Why did the battle of the Marne start?

Answer 1

The Battle of Verdun (La Bataille de Verdun) is a very important battle from World War I. Verdun is a small city about 260 kilometres away from Paris. The battle began on February 21st, 1916, when the Germans attacked the city. It officially ended on December 18, 1916. Approximately 970,000 soldiers died in the battle and 40 million artillery shells were exchanged by the French and German armies. The Germans attacked Verdun because they thought they could break through the city and then continue into Paris. At this point, they hoped to end the war with a strong negotiation position. However, they lost the battle and their plan did not work.

Answer 2

The simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't allow it. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The resulting casualties on both sides were appalling. But war itself is never so simple as that …

The battle for Verdun was fought during WW1 between the French and German armies from February 21, 1916 to approximately December 18, 1916, a period of roughly ten months, making it the longest single battle of WW1 and one of the longest battles in history. In those 10 months more than 250,000 men lost their lives and more than 500,000 were wounded, all in an area roughly the size of Central Park in New York City.

In August of 1914, when The Great War broke out, the Germans had the Schlieffen Plan for the rapid conquest of France in exactly 39 days. It was the brainchild of Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff until 1906. The idea was fairly simple: rapid mobilization of the German armies, advance on a broad front including deliberately violating the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, with two entire German armies sweeping like a swinging gate hinged at Luxembourg down through Belgium and on to Paris. Having invested Paris, the Germans would be able to turn their full attention to the Russians in the east.

Von Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth von Moltke, made some changes in the basic plan that may or may not have caused it to fail, but one must not overlook the fact, as Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything." The French, on their side, had their Plan XVII, which called for a massive blow to the German center in the Alsace-Lorraine. While this plan was a total failure, it did slow the German advance. Meanwhile, in Belgium, the Germans were somewhat taken aback when the Belgians resisted their invasion, further playing havoc with the timetable. Then the Russians attacked in the east weeks earlier than expected (the Russians were not, in fact, ready, but it was a spoiling attack which forced the Germans to take 2 corps away from the western front just when they were most needed). Finally, the French stopped the German juggernaut at the Marne, both sides dug in, and as any student of the American Civil War could have told them, determined infantry in well placed entrenchments are virtually impossible to move. The war ground to a shuddering halt and pretty much stayed that way until 1918, except, of course, for the unbelievable casualties as each side sought to restore a war of movement from what had become a war of attrition.

Which brings us to Verdun: there used not to be any question about the cause of the Battle of Verdun. According to historian Alistair Horne, writing in The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916(St. Martin's Press 1962), Erich von Falkenhayn, the German chief of staff who dreamed up the attack on the Verdun area, allegedly wrote in a Christmas, 1915 letter to the Kaiser that he essentially planned to suck the whole French Army into a killing ground at Verdun and "bleed white" the French. He called it "Operation Gericht," which is sometimes translated "an execution place." The text of the purported Christmas memo is in Falkenahyn's memoirs. It said:

• "…There remains only France …. If we succeeded in opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. To achieve that object the uncertain method of a mass breakthrough, in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purposes with limited resources. Within our reach behind the French sector of the Western front there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death." [italics are Horne's]

Let me quote that again: "…there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have," supposedly wrote Falkenhayn, and if he said this, it is absolutely true because the area of Verdun was, to the French, Holy Soil to be held at any cost. Verdun had been French since 1648, and it lay on a direct east-west line with Paris. Overrun Verdun, roll up the French flanks, and there was nothing between you and the capital.

But according to Horne's 1962 version, Falkenhayn never actually intended to take the fortresses of Verdun; in fact did not even think he could achieve a mass breakthrough, but rather would simply hold the entire French Army on the one piece of Holy Ground it could not stand to leave and beat it to death with massive artillery and flame throwers (which made their first horrifying appearance in this battle).

But more modern scholarship by Holger Afflerbach (Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich. Oldenbourg 1996) and others has called into question whether the so-called "Christmas memo" ever actually existed. Apparently no copy of it has ever been seen, and the only place it is quoted is in Falkenhayn's memoir. According to Afflerbach, Falkenhayn's army commanders, including the Crown Prince, commanding the German 5th Army at Verdun, knew nothing of a whole plan of battle deliberately based on attrition. In any event, the attrition was as bad on the German side as it was on the French, so if that was Falkenhayn's plan, it was a failure. Afflerbach suggests it may be that Falkenhayn was, after the fact, trying to explain away his dismal failure to make the long desired breakthrough at Verdun and restore the war of movement that Germany might have actually been able to win.

