Nuclear Weapons

The nuclear bomb was invented when it became known that Nazi Germany was actively experimenting with nuclear material to build a possible bomb. Albert Eienstein urged President Roosvelt via a letter signed by him that he the president seriously commence a project to build a nuclear bomb. The project was code named "Manhattan Project". Eventually, some of the same scientist that were in Germany were brought to US where with their help the first bomb was tested. I believe the site is known as Trinity, New Mexico.

besides this facts, Einstein left Germany when he saw the military type regime in schools on time not to fall in the hands of the nazi.

Leo Szilard invented the nuclear reactor and nuclear bomb in London in 1933, shortly after the neutron was discovered as an improved source of neutrons for experiments. He was also very aware of their potential destructive effects. He was not able to build either at the time because of lack of a suitable material.

Otto Frisch discovered that Uranium-235 fissioned when hit by a neutron, producing an excess of neutrons in Berlin in 1938. This was the first material found that made Szilard's invention practical, but it is a very rare isotope and expensive to concentrate.

Szilard wrote the letter to FDR in 1942, but had Einstein sign it because his name and reputation were well known. Had Szilard signed it himself FDR might not have seen the significance and done nothing!

Enrico Fermi built the first nuclear reactor in Chicago, IL in 1942. It had a peak operating power of half a watt.

Los Alamos labs built the first nuclear bomb in Los Alamos, NM in 1945. It was tested at Trinity site, NM on July 16, 1945 with a yield of about 20KTons of TNT.

This is an extremely difficult question to answer, from any number of positions (practical, political, moral, military, and even philosophical).

To determine a plausible framework for discussing this question, we first must look at what has come before: that is, when looking at whether to ban nukes, we should see what other weapons are banned, and why, then try to see if nuclear weapons have some analogous reasoning applicable to them.

The Hague Conventions, several of the Geneva Conventions, Ottawa Treaty (Landmines), and Convention on Cluster Bombs have generally banned several types of weapons right now (specifically, we're talking about weapons whose USE has been banned): explosive bullets, chemical weapons, biological weapons, toxin weapons, weapons causing fragments no detectable by X-Rays, blinding lasers, certain incendiary weapons, "stupid" anti-personnel landmines, and small-scale cluster weapons.

Looking at what we have banned so far, there seems to be several characteristics which lead to a weapon's banning. All of the weapons above have at least one of the following characteristics (and, many have more than one):

• Infliction of excessively painful wounds, beyond that necessary for incapacitation.
• The military utility is significantly less than the threat to nearby civilians
• Their effect is to cause permanent, rather than temporary, injury.
• Use causes indiscriminate damage, death, or injury not reasonably controllable or targetable by the weapon's user
• Injury to civilian populations is likely to occur long after their military use

In addition, and unstated, but nonetheless very important aspect of banning a weapon is that other more "humane" weapons are available to perform a similar (though not identical) function. For example: regular solid bullets instead of explosive ones, mass bombing or artillery instead of chemical or biological weapons, and "smart" (e.g. time deactivated, or command-detonated only) landmines rather than "stupid" ones. That is, humanity seems to be OK with banning weapons which are generally not unique in their utility.

Looking at the above criteria, we can see that nuclear weapons certainly have the following characteristics which are similar to certain banned weapons:

• Indiscriminate effects (inability of the user to reasonably restrict effects to military targets when civilian ones are in the vicinity) - compare to chemical or toxin weapons
• After effects of the nuke's use linger for a substantial time and are difficult to neutralize - compare to biological weapons or landmines
• Injuries are commonly permanent in nature, and many are disfiguring or severely painful - compare to incendiary or chemical weapons

However, the first case above also applies to very-large-scale conventional weapons, and is more a matter of size than anything else (which, nonetheless, is important to consider). The second case is also signficantly less important than originally thought - residual radiation left by nuclear weapons is very short-term, and what does remain as long-term radiation has been shown to be much less harmful than expected (indeed, many experts now discount any real long-term impact of radiation in the immediate vicinity). However, fallout is still a huge problem, so while long-term effects nearby the nuclear explosion are unlikely to be noticeable around the detonation zone, fallout contamination can very likely impact a huge area outside the target zone.

