| Battle of Chancellorsville |
| Part of the American Civil War |
Battle of Chancellorsville by Kurz and Allison |
|
|
| Combatants |
| United States of America |
Confederate States of
America |
| Commanders |
| Joseph Hooker |
Robert E. Lee
Stonewall Jackson† |
| Strength |
| 133,868 |
60,892 |
| Casualties |
| 17,197 (1,606 killed, 9,672 wounded, 5,919 missing)[1] |
12,764 (1,665 killed, 9,081 wounded, 2,018 missing)[1] |
The Battle of Chancellorsville was a major battle of the American Civil
War, fought near the village of Spotsylvania Courthouse,
Virginia, from April 30 to May 6 1863. Called Gen. Robert E.
Lee's "perfect battle"[2] because of his risky but
successful division of his army in the presence of a much larger enemy force, the battle pitted Union Army Maj. Gen. Joseph
Hooker's Army of the Potomac against an army half its size, Lee's
Confederate Army of Northern
Virginia. Lee's audacity and Hooker's timid performance in combat combined to result in a significant Union defeat. The
Confederate victory was tempered by the mortal wounding of Lt. Gen.
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson to friendly fire,
a loss that Lee likened to "losing my right arm."
The Chancellorsville campaign began with the crossing of the Rappahannock River by
the Union army on the morning of April 27 1863. Heavy fighting
began on May 1 and did not end until the Union forces retreated across the river on the night of
May 5 to May 6.
Forces and plans
The Chancellorsville campaign began with the potential of leading to one of the most lopsided clashes in the war. The Union
army brought an effective fighting force of 133,868 men onto the field at the start of the fighting; the Confederate army
numbered less than half that figure, at 60,892.[3]
Furthermore, the Union forces were much better supplied and were well-rested after several months of inactivity. Lee's forces, on
the other hand, were scattered all over the state of Virginia. In fact, some 15,000 men of the
Army of Northern Virginia under Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, stationed near
Norfolk dealing with a Federal threat at Suffolk, failed to arrive in time to aid Lee's outmanned forces.
Moreover, the engagement began with a Union battle plan superior to most of the previous efforts by Army of the Potomac
commanders. The army started from its winter quarters around Fredericksburg,
where it faced Lee across the Rappahannock. Hooker planned a bold double envelopment of
Lee's forces, sending four corps on a stealthy march northwest, turning south to cross the
Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, turning east, and striking Lee in his rear. The remaining
corps would strike Lee's front through Fredericksburg. Meanwhile, some 7,500 cavalry under Maj.
Gen. George Stoneman were to raid deep into the Confederate rear areas, destroying
crucial supply depots along the railroad from the Confederate capital in Richmond to
Fredericksburg, which would cut Lee's lines of communication and supply. This bold, aggressive plan was later known as
Stoneman's Raid.
However, despite its superior forces and sound strategy, the Army of the Potomac's lack of competent leadership doomed its
forces, as in earlier campaigns of the war. The superior tactical skills of the Confederate leaders Lee and Jackson won the
day.
On April 27 and April 28, the four corps of the Army of
the Potomac crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers in several places, most of them near the confluence of the two rivers and
the hamlet of Chancellorsville, which was little more than a large mansion,
owned by the Chancellor family, at the junction of the Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road. In the meantime, the second force
of more than 30,000 men, under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, crossed the Rappahannock at
Fredericksburg, and Stoneman's cavalry began its movement to reach Lee's rear areas.
Battle
May 1 – May 2
Chancellorsville battle on May 1 and 2
Confederate Union
By May 1, Hooker had approximately 70,000 men concentrated in and around Chancellorsville,
while Lee worked frantically to concentrate his own army. He confronted Hooker at Chancellorsville with 40,000 men, while on his
right, Maj. Gen. Jubal Early manned Fredericksburg's formidable Marye's Heights
with 12,000 troops, hoping to keep Sedgwick out of Lee's rear. The next day, the Union and Confederate troops clashed on the
Chancellorsville front, with some Union forces actually pushing their way out of the impenetrable thickets and scrub pine that
characterized the area. This was seen by many Union commanders as a key to victory. If the larger Union army fought in the woods,
known as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, its huge advantage in artillery would be
minimized, since artillery could not be used to any great effect in the Wilderness.
