Yalta Conference

In 1945, the “Big Three” of World War II—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston S. Churchill, and Josef Stalin—had not met since December 1943. Because of Allied landings in France and the Soviet thrust across Poland and into Germany, by the summer of 1944 a second meeting of the three men was deemed necessary. But arguments over the time and place of their meeting delayed the conference until 4–11 February 1945, when they met at Yalta in the Crimea because Stalin refused to leave the Soviet Union.

Each man traveled to Yalta for different reasons. Roosevelt came because of his desire to create a United Nations before World War II ended. Churchill feared the growing power of the Soviet Union in a devastated Europe. Stalin was intent on protecting the Soviet Union against another German invasion. The major problems facing the three leaders included Poland, Germany, Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and the United Nations.

At Yalta, Roosevelt attained his goal in an agreement for a conference on the United Nations to convene in San Francisco, 25 April 1945. In addition, Stalin accepted the American proposal on the use of the veto in the Security Council and the number of Soviet states represented in the General Assembly.

Much time was spent on Poland because Stalin insisted on a “friendly” Poland. The three men agreed to move the Polish eastern boundary westward to the 1919 Curzon Line and to restore western Byelorussia and the western Ukraine to the Soviet Union. At Stalin's insistence, a Communist Polish provisional government would be reorganized to include primarily Polish leaders from within Poland, but he agreed to some from abroad to placate Roosevelt. Stalin promised free elections there within a month on the basis of universal suffrage and the secret ballot.

Stalin demanded $20 billion in reparations from Germany, half of this sum to be destined for the Soviet Union. Churchill rejected this amount while Roosevelt accepted the sum as a basis for future discussion. Germany would be temporarily divided into three zones of occupation, with France invited to become a fourth occupying power.

Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan after the fighting ended in Europe. Stalin's terms for this were accepted: the southern Sakhalin and adjacent islands to be returned to the Soviet Union; Darien to be internationalized; Port Arthur to be leased as a naval base to the Soviet Union; Chinese‐Soviet companies to operate the Chinese‐Eastern and the South Manchurian railroads; Outer Mongolia to remain independent of China; and the Kurile Islands to be handed over to the Soviet Union. China would be sovereign in Manchuria.

In a Declaration on Liberated Europe, proposed by Roosevelt, the three governments pledged jointly to assist liberated people in forming temporary governments representing all democratic elements and pledged to free, early elections. When the three governments thought action necessary, they would consult together on measures to fulfill their responsibilities. There could be no action without the agreement of all three governments.

Roosevelt probably hoped that in the United States, the Declaration would project an acceptable image of the Yalta Conference as the protector of the rights of liberated peoples. It could also be a standard against which Stalin's policies in Eastern Europe could be judged. However, when put to the test, Declaration proved ineffective. After the Yalta Conference, the Western powers accepted a Polish government in which two‐thirds of the members were Communists. When elections finally came in 1947, they were not democratic.

In the Far East, Soviet armies went to war against Japan two days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The Soviet entry into the war accelerated the Japanese surrender. However, in February 1945, American military planners had expected the war against Japan to drag on into 1946 or even 1947.

As the Cold War heated up, anti‐Communist American critics, particularly in the Republican Party, condemned Yalta as a symbol of appeasement and a diplomatic defeat for the United States. Poland and Eastern Europe had been betrayed. The United States should avoid negotiating with the Soviet Union. Some critics later insisted that China had gone Communist because of the Yalta Conference. The severest claimed that Roosevelt was either too sick to deal with Stalin or was duped by him.

The reality of Yalta was that the location of armies determined the final outcome. Soviet armed forces decided the politics of Eastern Europe; Allied forces influenced politics in Western Europe. China became Communist because the armies of Chiang Kaishek were defeated, not because Roosevelt had abandoned Chiang.

Yalta was an attempt to transform a temporary wartime coalition into a permanent agency for peace. Roosevelt apparently hoped to modify Stalin's behavior through the United Nations and postwar U.S. policies. Agreements had been negotiated while war was in progress when unity was vital. After the enemies were vanquished, however, the victors quarreled and their fundamental disagreements emerged.

[See also Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Bombings of; World War II: Postwar Impact; World War II: Changing Interpretations.]