Overall, there does seem to be a real good argument for the banning of nuclear weapons, based on historical precedents. However, there is a major, practical reason they aren't right now: they are currently the weapon of last resort, one which no other weapon can take the place of.

That is, nuclear weapons provide a failsafe, and a check on those acting in bad faith with respect to abiding by weapons ban. Should nuclear weapons themselves be banned, there will be very significant pressure on nations to secretly "cheat" and eventually to use banned weapons, particularly other weapons of mass destruction. To put it more clearly, if nuclear weapons are banned, then there is a very big advantage to be had by one nation into secretly creating chemical, biological, toxin, or even nuclear weapons, and then use them, as the military advantage of being the ONLY user of such a weapon far outweighs any sanction other nations may impose.

Until some mechanism can be developed to remove the cheating incentive, the utility of nuclear weapons as a weapon of last resort will remain, and indeed, be sorely needed.

Sadly, for now, I'd say that nuclear weapons cannot be banned.

All weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological, ... etc) should be banned and eliminated completely. All faiths and religions ban mass destruction weapons. How do you allow a military force to use a weapon of mass destruction that kills children, women, old people, and animals that have no choice and never participated in a war? How do you allow use of weapons of mass destruction that destroys in moments hundreds and thousands of homes, plants, factories, and institutions? There is no logic; in our civilized world; in using weapons of mass destruction in any war.

Per human rights and peace arguments, all weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons should be banned and eliminated.