However, Hooker had decided before beginning the campaign that he would fight the battle defensively, forcing Lee, with his
small army, to attack his huge one. At the Battle of Fredericksburg, the Union
army had done the attacking and met with a bloody and dreadful defeat. Hooker knew Lee could not take such a defeat and keep an
effective army in the field, so he ordered his men to withdraw back into the Wilderness and take a defensive position around
Chancellorsville, daring Lee to attack him or retreat with superior forces at his back.
Lee accepted Hooker's gambit and planned an attack for May 2. On the night before, Lee and Lt.
Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, came up with a risky plan of attack. They would
split the 40,000-man force at Chancellorsville, with Jackson taking his Second Corps of 28,000 men around to attack the Union right flank. Lee, on the
other hand, would exercise personal command of the other 12,000 (the other half of Longstreet's First
Corps, commanded directly by Lee during the battle) facing Hooker's entire 70,000 man force at Chancellorsville.
For this to work, several things had to happen. First, Jackson had to make a 12-mile (19 km) march via roundabout roads to
reach the Union right, and he had to do it undetected. Second, Lee had to hope that Hooker stayed tamely on the defensive. Third,
Early would have to keep Sedgwick bottled up in Fredericksburg. And when Jackson launched his attack, he had to hope that the
Union forces were unprepared.
Incredibly, all of this happened. Confederate cavalry under Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart
kept the Union forces from spotting Jackson on his long flank march, which took almost all day. The only sighting came shortly
after Jackson's corps disengaged from Union forces south of Chancellorsville, and this worked to the Confederates'
advantage—Hooker thought that his cavalry under Stoneman had cut Lee's supply
line and that Lee was about to retreat. Therefore, he stayed right where he was and never contemplated an all-out attack,
sending only his III Corps of 13,000 men under Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles forward. Sickles captured a handful of Second Corps men and then stopped.
Over at Fredericksburg, Sedgwick and Hooker were unable to communicate with one another because of a failure of telegraph
lines. When Hooker finally got an order to Sedgwick late on the evening of May 2 ordering him to
attack Early, Sedgwick failed to do so because he mistakenly believed Early had more men than he did.
But what led most of all to the impending Union disaster was the incompetent commander of the Union XI Corps, Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Howard, whose 11,000 men
were posted at the far right of the Union line, failed to make any provision for his defense in case of a surprise attack, even
though Hooker ordered him to do so. The Union right flank was not anchored on any natural obstacle, and the only defenses against
a flank attack consisted of two cannons pointing out into the Wilderness. Also, the XI Corps was a poorly trained unit made up
almost entirely of German immigrants, many of whom did not speak English.
At 4:30 p.m., Jackson's 28,000 men came running out of the Wilderness and hit Howard's corps by surprise while most of them
were cooking dinner. More than 4,000 of them were taken prisoner without firing a shot, and most of the remainder were routed.
Only one division of the XI Corps made a stand, and it was soon driven off as well. By nightfall, the Confederate Second Corps
had advanced more than two miles (3 km), to within sight of Chancellorsville, and was separated from Lee's men only by Sickles'
corps, which remained where it had been after attacking that morning. Hooker suffered a minor injury during the peak of the
fighting when a Confederate cannonball hit a wooden pillar he was leaning against at his headquarters. Although practically
incapacitated, Hooker refused to turn over command temporarily to his second-in-command, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch, and this failure affected Union performance over the next day and contributed to
Hooker's lack of nerve and timid performance throughout the rest of the battle.
