Who was victorious in the Seven Day's battle and in the second Battle of Bull Run?

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The South won.

The First Bull Run battle, or the Battle of Manassas, was by far the most costly of human life since the beginning of the country and it totaled over 5000 dead. The soldiers died not only on the battle field but also from wounds, disease, and some were also declared missing. All that loss of life and nothing was settled by it. A pointless battle for nothing was gained.

The First Battle of Bull Run, also known as the First Battle of Manassas (the name used by Confederate forces and still often used in the South), was the first major land battle of the American Civil War, fought on July 21, 1861, near Manassas, Virginia. Unseasoned Union Army troops under Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell advanced across Bull Run against the equally unseasoned Confederate Army under Brig. Gens. Joseph E. Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard, and despite the Union's early successes, they were routed and forced to retreat back to Washington, D.C.

The first major battle of the Civil War was fought in Virginia, near the Manassas, Virginia railway junction, after which the battle is called (or First Bull Run, named after the flowing stream on the battlefield, if of the Union persuasion). The armies in this first battle were not very large by later Civil War standards. The Federal forces under Brigadier General Irvin McDowell were organized into four divisions (five, if one includes Runyan's division), of about 30,000 men. These divisions were commanded by Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, (Runyan), and Miles. The Confederate command structure was somewhat more unwieldy, including two "armies", with no division structure and thirteen independent brigades under Bonham, Ewell, Jones, Longstreet, Cocke, Early, Holmes, Kershaw, Evans, Jackson, Bartow, Bee, Smith, and a cavalry brigade under Stuart. The Confederate Army of the Potomac was under the command of Brigadier General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, and the Army of the Shenandoah was commanded by Brigadier General Joseph E. Johnston. These two forces would equal McDowell's strength.

Interestingly enough, each commander had planned to initiate an attack on the other side with a feint attack on the enemy's right flank and a massed attack on the opposite flank. Had this been done simultaneously, and both been successful in their purpose, the two armies would have simply pivoted around each other and ended up in each other's rear, able to march unopposed to Washington or Richmond, as the case may be. As it turned out, the general least successful in initiating this movement was the winner.

McDowell had planned to use Tyler's division as the diversionary attack at the Stone Bridge, while Davies' brigade did the same at Blackburn's Ford. At the same time, Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions would cross Bull Run at Sudley Springs and attack from the north.

McDowell's green troops involved in the flanking column, reached their jumping off positions two and a half hours behind schedule. Tyler's and Davies' attacks at the Stone Bridge and Blackburn's Ford were already well under way, and the Confederate high command was beginning to sense a ruse because the Union attacks were not pressed very hard. When Beauregard was notified that Federal troops were massing on his left flank, he realized that this must be the main attack so began to shift his own troop dispositions.

The Federals had about 18,000 men in the main attack column and it was only thanks to the quick reactions of Colonel "Shank" Evans and his small brigade that Beauregard did not suffer a major disaster. He quickly moved his small force to Matthew's Hill to block the Federal move. Sounds of the fighting drew other brigade commanders to Evans' aid on their own initiative. Brigadier General Barnard Bee and Colonel Bartow joined Evans' defensive line and deployed their men to his right to extend and strengthen it.

The Confederate position was still badly outnumbered however, and eventually the weight of those numbers began to be felt. With Tyler's division threatening the right flank and rear of the Confederate position after having forced a crossing at the Stone Bridge, and their left flank now being overlapped by Federal reinforcements, the three Confederate brigades broke to the rear, heading toward the cleared plateau of the Henry House Hill. Unfortunately for the Federals, they were slow to follow-up their success and allowed the Southern brigade commanders to rally the remnants of their units behind Jackson's brigade which had just arrived and formed a line of battle on the reverse slope of Henry House Hill.

In the meantime, McDowell ordered two artillery batteries to advance to silence the defensive fire. Rickett's Battery and Griffin's Battery advanced to well within musket range of the Confederate positions near the crest of the hill. These batteries were counterattacked by Confederate infantry and overrun and although it is still somewhat an open question, most historians give credit to the 33rd Virginia Infantry, although the 6th North Carolina State Troops, and elements of the 2nd Mississippi Infantry also claim credit for silencing Ricketts. This counterattack also routed the infantry supports to the guns -- a battalion of U. S. Marines and the 11th New York Infantry, the famed Fire Zouaves. The loss of the guns became a focal point for see-saw attacks and counterattacks by each side, with the possession of the guns changing hands several times.