Bibliography

• Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians. The Yalta Conference, ed. Walter Johnson, 1949.
• Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Conference at Malta and Yalta, 1955.
• John L. Snell, ed., The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power, 1955.
• Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta, 1970.
• Athan G. Theoharis, The Yalta Myth: An Issue in American Politics, 1945–1955, 1970.
• Richard F. Fenno, Jr., ed., The Yalta Conference, 1972.
• Russell D. Buhite, Decision at Yalta. An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy, 1986

A World War II peace conference held on February 4-11, 1945, at Yalta in the Crimea, between President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet premier Josef Stalin. Issues they discussed included the occupation of Germany, the establishment of a government and borders in Poland, Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and voting procedures for the United Nations. In the aftermath of the war, the agreements reached by the leaders proved largely unsuccessful.

See the Introduction, Abbreviations and Pronunciation for further details.

For more information on Yalta Conference, visit Britannica.com.

Yalta conference, 4- 11 February 1945. Churchill was increasingly fearful of the rising power of the USSR, but agreed that she was entitled to a buffer zone in eastern Europe. He agitated for some western influence in the reorganization of the Polish government and strove to promote free elections in the east. He also ensured that France was given an occupation zone in Germany, but was less successful in resisting Stalin's demands for huge reparations. After Yalta Churchill briefly seemed hopeful concerning the future.

In early February 1945, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Marshal Joseph Stalin met in the Black Sea port city of Yalta to discuss the postwar administration of Europe. At the time of the conference, Allied forces had pushed Nazi Germany to the brink of collapse, and all sides recognized that the end of World War II was imminent. Roosevelt hoped to use the conference not only as a planning meeting for the postwar period but also as a forum to establish a warmer personal relationship with Stalin. Although weakened by a deteriorating heart condition that took his life two months later, Roosevelt believed he could use his charm and skills of persuasion to win Stalin's confidence in American goodwill, thereby ensuring a peaceful postwar world order.

Despite Roosevelt's efforts, however, Stalin drove a hard bargain at Yalta. Roosevelt's physical weakness as a dying man and Churchill's political weakness as head of a dying empire left Stalin in the strongest bargaining position of the three. The fact that Soviet forces had numerical superiority over their American and British allies on the continent of Europe further strengthened Stalin's hand. After a week of negotations, the three leaders announced agreement on (1) the occupation of Germany by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France in four separate zones; (2) a conference of the signatories of the United Nations Declaration to open at San Francisco on 25 April 1945, for the purpose of establishing a world peace organization; (3) a (then-secret) large-power voting formula in the new organization; (4) an eastern boundary of Poland mainly following the Curzon Line (which gave the Soviet Union about one-third of prewar Poland), for which Poland was to be compensated by unspecified German territory in the north and west, and a new, freely elected, democratic Polish government; and (5) freely elected democratic governments for other liberated European nations. A supplementary secret agreement provided for Soviet entry into the war with Japan in two or three months after Germany surrendered, and, in return, British and American acceptance of (1) the status quo of Outer Mongolia; (2) restoration to the Soviet Union of its position in Manchuria before the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), with safeguarding of Soviet interests in Dairen, Port Arthur, and the Manchurian railways; and (3) the cession to the Soviet Union of the Kurile Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin Island.

Contrary to Roosevelt's hopes, the conference failed to establish a spirit of trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the months and years following Germany's capitulation in May 1945, relations between Moscow and Washington steadily deteriorated, and a Cold War developed between the two rival superpowers. The Yalta conference became a major point of friction, as Americans charged the Soviets with systematically violating the Yalta agreements. Although at Yalta Stalin had agreed to support freely elected democratic governments in the liberated territories, he broke his pledges and brutally suppressed incipient democratic movements across Eastern Europe. The establishment of pro-Soviet puppet regimes in Eastern Europe led Churchill in a 1946 speech to accuse Moscow of having divided the continent with an Iron Curtain. In the United States, Republican critics accused the Roosevelt administration of having cravenly capitulated to Stalin's demands at Yalta. The controversy over Roosevelt's diplomacy at Yalta later became a major part of Senator Joe McCarthy's crusade of Anticommunism in the early 1950s. The Republicans' accusation that Democratic administrations were "soft" on communism remained a significant feature of American presidential campaigns until the end of the Cold War.