Date of first bombing: August 6, 1945

In April and May 1945, Japan made three attempts through neutral Sweden and Portugal to bring the war to a peaceful end. On April 7, acting Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu met with Swedish ambassador Widon Bagge in Tokyo, asking him "to ascertain what peace terms the United States and Britain had in mind." But he emphasized that unconditional surrender was unacceptable, and that "the Emperor must not be touched." Bagge relayed the message to the United States, but Secretary of State Stettinius told the US Ambassador in Sweden to "show no interest or take any initiative in pursuit of the matter." Similar Japanese peace signals through Portugal, on May 7, and again through Sweden, on the 10th, proved similarly fruitless.
By mid-June, six members of Japan's Supreme War Council had secretly charged Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo with the task of approaching Soviet Russia's leaders "with a view to terminating the war if possible by September." On June 22 the Emperor called a meeting of the Supreme War Council, which included the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the leading military figures. "We have heard enough of this determination of yours to fight to the last soldiers," said Emperor Hirohito. "We wish that you, leaders of Japan, will strive now to study the ways and the means to conclude the war. In doing so, try not to be bound by the decisions you have made in the past."
By early July the US had intercepted messages from Togo to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato, showing that the Emperor himself was taking a personal hand in the peace effort, and had directed that the Soviet Union be asked to help end the war. US officials also knew that the key obstacle to ending the war was American insistence on "unconditional surrender," a demand that precluded any negotiations. The Japanese were willing to accept nearly everything, except turning over their semi-divine Emperor. Heir of a 2,600-year-old dynasty, Hirohito was regarded by his people as a "living god" who personified the nation. (Until the August 15 radio broadcast of his surrender announcement, the Japanese people had never heard his voice.) Japanese particularly feared that the Americans would humiliate the Emperor, and even execute him as a war criminal.
On July 12, Hirohito summoned Fumimaro Konoye, who had served as prime minister in 1940-41. Explaining that "it will be necessary to terminate the war without delay," the Emperor said that he wished Konoye to secure peace with the Americans and British through the Soviets. As Prince Konoye later recalled, the Emperor instructed him "to secure peace at any price, notwithstanding its severity."
The next day, July 13, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo wired ambassador Naotake Sato in Moscow: "See [Soviet foreign minister] Molotov before his departure for Potsdam ... Convey His Majesty's strong desire to secure a termination of the war ... Unconditional surrender is the only obstacle to peace ..."
On July 17, another intercepted Japanese message revealed that although Japan's leaders felt that the unconditional surrender formula involved an unacceptable dishonor, they were convinced that "the demands of the times" made Soviet mediation to terminate the war absolutely essential. Further diplomatic messages indicated that the only condition asked by the Japanese was preservation of "our form of government." The only "difficult point," a July 25 message disclosed, "is the ... formality of unconditional surrender."
Summarizing the messages between Togo and Sato, US naval intelligence said that Japan's leaders, "though still balking at the term unconditional surrender," recognized that the war was lost, and had reached the point where they have "no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the [1941] Atlantic Charter." These messages, said Assistant Secretary of the Navy Lewis Strauss, "indeed stipulated only that the integrity of the Japanese Royal Family be preserved."
Navy Secretary James Forrestal termed the intercepted messages "real evidence of a Japanese desire to get out of the war." "With the interception of these messages," notes historian Alperovitz (p. 177), "there could no longer be any real doubt as to the Japanese intentions; the maneuvers were overt and explicit and, most of all, official acts. Koichi Kido, Japan's Lord Privy Seal and a close advisor to the Emperor, later affirmed: "Our decision to seek a way out of this war, was made in early June before any atomic bomb had been dropped and Russia had not entered the war. It was already our decision."
In spite of this, on July 26 the leaders of the United States and Britain issued the Potsdam declaration, which included this grim ultimatum: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces and to provide proper and adequate assurance of good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."
Commenting on this draconian either-or proclamation, British historian J.F.C. Fuller wrote: "Not a word was said about the Emperor, because it would be unacceptable to the propaganda-fed American masses." (A Military History of the Western World [1987], p. 675.)
America's leaders understood Japan's desperate position: the Japanese were willing to end the war on any terms, as long as the Emperor was not molested. If the US leadership had not insisted on unconditional surrender -- that is, if they had made clear a willingness to permit the Emperor to remain in place -- the Japanese very likely would have surrendered immediately, thus saving many thousands of lives.
The sad irony is that, as it actually turned out, the American leaders decided anyway to retain the Emperor as a symbol of authority and continuity. They realized, correctly, that Hirohito was useful as a figurehead prop for their own occupation authority in postwar Japan.
On August 6, 1945, the world dramatically entered the atomic age: without either warning or precedent, an American plane dropped a single nuclear bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The explosion utterly destroyed more than four square miles of the city center. About 90,000 people were killed immediately; another 40,000 were injured, many of whom died in protracted agony from radiation sickness. Three days later, a second atomic strike on the city of Nagasaki killed some 37,000 people and injured another 43,000. Together the two bombs eventually killed an estimated 200,000 Japanese civilians.

Source: Weber, Mark "Was Hiroshima Necessary? Why the Atomic Bombings could have been avoided" The Journal of Historical Review, May-June 1997 (Vol. 16, No. 3), pages 4-11.

Blast radius (and other effects) varies with:

• yield
• burst height/depth
• terrain
• if subsurface, the material around the burst
• inversion layer present or absent
• etc.

Using my Nuclear Weapon Effects circular sliderule, assuming distance for 1 psi maximum overpressure as "blast radius":

A 1 KTon yield at optimum burst height on flat terrain: 1.35 miles.

A 1 KTon yield surface burst on flat terrain: 0.75 miles.

A 20 KTon yield at optimum burst height on flat terrain: 3.64 miles.

A 20 KTon yield surface burst on flat terrain: 2.00 miles.

A 10 MTon yield at optimum burst height on flat terrain: 29 miles.

A 10 MTon yield surface burst on flat terrain: 15.8 miles.

1 psi maximum overpressure was selected because structural damage to buildings due to blast wave and wind is minor, however glass, plaster, etc. damage will be much further out.

Except for thermal burns, most immediate radiation effects are also contained within this radius.