Pearl Harbor

General of Army under Gen Dwight (Ike) Eisenhower.

He served under Patton during North Africa and Sicily and during the Sicily Campaign he developed a hatred of British General Bernard Montgomery. The Allied Commander for the Sicily campaign, Harold Alexander, had made no strategic plans for the invasion whatsoever and Montgomery was frustrated with him for it and took matters into his own hands by "suggesting" the direction the campaign would go. Alexander, who never visited the front, agreed with what Monty wanted without knowing how the battle was going and force Bradley to rearrange his advance in Monty's favor and this, Bradley remained bitter about to his dying days.

During the Normandy Campaign Bradley served under Bernard Montgomery who was the Allied Ground Forces Commander. In this campaign Bradley commanded the only active America Army while British General Miles Dempsey commanded the British/Commonwealth army under the direction of Montgomery. Bradley's objectives in this campaign was to succor the hold on the beaches, expand his across the Cherbourg Peninsular (take Cherbourg is possible) and once established on his front he was to create a break through. That being done George Patton's Army would be activated to exploit that opening. While this was happened Miles Dempsey was to advance on and past on Caen (taken that as soon as possible) and threaten the German right flank so as to draw the bulk of the German forces in Normandy against the British/Commonwealth forces and write them off as a threat to the Americans and thus ease the was out for them. This is, generally speaking on a strategic level, what happened, tactics changed but the strategy remain successful.

During the Normandy Campaign Bradley enjoyed working under Montgomery. He was allowed as much freedom as he wanted and was given crucial direction when the situation require it from his superior. He wrote later that Montgomery was as good a commanding officer as he could ever hope to have served under. However this was a minor period of good-will on Bradley's part to the British General as this would soon change after affairs in Normandy were over.

After the break out from the beaches had occurred Bradley sent some of his force off to Brittany to take the German held ports there while using the rest of his force to pressure the Germans in the Falaise region. Montgomery express the utmost importance of closing the Falaise Gap at either Argentan of further East at the Seine and pushed his British and Canadian and Polish and Commonwealth forces hard to close the Gap from the north and order Bradley to do the same (Bradley having then been activated as the top American field commander in the West). Patton pressed Bradley to be allowed to close the Gap but Bradley, without consulting or even informing Montgomery, ordered Patton to go no further than Argentan as he fear both friendly fire could occur and that Patton wasn't cut out to fight the Germans. As a result Bradley became responsible to the failure to completely close the Falaise Gap and he subsequently (to his credit) accepted responsibility for it.

While the defeat of the Germans in Normandy General Dwight D. Eisenhower was activated as the top Allied Field Commander but he took the job with no established plan to exploit the victory. He was presented with two plans, one from Montgomery and one from Bradley/Patton.

Montgomery's plan was to keep the Allies together as one massive army, move North and succour the Channel Ports, Belgium and the Lowlands, build a strong Air presence in Norther Europe and strike into the Ruhr and Germany from the north. Montgomery also felt Eisenhower wasn't up for the job of field commander and needed a permanent Ground Forces Commander, he would have liked the job himself but it was more the principal of the thing that the desire for the power. He felt so strongly about these things that he told Eisenhower that he would willingly serve under Bradley if it meant his plan was employed and a permanent Ground Forces Commander was in place.

The Bradley/Patton plan was the split the Allies between American and British/Commonwealth forces and strike for different Tactical Target. In this plan the British/Commonwealth forces would advance along the Northern route alone, capture the channel ports and clear Belgium and the Lowlands before entering Germany from there while Bradley would take his Army group directly East aiming for Frankfurt, and capturing the rest of Europe along the way and Patton would aim for Metz and the Saar and enter Germany from there. Bradley proposed this however not because it was the best way to continue the conflict but because of nationalistic sentiments. He and Patton had had enough of serving alongside Brits and their Commonwealth and wanted a purely American Victory of while the British could claim no part of and to ensure they got this they were prepared to play up the effect of Political considerations to Eisenhower.

Eisenhower, in an attempt to please everyone, compromised and permitted Courtney Hodge's Army to go with Monty North while Bradley and Patton went East. Bradley complained bitterly that Montgomery didn't need the extra manpower and that Hodge's could be better used else where and eventually got his way once Belgium was succor and Antwerp was in the process of being taken. He was either wrong or deliberately lying in his assessment of Montgomery's strength as the British/Commonwealth forces were drastically undermanned for the task assigned to them.

Bradley proceeded to spent the next few week indulging Patton's gung-ho mentality and making deals to support Montgomery with Hodges' before changing his mind and sending Hodges forces south and preventing cooperation between British and American forces near Aachen. Eisenhower at his HQ at the Cherbourg Peninsular was too out of touch to change anything.

