• Appeasement allowed the British and French to ignore an imminent threat and produced a fake peace which led to many deaths.
• Appeasement bought Britain the precious time it needed to prepare for an inevitable war.

• Appeasement led Hitler to believe that no one would oppose his expansionist policies. In short, if Europe had abandoned its appeasement policy by 1935 WWII probably could have been averted.

• Britain, already economicaly damaged and knowing that a war was impossible to avoid, tried to buy vital time. She had stepped up production ao arms but was still unable to realistically fight another great war in a quarter of a century. What Chamberlain brought back from his talks was time and it proved the balance between winning an unprovoked war.

• England under the premiership of Chamberlain, I believe, made the correct deision to appease Germany, a weakend, abused country deeply buried in debt after its ill-treatment in a post treaty of Versailles Europe. Slowly climbing out of debt, England had not the economy, or gun power to rsk and survive an all-out war with any country. Chamberlain also upheld beliefs about peace and felt that diplomacy, not mindless slaughter, was the answer in dealing with a responsible leader, as Hitler was to his German people. (Jews and other minorities were not threatened at the time.) Hitler was not the epitomy of evil, and should not have been treated as such, at that time.

• The policy of appeasement used by Neville Chamberlain, while intended to preserve the peace, hindered the Allies and help Germany when WWII broke out. Letting Germany increase its navy, army, and air force, reoccupy the Rhineland, and give it the Czech Sudatenland all helped to strengthen the German postition in Europe. It would lead to Germany taking over most of Europe with relative ease in a matter of months.

• Appeasement refers to the foreign policy of England and France toward Germany in the years prior to WWII. They let Hitler rebuild the German army and navy, occupy the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. If they had put up a fight at the beginning, perhaps Hitler would not have kept pushing until the situation turned into a World War. Or maybe not.

• Originally Appeasement was a positive concept, it had started in 1919 after the Treaty of Versailles. During the 1920's Britain had control however by 1930's Hitler had seized the intiative. Appeasement was apopulare concept especially among British policy, there were several reasons as to why Neville Chamberlain favoured this policy- people in Britain during the early 1930's had voted against war and favoured collective security, this could also be down the economic problems that had arised after the Great Depression such as high unemployment which the treasury had wanted to improve rather than muntions armament. Due to the econonmic problems this led to military weakness as the country virtually had no airforce and the navy was insufficient as was the army. In light of all these problems Neville Chamberlain had seen the effects of Hitler and the Nazis however he had believed that by getting Hitler to sign compromise documents that this would successfully bind Hitler into keeping his promises. Was Chamberlain naive? Chamberlain persisted with appeasement well after it had been crushed i.e. the Czech Crisis. However in doing so he had stepped up rearmament to give him more time. So did Hitler take advantage of Chamberlain's naivity? Subject to evidence it can be almost certain to say the answer is yes, the evidence is seen clearly right from the remilitiarization of the Rhineland up to the Munich Conference. Historians say that Chamberlain appeased Hitler in order to avoid war, others say that he was propelling Europe into war by basically allowing Hitler to do as he pleased. As Hitler prepared fo invasion of Poland, Chamberlain had no choice but to issue an ultimatum to Hitler over Poland- invade Poland and risk war with Britain or step back from Poland and reintroduce peace? Hitler did not think that Britain would go through with its 'ultimatum' so invaded Poland sept 1939. Had Britain and France resisted German aggression world war II might not have broken out.

2. In 1933, when Hitler came to power, the official British policy was multilateral disarmament and talks were in progress to try to achieve this. Britain and France were caught out at the time.

3. It's not clear how well informed Baldwin and Chamberlain really were about the intentions of the Nazi regime.

4. The ultimate irony is that in many respects the policy of appeasement continued well into WWII. Britain and an even more reluctant France declared war on Germany supposedly in order to uphold Polish sovereignty - but did absolutely nothing to give any practical assistance to Poland. Viewed coldly, the declaration of war in 1939 bears the hallmarks of grandstanding, of an empty gesture. In many ways it was a barely rational act ... Among some British grandees there was talk of making peace - until the Nazis bombed civilian areas of London in September 1940.

5. Britain never had much influence in Eastern Central Europe. It was an area where Britain could only have acted by proxy.

6. There's a widespread belief that all Britain needed was to "do something", but very few are realistic about what that something should have been. A thunderous roar of condemnation (for example, in 1935 or 1936) might well have strengthened, not weakened Hitler, as Germans would have rallied round. A few minutes with a good atlas of Europe should make it clear that Britain would have had to act *through France*. In the mid and late 1930s France was bitterly divided into Left and Right and not well placed to take decisive action, as the events of 1940 made very clear.

7. Although Britain had a vast empire at the time it was rather weak in Europe.

8. As for Chamberlain being 'naive', people seem to think that politicians operate in a vacuum, which is not the case. Chamberlain had become Prime Minister in May 1937 and inherited a very difficult situation. Moreover, Britain was (and is) a democracy, and fighting a major war without broad support is very foolish.

