Military History Companion:
Hundred Years War
This is the term coined in France in the early 1860s to describe the wars between England and France from 1337 to 1453. In reality, there was not a constant state of warfare. Conflict was punctuated by several truces and by full peace between 1360 and 1369. Even in such periods there existed a type of ‘cold war’ between England and France, and their hostilities spilled over into conflicts waged within other lands, the best example, perhaps, being the civil war in Spain during the 1360-9 peace.
England and France had been at war on several occasions before 1337, most recently in 1294-7 and 1324-7, over the extent and conditions of tenure of the lands which the English kings held (or claimed) in France. By the early 13th century, Normandy, Maine, Anjou, and Poitou had been lost and only the duchy of Aquitaine remained in English control. The most important part of Aquitaine, especially because of the wine trade, was Gascony, whose capital was Bordeaux. At the Treaty of Paris in 1259 Henry III (1216-70) accepted that he held Aquitaine as a fief of the French crown and owed liege homage. This gave the French king the opportunity to intervene in the king/duke's lands, and the right to confiscate the duchy: this had led to the outbreak of war in 1294 and 1324.
The Hundred Years' War
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Relations were already stormy, therefore, at the accession of Edward III in 1327. In the very next year, Charles IV of France (1322-8) died without a direct male heir. The French crown passed to Philip VI (of Valois, 1328-50) as the nearest heir through the male line, but Edward also had a claim as the closest relative through the female line, being the son of Charles's sister, Isabella. Threats of the confiscation of his duchy of Aquitaine combined with a weak position at home forced Edward to pay homage to Philip in 1329, thereby effectively recognizing him as king of France. But the problems inherent in the tenure of part of France by the English king smouldered on, until Philip confiscated the duchy in 1337 and war began again. After some hesitation, Edward finally declared himself king of France in January 1340, and although he dropped the title between 1360 and 1369, as did Henry V between 1420 and 1422, English kings otherwise all called themselves kings of France until 1801-2. Between 1337 and 1453 there were intensive periods of warfare over the claim to the French throne and over pre-existing territorial issues.
In the early stages of the Hundred Years War England and France largely fought each other by exploiting their alliances with other powers, alliances which they had built up during the 1330s as the likelihood of war mounted. The first campaign of Edward III is a good illustration of this. In 1338 he established a base at Antwerp, the capital of his ally the Duke of Brabant, and negotiated an alliance with the Holy Roman Emperor, Louis of Bavaria, which made him the imperial vicar general in Germany and France. The first attack on France, launched in September 1339, was thus in the Cambrésis, that part of France which lay within the boundary of the Holy Roman Empire. At Ghent in January 1340 Edward declared himself king of France in order to be able to exploit the military assistance of the Flemish townsmen who had rebelled against their pro-Valois count. The second campaign (July-September 1340) was thus against Tournai, a town in northern France which was claimed by the Flemish. For their part, the French conducted a series of raids on the south coast in 1338-9, but the threat to England and the Channel was reduced by the English naval victory at Sluys on 24 June 1340. The matter of Scotland also loomed large. English intervention there in the 1290s had prompted the Scots to ally with the French (see Scots wars of independence). In the early 1330s Edward III had attempted to restore English royal authority through a puppet ruler. As a result, David II (Bruce) had fled to France in 1334, but was helped to return in 1341 so stirring up trouble for Edward on his northern frontier.
By the autumn of 1340 the wars had come to a stalemate and hence a temporary truce: Edward was short of resources, and his allies were increasingly reluctant to assist. A new opportunity presented itself in 1341 with a succession dispute in Brittany. Edward offered military support to the de Montfort claimant, pouring in troops to the duchy and campaigning there in person in 1342. The English war effort became more adventurous in the mid-1340s. In 1345 the Duke of Lancaster expanded holdings in Aquitaine. In the following year Edward invaded Normandy, sacking Caen and marching inland almost as far as Paris. As he continued north he was intercepted by the French army at Crécy (which lay within Ponthieu, a territory in English hands since 1279 through inheritance by Eleanor of Castile). His victory there on 26 August dealt a major blow to French morale, as did the English victory over the Scots at Neville's Cross (17 October 1346), and the surrender of Calais in the following year. Calais was subsequently developed as an English military and trading base, and was not retaken by the French until 1558.
