Discrimination

If you are called a "cracker", it's likely due to you being white, referring to whip cracker or cracking a whip against black slaves. The reason why a person would be called that is because the person making the claim is probably ignorant, and views all whites the same.

However, if you are "crackers" you are considered crazy, and the reason to be call that is someone making a claim that you are cracking up.

Many cases fall within the scope of this question. Buchanan v. Warley, (1917), was the first instance in which the Supreme Court declared a specific policy of residential segregation unconstitutional; however, Jones v. Mayer, (1968), may come closest to a formal court declaration outlawing racial segregation in housing altogether (although the decision was based on federal, not constitutional, law). Shelley v. Kraemer, (1948) is considered a landmark case because it prohibited courts from awarding monetary damages against people violating restrictive covenants by selling their homes to non-whites, removing a powerful legal weapon from those who hoped to continue segregation practices. The Court did not simultaneously rule private covenants, themselves, unconstitutional. Unfortunately, there is no US Supreme Court housing case comparable in magnitude to the impact of Brown v. Board of Education, (1954) on civil rights.

Most forms of racial discrimination were outlawed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and subsequent legislation, leaving the federal courts to interpret the laws and determine who has standing to seek adjudicative relief, rather than pass judgment on segregated housing as a whole. This form of discrimination has been so pervasive and insidious, every time the Supreme Court rules one action unconstitutional or in violation of federal law, someone devises a way around the ruling.

Housing discrimination is still being tried in the courts, but most cases are handled by the lower courts without additional input from the US Supreme Court because supporting legislation has largely matured (not because the Supreme Court fails to recognize the egregiousness of discrimination).

The following cases are some of the better known, to date:

Buchanan v. Warley, 245 US 60 (1917) 
The Court unanimously struck down a Louisville, KY, municipal ordinance that required residential segregation by race. The law prohibited blacks or whites from living on blocks where members of one race occupied the majority of homes. The Court struck down the statute because it destroyed the right of the individual to acquire, enjoy and dispose of his property, which right is protected by the 14th Amendment. (While this set a valuable legal precedent, developers and homeowner associations circumvented the law by setting up association-based restrictive covenants.) 


Harmon v. Tyler, 273 US 688 (1927) 
Based on the precedent set in Buchanan v. Warley (above) the Supreme Court held that cities could not segregate housing by denying building permits to African-Americans who wanted to construct a home in a "white" neighborhood.

Hansberry v. Lee, 311 US 32 (1940)

Rejected a restrictive covenant prohibiting African-Americans from living in the exclusive "white" suburb of Hyde Park, Chicago, on the basis of a technicality, but did not render all restrictive covenants illegal.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948)

Held that courts could not enforce in equity (allow monetary damages) restrictive covenants banning African-Americans and Asians (or other legally defined minorities) from purchasing a home or living in any neighborhood. Held that private restrictive covenants were not necessarily a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that they could not be legally enforced. In other words, the Court declined to impose constitutional restrictions on private individuals. This is still considered a landmark case.

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 US 249 (1953)

Pursuant to Shelley v. Kraemer, (1948), upheld a state court decision forbidding use of race-based restrictive covenants from being used to recover monetary damages from a party in breach of the covenant. Also ruled that an individual has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the practice without being personally damaged, because the rule to deny standing is outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights of an entire class.

Jones v. Mayer, 392 US 409 (1968)

Decision based on Title 42 of federal law (42 USC § 1982) that stated: "all citizens shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." Reversed lower court rulings that housing discrimination laws applied only to government entities, and did not reach private parties, and held that refusing to sell or rent property to otherwise qualified African-Americans (or any non-whites) was unconstitutional. Applied the Thirteenth Amendment right of Congress to pass civil rights laws that are enforceable against private individuals.

Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,409 US 205 (1972)

Held that tenants of an apartment community that practiced racial discrimination against non-whites had standing to bring suit against the landlord, despite their unusual status of not being denied housing. The tenants "claimed they had been injured in that (1) they had lost the social benefits of living in an integrated community; (2) they had missed business and professional advantages which would have accrued if they had lived with members of minority groups; (3) they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage in social, business, and professional activities from being "stigmatized" as residents of a "white ghetto." Determined that a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 USC § 3610 (a)) must be broadly interpreted to allow standing to bring suit in federal court for any person aggrieved by discriminatory housing practices, not just those denied housing.

Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91 (1979)

Pursuant to Trafficante, held that residents of an integrated neighborhood and the town itself had standing to file for injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief against real estate companies and their agents who were engaged in the practice of "steering" (creating de facto segregation by selecting which houses to show a client based on his or her race) white clients away from and African-American clients toward a twelve- to thirteen-block square integrated neighborhood, in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.