In retrospect, it makes more sense that the Germans were trying to achieve a breakthrough of the whole front at Verdun. For one thing, it was a salient sticking into the German lines, and salients (bulges in the line) are notoriously hard to hold because they're easily flanked. Considering the care of the German planning, the unbelievable number and caliber of guns they brought up, the millions of shells that were expended to reduce the forts in the Verdun area (which, while reducing the forts' superstructures to dust failed to actually crack any of them), it's much more logical that the Germans were going for the mass breakthrough, and the French resisted so tenaciously that the Germans couldn't achieve it. The French battle cry at Verdun, "Ils ne passeront pas" ("They shall not pass") was truly spoken.

So, it would seem that the simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't let them. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The result was more than a quarter million dead and absolutely nothing gained in 10 months of vicious fighting.

But, according to Alistair Horne, there was one outcome of the battle that didn't appear until 1940, when the Germans again came sweeping through Belgium on the way to Paris. The vaunted Maginot Line was thin in front of the Belgian border, a result of a treaty that Belgium abrogated in 1936. But the French knew that the Germans would again come through Belgium, so they massed the French Army at the border and still couldn't stop them. According to Horne, they didn't really try. Horne says that the heart of the French Army had been ripped out at Verdun 25 years earlier, and who knows? Maybe he was right.

Answer 3

The Schlieffen Plan involved the German Army surrounding Paris to the West before moving back East, capturing the city forcing the French into surrender. However, with the Belgian resistance and the BEF (British Expeditionary Force) also fighting the Germans, the German Army divided into two, leaving a gap. The BEF and French Fifth Army exploited the weakness, beginning the First Battle of the Marne, (3rd September - 12th September)

Answer 4

The French were considered as weak opponents by the Germans who had good military strength and ammunition. But poor war strategy by the Germans and counter offensive moves by the French along with help from Britain led to the French victory.

Answer 5

The simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't allow it. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The resulting casualties on both sides were appalling. But war itself is never so simple as that …

The battle for Verdun was fought during WW1 between the French and German armies from February 21, 1916 to approximately December 18, 1916, a period of roughly ten months, making it the longest single battle of WW1 and one of the longest battles in history. In those 10 months more than 250,000 men lost their lives and more than 500,000 were wounded, all in an area roughly the size of Central Park in New York City.

In August of 1914, when The Great War broke out, the Germans had the Schlieffen Plan for the rapid conquest of France in exactly 39 days. It was the brainchild of Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff until 1906. The idea was fairly simple: rapid mobilization of the German armies, advance on a broad front including deliberately violating the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, with two entire German armies sweeping like a swinging gate hinged at Luxembourg down through Belgium and on to Paris. Having invested Paris, the Germans would be able to turn their full attention to the Russians in the east.

Von Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth von Moltke, made some changes in the basic plan that may or may not have caused it to fail, but one must not overlook the fact, as Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything." The French, on their side, had their Plan XVII, which called for a massive blow to the German center in the Alsace-Lorraine. While this plan was a total failure, it did slow the German advance. Meanwhile, in Belgium, the Germans were somewhat taken aback when the Belgians resisted their invasion, further playing havoc with the timetable. Then the Russians attacked in the east weeks earlier than expected (the Russians were not, in fact, ready, but it was a spoiling attack which forced the Germans to take 2 corps away from the western front just when they were most needed). Finally, the French stopped the German juggernaut at the Marne, both sides dug in, and as any student of the American Civil War could have told them, determined infantry in well placed entrenchments are virtually impossible to move. The war ground to a shuddering halt and pretty much stayed that way until 1918, except, of course, for the unbelievable casualties as each side sought to restore a war of movement from what had become a war of attrition.

Which brings us to Verdun: there used not to be any question about the cause of the Battle of Verdun. According to historian Alistair Horne, writing in The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916(St. Martin's Press 1962), Erich von Falkenhayn, the German chief of staff who dreamed up the attack on the Verdun area, allegedly wrote in a Christmas, 1915 letter to the Kaiser that he essentially planned to suck the whole French Army into a killing ground at Verdun and "bleed white" the French. He called it "Operation Gericht," which is sometimes translated "an execution place." The text of the purported Christmas memo is in Falkenahyn's memoirs. It said:

* "…There remains only France …. If we succeeded in opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. To achieve that object the uncertain method of a mass breakthrough, in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purposes with limited resources. Within our reach behind the French sector of the Western front there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death." [italics are Horne's] Let me quote that again: "…there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have," supposedly wrote Falkenhayn, and if he said this, it is absolutely true because the area of Verdun was, to the French, Holy Soil to be held at any cost. Verdun had been French since 1648, and it lay on a direct east-west line with Paris. Overrun Verdun, roll up the French flanks, and there was nothing between you and the capital.

