James Longstreet (January 8, 1821 – January 2, 1904) was one of the foremost Confederate generals of the American Civil War, the principal subordinate to General Robert E.
Lee, who called him his "Old War Horse." He served under Lee as a corps commander for many of the famous battles fought by
the Army of Northern Virginia in the Eastern Theater, but also with Gen. Braxton
Bragg in the Army of Tennessee in the Western Theater. Biographer and historian Jeffry D. Wert wrote that
"Longstreet ... was the finest corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia; in fact, he was arguably the best corps
commander in the conflict on either side."[1]
Longstreet's talents as a general made significant contributions to the Confederate victories at Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and
Chickamauga, in both offensive and defensive roles. He also performed strongly
during the Seven Days Battles, the Battle of
Antietam, and until he was seriously wounded, at the Battle of the
Wilderness. His performance in semiautonomous command at Knoxville,
Tennessee, resulted in an embarrassing Confederate defeat. His most controversial service was at the Battle of Gettysburg, where he disagreed with General Lee on the tactics to be employed, and
reluctantly supervised the disastrous infantry assault known as Pickett's Charge.
He enjoyed a successful post-war career working for the U.S. Government as a diplomat, civil servant, and administrator.
However, his conversion to the Republican Party and his cooperation
with his old friend, President Ulysses S. Grant, as well as critical comments he wrote
in his memoirs about General Lee's wartime performance, made him anathema to many of his former Confederate colleagues. Authors
of the Lost Cause movement focused on Longstreet's actions at Gettysburg
as a primary reason for the Confederacy's loss of the war. His reputation in the South was damaged for over a century and has
only recently begun a slow reassessment.
Early life and career
Longstreet was born in Edgefield District, South Carolina. He was the fifth child and third son of James and Mary Ann Dent Longstreet, originally
from New Jersey and Maryland, respectively, who owned a cotton plantation close to where the village of Gainesville would be founded in northeastern Georgia. James's ancestor Dirck Stoffels Langestraet
immigrated to the Dutch colony of New Netherland in
1657, but the surname became Anglicized over the generations.[2] James's father was impressed by his son's "rocklike" character on the rural plantation, giving him
the nickname Peter, and he was known as Pete or Old Pete for the rest of his life.[3]
James's father decided on a military career for his son, but felt that the local education available to him would not be
adequate preparation. At the age of nine, James was sent to live with his aunt and uncle in Augusta, Georgia. His uncle, Augustus Baldwin
Longstreet, was a newspaper editor, educator, and a Methodist minister. James spent eight years on his uncle's plantation,
Westover, just outside the city, while he attended the Richmond County Academy. His father died from a cholera epidemic while visiting Augusta in 1833; although James's mother and the rest of the family moved to
Somerville, Alabama, following his father's death, James remained with uncle
Augustus.[4]
In 1837, Augustus attempted to obtain an appointment for James to the United
States Military Academy, but the vacancy for his congressional district had already been filled, so James was appointed in
1838 by a relative, Reuben Chapman, who represented the First District of Alabama, where
Mary Longstreet lived. James was a poor student academically and a disciplinary problem at West Point, ranking 54th out of 56
cadets when he graduated in 1842. He was popular with his classmates, however, and befriended a number of men who would become
prominent during the Civil War, including George Henry Thomas, William S. Rosecrans, John Pope,
D.H. Hill, Lafayette McLaws,
George Pickett, John Bell "Sam" Hood, and his
closest friend, Ulysses S. Grant of the class of 1843. Longstreet was commissioned a
brevet second lieutenant in the 4th U.S.