The late 1340s saw a break in fighting due to the effects of the Black Death. Philip VI died in 1350 and his heir, John II (1350-64), afraid of an Anglo-Navarrese alliance and of further English successes, was more willing to negotiate than his father had been. But papally sponsored negotiations at Guines in 1354 failed and the war began again in 1355. Edward, Prince of Wales (the ‘Black Prince’) carried out a raid across southern France from Bordeaux almost to the Mediterranean coast. In 1356 the Duke of Lancaster was active in Normandy and the Black Prince raided northwards. Forced to give battle at Poitiers, he won an emphatic victory, capturing John II. Edward launched what turned out to be his last major attack in 1359, probably hoping to take Rheims and to be crowned French king. But his plan failed and he agreed instead to a settlement (the Treaty of Brétigny, 8 May 1360). John was released in return for a ransom of 3 million écus, Edward agreed to give up his claim to the French throne in return for an enlarged Aquitaine, Poitou, Ponthieu, and Calais, all to be held in full sovereignty, that is, without French overlordship or the need to pay homage. Although this settlement was confirmed by Edward and John at Calais on 24 October, the renunciation clauses (whereby Edward gave up his French title and the French surrendered sovereignty over his land acquisitions) were removed from the main treaty and were never effected: Edward was probably hoping to keep his options open.
This loophole in the treaty was exploited by Charles V in 1369, enabling him to confiscate Aquitaine and to send troops into Edward's lands. In revenge, Edward resumed his use of the title king of France. In the next period of conflict (1369-89) the English did badly, losing almost all of their recent gains. The French benefited considerably from an alliance with the Castilians which gave them supremacy at sea, enabling them to harass the English coasts. The English tried various forms of attack—raids through northern French territory, the attempted capture of bridgeheads on the French coast, alliances with the Flemish and the Duke of Brittany—but none met with marked success. The Papal Schism from 1378 to 1418 complicated the issue as the French and English supported opposing popes, and both kingdoms had minors as kings in the 1380s (Richard II, 1377-99, and Charles VI, 1380-1422).
The issues remained insoluble, and all that could be agreed in 1396 was a long truce (due to last to 1426), and the marriage of Richard II to Charles VI's daughter, Isabella. This situation was thrown into disarray by Charles's insanity which led to civil war in France between the Burgundian and Armagnac (or Orléanist factions), and by Richard II's deposition by his cousin, Henry Bolingbroke (Henry IV, 1399-1413). Although the long truce technically still applied, the French sent aid to Welsh rebels fighting against Henry, and attempted to take Calais and Gascony as well as to disrupt the Channel. By 1410, the French civil war had reached such a height that the two parties sought English assistance. This convinced the English that time was ripe for a new initiative in France. Thus in 1415 Henry V launched his first invasion which led to the capture of Harfleur and to victory at Agincourt. Despite being severely outnumbered and weakened by an extended march, the English again defeated the French in emphatic fashion, taking Charles VI's nephew, Philip, Duke of Orléans, and many others prisoner.
Successes followed apace over the next few years not only due to the military genius of Henry V and his commanders but also due to divisions within France. Henry's second campaign, begun on 1 August 1417, was devoted to a systematic conquest of Normandy by means of sieges, the first time the English had tried this strategy on a major scale. Once Rouen fell in January 1419 after an eight-month siege, the duchy was effectively in Henry's hands and he began to march towards Paris. French attempts to unify came to an abrupt end when John, Duke of Burgundy, was murdered by the men of the Dauphin (who now headed the Armagnac group). This forced the Burgundians, who controlled the mad Charles VI, into alliance with Henry, who was now in a position to dictate terms. By the Treaty of Troyes (21 May 1420) he became heir to Charles VI (the Dauphin, later Charles VII, 1422-61, was disinherited) and Regent of France. As the treaty was not accepted outside the lands under English or Burgundian control, Henry and those acting on behalf of his son, Henry VI (1422-61, restored briefly 1470-1), who was only 9 months old at his father's death, had the difficult task of attempting to extend the area under their control. Victories in battle at Cravant (31 July 1423) and Verneuil (16 August 1424—a battle where the Dauphin's armies were boosted by Scots allies) assisted, and by 1428 the frontier had been pushed to the Loire. But the Dauphin's forces managed to raise the siege laid to Orléans, partly through the boost to morale given by Joan of Arc. Charles's army went on to defeat the English at Patay (18 June 1429) and to recapture much of the land to the east of Paris, enabling the Dauphin to be crowned at Rheims a month later.
From then onwards the English were forced onto the defensive, even though Henry VI was crowned French king at Paris on 16 December 1431—the only king of England to realize the claim first put forward by his ancestor almost a century earlier. Their Burgundian ally defected in 1435 and in the following year Charles entered Paris. The English were left with Gascony, Calais, and Normandy, although control of upper Normandy was undermined by revolt in 1435-6 when even Harfleur was lost. Although it was subsequently recovered after a major siege (1440), Dieppe remained in French hands, causing the Channel and English coasts to be vulnerable once more. The English remained on the defensive into the 1440s, finding the war increasingly expensive to maintain. After the agreement of a truce in 1444 and the marriage of Henry VI to Margaret of Anjou, English defences in Normandy were scaled down, leaving them as easy pickings for Charles when he invaded the duchy with the assistance of the Duke of Brittany in 1449. What was left of English Normandy fell within a year, Gascony following suit in 1451. A rebellion against the French in Bordeaux in 1453 encouraged the English to send an army under the veteran Lord John Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, but both he and the English war effort met their death at the battle of Castillon on 17 July.