Bibliography

Clemens, Diane Shaver. Yalta. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Divine, Robert A. Roosevelt and World War II. New York: Atheneum, 1967.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

The Yalta Conference was the second wartime summit meeting between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Josef Stalin. It met from February 4 through February 11, 1945, in the Crimean city of Yalta. A mood of optimism prevailed at the conference because German armies were in retreat throughout Europe and victory was assured. The principal agenda item was Germany. Although there were sharp policy differences between the three parties, the Yalta Conference reached agreement on most issues, and the Big Three came away convinced that allied unity had been preserved.

Germany, it was agreed, would be divided into three zones of occupation (a fourth zone was carved out of the British and American zones for France). Occupation policy would be made by a Four Power Allied Control Commission to be located in Berlin. Reparations were to be extracted from Germany, with the details to be determined by an Allied Reparations Commission in Moscow. Nazism and German militarism were to be extinguished, and war criminals were to be justly and swiftly punished.

Poland proved to be an intractable problem. Churchill and Roosevelt sought unsuccessfully to persuade Stalin to recognize the London-based government in exile, but he continued to support the government installed by the Soviet Union in Lublin. At most, the Western leaders secured from Stalin a commitment to free and unfettered elections as soon as possible. No decisions were reached regarding

Poland's postwar boundaries, although it was understood that the eastern boundary would be the Curzon line. As to the liberated countries in Eastern Europe, the conferees pledged in a Declaration on Liberated Europe to respect "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."

A secret protocol stipulated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan within three months after Germany's surrender. As compensation, Russia's losses to Japan resulting from the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and 1905 would be restored. These included southern Sakhalin, adjacent islands, and the Kuril Islands. The Soviet Union also received the lease of Port Arthur, internationalization of the port of Dairen, and partial control over the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads as concessions.

Regarding the United Nations, it was agreed that a United Nations conference would be held in the United States on April 25, 1945. The United States and Britain agreed to accept Ukraine and Belorussia as original members, thus giving the Soviet Union three votes in the General Assembly. Also, important provisions related to the voting rules of the Security Council were formulated, including a provision for the veto power of the five permanent members.

Because Stalin ultimately succeeded in imposing communist regimes on the peoples of Eastern Europe, some critics have accused Roosevelt of "selling out" Eastern Europe. However, the consensus of scholarly opinion is that the superior military position of the Red Army at the end of the war virtually guaranteed Soviet predominance, regardless of the decisions made at Yalta.

Bibliography

Buhite, Russell D. (1986). Decisions at Yalta: An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources.

Clemens, Diane Shaver. (1970). Yalta. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mastny, Vojtech. (1979). Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Snell, John L. (1956). The Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

—JOSEPH L. NOGEE

A World War II accord made in 1945 between Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

British prime minister Winston Churchill, U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet premier Joseph Stalin met from February 4 to 11, 1945, at Yalta, in the Crimea. The conference, the last attended by all three of these leaders, produced an agreement concerning the prosecution of the war against Japan, the occupation of Germany, the structure of the United Nations, and the postwar fate of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. The Yalta agreement proved to be controversial, as many in the United States criticized Roosevelt for abandoning Eastern Europe to the Communists.

Roosevelt came to Yalta seeking early Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Fearing that Japan would not surrender easily, Roosevelt promised Stalin the return of territories lost following the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Stalin agreed to declare war on Japan, but only ninety days after the surrender of Germany. With the surrender of Japan in August 1945, which followed the dropping of nuclear bombs by the United States on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union obtained the promised territories after expending minimal military effort.

Roosevelt also sought Stalin's approval of the U.N. Charter, which had already been drafted. Stalin had previously insisted that each of the sixteen Soviet republics be represented and that the permanent members of the Security Council retain a permanent veto on all issues, not just those involving sanctions or threats to peace. Roosevelt and Churchill objected to this proposal, and at Yalta, Stalin agreed to three seats for the Soviet Union in the General Assembly and a limited veto.

The postwar status of Germany was also settled at Yalta. Germany was to be divided into four zones of occupation by the three countries and France, as was the city of Berlin. Germany was to have its industrial base rebuilt but its armaments industries were to be abolished or confiscated. The leaders also approved the creation of an international court to try German leaders as war criminals, setting the stage for the Nuremberg trials.

The most troublesome issue was the fate of the Eastern European countries that Germany had conquered during the war. The Soviet army occupied most of the territory, making it difficult for Churchill and Roosevelt to bargain with Stalin on this point. It was agreed that interim governments in these countries would give way to democratically elected regimes as soon as practicable. On Poland, Churchill and Roosevelt abandoned the London-based Polish government-in-exile, agreeing that members of this group must work with the Soviet-dominated group with headquarters in Lublin, Poland.