Infantry.[5]
Longstreet spent his first two years of service at Jefferson
Barracks, Missouri, where he was soon joined by his friend, Lieutenant Grant. Longstreet
introduced Grant to his fourth cousin, Julia Dent, and the couple eventually married. Soon
after that introduction, Longstreet met Maria Louisa Garland, called Louise by her family, the daughter of Longstreet's
regimental commander, Lt. Col. John Garland. They were married in March 1848, after the Mexican-American War. Although their marriage would last for over 40 years and produce 10 children,
Longstreet never mentioned Louise in his memoirs and most anecdotes about their relationship came to historians through the
writings of his second wife.[6]
Mexican-American War
Longstreet served with distinction in the Mexican War with the 8th U.S. Infantry. He received brevet promotions to captain for
Contreras and Churubusco and to major
for Molino del Rey. In the Battle of
Chapultepec on September 12, 1847, he was wounded in
the thigh while charging up the hill with his regimental colors; falling, he handed the flag to his friend, Lt. George E. Pickett, who was able to reach the summit.[7]
After the war and his recovery from the Chapultepec wound, Longstreet and his new wife served on frontier duty in Texas,
primarily at Fort Bliss. He performed scouting missions and also served as major and
paymaster for the 8th Infantry from July 1858.[8]
After the election of Abraham Lincoln, Longstreet decided that his allegiance
belonged to the South. He was not enthusiastic about secession from the Union, but he had learned from his
uncle Augustus about the doctrine of states' rights early in his life and had seen his
uncle's passion for it. Although he was born in South Carolina and raised in Georgia, he offered his services to the state of
Alabama, which had appointed him to West Point, and where his mother still lived. Furthermore, he was the senior West Point
graduate from that state, which implied a commensurate rank in the state's forces would be available. He resigned from the
U.S. Army in June 1861 to cast his lot with the Confederacy in the Civil War.[9]
Civil War
First Bull Run and the Peninsula
Longstreet arrived in Richmond, Virginia, with a commission as a lieutenant colonel in the Confederate States Army.
He met with Confederate President Jefferson Davis at the executive mansion on June 22, 1861, where he was informed that he had been appointed a brigadier
general with date of rank on June 17, a commission he accepted on June 25. He was ordered to report to Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard
at Manassas, where he was given command of a brigade of three Virginia regiments—the
1st, 11th, and 17th Virginia.[10]
Longstreet assembled his staff and trained his brigade incessantly. They saw their first action at Blackburn's Ford on July 18, resisting a Union Army reconnaissance in force that preceded the First Battle
of Bull Run. When the main attack came at the opposite end of the line on July 21, the
brigade played a relatively minor role, although it endured artillery fire for nine hours. Longstreet was infuriated that his
commanders would not allow a vigorous pursuit of the defeated Union Army. His trusted staff officer, Moxley Sorrel, recorded that he was "in a fine rage. He dashed his hat furiously to the ground, stamped,
and bitter words escaped him." He quoted Longstreet as saying, "Retreat! Hell, the Federal army has broken to pieces."[11] Longstreet was promoted to major general on October 7 and assumed command of a division in the
Confederate Army of the Potomac—four infantry brigades and
Hampton's Legion.[12]
Tragedy struck the Longstreet family in January 1862. A scarlet fever epidemic in
Richmond claimed the lives of his one-year-old daughter Mary Anne, his four-year-old son James, and six-year-old Augustus
("Gus"), all within a week. His 13-year-old son Garland almost succumbed. The losses were devastating for Longstreet and he
became withdrawn, both personally and socially. In 1861, his headquarters were noted for parties, drinking, and poker games.
After he returned from the funeral, the headquarters social life became more somber, he rarely drank, and he became a devout
Episcopalian.[13]
Longstreet turned in a mixed performance in the Peninsula Campaign that spring. He
executed well as a rear guard commander at Yorktown and Williamsburg, delaying the advance of Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's army toward Richmond. At the Battle of
Seven Pines, he marched his men in the wrong direction down the wrong road, causing congestion and confusion with other
Confederate units, diluting the effect of the massive Confederate counterattack against McClellan. His report unfairly blamed
fellow general Benjamin Huger for the mishaps.[14] General Joseph E. Johnston was
wounded during the battle and he was replaced in command of the Army of Northern
Virginia by Gen. Robert E. Lee.