But according to Horne's 1962 version, Falkenhayn never actually intended to take the fortresses of Verdun; in fact did not even think he could achieve a mass breakthrough, but rather would simply hold the entire French Army on the one piece of Holy Ground it could not stand to leave and beat it to death with massive artillery and flame throwers (which made their first horrifying appearance in this battle).

But more modern scholarship by Holger Afflerbach (Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich. Oldenbourg 1996) and others has called into question whether the so-called "Christmas memo" ever actually existed. Apparently no copy of it has ever been seen, and the only place it is quoted is in Falkenhayn's memoir. According to Afflerbach, Falkenhayn's army commanders, including the Crown Prince, commanding the German 5th Army at Verdun, knew nothing of a whole plan of battle deliberately based on attrition. In any event, the attrition was as bad on the German side as it was on the French, so if that was Falkenhayn's plan, it was a failure. Afflerbach suggests it may be that Falkenhayn was, after the fact, trying to explain away his dismal failure to make the long desired breakthrough at Verdun and restore the war of movement that Germany might have actually been able to win.

In retrospect, it makes more sense that the Germans were trying to achieve a breakthrough of the whole front at Verdun. For one thing, it was a salient sticking into the German lines, and salients (bulges in the line) are notoriously hard to hold because they're easily flanked. Considering the care of the German planning, the unbelievable number and caliber of guns they brought up, the millions of shells that were expended to reduce the forts in the Verdun area (which, while reducing the forts' superstructures to dust failed to actually crack any of them), it's much more logical that the Germans were going for the mass breakthrough, and the French resisted so tenaciously that the Germans couldn't achieve it. The French battle cry at Verdun, "Ils ne passeront pas" ("They shall not pass") was truly spoken.

So, it would seem that the simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't let them. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The result was more than a quarter million dead and absolutely nothing gained in 10 months of vicious fighting.

But, according to Alistair Horne, there was one outcome of the battle that didn't appear until 1940, when the Germans again came sweeping through Belgium on the way to Paris. The vaunted Maginot Line was thin in front of the Belgian border, a result of a treaty that Belgium abrogated in 1936. But the French knew that the Germans would again come through Belgium, so they massed the French Army at the border and still couldn't stop them. According to Horne, they didn't really try. Horne says that the heart of the French Army had been ripped out at Verdun 25 years earlier, and who knows? Maybe he was right.
The simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't allow it. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The resulting casualties on both sides were appalling. But war itself is never so simple as that …

The battle for Verdun was fought during WW1 between the French and German armies from February 21, 1916 to approximately December 18, 1916, a period of roughly ten months, making it the longest single battle of WW1 and one of the longest battles in history. In those 10 months more than 250,000 men lost their lives and more than 500,000 were wounded, all in an area roughly the size of Central Park in New York City.

In August of 1914, when The Great War broke out, the Germans had the Schlieffen Plan for the rapid conquest of France in exactly 39 days. It was the brainchild of Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff until 1906. The idea was fairly simple: rapid mobilization of the German armies, advance on a broad front including deliberately violating the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, with two entire German armies sweeping like a swinging gate hinged at Luxembourg down through Belgium and on to Paris. Having invested Paris, the Germans would be able to turn their full attention to the Russians in the east.

Von Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth von Moltke, made some changes in the basic plan that may or may not have caused it to fail, but one must not overlook the fact, as Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything." The French, on their side, had their Plan XVII, which called for a massive blow to the German center in the Alsace-Lorraine. While this plan was a total failure, it did slow the German advance. Meanwhile, in Belgium, the Germans were somewhat taken aback when the Belgians resisted their invasion, further playing havoc with the timetable. Then the Russians attacked in the east weeks earlier than expected (the Russians were not, in fact, ready, but it was a spoiling attack which forced the Germans to take 2 corps away from the western front just when they were most needed). Finally, the French stopped the German juggernaut at the Marne, both sides dug in, and as any student of the American Civil War could have told them, determined infantry in well placed entrenchments are virtually impossible to move. The war ground to a shuddering halt and pretty much stayed that way until 1918, except, of course, for the unbelievable casualties as each side sought to restore a war of movement from what had become a war of attrition.