In the aftermath of World War II the results envisioned in the Yalta agreement on Eastern Europe proved illusory. Communist regimes were established by the Soviet Union, accompanied by the destruction of democratic political groups. The legacy of Yalta continued until the collapse of Communism and the emergence of democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

An agreement reached near the end of World War II between President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United States, Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Britain, and Premier Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union. The three met in Yalta, in the southern Soviet Union, in February 1945, and discussed issues such as the occupation of Germany, free elections in the liberated countries of eastern Europe, the postwar boundaries of Poland and Russia, and a common strategy against Japan. Stalin aided the United States against Japan, as he had promised; but he expanded Soviet influence rapidly into eastern Europe after the war, and the elections he agreed to were never held.

The "Big Three" at the Yalta Conference, Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin. Also present are Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, RN, Marshal of the RAF Sir Charles Portal, RAF (both standing behind Churchill); and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, USN, (standing behind Roosevelt).

The Yalta Conference, sometimes called the Crimea Conference and codenamed the Argonaut Conference, was the wartime meeting from 4 February 1945 to 11 February 1945 among the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union—President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Josef Stalin, respectively—for the purpose of discussing Europe's postwar reorganization. Mainly, it was intended to discuss the re-establishment of the nations of war-torn Europe.

The conference convened in the Livadia Palace near Yalta, the Crimea. It was the second of three wartime conferences among the Big Three (Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin) . It had been preceded by the Tehran Conference in 1943, and it was followed by the Potsdam Conference, which Harry S Truman attended in place of the late Roosevelt.

Contents 1 The conference 1.1 Major points 1.2 Section of the Report Addressing Democratic Elections 2 Aftermath 2.1 Poland and the Eastern Bloc 2.2 Potsdam and the atomic bomb 3 See also 4 Notes 5 References 6 Further reading 7 External links

The conference

v • d • e Territorial changes of Germany in the 20th Century   Post World War I Treaty of Versailles (1919) Silesian Uprisings (1918-1919) Polish Corridor Return of the Saar region (1935) Remilitarization of the Rhineland (1936) Anschluss with Austria (1938) Munich Agreement (1938) Treaty of the Cession of the Memel Territory to Germany (1939) Seizure of Czechoslovakia (1939)   World War II Großdeutschland Polish areas annexed by Nazi Germany Tehran Conference (1943) Yalta Conference (1945)   Post World War II Potsdam Conference (1945) Treaty of Zgorzelec (1950) Treaty of Warsaw (1970) Two Plus Four Treaty (1990) German-Polish Border Treaty (1990) Oder-Neisse line (current eastern border)   Areas Former eastern territories of Germany   Adjacent Countries Territorial changes of Poland Territorial changes of the Baltic states

v • d • e Territorial changes of Poland in the 20th Century   Post World War I Greater Poland Uprising (1918–1919) Treaty of Versailles (1919) Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1919) Suwałki Agreement (1920) Treaty of Riga (1921) Silesian uprisings Polish Corridor   World War II Polish areas annexed by Nazi Germany Polish areas annexed by USSR Wartime administrative division Tehran Conference (1943) Yalta Conference (1945)   Post World War II Potsdam Conference (1945) Treaty of Zgorzelec (1950) Polish-Soviet border adjustment Treaty (1951) Treaty of Warsaw (1970) Two Plus Four Treaty (1990) German-Polish Border Treaty (1990)   Areas Kresy Wschodnie ("Eastern Borderlands") Kresy Zachodnie ("Western Borderlands") Recovered Territories Former eastern territories of Germany Zaolzie   Demarcation Lines Curzon Line (1920) Oder-Neisse line (1950–1990)   Adjacent Countries Territorial changes of Germany Territorial changes of the Baltic states

All three leaders were trying to establish an agenda for governing post-war Germany. Churchill's Soviet policy differed vastly from that of Roosevelt, with the former believing Stalin to be a "devil"-like tyrant leading a vile system.^[1] In 1942, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union William Christian Bullitt, Jr.'s thesis prophesied the "flow of the Red amoeba into Europe". Roosevelt responded to Bullitt, Jr. with a statement summarizing his rationale for war time relations with Stalin:^[2]

“	I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of a man. . . . I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.	”
—Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1943

On the Eastern Front, the Front Line at the end of December 1943 remained in the Soviet Union, but by August 1944 Soviet forces were inside Poland and parts of Romania in their relentless drive West.^[3] By the time of the Conference, Red Army Marshal Georgy Zhukov's forces were 65 km from Berlin. Stalin's position at the conference was one which he felt was so strong that he could dictate terms. As U.S. delegation member and future Secretary of State James F. Byrnes commented, "[i]t was not a question of what we [the West] would let the Russians do, but what we could get the Russians to do."^[4] Moreover, Roosevelt had hoped for Stalin's commitment to participate in the United Nations.