During the Seven Days Battles that followed in late June, Longstreet had
operational command of nearly half of Lee's army—15 brigades—as it drove McClellan back down the Peninsula. Longstreet performed
aggressively and well in his new, larger command, particularly at Gaines' Mill
and Glendale. Lee's army in general suffered from weak performances by Longstreet's
peers, including, uncharacteristically, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, and
was unable to destroy the Union Army. Moxley Sorrel wrote of Longstreet's confidence and calmness in battle: "He was like a rock
in steadiness when sometimes in battle the world seemed flying to pieces." Gen. Lee said, "Longstreet was the staff in my right
hand." He had been established as Lee's principal lieutenant.[15]
Second Bull Run, Maryland, and Fredericksburg
The military reputations of Lee's corps commanders are often characterized as Stonewall Jackson representing the audacious,
offensive component of Lee's army, whereas Longstreet more typically advocated and executed defensive strategies and tactics.
Jackson has been described as the army's hammer, Longstreet its anvil.[16] In the Northern Virginia Campaign of August
1862, this stereotype did not hold true. Longstreet commanded the Right Wing (later to become known as the First Corps) and
Jackson commanded the Left Wing. Jackson started the campaign under Lee's orders with a sweeping flanking maneuver that placed
his corps into the rear of Union Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia, but he then
took up a defensive position and effectively invited Pope to assault him. On August 28 and
August 29, the start of the Second Battle of Bull
Run, Pope pounded Jackson as Longstreet and the remainder of the army marched north to reach the battlefield. Postwar
criticism of Longstreet claimed that he marched his men too slowly, leaving Jackson to bear the brunt of the fighting for two
days, but they covered roughly miles ( km) in a little over 24 hours and Gen. Lee did not attempt to get his army
concentrated any faster.[17]
When Longstreet's men arrived around midday on August 29, Lee ordered a flanking attack on
the Union Army, which was concentrating its attention on Jackson. Longstreet delayed for the rest of the afternoon, requesting
time for personal reconnaissance, and forcing a frustrated Lee to issue his order three times. By 6:30 p.m., the division of
Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood moved forward against the troops of the Union V Corps, but Longstreet withdrew them at 8:30 p.m. Once again, Longstreet was criticized for his
performance and the postbellum advocates of the Lost Cause claimed that
his slowness, reluctance to attack, and disobedience to Gen. Lee were a harbinger of his controversial performance to come on
July 2, 1863, at the Battle
of Gettysburg. Lee's biographer, Douglas Southall Freeman, wrote: "The seeds
of much of the disaster at Gettysburg were sown in that instant—when Lee yielded to Longstreet and Longstreet discovered that he
would."[18]
Despite this criticism, the following day, August 30, was one of Longstreet's finest
performances of the war. Pope came to believe that Jackson was starting to retreat and Longstreet took advantage of this by
launching a massive assault on the Union army's left flank with over 25,000 men. For over four hours, they "pounded like a giant
hammer"[19] with Longstreet actively directing artillery
fire and sending brigades into the fray. Longstreet and Lee were together during the assault and both of them came under Union
artillery fire. Although the Union troops put up a furious defense, Pope's army was forced to retreat in a manner similar to the
embarrassing Union defeat at First Bull Run, fought on roughly the same battleground. Longstreet gave all of the credit for the
victory to Lee, describing the campaign as "clever and brilliant." It established a strategic model he believed to be ideal—the
use of defensive tactics within a strategic offensive.[20]
Longstreet's reputation as a defensive general was cemented by his performance in the final two major battles of 1862. In the
Maryland Campaign of September, at the Battle of
Antietam, Longstreet held his part of the Confederate defensive line against Union forces twice as numerous. (He
coordinated his defense on the battlefield while wearing carpet slippers and riding sidesaddle, on account of a painful
boot-chafed heel.) At the end of that bloodiest day of the Civil War, Lee greeted his subordinate by saying, "Ah! Here is