Appeasement gave Germany and other Axis powers an opportunity to build strength before attacking the rest of Europe.

[It also gave Britain more time, too.]

If a destroyer could engage the attacker, well and good, but the safety of the convoy was of over riding importance. Often the ships of a convoy would be out of sight of each other - they just followed a communal sailing pattern.

The significance of the system is simple: groups are easier to protect that those alone. As the number of defenseless civilian cargo ships greatly outnumber that of potential protecting warships, it is more effective to group those cargo ships together and protect them as a group.

That is, if each cargo ship travelled independently, and the warships attempted to individually patrol the shipping lanes, hunting for U-Boats, then the following would happen:

• Every time a U-Boat discovered a cargo ship, the cargo ship would be sunk.
• If a U-Boat came upon a warship, it would generally flee. Few U-Boats would be sunk.
• It would be modestly easy for a U-Boat to find a cargo ship, as the shipping lanes were well known, and all the U-Boats had to do would be lie in wait for one to come along
• Warships would have a very difficult time finding U-Boats, because the U-Boats were far fewer in numbers than cargo ships, and the shipping lanes were vast areas.
• The result is that the vast majority of U-boat attacks could be done safely (for the U-Boat), with very few chances for the warships to sink a U-Boat.

When putting several dozen cargo ships in a group, and protecting them with 10 or so warships, the following would happen:

• U-Boats would be forced to attack convoys, as there were no other targets
• When attacking a convoy, the U-Boat would have to expose itself to detection; since there were warships with the convoy, they would then automatically have a chance to sink the U-Boat.
• Thus, U-Boat attacks always ran the risk to the U-Boat of being sunk
• When U-Boats attacked convoys, they would be forced to fight the warships, giving valuable time to the cargo ships to flee the area. Thus, the total amount of "exposed" time would be significantly lower

Overall, the convoy system did two things: it lowered the loss of cargo ships to U-Boat attacks, and it significantly increased the losses to the U-Boat force, which in turn reinforced the first effect.

Overall, prior to the convoy system being put into place in both WW1 and WW2, the U-boats were winning very significantly - cargo ship losses were atrocious (well above replacement capabilities, and critically impacting delivery of desperately needed war material and food), and the U-Boats had few losses. After the convoy systems were put into effect, cargo ship losses were reduced to acceptable levels - while significant, the losses were not so much as to exceed replacement construction or endanger delivery of enough material. U-Boat losses after the convoy systems started, however, became exorbitant, and eventually unsustainable.

This made all the difference in both WW1 and WW2 for Great Britain. In both wars, prior to the convoy system being used, the UK was in critical danger of being starved into submission, or, at the very least, being rendered militarily impotent due to the strangulation of its ocean trade, which the UK depended on to survive. After the convoy system was implemented, the UK was able to resupply sufficiently to regain its fighting strength and make a war-winning contribution.

For an opposite situation, Japan in WW2 never bothered to implement a convoy system, allowing the US Pacific submarine force to virtually annihilate Japanese shipping by the end of the war, with devastating effects on the Japanese industrial output.

For comparison: in WW2, by the end of the war, allied shipping losses in the Atlantic accounted for about half of the pre-war total available ships, but less than a quarter when taking into account all mid-war ship construction. Almost 75% of the losses to allied shipping were in the pre-convoy days. On the other side, roughly 75% of all U-Boats (both pre-war and constructed) were lost, with most of the losses in the post-convoy days.

In the Pacific, the Japanese merchant marine lost close to 95% of all ships it had or built, while the US Submarine force lost roughly 18% of its subs. No convoy system was ever used by the Japanese for merchant ship protection.

The end result is that the convoy system saved Great Britain (not once, but twice).

RAAF: Royal Australian Air Force.
RAAF: Roswell Army Air Field (more commonly 'Roswell AAF')

Another possibility, with similar pronunciation but different spelling and meaning:

• For more information, see Related links below.

Britain had three Prime Ministers during World War 2. The first was Neville Chamberlain who attempted initially to appease Hitler to prevent a second world war. However Hitler invaded Poland in September, 1939 which prompted Chamberlain to declare war on Germany.

Following the failed Norwegian campaign against Germany, Chamberlain resigned as Prime Minister, and was replaced on the 10th of May, 1940 by Winston Churchill. The European war finished on the 8th of May 1945 when the allies declared VE day (the surrender itself having been signed on the previous day).

Churchill remained Prime Minister until the 27th of July, 1945, when he was replaced by Clement Attlee after Labour won a landslide election victory.

On the 14th of August 1945, Japan agreed to surrender and ultimately signed the surrender papers on the 2nd of September 1945, marking V-J Day and the end of World War 2.

Clement Attlee remained as Prime Minister until the 26th of October 1951 when he was replaced by a re-elected Conservative party led by Winston Churchill.
The priminster from ww2 is , Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain , Neville Chamberlain came out of office 2 weeks after England commit ed war on Germany , then Winston Churchill came in .