Which brings us to Verdun: there used not to be any question about the cause of the Battle of Verdun. According to historian Alistair Horne, writing in The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916(St. Martin's Press 1962), Erich von Falkenhayn, the German chief of staff who dreamed up the attack on the Verdun area, allegedly wrote in a Christmas, 1915 letter to the Kaiser that he essentially planned to suck the whole French Army into a killing ground at Verdun and "bleed white" the French. He called it "Operation Gericht," which is sometimes translated "an execution place." The text of the purported Christmas memo is in Falkenahyn's memoirs. It said:

* "…There remains only France …. If we succeeded in opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. To achieve that object the uncertain method of a mass breakthrough, in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purposes with limited resources. Within our reach behind the French sector of the Western front there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death." [italics are Horne's] Let me quote that again: "…there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have," supposedly wrote Falkenhayn, and if he said this, it is absolutely true because the area of Verdun was, to the French, Holy Soil to be held at any cost. Verdun had been French since 1648, and it lay on a direct east-west line with Paris. Overrun Verdun, roll up the French flanks, and there was nothing between you and the capital.

But according to Horne's 1962 version, Falkenhayn never actually intended to take the fortresses of Verdun; in fact did not even think he could achieve a mass breakthrough, but rather would simply hold the entire French Army on the one piece of Holy Ground it could not stand to leave and beat it to death with massive artillery and flame throwers (which made their first horrifying appearance in this battle).

But more modern scholarship by Holger Afflerbach (Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich. Oldenbourg 1996) and others has called into question whether the so-called "Christmas memo" ever actually existed. Apparently no copy of it has ever been seen, and the only place it is quoted is in Falkenhayn's memoir. According to Afflerbach, Falkenhayn's army commanders, including the Crown Prince, commanding the German 5th Army at Verdun, knew nothing of a whole plan of battle deliberately based on attrition. In any event, the attrition was as bad on the German side as it was on the French, so if that was Falkenhayn's plan, it was a failure. Afflerbach suggests it may be that Falkenhayn was, after the fact, trying to explain away his dismal failure to make the long desired breakthrough at Verdun and restore the war of movement that Germany might have actually been able to win.

In retrospect, it makes more sense that the Germans were trying to achieve a breakthrough of the whole front at Verdun. For one thing, it was a salient sticking into the German lines, and salients (bulges in the line) are notoriously hard to hold because they're easily flanked. Considering the care of the German planning, the unbelievable number and caliber of guns they brought up, the millions of shells that were expended to reduce the forts in the Verdun area (which, while reducing the forts' superstructures to dust failed to actually crack any of them), it's much more logical that the Germans were going for the mass breakthrough, and the French resisted so tenaciously that the Germans couldn't achieve it. The French battle cry at Verdun, "Ils ne passeront pas" ("They shall not pass") was truly spoken.

So, it would seem that the simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't let them. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The result was more than a quarter million dead and absolutely nothing gained in 10 months of vicious fighting.

But, according to Alistair Horne, there was one outcome of the battle that didn't appear until 1940, when the Germans again came sweeping through Belgium on the way to Paris. The vaunted Maginot Line was thin in front of the Belgian border, a result of a treaty that Belgium abrogated in 1936. But the French knew that the Germans would again come through Belgium, so they massed the French Army at the border and still couldn't stop them. According to Horne, they didn't really try. Horne says that the heart of the French Army had been ripped out at Verdun 25 years earlier, and who knows? Maybe he was right.
The simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't allow it. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The resulting casualties on both sides were appalling. But war itself is never so simple as that …

The battle for Verdun was fought during WW1 between the French and German armies from February 21, 1916 to approximately December 18, 1916, a period of roughly ten months, making it the longest single battle of WW1 and one of the longest battles in history. In those 10 months more than 250,000 men lost their lives and more than 500,000 were wounded, all in an area roughly the size of Central Park in New York City.

In August of 1914, when The Great War broke out, the Germans had the Schlieffen Plan for the rapid conquest of France in exactly 39 days. It was the brainchild of Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff until 1906. The idea was fairly simple: rapid mobilization of the German armies, advance on a broad front including deliberately violating the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, with two entire German armies sweeping like a swinging gate hinged at Luxembourg down through Belgium and on to Paris. Having invested Paris, the Germans would be able to turn their full attention to the Russians in the east.