Longstreet; here's my old war-horse!" On October 9, a few weeks after Antietam,
Longstreet was promoted to lieutenant general. Lee arranged for Longstreet's
promotion to be dated one day earlier than Jackson's, making the Old War-Horse the senior lieutenant general in the Confederate
Army. In an army reorganization in November, Longstreet's command, now designated the First Corps, consisted of five divisions,
approximately 41,000 men.[21]
In December, Longstreet's First Corps played the decisive role in the Battle of
Fredericksburg. There, Longstreet positioned his men behind a stone wall on Marye's Heights and held off fourteen assaults
by Union forces. About 10,000 Union soldiers fell; Longstreet lost only 500. His great defensive success was not based entirely
on the advantage of terrain, however. Remembering the slaughter at Antietam that had been magnified by a lack of defensive works,
Longstreet ordered trenches, abatis, and fieldworks to be constructed, which would set a
precedent for future defensive battles of the Army of Northern Virginia.[22]
Suffolk
In the early spring of 1863, Longstreet suggested to Lee that his corps be detached from the Army of Northern Virginia and
sent to reinforce the Army of Tennessee, where Gen. Braxton Bragg was being challenged in Middle Tennessee by Union
Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, Longstreet's roommate at West Point. It is possible
that Longstreet believed that an independent command in the West offered better opportunities for advancement than a corps under
Lee's shadow. Lee did detach two divisions from the First Corps, but ordered them to Richmond, not Tennessee. Seaborne movements
of the Union IX Corps potentially threatened vital ports on the mid-Atlantic coast. The
division of George Pickett started for the capital in mid-February, was followed by John Hood's, and then Longstreet himself was
ordered to take command of the detached divisions and the Departments of North Carolina and Southern Virginia.[23]
In April, Longstreet besieged Union forces in the city of Suffolk, Virginia, a
minor operation, but one that was very important to Lee's army, still stationed in war-devastated central Virginia. It enabled
Confederate authorities to collect huge amounts of provisions that had been under Union control. However, this operation caused
Longstreet and 15,000 men of the First Corps to be absent from the Battle of
Chancellorsville in May. Despite Lee's brilliant victory at Chancellorsville, Longstreet once again came under criticism,
claiming that he could have marched his men back from Suffolk in time to join Lee.[24]
Gettysburg
Campaign plans
Following Chancellorsville and the death of Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet and Lee
met in mid-May to discuss options for the army's summer campaign. Longstreet advocated, once again, detachment of all or part of
his corps to be sent to Tennessee. The justification for this course of action was becoming
more urgent as Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant was advancing on the critical
Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River, Vicksburg. Longstreet argued that a reinforced army under Bragg could defeat Rosecrans and drive
toward the Ohio River, which would compel Grant to break his hold on Vicksburg. Lee was
opposed to a division of his army, however, and instead advocated a large-scale offensive or raid into Pennsylvania.[25] In his memoirs,
Longstreet described his reaction to Lee's proposal:
| “ |
His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer suggestions
leading to a different course. All that I could ask was that the policy of the campaign should be one of defensive tactics; that
we should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position as we might find in our own country, so well adapted
to that purpose—which might assure us of a grand triumph. To this he readily assented as an important and material adjunct to his
general plan.[26] |
” |
This was written years after the campaign and is affected by hindsight, both of the results of the battle and of the
postbellum criticism of the Lost Cause authors. In letters of the time, Longstreet made no reference to such a bargain with Lee.
In April 1868, Lee said that he "had never made any such promise, and had never thought of doing any such thing." Yet in his
post-battle report, Lee wrote, "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless
attacked by the enemy."[27]
The Army of Northern Virginia was reorganized after Jackson's death. Two
division commanders, Richard S. Ewell and A.P.
