army of the Potomac to Fort Monroe. The fort is on the east coast of Virginia. The date of the first troop transport is April 1, 1862.
NEW RESPONDENT
On March 17, 1862 the Army of the Potomac started to embark on board the transport ships directed to Fort Monroe to begin the Peninsular Campaign.
McClellan began to ship the Army of the Potomac to Fort Monroe on March 17, 1862.
An unusual act on the conduct of strategy by a commanding officer would be to allow for a vote among commanders reporting to the general in charge of a military operation. In the case of General George B. McClellan, he informed the secretary of war, Edwin Stanton that his officers unanimously voted to use Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the upcoming Peninsula campaign. McClellan informed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in the middle of March 1862, that based on the votes of his officers, Fort Monroe would be this base for McClellan's march on Richmond.
The US Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton wanted to know from General George B. McClellan, his plans for protecting Washington DC while the main part of the Army of the Potomac was engaged in battle in the Peninsula campaign. Both he and US President Lincoln were concerned that while McClellan was in Virginia fighting his Peninsula campaign that there was a possibility of a Confederate assault on Washington DC.McClellan outlined for Stanton his plans for this. The troops he would leave in and around Washington DC would number 55,500 including the 35,000 troops in the Shenandoah. As General in Chief, McClellan assumed that all of these troops would remain under his command as he parted for Fort Monroe.
General In Chief George B. McClellan had assigned Major General Nathaniel Banks to control the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia. In order for the Peninsula campaign to be a success, McClellan's purpose for General Banks was to insure that Rebel forces did not cut the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and to prevent Confederate forces from invading Pennsylvania. If Banks failed to do that, then Union troops assigned to the Peninsula campaign would either have not left for Fort Monroe or those there already would be needed to protect Washington DC and other Northern territories, basically aborting the entire Peninsula plan.Both McClellan and Banks were aware of Confederate General Stonewall Jackson's presence in the Shenandoah. He had the potential to wreak havoc on Union plans. Jackson's presence there also meant that Banks had another assignment to insure the success of the Peninsula campaign. That assignment was to prevent, at all costs, allowing Jackson to reinforce Johnston and the main part of the Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan's plans were to surprise the Confederates with his planned rapid march eastward from Fort Monroe and thereby make it too late for Jackson to help out Johnston. McClellan, however, was not going to take any unplanned chances and so depended on General Banks to make sure he would not allow Rebel operations to spoil his eastern flanking plan embodied in the Peninsula campaign.
The operation George McClellan is most noted for is the Peninsular Campaign of 1862. It was designed to capture the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia, but it failed due to his greatly over estimating the strength of Robert E. Lee's army after a series of battles known as the Seven Days. He grew fearful that his Army of the Potomac would be destroyed by Lee, even though the Federals had held there own against the rebels. He withdrew and evacuated his army with the final units leaving Virginia August 26, 1862.Peninsula campaign
The Monroe Doctrine was the principle that the United States would not tolerate foreign intervention in the Americas, and it was formulated in 1823. George Washington died in 1799.
An unusual act on the conduct of strategy by a commanding officer would be to allow for a vote among commanders reporting to the general in charge of a military operation. In the case of General George B. McClellan, he informed the secretary of war, Edwin Stanton that his officers unanimously voted to use Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the upcoming Peninsula campaign. McClellan informed Secretary of War Edwin Stanton in the middle of March 1862, that based on the votes of his officers, Fort Monroe would be this base for McClellan's march on Richmond.
A respected Union general, Erasmus D. Keyes, one of McClellan's corps commanders in the Peninsula campaign, sided with his commanding officer. He wrote that Lincoln's decision to take away McDowell's corps from the Peninsula campaign forced McClellan to now execute a plan that was different than the one originally agreed upon before the move to Fort Monroe.
After General McClellan had persuaded President Lincoln to agree to McClellan's Peninsula campaign, he began shipping troops of the Army of the Potomac to Fort Monroe in April of 1862. By April 3, 1862, President Lincoln was deeply concerned that McClellan had planned on leaving less than 20,000 troops to defend Washington DC as his forces began to occupy Fort Monroe. Lincoln refused to let the Corps led by General McDowell to join the rest of the Army of the Potomac at Fort Monroe. Lincoln ordered McDowell to stay near Washington DC as a defensive measure. This began what would be an ongoing dispute between McClellan and President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton regarding the troop levels McClellan wanted for his campaign to take the Rebel capital of Richmond.