Premier Stalin, insisting that his doctors opposed any long trips, rejected Roosevelt's suggestion to meet on the Mediterranean.^[5] He offered, instead, to meet at the Black Sea resort of Yalta, in the Crimea. Each leader had an agenda for the Yalta Conference: Roosevelt asked for Soviet support in the U.S. Pacific War against Japan, specifically invading Japan; Churchill pressed for free elections and democratic governments in Eastern and Central Europe (specifically Poland); and Stalin demanded a Soviet sphere of political influence in Eastern and Central Europe, an essential to the USSR's national security strategy.

Poland was the first item on the Soviet agenda. Stalin stated that "[f]or the Soviet government, the question of Poland was one of honor" and security because Poland had served as a historical corridor for forces attempting to invade Russia.^[6] In addition, Stalin stated regarding history that "because the Russians had greatly sinned against Poland", "the Soviet government was trying to atone for those sins."^[6] Stalin concluded that "Poland must be strong" and that "the Soviet Union is interested in the creation of a mighty, free and independent Poland." Accordingly, Stalin stipulated that Polish government-in-exile demands were not negotiable: the Soviet Union would keep the territory of eastern Poland they had already annexed in 1939, and Poland was to be compensated for that by extending its Western borders at the expense of Germany. Comporting with his prior statement, Stalin promised free elections in Poland despite the Communist puppet government recently installed by him in Polish territories occupied by the Red Army.

Roosevelt wanted the USSR to enter the Pacific War with the Allies. One Soviet precondition for a declaration of war against Japan was an American recognition of Mongolian independence from China, and a recognition of Soviet interests in the Manchurian railways and Port Arthur; these were agreed without Chinese representation or consent. Stalin agreed that the Soviet Union would enter the Pacific War three months after the defeat of Germany.

A Big Three meeting room.

Roosevelt met Stalin's price, hoping the USSR could be dealt with via the United Nations. Later, many Americans^[who?] considered the agreements of the Yalta Conference were a "sellout", encouraging Soviet expansion of influence to Japan and Asia, and because Stalin eventually violated the agreements in forming the Soviet bloc. Furthermore the Soviets had agreed to join the United Nations, given the secret understanding of a voting formula with a veto power for permanent members of the Security Council, thus ensuring that each country could block unwanted decisions.

At the time the Red Army had occupied and held much of Eastern Europe with military three times greater than Allied forces in the West. The Declaration of Liberated Europe did little to dispel the sphere of influence agreements that had been incorporated into armistice agreements.

The Big Three ratified previous agreements about the post-war occupation zones for Germany: three zones of occupation, one for each of the three principal Allies: The Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States (France later received one also, when the USA and the UK ceded parts of their zones). Berlin itself, although in the Russian zone would also be divided into three sectors (and eventually became a Cold War symbol because of the division's realization via the Berlin Wall, built and manned by the Soviet-backed East German government).

Also, the Big Three agreed that all original governments would be restored to the invaded countries (with the exception of the French government, which was regarded as collaborationist; in Romania and Bulgaria, where the Soviets had already liquidated most of the governments; the Polish government-in-exile was also excluded by Stalin) and that all civilians would be repatriated.

Major points

A more casual picture of the Big Three at Yalta.

Military situation at the end of the conference.