Hill, were promoted to lieutenant general and assumed command of the Second and Third Corps, respectively. Longstreet's
First Corps gave up the division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson during the
reorganization, leaving him with the divisions of Lafayette McLaws, George Pickett, and John Hood.[28]
In the initial movements of the campaign, Longstreet's corps followed Ewell's through the Shenandoah Valley. A spy he had hired, Harrison, was
instrumental in warning the Confederates that the Union Army of the Potomac was
advancing north to meet them more quickly than they had anticipated, prompting Lee to order the immediate concentration of his
army near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.[29]
Battle of Gettysburg
Longstreet's actions at the Battle of Gettysburg would be the centerpiece of the
controversy that surrounded him for over a century. He arrived on the battlefield late in the afternoon of the first day,
July 1, 1863. By then, two Union corps had been driven by Ewell and
Hill back through the town into defensive positions on Cemetery Hill. Lee had not intended
to fight before his army was fully concentrated, but chance and questionable decisions by A.P. Hill brought on the battle, which
was an impressive Confederate victory on the first day. Meeting with Lee, Longstreet was concerned about the strength of the
Union defensive position and advocated a strategic movement around the left flank of the enemy, to "secure good ground between
him and his capital," which would presumably compel the Union commander, Maj. Gen. George G.
Meade, to attack defensive positions erected by the Confederates. Instead, Lee exclaimed, "If the enemy is there tomorrow,
we must attack him."[30]
Lee's plan for July 2 called for Longstreet to attack the Union's left flank, which would be
followed up by Hill's attack on Cemetery Ridge near the center, while Ewell demonstrated
on the Union right. Longstreet got off to a slow start, waiting for some of his brigades to arrive and forced to take a long
detour while approaching the enemy position. Postbellum criticism of Longstreet claims that he was ordered by Lee to attack in
the early morning and that his delays were a significant contributor to the loss of the battle.[31] However, Lee agreed to the delays for arriving troops and did not issue his
formal order for the attack until 11 a.m. Historians do agree that Longstreet did not aggressively pursue Lee's orders.[32] Once the assault began, around 4 p.m., Longstreet pressed
the assault by McLaws and Hood (Pickett's division had not yet arrived) competently against fierce Union resistance, but it was
largely unsuccessful, with significant casualties.[33]
On July 3, Lee ordered Longstreet to coordinate a massive assault on the center of the Union
line, employing the division of George Pickett and brigades from A.P. Hill's corps. Longstreet displayed great reluctance to
following this order, which he considered to have no chance of success. He claims to have told Lee:
| “ |
General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in
fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions, and armies, and should know, as well as any one, what soldiers can
do. It is my opinion that no fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle can take that position.[34] |
” |
During the artillery barrage that preceded the infantry assault, Longstreet attempted to pass the responsibility for launching
Pickett's division to his artillery chief, Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander. And
when the time came to actually order Pickett forward, Longstreet could only nod in assent, not verbalize the order. The assault,
known as Pickett's Charge, suffered the heavy casualties that Longstreet anticipated.