General McClellan believed that landing his army at Urbana Virginia gave him his best chance to cut off the forces Confederates under the command of Major General John B. Magruder. The landing there would be a total surprise for the Rebels and enable McClellan to reach Richmond before he could reinforce the Confederate capital. Urbana had to be placed aside and McClellan had to chose Fort Monroe as his forward base of operations in that the uncertainty caused by the ironclad CSS Virginia at Hampton Roads.
Shortly after landing at Fort Monroe in early on May 1st, as the first step in Union General George B. McClellan's so-called Peninsula campaign, he became aware of Confederate forces holding on to Yorktown. It was a small defending force led by Major General John B. Magruder. McClellan decided to lay siege to Yorktown although it seemed he could have easily over run the small force there. Confederate General Joseph Johnston joined forces with Magruder there but then decided to evacuate the area on May 3, 1862.
Union General George B. McClellan believed a southward movement of his Army of the Potomac from Alexandria Virginia would not result in the mission of capturing Richmond. He wanted to take the Southerners by surprise and launch a flanking attack from Fort Monroe which happened to be closer to Richmond than any other likely place. The idea was brilliant, however, McClellan failed to take advantage of his position east of Richmond. His troops actually got to within six miles of Richmond before they were forced to retreat.
Late in November of 1861, General in Chief George B. McClellan sought the advice of the Army of the Potomac's chief engineer, John G. Barnard. He asked for Barnard's advice concerning an amphibious operation aimed undermining Confederate positions in Northern Virginia. Barnard gave McClellan a detailed study that proposed a number of landing places, including Fort Monroe. Barnard also suggested making more than one landing on the coastline of Virginia to confuse Rebel defenders,
General in chief George B. McClellan had convinced US President Lincoln that an assault on Richmond from Alexandria, Virginia would not be as effective as his plans to attack Richmond from the Chesapeake Bay. His plans, however, were disrupted by the Battle of Hampton Roads and the movement of Confederate General Joseph Johnston south of his position at Manassas. By landing at Urbana, Virginia, McClellan planned to move west and place his army between Johnston's forces and Richmond. As part of a "plan B" he settled on the Union Fort Monroe from which to launch his army east to the mainland of Virginia.
The US Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton wanted to know from General George B. McClellan, his plans for protecting Washington DC while the main part of the Army of the Potomac was engaged in battle in the Peninsula campaign. Both he and US President Lincoln were concerned that while McClellan was in Virginia fighting his Peninsula campaign that there was a possibility of a Confederate assault on Washington DC.McClellan outlined for Stanton his plans for this. The troops he would leave in and around Washington DC would number 55,500 including the 35,000 troops in the Shenandoah. As General in Chief, McClellan assumed that all of these troops would remain under his command as he parted for Fort Monroe.
Union General George B. McClellan had estimated that 19,000 troops were needed to man Washington DC's defense as he proceeded to Fort Monroe. The fort was his safe launching pad for his Peninsula campaign. Somehow, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton concluded that 30,000 troops were needed. The term of "somehow" is used as there seems to have been no military officer involved in establishing this number. President Lincoln was given this information. Lincoln was also under pressure from the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Lincoln himself feared a problem if Washington DC was light on defenses. This resulted in removing General McDowell's corps from McClellan's army. McClellan was seething over this "political" decision. He later wrote that this move was the most infamous thing that history ever recorded.
The problem caused by the CSS Virginia blocked Union General George B. McClellan from using the James River and landing at Urbana. The planned surprise by using the Rappahnock River was set back as Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston withdrew from Manassas to a more southernly position behind that same river. McClellan's plan was to maneuver his forces so that he lay between Manassas and Richmond, Virginia. This gave him, however, the use of the fortified Fort Monroe as a first position in Virginia. From a military point of view, it still at first at least was a better starting position than Alexandria Virginia would have been.
The Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton M. Stanton had once been a strong supporter of General In Chief George B. McClellan. This relationship began to deteriorate as the Peninsula campaign began to unfold. With McClellan now at Fort Monroe, the garrison commander of the troops protecting Washington DC informed Stanton that he lacked enough troops to protect Washington DC. The claim was that this was an acute problem in that 4,000 troops had been ordered from Washington DC to Manassas. This was one of General Bank's areas of responsibility. Stanton determined that 30,000 troops were required to defend the city. At the time there were only 19,000. There are no records on how the number of 30,000 was determined. The end result was that US President Lincoln, under Stanton's advice, removed one division from McClellan's army. This was a direct intervention of McClellan's plans and he was not consulted on it.There is speculation that Lincoln was not only pressured by Stanton, but also from Congress's Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.