Key points of the meeting are as follows:

• There was an agreement that the priority would be the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany. After the war Germany would be split into four occupied zones.
• Stalin agreed that France might have a fourth occupation zone in Germany and Austria but it would have to be formed out of the American and British zones.
• Germany would undergo demilitarization and denazification.
• German reparations were partly to be in the form of forced labor. (see also Forced labor of Germans in the Soviet Union). The forced labor was to be used to repair damage Germany inflicted on its victims.^{[citation needed]}
• Creation of a reparation council which would be located in Russia.
• The status of Poland was discussed. It was agreed to reorganize the communist Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland that had been installed by the Soviet Union "on a broader democratic basis."
• The Polish eastern border would follow the Curzon Line, and Poland would receive territorial compensation in the West from Germany.
• Churchill alone pushed for free elections in Poland.^[7] The British leader pointed out that UK "could never be content with any solution that did not leave Poland a free and independent state". Stalin pledged to permit free elections in Poland, but eventually never honored his promise.
• Citizens of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia were to be handed over to their respective countries, regardless of their consent.
• Roosevelt obtained a commitment by Stalin to participate in the United Nations.
• Stalin requested that all of the 16 Soviet Socialist Republics would be granted United Nations membership. This was taken into consideration, but 14 republics were denied.
• Stalin agreed to enter the fight against the Empire of Japan within 90 days after the defeat of Germany.
• Nazi war criminals were to be hunted down and brought to justice.
• A "Committee on Dismemberment of Germany" was to be set up. The purpose was to decide whether Germany was to be divided into several nations, some examples of partition plans are shown below:

The eventual partition of Germany into Allied Occupation Zones:      British zone      French zone (two exclaves) and from 1947 the Saar protectorate      American zone      Soviet zone, later the DDR      Annexed territory

Partition plan from Winston Churchill:      North German state      South German state, including modern Austria and Hungary      West German state

Partition plan from Franklin D. Roosevelt:      Hanover      Prussia      Hesse      Saxony      Bavaria      International zone (two exclaves)      Allied-administered Austria

Morgenthau Plan:      North German state      South German state      International zone      Territory lost from Germany (Saarland to France, Upper Silesia to Poland, East Prussia partitioned between Poland and the USSR)

Section of the Report Addressing Democratic Elections

The Big Three further agreed that democracies would be established, all liberated European and former Axis satellite countries would hold free elections and that order would be restored.^[8] In that regard, they promised to rebuild occupied countries by processes that will allow them "to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter -- the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live".^[8] The report that resulted stated that the three would assist occupied countries to form interim government that "pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of the Governments responsive to the will of the people" and to "facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections."^[8]

The Declaration contained no mechanisms for the enforcement of its principles. The agreement called on signatories to “consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.” During the Yalta discussions, Molotov inserted language that weakened the implication of enforcement of the declaration.^[9]

Regarding Poland, the Yalta report further stated that the provisional government should "be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot."^[8] The agreement could not conceal the importance of acceding to pro-Soviet short-term Lublin government control and of eliminating language calling for supervised elections.^[9]

According to President Roosevelt, “if we attempt to evade the fact that we placed somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups from which the new government is to be drawn I feel we will expose ourselves to the charges that we are attempting to go back on the Crimea decision." Roosevelt conceded that the language of Yalta was so vague that the Soviets would be able to “stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without every technically breaking it.”American government officials such as Harry Hopkins conceded that the Soviet position on the predominance of the Lublin Poles in any provisional government comported with the compromises worked out at Yalta. Scholars believe that the recognition of the Lublin Government by the Western powers meant acceptance of predominant Soviet influence in postwar Poland.

The final agreement stipulated that “the Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland and from Poles abroad.”^[8] The language of Yalta conceded predominance of the pro-Soviet Lublin Government in a provisional government, albeit a reorganized one.^[9]

Aftermath

Poland and the Eastern Bloc

Further information: History of Poland (1939–1945) and Eastern Bloc

Although suspicious of Stalin, even Churchill believed that, because of Stalin's strong promises and admission of guilt over Poland, that Stalin might keep his word regarding Poland, remarking "Poor Neville Chamberlain believed he could trust Hitler. He was wrong. But I don't think I'm wrong about Stalin."^[10]

At the time, over 200,000 troops of the Polish Armed Forces in the West were serving under the high command of the British Army. Many of these men and women were originally from the Kresy region of eastern Poland including cities such as Lwow and Wilno. They had been deported from Kresy to the Russian Gulags when Hitler and Stalin occupied Poland in 1939 in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. When two years later Churchill and Stalin formed an alliance against Hitler, the Kresy Poles were released from the Gulags in Siberia, formed the Anders Army and marched to Persia to create the II Corps (Poland) under British high command.