It was the decisive point in the Confederate loss at Gettysburg and Lee ordered a retreat back to Virginia the following
day.[35]
Criticism of Longstreet after the war was based not only on his reputed conduct at the Battle of Gettysburg, but also
intemperate remarks he made about Robert E. Lee and his strategies, such as:
| “ |
That he [Lee] was excited and off his balance was evident on the afternoon of the 1st,
and he labored under that oppression until enough blood was shed to appease him.[36] |
” |
Tennessee
In mid August 1863, Longstreet resumed his attempts to be transferred to the Western Theater. He wrote a private letter to
Secretary of War James Seddon,
requesting that he be transferred to serve under his old friend Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston. He followed this up in conversations with his congressional ally, Senator Louis
Wigfall, who had long considered Longstreet a suitable replacement for Braxton Bragg. Since Bragg's army was under
increasing pressure from Rosecrans outside of Chattanooga, Lee and President
Davis agreed to the request on September 5. In one of the most daunting logistical efforts
of the Confederacy, Longstreet, with the divisions of Lafayette McLaws and John Hood, a brigade from George Pickett's division,
and Porter Alexander's 26-gun artillery battalion, traveled over 16 railroads on a mile ( km) route through the
Carolinas to reach Bragg in northern Georgia. Although the entire operation would
take over three weeks, Longstreet and lead elements of his corps arrived on September
17.[37]
The First Corps veterans arrived in the early stages of the Battle of
Chickamauga. Bragg placed Longstreet in command of the Left Wing of his army, Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk the Right. On September 20, 1863, Longstreet organized an attack of eight brigades in a deep column against a narrow front. By chance, a
mistaken order from General Rosecrans caused a gap to appear in the Union line and Longstreet took advantage of it, but the
organization of the attack was well suited to the terrain and would have made a powerful impact on the Union line regardless. The
Union right collapsed and Bragg's army came close to destroying their enemy. As Rosecrans and a number of his units retreated
toward Chattanooga, it was only the stout defense of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas that
prevented a total rout. Bragg also neglected to pursue the retreating Federals aggressively. Nevertheless, Chickamauga was the
greatest Confederate victory in the Western Theater and Longstreet deserved a good portion of the credit.[38]
Longstreet soon clashed with the much maligned Bragg and became leader of a group of senior commanders of the army who
conspired to have him removed. Bragg's subordinates had long been dissatisfied with his leadership and abrasive personality; the
arrival of Longstreet, the senior lieutenant general in the army, proved to be a catalyst toward action. Longstreet wrote to
Seddon, "I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander." The
situation became so grave that President Davis was forced to intercede in person. What followed was one of the most bizarre
scenes of the war, with Bragg sitting red faced as a procession of his commanders condemned him. Longstreet stated that Bragg
"was incompetent to manage an army or put men into a fight" and that he "knew nothing of the business." Davis sided with Bragg
and did nothing to resolve the conflict.[39]
Bragg retained his position and retaliated against Longstreet by reducing his command to only those units that he brought with
him from Virginia. After participating in some minor battles that preceded the Battle of Chattanooga, Longstreet and his men were dispatched to East Tennessee to deal with
an advance by Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside. Longstreet was selected for this
assignment partially due to enmity on Bragg's part, but also because the War Department intended for Longstreet's men to return
to Lee's army and this movement was in the correct direction.[40]
Longstreet was criticized for the slow pace of his advance toward Knoxville in
November and some of his troops began using the nickname Slow Peter. Burnside evaded him at the Battle of Campbell's Station and settled into entrenchments around the city, which
Longstreet besieged unsuccessfully. The Battle of Fort Sanders failed to bring a
Confederate breakthrough. When Bragg was defeated by Grant at Chattanooga on November 25,
Longstreet was ordered to join forces with the Army of Tennessee in northern Georgia. He demurred and began to move back to
Virginia, soon pursued by Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in early December. The
armies went into winter quarters and the First Corps rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia in the spring. The only real effect
of the minor campaign was to deprive Bragg of troops he sorely needed in Chattanooga. Longstreet's second independent command
(after Suffolk) was a failure and his self-confidence was damaged. He reacted to the failure of the campaign by blaming others,
as he had done at Seven Pines. He relieved Lafayette McLaws from command and requested the court martial of Brig. Gens.
Jerome B. Robertson and Evander M. Law. He
also submitted a letter of resignation to Adjutant General Samuel Cooper on
December 30, 1863, but his request to be relieved was
denied.[41]
As his corps suffered through a severe winter in Eastern Tennessee with inadequate shelter and provisions, Longstreet again
developed strategic plans. He called for an offensive through Tennessee into Kentucky in which his command would be bolstered by
P.G.T. Beauregard and 20,000 men. Although he had the concurrence of Gen. Lee, Longstreet was unable to convince President Davis
or his newly appointed military adviser, Braxton Bragg.[42]
Wilderness to Appomattox
Battle of the Wilderness,