Von Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth von Moltke, made some changes in the basic plan that may or may not have caused it to fail, but one must not overlook the fact, as Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything." The French, on their side, had their Plan XVII, which called for a massive blow to the German center in the Alsace-Lorraine. While this plan was a total failure, it did slow the German advance. Meanwhile, in Belgium, the Germans were somewhat taken aback when the Belgians resisted their invasion, further playing havoc with the timetable. Then the Russians attacked in the east weeks earlier than expected (the Russians were not, in fact, ready, but it was a spoiling attack which forced the Germans to take 2 corps away from the western front just when they were most needed). Finally, the French stopped the German juggernaut at the Marne, both sides dug in, and as any student of the American Civil War could have told them, determined infantry in well placed entrenchments are virtually impossible to move. The war ground to a shuddering halt and pretty much stayed that way until 1918, except, of course, for the unbelievable casualties as each side sought to restore a war of movement from what had become a war of attrition.

Which brings us to Verdun: there used not to be any question about the cause of the Battle of Verdun. According to historian Alistair Horne, writing in The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916(St. Martin's Press 1962), Erich von Falkenhayn, the German chief of staff who dreamed up the attack on the Verdun area, allegedly wrote in a Christmas, 1915 letter to the Kaiser that he essentially planned to suck the whole French Army into a killing ground at Verdun and "bleed white" the French. He called it "Operation Gericht," which is sometimes translated "an execution place." The text of the purported Christmas memo is in Falkenahyn's memoirs. It said:

* "…There remains only France …. If we succeeded in opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. To achieve that object the uncertain method of a mass breakthrough, in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purposes with limited resources. Within our reach behind the French sector of the Western front there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death." [italics are Horne's] Let me quote that again: "…there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have," supposedly wrote Falkenhayn, and if he said this, it is absolutely true because the area of Verdun was, to the French, Holy Soil to be held at any cost. Verdun had been French since 1648, and it lay on a direct east-west line with Paris. Overrun Verdun, roll up the French flanks, and there was nothing between you and the capital.

But according to Horne's 1962 version, Falkenhayn never actually intended to take the fortresses of Verdun; in fact did not even think he could achieve a mass breakthrough, but rather would simply hold the entire French Army on the one piece of Holy Ground it could not stand to leave and beat it to death with massive artillery and flame throwers (which made their first horrifying appearance in this battle).

But more modern scholarship by Holger Afflerbach (Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich. Oldenbourg 1996) and others has called into question whether the so-called "Christmas memo" ever actually existed. Apparently no copy of it has ever been seen, and the only place it is quoted is in Falkenhayn's memoir. According to Afflerbach, Falkenhayn's army commanders, including the Crown Prince, commanding the German 5th Army at Verdun, knew nothing of a whole plan of battle deliberately based on attrition. In any event, the attrition was as bad on the German side as it was on the French, so if that was Falkenhayn's plan, it was a failure. Afflerbach suggests it may be that Falkenhayn was, after the fact, trying to explain away his dismal failure to make the long desired breakthrough at Verdun and restore the war of movement that Germany might have actually been able to win.

In retrospect, it makes more sense that the Germans were trying to achieve a breakthrough of the whole front at Verdun. For one thing, it was a salient sticking into the German lines, and salients (bulges in the line) are notoriously hard to hold because they're easily flanked. Considering the care of the German planning, the unbelievable number and caliber of guns they brought up, the millions of shells that were expended to reduce the forts in the Verdun area (which, while reducing the forts' superstructures to dust failed to actually crack any of them), it's much more logical that the Germans were going for the mass breakthrough, and the French resisted so tenaciously that the Germans couldn't achieve it. The French battle cry at Verdun, "Ils ne passeront pas" ("They shall not pass") was truly spoken.

So, it would seem that the simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't let them. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The result was more than a quarter million dead and absolutely nothing gained in 10 months of vicious fighting.

But, according to Alistair Horne, there was one outcome of the battle that didn't appear until 1940, when the Germans again came sweeping through Belgium on the way to Paris. The vaunted Maginot Line was thin in front of the Belgian border, a result of a treaty that Belgium abrogated in 1936. But the French knew that the Germans would again come through Belgium, so they massed the French Army at the border and still couldn't stop them. According to Horne, they didn't really try. Horne says that the heart of the French Army had been ripped out at Verdun 25 years earlier, and who knows? Maybe he was right.
The simple answer is that the Germans were trying to get past Verdun to capture Paris, and the French wouldn't allow it. The Germans wouldn't stop trying, and the French wouldn't stop resisting. The resulting casualties on both sides were appalling. But war itself is never so simple as that …

The battle for Verdun was fought during WW1 between the French and German armies from February 21, 1916 to approximately December 18, 1916, a period of roughly ten months, making it the longest single battle of WW1 and one of the longest battles in history. In those 10 months more than 250,000 men lost their lives and more than 500,000 were wounded, all in an area roughly the size of Central Park in New York City.