Finally having accumulated enough units to not only stabilize the Confederate lines, but also overlap the right flank of the Federal lines, the order was given for a general advance by Beauregard. This attack caved-in the Federal right and what began as a fairly orderly retreat turned into a disorganized rout. The equally tired and inexperienced Confederates however, were in no shape to conduct an effective pursuit, so the battle ended. The Federals lost about 3,000 casualties (killed, wounded, and captured or missing), and the Confederates suffered about 2,000.

A curious thing about McDowell's enterprise at Bull Run is that one may fairly say that it was foreordained to failure, and yet conclude that it came within inches of success. Wholly untrained in the higher branches of the military art, he was compelled, by the force of circumstances, to operate with an army that was entirely unfit for active campaigning; but he had an opponent no better than himself, and the chief difference between two armies that both lacked the distinctive qualities of a field force resolved itself into that which lay between the disadvantage of the offensive and the benefit of the defensive.

In some ways McDowell did better than his critics have allowed. To move such an army at all, to get it concentrated at Centreville, to throw a wing of 17,000 men over Bull Run, meant much hard work and hard driving. And yet, as we have seen, all this fell entirely short of what was needed for success. Rapidity of action was essential, and at no moment, at no point, did McDowell show any tendency of the sort, -- rather the contrary.

It is perhaps fairer to emphasize that McDowell had had no training or experience in the difficult art of generalship, than to say that he displayed no sign of possessing military qualities. It was certainly not easy for a junior officer in a military service that gave neither practical nor theoretical training to its higher ranks, when suddenly promoted to the command of an army to assume all the superiority and decision, to display all the science, that such a function demands. It is not surprising that he took too much advice, and deferred too much to the views of subordinates whose judgments, on the whole, do not appear to have been as good as his own.

In bringing his troops into contact with the enemy McDowell showed little tactical sense. His order of the 20th of July showed gross inability to handle marching arrangements. But he did better than his opponents in utilizing a considerable part of his forces for delivering his blow. His employment both of his guns and of his infantry was far from good. Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries were recklessly exposed; his infantry brigades were allowed to become mere supports for the artillery, and to go into action as strings of regiments employed one at a time. For these failings, the configuration of the ground, the superior tactics of the Confederates, the general lack of ability of McDowell's subordinates, the want of a proper system of command, and the general ignorance of staff work, were in part responsible.

Several of the Federal commanders ascribed their ill success to what they believed to be the inferiority of their musketry. Thus Franklin says :-- "It is my firm belief that a great deal of the misfortune of the day at Bull Run is due to the fact that the troops knew very little of the principles and practice of firing. In every case I believe that the firing of the rebels was better than ours."

The truth appears to be this. The Federal infantry as it advanced was too carefully nursed by its officers; as soon as it reached the fire zone it was ordered to lie down and keep covered while the artillery did the work. So long as the artillery was successful in breaking down resistance the plan succeeded, but when the infantry was called on--after the hard day's work and much lying out of sight of the enemy in the sun--to advance into the open, firing at the enemy's line at short range, it jibbed away, fired wildly, and eventually broke.

Far more important than this was the complete and miserable failure of the regimental officers. Quite one half of McDowell's regiments were good stuff so far as the men went; all they needed was to be led and commanded. McDowell himself relates that on the field disorganized bodies of soldiers called to him asking to be led. Colonel Biddle, speaking of the volunteers after their return to camp, says: "They had a perfect dread of going into battle with their officers, and they wanted to go back and enter into new organizations.''

If the regimental officers were for the most part worse than useless, the field and staff officers were not much better, though in a different way. The West-Pointers were fearless enough, and fit to lead any troops into battle; but they had no more knowledge of the art of high command than the regimental officers had of the art of company leading. This subject has already been dealt with. Suffice it to say that on the field the confusion of orders and of organization was almost complete. Everybody gave orders, and nobody gave orders. McDowell's staff in large part disintegrated. No one knew what to do, where to find headquarters. At the moment when the attack on the Henry house plateau began, Averell says: "this feeling was uppermost: want of orders." Later, even civilians like Governor Sprague took it on themselves to order troops about.