These Polish troops were instrumental to the Allied defeat of the Germans in North Africa and Italy, and hoped to return to their homes in Kresy in an independent and democratic Poland at the end of the War. But at Yalta, Churchill agreed that Stalin should keep the Soviet gains Hitler agreed to in the Nazi-Soviet Pact, including Kresy, and carry out Polish population transfers (1944–1946). Consequently, Churchill had agreed that tens of thousands of veteran Polish troops under British command should lose their Kresy homes to the Soviet Union.^[11] In reaction, thirty officers and men from the II Corps (Poland) committed suicide.^[12]

Churchill defended his actions at Yalta in a three-day Parliamentary debate starting 27 February 1945, which ended in a vote of confidence. During the debate, many MPs openly criticised Churchill and passionately voiced loyalty to Britain's Polish allies and expressed deep reservations about Yalta.^[12] Moreover, 25 of these MPs risked their careers to draft an amendment protesting against Britain's tacit acceptance of Poland's domination by the Soviet Union. These members included: Arthur Greenwood; Sir Archibald Southby, 1st Baronet; Sir Alec Douglas-Home; James Heathcote-Drummond-Willoughby, 3rd Earl of Ancaster and Victor Raikes.^[12] After the failure of the amendment, Henry Strauss, 1st Baron Conesford, the Member of Parliament for Norwich, resigned his seat in protest at the British treatment of Poland.^[12]

When the Second World War ended, a Communist government was installed in Poland. Most Poles felt betrayed by their wartime allies. Many Polish soldiers refused to return to Poland, because of the Soviet repressions of Polish citizens (1939–1946), the Trial of the Sixteen and other executions of pro-democracy Poles, particularly the former members of the AK (Armia Krajowa). The result was the Polish Resettlement Act 1947, Britain's first mass immigration law.

The Western Powers soon realized that Stalin would not honor his free elections promise regarding Poland. After receiving considerable criticism in London following Yalta regarding the atrocities committed in Poland by Soviet troops, Churchill wrote Roosevelt a desperate letter referencing the wholesale deportations and liquidations of opposition Poles by the Soviets.^[13] Roosevelt, however, maintained his confidence in Stalin, reasoning that Stalin's early priesthood training had "entered into his nature of the way in which a Christian gentleman should behave."^[13] On March 1, Roosevelt assured Congress that "I come from the Crimea with a firm belief that we have made a start on the road to a world of peace."^[13] By March 21, Roosevelt's Ambassador to the USSR Averell Harriman cabled Roosevelt that "we must come clearly to realize that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know it."^[14] Two days later, Roosevelt began to admit that his view of Stalin had been excessively optimistic and that "Averell is right."^[14]

Four days later, on March 27, the Soviet NKVD arrested 16 Polish opposition political leaders that had been invited to participate in provisional government negotiations.^[14] The arrests were part of a trick employed by the NKVD, which flew the leaders to Moscow for a later show trial followed by sentencing to a gulag.^[14][15] Churchill thereafter argued to Roosevelt that it was "as plain as a pike staff" that Moscow's tactics were to drag out the period for holding free elections "while the Lublin Committee consolidate their power."^[14] The fraudulent Polish elections, held in January 16, 1947 resulted in Poland's official transformation to undemocratic communist state by 1949.

Following Yalta, in Moscow, when Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov expressed worry that the Yalta Agreement's wording might impede Stalin's plans, Stalin responded "Never mind. We'll do it our own way later."^[10] While the Soviet Union had already annexed several occupied countries as (or into) Soviet Socialist Republics,^[16][17][18] other countries in eastern Europe that it occupied were converted into Soviet-controlled satellite states, such as the People's Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Hungary^[19], the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic^[20], the People's Republic of Romania, the People's Republic of Albania,^[21] and later East Germany from the Soviet zone of German occupation.^[22] Eventually the United States and the United Kingdom made concessions in recognizing the then Communist-dominated regions, sacrificing the substance of the Yalta Declaration, while it remained in form.^[23]

Potsdam and the atomic bomb

Further information: Potsdam Conference and Potsdam Agreement

The Potsdam Conference was held from July to August 1945, which included the participation of Clement Attlee, who had replaced Churchill as Prime Minister.^[24][25] At Potsdam, the Soviets denied claims that they were interfering in the affairs of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.^[23] The conference resulted in (1) the Potsdam Declaration regarding the surrender of Japan^[26], and (2) the Potsdam Agreement regarding the Soviet annexation of former Polish territory east of the Curzon Line, and, provisions, to be addressed in an eventual Final Treaty ending World War 2, for the annexation of parts of Germany east of the Oder-Neisse line into Poland, and northern East Prussia into the Soviet Union.