In August of 1914, when The Great War broke out, the Germans had the Schlieffen Plan for the rapid conquest of France in exactly 39 days. It was the brainchild of Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff until 1906. The idea was fairly simple: rapid mobilization of the German armies, advance on a broad front including deliberately violating the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, with two entire German armies sweeping like a swinging gate hinged at Luxembourg down through Belgium and on to Paris. Having invested Paris, the Germans would be able to turn their full attention to the Russians in the east.

Von Schlieffen's successor, Helmuth von Moltke, made some changes in the basic plan that may or may not have caused it to fail, but one must not overlook the fact, as Eisenhower said, "Plans are nothing; planning is everything." The French, on their side, had their Plan XVII, which called for a massive blow to the German center in the Alsace-Lorraine. While this plan was a total failure, it did slow the German advance. Meanwhile, in Belgium, the Germans were somewhat taken aback when the Belgians resisted their invasion, further playing havoc with the timetable. Then the Russians attacked in the east weeks earlier than expected (the Russians were not, in fact, ready, but it was a spoiling attack which forced the Germans to take 2 corps away from the western front just when they were most needed). Finally, the French stopped the German juggernaut at the Marne, both sides dug in, and as any student of the American Civil War could have told them, determined infantry in well placed entrenchments are virtually impossible to move. The war ground to a shuddering halt and pretty much stayed that way until 1918, except, of course, for the unbelievable casualties as each side sought to restore a war of movement from what had become a war of attrition.

Which brings us to Verdun: there used not to be any question about the cause of the Battle of Verdun. According to historian Alistair Horne, writing in The Price of Glory: Verdun, 1916(St. Martin's Press 1962), Erich von Falkenhayn, the German chief of staff who dreamed up the attack on the Verdun area, allegedly wrote in a Christmas, 1915 letter to the Kaiser that he essentially planned to suck the whole French Army into a killing ground at Verdun and "bleed white" the French. He called it "Operation Gericht," which is sometimes translated "an execution place." The text of the purported Christmas memo is in Falkenahyn's memoirs. It said:

* "…There remains only France …. If we succeeded in opening the eyes of her people to the fact that in a military sense they have nothing more to hope for, that breaking point would be reached and England's best sword knocked out of her hand. To achieve that object the uncertain method of a mass breakthrough, in any case beyond our means, is unnecessary. We can probably do enough for our purposes with limited resources. Within our reach behind the French sector of the Western front there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death." [italics are Horne's] Let me quote that again: "…there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have," supposedly wrote Falkenhayn, and if he said this, it is absolutely true because the area of Verdun was, to the French, Holy Soil to be held at any cost. Verdun had been French since 1648, and it lay on a direct east-west line with Paris. Overrun Verdun, roll up the French flanks, and there was nothing between you and the capital.

But according to Horne's 1962 version, Falkenhayn never actually intended to take the fortresses of Verdun; in fact did not even think he could achieve a mass breakthrough, but rather would simply hold the entire French Army on the one piece of Holy Ground it could not stand to leave and beat it to death with massive artillery and flame throwers (which made their first horrifying appearance in this battle).

But more modern scholarship by Holger Afflerbach (Falkenhayn. Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich. Oldenbourg 1996) and others has called into question whether the so-called "Christmas memo" ever actually existed. Apparently no copy of it has ever been seen, and the only place it is quoted is in Falkenhayn's memoir. According to Afflerbach, Falkenhayn's army commanders, including the Crown Prince, commanding the German 5th Army at Verdun, knew nothing of a whole plan of battle deliberately based on attrition. In any event, the attrition was as bad on the German side as it was on the French, so if that was Falkenhayn's plan, it was a failure. Afflerbach suggests it may be that Falkenhayn was, after the fact, trying to explain away his dismal failure to make the long desired breakthrough at Verdun and restore the war of movement that Germany might have actually been able to win.

In retrospect, it makes more sense that the Germans were trying to achieve a breakthrough of the whole front at Verdun. For one thing, it was a salient sticking into the German lines, and salients (bulges in the line) are notoriously hard to hold because they're easily flanked. Considering the care of the German planning, the