It was the rout of the army back to Centreville and Washington that attracted most attention at the time. On the whole that was a mere incident of a not abnormal character when all the facts of the case are considered. That rout really began when, on the advance, the columns were kept standing long hours in the sun and the officers proved unable to prevent their men from going off into the woods after blackberries; or when the Pennsylvania and New York troops were allowed shamefully to abandon the army, with hardly a word of reproof, at the moment of battle; or even when Lincoln proclaimed that only the common soldier could be trusted and his officer was a leader not entitled to confidence. The rout at Stone Bridge was good newspaper copy, and little more.

It should be added that McDowell showed his even, steady, bravery, in that disheartening hour. He continued to do all that was in him to the bitter end. At Young's Branch, at Centreville, and again at Fairfax Court House, he did his best to turn the stream of fugitives, he continued to take every measure he could to fulfil his duty as a soldier; from that high and honorable standard he never for a moment wavered. And his report is on the whole a straightforward and honest confession of failure, very little colored or distorted in an endeavor to evade responsibility.

On the Southern side the superiority of Johnston's corps in leadership, organization, and mobility stands out conspicuously. Bee got much out of his troops. Jackson showed the highest tactical ability, and great firmness of character, in the way he chose his position and handled his infantry and guns together on the Henry house plateau; he earned and he deserved the honors of the day. Johnston himself showed too much diffidence till about twelve o'clock, and it was not till about 2.30 or 3 P.M. that he really assumed control of operations. He displayed courage and at times judgment. Yet on the whole his conduct in the battle was far less creditable to him than the degree of organization and fighting quality he had succeeded in imparting to his little army, and the way in which he brought it from the Valley to Manassas.

Beauregard's errors, and his lack of the logic, system, and clearness of vision which are called for in the higher command of armies, have already been sufficiently emphasized. It is doubtful whether he did any one single thing that helped to bring success to the Confederate arms on the 21st of July, while his blunders would require a lengthy enumeration.

The defensive was assuredly a great advantage to the Confederate commanders. When their turn came to take the offensive on the Henry hill, -- and they timed the moment skilfully, -- their opponents were spent. Beauregard's orders and staff work certainly give one the impression that a Confederate offensive towards Centreville would probably have been marked by even less cohesion than McDowell's movement was. For although the Federal general failed to keep his brigades marching by the left after they passed Sudley Spring, he did at all events keep them together and strike a concerted blow. The movements of Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet do not suggest that Beauregard could have done as much.

Johnston himself wrote as follows:-- "A large proportion of it [Beauregard's army] was not engaged in the battle. This was a great fault on my part. When Bee's and Jackson's brigades were ordered to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, those of Holmes and Early should have been moved to the left also, and placed in the interval on Bonham's left--if not then, certainly at nine o'clock, when a Federal column was seen turning our left: and, when it seemed certain that General McDowell's great effort was to be made there. Bonham's, Longstreet's, Jones', and Ewell's brigades, leaving a few regiments and their cavalry to impose on Miles' division, should have been hurried to the left to join in the battle. If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy we should have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped. General McDowell would have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly underestimated the strength of his enemy."

The subsequent action of the Confederate authorities contains an official verdict on the generals. J. E. Johnston was left in charge of the main Confederate army at Manassas. Jackson was promoted to an independent command in the Shenandoah; while Beauregard was sent out West and placed under A. S. Johnston, with whom in the following year he fought the battle of Shiloh against Grant.

At Washington the scenes that followed the battle were disheartening for the Federal cause. The city openly avowed its satisfaction at the Confederate victory. The volunteers showed up badly after their defeat. Discipline was at an end; drunkenness and disorder of the worst kind reigned supreme. The gravest anxiety prevailed, and a change of commanders was decided on that brought McClellan to Washington. Whether McClellan was any better than McDowell may be doubted, but at all events from that moment it was recognized by the Administration that the military problem was one for experts, and could not be solved by a handful of improperly organized three months' volunteers.

did everyone have fun reading it because i did!!!!! oh and if you have any questions E-mail me at sunshine_sunny_1011@yahoo.com or at daisy_hollister@yahoo.com

it was either the north or the south!!!!!!!!!