Both Hooker and Jackson made serious errors that night, and for Jackson, his mistake cost him his life.
Hooker, concerned about Sickles' ability to hold what was now a salient into the Confederate lines, pulled the
III Corps back to Chancellorsville that night. This gave the Confederates two
advantages—it reunited Jackson and Lee's forces, and it gave them control of an elevated clearing in the woods known as Hazel
Grove, one of the few places in which artillery could be used effectively. (Sickles was quite bitter about giving up this high
ground; his insubordinate actions at the Peach Orchard in the Battle of Gettysburg
two months later were probably influenced strongly by this incident.)
Jackson's mistake came when he was scouting ahead of his corps along the Orange Plank Road that night. Having won a huge
victory that day, Jackson wanted to press his advantage before Hooker and his army could regain their bearings and plan a
counterattack, which might still succeed because of the sheer disparity in numbers. He rode out onto the plank road that night,
unrecognized by men of the Second Corps behind him, and was hit by friendly fire. The
wound was not life-threatening, but Jackson contracted pneumonia after his arm was amputated,
and he died on May 10. His death was a devastating loss for the Confederacy.
May 3
Chancellorsville battle on May 3
On May 3, Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill, who had taken command of
the Second Corps following Jackson's injuries, was incapacitated. Hill consulted with Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes, the next most senior general in the corps, and Rodes acquiesced in Hill's decision to
summon J. E. B. Stuart to take command, notifying Lee after the fact. The daring
cavalryman proved to be a fine infantry commander as well. Stuart launched a massive assault
all along the front, aided by Hooker who was withdrawing troops from Hazel Grove, and then set up artillery on the spot to
bombard Union artillerists. Fierce fighting broke out that evening when Stuart launched another massive assault against the Union
lines, which were slowly crumbling from the pressure and a lack of resupply and reinforcements. By that afternoon, the
Confederates had captured Chancellorsville, and Hooker pulled his battered men back to a line of defense circling United States
Ford, their last remaining open line of retreat.
Still, Lee could not declare victory, and Hooker was not conceding defeat either. During the peak of the fighting at
Chancellorsville on May 3, he again called on Sedgwick to break through and attack Lee's rear.
Again that general delayed until it was too late. That afternoon, he finally did attack Early's position (after Early at one
point abandoned it himself thanks to a misinterpreted order from Lee), and broke through. But he did it too late in the day to
help Hooker. In fact, a single brigade of Alabama troops led by Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox staged a delaying action along
the Orange Plank Road west of Fredericksburg and slowed Sedgwick's already-sluggish advance. Reinforcements under Maj. Gen.
Lafayette McLaws arrived from Chancellorsville late in the afternoon and joined Wilcox
at Salem Church, four miles (6 km) west of Fredericksburg, and the combined Confederate force halted Sedgwick's march to
Chancellorsville.
The fighting on May 3, 1863, was some of the most furious
anywhere in the war and would have ranked among the bloodiest battles of the Civil War by itself. About 18,000 men, divided
equally between the two armies, fell that day.
May 4 – May 6
Chancellorsville battle on May 4
On the evening of May 3 and all day May 4, Hooker remained in
his defenses while Lee and Early battled Sedgwick. Sedgwick, after breaking Early's defenses, foolishly neglected to secure
Fredericksburg. Early simply marched back and reoccupied the heights west of the city, cutting Sedgwick off. Meanwhile, Lee
directed the division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson from the Chancellorsville
front and reinforced McLaws before Sedgwick realized just how few men were opposing him. Sedgwick, as it turned out, was as
resolute on the defensive as he was irresolute on the attack, and he stood his ground that day before withdrawing back across the
Rappahannock at Banks's Ford during the pre-dawn hours of May 5. This was another miscommunication
between him and Hooker; the commanding general had wanted Sedgwick to hold Banks's Ford, so that Hooker could withdraw from the
Chancellorsville area and re-cross the river at Banks's to fight again. When he learned that Sedgwick had retreated back over the
river, Hooker felt he was out of options to save the campaign, and on the night of May 5 –
May 6, he also withdrew back across the river.