Four months after the death of Roosevelt, President Truman ordered the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, which was 88 days after the Soviet Union had agreed to enter the Pacific War within 90 days.

See also

• Eastern Bloc
• Iron Curtain
• List of World War II conferences
• Operation Keelhaul
• Percentages agreement
• Western Betrayal
• Plan Totality
• World War II Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis and the West

Notes

1. ^ Miscamble 2007, p. 51
2. ^ Miscamble 2007, p. 52
3. ^ Traktuyev, Michael Ivanovich, The Red Army's Drive into Poland in Purnell's History of the Second World War, editor Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Hatfield, UK, 1981, vol.18, p.1920-1929
4. ^ Black et al. 2000, p. 61
5. ^ Stephen C. Schlesinger, "Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations," (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003). ISBN 0813333245
6. ^ ^{a b} Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 285
7. ^ http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=714
8. ^ ^{a b c d e} February 11, 1945 PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS OF CRIMEA CONFERENCE, reprinted in Grenville, John Ashley Soames and Bernard Wasserstein, The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts, Taylor & Francis, 2001 ISBN 041523798X, pages 267-277
9. ^ ^{a b c} Melvyn P. Leffler, Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War, International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Summer, 1986), pp. 88-123
10. ^ ^{a b} Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 289
11. ^ http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/about/index.html
12. ^ ^{a b c d} pp.374-383 Olson and Cloud 2003
13. ^ ^{a b c} Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 290-94
14. ^ ^{a b c d e} Berthon & Potts 2007, p. 296-97
15. ^ Wettig 2008, p. 47-8
16. ^ Senn, Alfred Erich, Lithuania 1940 : revolution from above, Amsterdam, New York, Rodopi, 2007 ISBN 9789042022256
17. ^ Roberts 2006, p. 43
18. ^ Wettig 2008, p. 20-1
19. ^ Granville, Johanna, The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956, Texas A&M University Press, 2004. ISBN 1-58544-298-4
20. ^ Grenville 2005, p. 370-71
21. ^ Cook 2001, p. 17
22. ^ Wettig 2008, p. 96-100
23. ^ ^{a b} Black et al. 2000, p. 63
24. ^ Roberts 2006, p. 274-5
25. ^ Clement Richard Attlee, Archontology.org
26. ^ Potsdam Declaration

References

• Berthon, Simon & Joanna Potts (2007), Warlords: An Extraordinary Re-creation of World War II Through the Eyes and Minds of Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, Da Capo Press, ISBN 0306815389
• Black, Cyril E.; Robert D. English & Jonathan E. Helmreich et al. (2000), Rebirth: A Political History of Europe since World War II, Westview Press, ISBN 0813336643
• Grenville, John Ashley Soames (2005), A History of the World from the 20th to the 21st Century, Routledge, ISBN 0415289548
• Miscamble, Wilson D. (2007), From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521862442
• Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, ISBN 0300112041
• Wettig, Gerhard (2008), Stalin and the Cold War in Europe, Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0742555429

Further reading

1. O’Neil, William L. World War II: a Student Companion. New York: Oxford UP, 1999.
2. Persico, Josef E. Roosevelt’s Secret War. New York: Random House, 2001.
3. “Portraits of Presidents: Franklin D. Roosevelt.” School Arts Magazine February 1999: 37. Student Research Center. EBSCO Host. Philadelphia. 2 Apr. 2006. Keyword: FDR.
4. Snyder, Louis L. World War II. New York: Grolier Company, 1981.
5. Sulzberger, C L. American Heritage New History of World War II. Ed. Stephen E. Ambrose. New York: Viking Penguin, 1998.
6. Waring, J. G. A student's experience of Yalta
7. “Yalta Conference.” Funk and Wagnalls New Encyclopedia. World Almanac Education Group, 2003. SIRS DISCOVER. Philadelphia. 2 April 2006. Keyword: Yalta Conference.

External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Yalta conference

• Foreign relations of the United States. Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945
• Protocol of proceedings of Crimea Conference
• MilitaryHistoryOnline Yalta Conference
• How good was the Good War?
• The Division of Europe Online Documents Collection
• Special German series 2. The Committee on Dismemberment of Germany Allied discussions on the dismemberment of Germany into separate states, March 29, 1945. The committee was ordained at Yalta.
• Yalta casts its shadow 60 years on, BBC, February 7, 2005

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