War aims were certainly not consistent over the whole of the Hundred Years War: the claim to the throne was less significant after 1360 until it was given a new emphasis by the Treaty of Troyes. Strategy also varied. Generally speaking, the 14th century saw the dominance of the chevauchée. This was a large-scale raid conducted into French territory, aimed at lowering morale, creating economic havoc, and collecting as much booty and prisoners as possible. This type of action was popular among English troops because of the rich pickings, and had a political significance in that it called into question the Valois's capacity to defend their lands and people. But it was of only temporary benefit to the English cause as a whole. Only by systematic conquest could the English translate their claims to territory, sovereignty, and the French crown into reality. Under Henry V and Henry VI, therefore, the predominant form of action was the siege. By this time too, of course, artillery was much more extensively used as both an offensive and defensive weapon in siege actions. But the 14th century did see sieges, the most obvious being that of Calais, and there were chevauchée-style actions in the 15th century, such as that conducted by John, Earl of Somerset, into Brittany and Anjou in 1443. In both centuries there were many smaller skirmishes, raids and patrols, and the fortification and garrisoning of strongholds were important for both sides. The French found it very difficult to penetrate far into English Gascony because its frontier was well protected by defensive structures. Because the English were waging a war overseas, naval activity was very significant, for the carrying of troops, for the patrolling of the Channel and trade routes to Gascony, and for actions at sea.
Both on land and sea full battles were few and far between, but the war will always be remembered for the three great English victories at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt. All were fought in similar fashion, with the English dismounted and relying heavily on the withering effects of arrow fire to undermine the French charge. On all three occasions the English commander deployed his troops across a relatively narrow front. This created a funnel effect, limiting French freedom of action (all the more significant given that the French outnumbered the English threefold or more), making the arrow fire more telling in its impact, and leading to massive fatalities and captures on the French side. As the English had to send armies across the sea, they were inevitably small. Those of the 15th century, for instance, were rarely above 2, 500 men (although troops were sent in almost every year from 1415 to 1450) and the chevauchées by the Black Prince of 1355 and 1356 were conducted with about the same number of English soldiers, although boosted by Gascons. Edward III probably had about 7, 000 men at the battle of Crécy, and 10, 000 on his 1359 campaign. While Henry V had also set off with 12, 000 in 1415, sickness and the need to defend Harfleur had led to only about half the army being present at Agincourt. Although it is unlikely that Edward III did have an army as great as 32, 000 for the siege of Calais that action probably did see the largest number of English troops.
Alliances remained important throughout the war—that of the French and Scots proving particularly enduring—and had a considerable military (and in the case of the Franco-Castilian link, naval) significance. Except for the first four years of the Hundred Years War the English relied mainly on troops from their own lands and not on foreign mercenaries. Most, and after 1369 all, troops used by the English were raised by the contract system whereby captains (including peers, knights, and esquires) indented to provide a certain number of men who received royal pay for the whole of their service. Many served only for short periods, six months or so, although the need for garrisons, most notably in 15th-century Normandy, did generate a form of standing army and extended lengths of military careers. In the 14th century the ratio of men-at-arms to archers was about one to one; from the Welsh wars of Henry IV, a ratio of one to three became common, recognition not only of the tactical value of archers but also of their relative cheapness and ease of recruitment. French armies were also based upon noble companies but there was a stronger element of feudal obligation and use of urban militias. Larger armies were thereby feasible, but lacked the degree of cohesion and professionalism found in English armies. The growing use of the longbow on the English side and of the crossbow on the French side, the development of the sword, and the trend towards dismounted actions led to the increasing predominance of full plate armour. Artillery was already beginning to make its mark in the second half of the 14th century and, by the end of the war, handguns and larger pieces were common on both sides: indeed the eventual French victory was much due to their increased use of artillery as well as to the reorganization and professionalization of the army which Charles VIII had ordered in the 1440s.
Bibliography
- Allmand, Christopher, The Hundred Years War (Cambridge, 1988).
- Curry, Anne, The Hundred Years War (London, 1993).
- —— and Hughes, Michael (eds.), Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War (Woodbridge, 1994).
- Sumption, Jonathan, The Hundred Years War (London, 1990)
— Anne Curry
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