Aftermath
Confederate dead behind the stone wall of Marye's Heights, Fredericksburg, Virginia, killed during the Battle of
Chancellorsville, May 1863
Stoneman, after a week of ineffectual raiding in central and southern Virginia in which he failed to attack any of the
objectives Hooker set out for him, withdrew into Union lines east of Richmond on May 7, ending the
campaign.
The battle was fought under terrible conditions. Soldiers tended to get lost in the impenetrable maze of undergrowth, and many
fires started during the course of the battle. Reports of wounded men being burned alive were common.
Lee, despite being outnumbered by a ratio of about five to two, won arguably his greatest victory of the war. But he paid a
terrible price for it. With only 52,000 infantry engaged, he suffered more than 13,000 casualties, losing some 25% of his
force—men that the Confederacy, with its limited manpower, could not replace. Just as seriously, he lost several top generals,
most notably Jackson, his most aggressive field commander.
Hooker, who began the campaign believing he had "80 chances in 100 to be successful", lost the battle through
miscommunications, the incompetence of some of his leading generals (most notably Howard and Stoneman, but also Sedgwick), and
through some serious errors of his own. Hooker's errors include abandoning his offensive push on May
1 and ordering Sickles to give up Hazel Grove and pull back on May 2. He also erred in his
disposition of forces; some 40,000 men of the Army of the Potomac scarcely fired a shot. When later asked why he had ordered a
halt to his advance on May 1, Hooker responded, "For the first time, I lost faith in Hooker."
Of the 90,000 Union men who bore the brunt of the fighting, just over 17,000 fell in battle, a casualty rate much lower than
Lee's, and this without taking into account the 4,000 men of the XI Corps who were
captured without a fight in the initial panic on May 2. Hooker's tactic of forcing Lee to attack
him was clearly sound in concept, but it was terribly flawed in the way he and his subordinates implemented it. The actual
fighting showed the Union army had become as formidable in battle as Lee's heretofore unbeatable legions.
The Union was shocked by the defeat. President Abraham Lincoln was quoted as saying,
"My God! My God! What will the country say?" A few generals were career casualties. Hooker relieved Stoneman for incompetence.
Couch was so disgusted by Hooker's conduct of the battle (and his incessant political maneuvering) that he resigned and was
placed in charge of the Pennsylvania militia. Hooker was
relieved of command on June 28, just before the Battle of
Gettysburg.
The Battle of Chancellorsville, along with the May 1864 Battle of the
Wilderness fought nearby, formed the basis for Stephen Crane's 1895 novel
The Red Badge of Courage.
Portions of the Chancellorsville battlefield are now preserved as part of Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park.
See also
References
- Dupuy, R. Ernest, Dupuy, Trevor N., and Braim, Paul F., Military Heritage of America, McGraw-Hill, 1956, ISBN
0-8403-8225-1.
- Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War, Simon & Schuster, 2001, ISBN
0-684-84944-5.
- Esposito, Vincent J., West Point Atlas of American Wars, Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
- Foote, Shelby, The Civil War, A Narrative: Fredericksburg to Meridian, Random
House, 1958, ISBN 0-394-49517-9.
- Sears, Stephen W., Chancellorsville, Houghton Mifflin, 1996, ISBN 0-395-87744-X.
- National Park Service battle
description
Notes
- ^ a b Eicher, p. 488. Casualties cited are for the full campaign.
- ^ Dupuy, p. 261.
- ^ Eicher, p. 475
Further reading
- Dodge, Theodore A., The Campaign of
Chancellorsville, 1881, Project Gutenberg.
- Furgurson, Ernest B., Chancellorsville 1863, The Souls of the Brave, Knopf, 1992, ISBN 0-394-58301-9.
External links
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