When Bradley learnt of the decision of Eisenhower to support MARKET GARDEN and give Montgomery support he flew in to meet Montgomery and came to an agreement with the British Field Marshal to support him but then upon returning to his own HQ he pressed his advance forward, encouraged Patton to press further forward on the right and sent Eisenhower a message saying that there was no need to halt the American offensive to support Montgomery. In this he was lying and deliberately trying to sabotage Montgomery's offensive out of pure spite and National chauvinism. He was applauded in doing so by most of his staff and by Patton who claimed that Bradley was representing "American Interest" and Eisenhower, like the weak willed field commander he was, caved in to Bradley again.

When Montgomery became aware that Eisenhower was permitting the American forces to continue despite promising to give Montgomery's offensive priority and support (none of which was forthcoming) he sent Eisenhower a message saying that if the Americans were going to press on anyway then MARKET GARDEN should be scrapped and the British/Commonwealth forces would deal with things at a slower pace. There was no capacity in the Allied camp, Monty argued for and offensive over 230 miles wide and if his offensive could not be supported then it would be better to scrap it all together. Unfortunately Eisenhower received this message after the Airborne troops had left to start MARKET GARDEN and it was too late to call the offensive off.

At the Battle of the Bulge Bradley had stations his HQ far to far south and refused to believe any reports that the Germans were planning a counter offensive and so when the attack came he found himself cut off from the Northern sector of his Army Group and out of touch. Without his guidance the battle in the North deteriorated into chaos and Hodges almost suffered a nervous breakdown but Bradley had locked himself away in his HQ and refused to emerge as he felt himself the target for an assassination attempt.

Eisenhower, in what was one of his finest hours as a field commander, recognized the chaos the North and descended into and after feeling out the situation with his staff officers he knew something had to be done a Hodges alone could not change the situation. He contacted Bradley but received no words of reassurance. At that moment Eisenhower's Chief of Staff Walter Bedel Smith suggesting putting Montgomery in temporary command of the North.

Montgomery had been watching the development of the battle with great interest and had pulled a large contingent of his own forces out of the line and formed them into a reserve behind the American forces in the North so as to be able to prevent a German victory should they get through the American lines. He met Bedel Smith when Smith had come up to the front and discussed the situation with him and expressed the urgency in which the situation should be resolved. He suggested that he be given command the Northern American forces until the situation was resolved and Smith agreed without hesitation as he had already resolved to suggest this to Eisenhower.

Eisenhower, having received no reassurance from Bradley placed Montgomery in command of the Northern American forces with immediate effect and phones Bradley with the news. Bradley tried desperately to get Eisenhower to reconsiders, even suggesting that he could control the battle from the south by telephone, but Eisenhower could not be swayed and for once told Bradley that he wasn't going to get his own way. Bradley hardly influenced the battle at all and in truth had pretty much lost control and needed Montgomery and Patton to come to his rescue but nevertheless he hated Eisenhower for the rest of his life for putting Monty in charge in the north and gained an even greater hatred of Montgomery for it as well.

Bradley was saved an examination into his dismal performance at the Bulge because of Monty's press conference after the battle which was poorly delivered and taken entirely in the wrong context. Americans believed Monty was trying to take credit for the victory when in truth he was trying to take pressure off of Eisenhower from the British press by supporting him but Bradley and Patton in particular to great offense to the way he delivered the interview and to what wasn't said and raised enough of a stink about it that it almost got Monty sacked. This event overshadowed Bradley dismal display.

To quieten Bradley descent Eisenhower got him promoted so not only did Bradley not face an inquiry to his poor performance and refusal to exercise command he got promoted.

During the rest of the European Campaign Bradley exercise barely concealed hatred fro Montgomery and contempt for Eisenhower. When ordered to slow his advance so that the Rhine crossing could be undertaker in the North Bradley disobeyed and pushed on, spurred on by Patton, and luckily found an undemolished Bridge with which to cross.

He was a good and steady general. He had no moments of genius or inspiration and was often blinded by his Americanophilic and Anglophobic beliefs which lead him to pursue roads of personal and national glory rather than what was the correct route for swift victory. He was a bitter and petty man and never forgave a slight against him, no matter how small it may have been, he relieved subordinates because he didn't like them or their lifestyle regardless of whether they did their job well or not. He disobeyed direct orders and ignored strategic or tactical objective/plans if he felt they didn't serve him or his army all that well. His greatest flaw in the Allied camp was that he would never consent to anything that would help Montgomery regardless of whether helping Montgomery would shorten the war or not.

it got the US join the war

It caused the Americans to live in fear that the Japanese were going to attck the heart of their country, it also changed the lives of The Japanese significantly.